福音的預備 第 15 章 第 5/5 段

Aristotle holds that the part of the world beneath the moon is subject to change, and it is in this part that terrestrial things decay.

From what is the world nourished? Aristotle says: if the world were nourished, it would also perish; but in fact it needs no nourishment whatsoever, and for this reason it is also eternal.

Plato holds that the world provides itself with its own nourishment out of that which perishes through change.

Philolaus holds that destruction is twofold: at one time from fire flowing down from heaven, at another from water poured forth from the moon through the revolution of the air; and that the exhalations of these are the nourishment of the world.

From what element did God first begin to form the world? The natural philosophers say that the generation of the world began from earth, as from a center, for the center is the starting-point of a sphere.

Pythagoras holds that it began from fire and the fifth element.

Empedocles holds that the aether was first separated out, second the fire, and after this the earth; and that from the earth, being violently compressed by the rush of the sphere's motion, water gushed forth, and from the water the air was exhaled; and that heaven came to be from the aether, and the sun from the fire, while the terrestrial things were compacted from the rest.

Plato holds that the visible world came into being after the pattern of the intelligible world; and that, of the visible world, the soul came first, and after it the bodily element—which is first composed of fire and earth, and second of water and air.

Pythagoras holds that, there being five solid figures, which are also called mathematical figures, earth came to be from the cube, fire from the pyramid, air from the octahedron, water from the icosahedron, and the sphere of the universe as a whole from the dodecahedron.

And in these matters too Plato follows Pythagoras.

On the order of the world. Parmenides holds that there are crowns intertwined one upon another, one composed of the rare, another of the dense; and other mixed crowns of light and darkness between these; and that what encompasses them all, solid like a wall, is a boundary.

Leucippus and Democritus stretch a tunic and a membrane in a circle around the world.

Epicurus holds that the boundary of some worlds is rare, and of others dense; and that of these, some are in motion and others motionless.

Plato places fire first, then aether, after this air, then water, and last of all earth; though sometimes he joins the aether to the fire as one.

Aristotle places first the impassible aether, the fifth body; after it the passible elements—fire, air, water—and last of all earth. Of these, to the heavenly bodies circular motion has been assigned, while among the elements set beneath, upward motion belongs to the light ones and downward motion to the heavy ones.

Empedocles holds that the places of the elements are not fixed forever, nor determined, but that they all somehow exchange with one another.

What is the cause of the world's inclination? Diogenes and Anaxagoras hold that, after the world had come together and had brought forth living creatures from the earth, the world of itself somehow inclined toward its southern part—perhaps by providence—so that some parts of the world might become uninhabitable and others inhabitable, according to cold, burning heat, and temperate climate.

Empedocles holds that, when the air yielded to the impulse of the sun, the region of the Bears inclined and the northern parts were raised up, while the southern parts were lowered, and accordingly the whole world inclined likewise.

Concerning what is outside the world, whether there is a void. The Pythagoreans hold that outside the world there is a void, into which the world breathes out and from which it breathes in.

But the Stoics hold that this void, into which the world also dissolves at the conflagration, is infinite.

Posidonius holds that it is not infinite, but only as much as is sufficient for the world's dissolution—so he writes in the first book On the Void.

Plato and Aristotle hold that there is no void either outside the world or within it.

What are the right and what the left of the world? Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle hold that the right of the world is the eastern parts, from which the beginning of its motion proceeds, and the left is the western parts.

Empedocles holds that the right is the region toward the summer tropic, and the left the region toward the winter tropic.

On heaven, what its substance is. Anaximenes holds that it is the revolution of the outermost belt.

Empedocles holds that heaven is solid, formed of air compacted by fire in crystalline fashion, containing the fiery and airy substance in each of the two hemispheres.

Aristotle holds that heaven is composed of the fifth body, or of a mixture of hot and cold.

On daemons and heroes. And next to the discourse concerning the gods, an account must be given concerning daemons and heroes.

Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics hold that daemons exist as substances of the soul; and that heroes too are souls that have been separated from bodies; and that the good souls are good daemons or heroes, while the base souls are evil ones.

But Epicurus approves none of these things.

On matter. Matter is that which underlies generation, corruption, and the other changes.

The followers of Thales and Pythagoras, and the Stoics, hold that matter is convertible, alterable, and fluid throughout its whole self.

The followers of Democritus hold that the primary elements—the atom, the void, and the incorporeal—are impassible.

Aristotle and Plato hold that matter is bodily in kind, formless, without shape, without figure, and without quality so far as concerns its own nature, yet is a receptacle of forms, becoming, as it were, a nurse, a mold, and a mother. But those who say that water, fire, air, or earth is matter no longer call it formless but a body; while those who posit the partless magnitudes and the atoms call matter formless.

On the Idea. The Idea is an incorporeal substance, subsisting in itself and by itself, giving image to the formless matters and becoming the cause of their manifestation.

Socrates and Plato suppose the Ideas to be substances separate from matter, subsisting in the thoughts and imaginings of God, that is, of the [divine] Mind.

Aristotle retained forms and ideas, yet not as separated from matter, and in this he departed from the doctrine that they subsist in God.

The Stoics, followers of Zeno, hold that the Ideas are mere concepts.

On the arrangement [of the stars]. Xenocrates thinks that the stars move along a single surface.

The other Stoics hold that some stars are before the others, in height and in depth.

Democritus places the fixed stars first, and after these the planets, and after these the sun, the Morning Star, and the moon.

Plato, after the position of the fixed stars, places first the one called Phaenon, that of Saturn; second Phaethon, that of Jupiter; third Pyroeis, that of Mars; fourth Eosphorus, that of Venus; fifth Stilbon, that of Mercury; sixth the sun; seventh the moon.

Of the mathematicians, some arrange them as Plato does, while others place the sun in the middle of all.

Anaximander, Metrodorus of Chios, and Crates hold that the sun is positioned uppermost of all, after it the moon, and beneath these the fixed stars and the planets.

On the course and motion of the stars. Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Cleanthes hold that all the stars are borne from east to west.

Alcmaeon and the mathematicians hold that the planets move contrary to the fixed stars, for they are borne in the opposite direction, from the west.

Anaximander holds that they are borne along by the circles and spheres upon which each is set. Anaximenes holds that the stars do not move beneath the earth, but revolve around it.

Plato and the mathematicians hold that the sun, Phosphorus, and Stilbon run their courses at equal speed.

From what source are the stars illuminated? Metrodorus holds that all the fixed stars are lit up by the sun.

Heraclitus and the Stoics hold that the stars are nourished from the exhalation rising from the earth.

Aristotle holds that the heavenly bodies need no nourishment, for they are not perishable but eternal.

Plato holds that, in general, the whole world together with the stars is nourished from itself.

On the so-called Dioscuri. Xenophanes holds that the things which appear on ships, like stars, are little clouds shining according to a certain kind of motion.

Metrodorus holds that they are glimmerings in the eyes of those who look on with fear and consternation.

On the eclipse of the sun. Thales was the first to say that the sun is eclipsed when the moon, being by nature earthy, passes directly beneath it in a straight line; and that this is seen mirror-like, as the moon is set beneath the disk.

Anaximander holds that it occurs when the aperture of the fire's outlet of breath is blocked up.

Heraclitus explains it by the turning of the boat-shaped vessel, so that its hollow side comes to be upward and its convex side downward, toward our sight.

Xenophanes explains it by extinction, and holds that another sun again comes to be at the risings. He has further recorded a solar eclipse lasting a whole month, and again a total eclipse, so that the day appeared as night.

Some hold that it is a thickening of invisible clouds coming over the disk.

Aristarchus sets the sun at rest among the fixed stars, and moves the moon around the sun's circle, and holds that according to these inclinations the disk is shadowed.

Xenophanes holds that there are many suns and moons, according to the regions, sections, and belts of the earth; and that at a certain time the disk falls into some section of the earth not inhabited by us, and thus, as though treading upon emptiness, presents the appearance of an eclipse. The same Xenophanes says that the sun advances into infinity, but seems to move in a circle because of the distance.

On the eclipse of the moon. Anaximander holds that it occurs when the aperture around the wheel is stopped up.

Berossus explains it by the turning toward us of the unignited part of the moon.

Heraclitus explains it by the turning of the boat-shaped vessel.

Some of the Pythagoreans [explain the moon's monthly waxing and waning] by reflected light and the interposition of the earth, or of the counter-earth; but the more recent [thinkers explain it] by the gradual kindling of a flame in due order, little by little, until it renders the moon fully full, and again by its proportional diminishing until the conjunction, at which point it is completely extinguished.

Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the mathematicians agree that the monthly disappearances of the moon occur because it travels in conjunction with the sun and is illumined together with it; but that the eclipses occur when it falls into the shadow of the earth, which comes to be between the two heavenly bodies — or rather, when the moon itself is screened off [from the sun's light].

On its [the moon's] appearance, and why it appears earthy. The Pythagoreans [say] that the moon appears earthy because it is inhabited round about, just as our earth is, by animals larger and by plants more beautiful; for the animals upon it are fifteen times [larger than ours], excreting nothing bodily, and its day is proportionately as long [i.e. fifteen times as long].

Anaxagoras [attributes the moon's appearance] to the unevenness arising from its compound nature, on account of the coldish [element] combined with the earthy; for the gloomy is mixed together with the fiery [element] in it; whence the star is also called 'falsely-shining.'

The Stoics [say it is] because of the airy admixture in its substance, [holding] that its compound is not unmixed.

On its distances. Empedocles [says] that the moon is twice as far from the sun as it is from the earth.

The followers of the mathematicians [say the ratio is] eighteenfold.

Eratosthenes [says] that the sun is distant from the earth four million and eighty thousand stades, and that the moon is distant from the earth seven hundred and eighty thousand stades.

On years. A 'year' is: for Cronus [Saturn], a period of thirty years; for Zeus [Jupiter], twelve; for Ares [Mars], two; for the sun, twelve months — the same for Hermes [Mercury] and Aphrodite [Venus], for they run their course together [with the sun]; and for the moon, thirty days, for this is the perfect [period] from [first] appearance to conjunction.

As for the 'great year,' some place it at the octaeteris [eight-year cycle], others at the nineteen-year cycle, others at fifty-nine [years, that is, sixty minus one]. Heraclitus [reckons it] as consisting of eighteen thousand solar years. Diogenes [reckons it] as three hundred sixty-five years, each as great as Heraclitus's year; but others [place it] at seven hundred seventy-seven [years].

So much, then, concerning heavenly and atmospheric matters is disputed among the aforementioned [philosophers] with one another. Let us now also examine the matters concerning the earth.

On the earth. Thales and his followers [hold] that the earth is one.

Hicetas the Pythagorean [holds there are] two — this earth and the counter-earth.

The Stoics [hold] that the earth is one and finite.

Xenophanes [holds] that the earth is rooted downward into infinity, but is compacted together out of air and fire.

Metrodorus [holds] that the earth is a deposit and the lees of water, and that the sun [is a deposit] of air.

On the shape of the earth. Thales and the Stoics [hold] that the earth is spherical.

Anaximander [holds it is] like a stone column [i.e. cylindrical] in its flat surfaces.

Anaximenes [holds it is] table-shaped.

Leucippus [holds it is] drum-shaped.

Democritus [holds it is] disk-shaped in its breadth, but hollow in the middle.

On the position of the earth. The followers of Thales [hold] that the earth is in the middle [of the universe].

Xenophanes [holds it is] lowest of all, for it is rooted into infinity.

Philolaus the Pythagorean [holds that] fire occupies the middle, for this is the hearth of the universe; second is the counter-earth; and third is the earth we inhabit, lying opposite to the counter-earth and revolving along with it — for which reason those who dwell in that [counter-earth] are not seen by those who dwell in this [earth of ours].

Parmenides was the first to demarcate the inhabited regions of the earth as lying beneath the two tropical zones.

On the motion of the earth. The rest [of the philosophers hold] that the earth remains at rest.

But Philolaus the Pythagorean [holds] that it revolves in a circle around the fire, along an oblique circuit, in the same manner as the sun and the moon.

Heraclides of Pontus and Ecphantus the Pythagorean set the earth in motion — not, however, with a motion of translation [from place to place], but with a motion of rotation, turning like a wheel upon an axis, from west to east, about its own center.

Democritus [holds] that at first the earth wandered about, on account of its smallness and lightness, but that, having become condensed in the course of time and grown heavy, it settled into rest. Since these matters, too, concerning the earth have been disputed among these noble [thinkers], hear now also what they say concerning the sea.

On the sea: how it came into being, and why it is bitter. Anaximander says that the sea is a remnant of the original moisture, the greater part of which the fire dried up, while what remained was changed by the scorching.

Anaxagoras [says the sea arose] from the moisture that at first lay stagnant like a marsh, being scorched round about by the revolution of the sun, and thereafter the oily part settled out — the remainder [turning] into brackishness and bitterness. [So too] Empedocles.

Empedocles [says the sea is] the sweat of the earth as it is scorched by the sun, on account of the excessive compression [the earth undergoes].

Antiphon [says the sea is] the sweat of the hot [element], out of which the surrounding moisture was separated, having become brackish through being boiled down — which is what happens with all sweat.

Metrodorus [says it is] because, being filtered through the earth, [the water] partakes of the density surrounding it [the earth], just as things filtered through ashes [take on their quality].

The followers of Plato [say] that, of elemental water, the portion that is formed from air through cooling becomes sweet, while the portion that rises up as vapor from the earth through scorching and combustion becomes salty.

So much, then, concerning the sea as well. But as for how those who professed to give a natural account of the whole cosmos, of the heavenly and ethereal realms, and of the comprehension of the universe, did not even know the things pertaining to themselves — you may learn this from the fact that they have disagreed among themselves in this fashion even about these matters.

On the parts of the soul. Pythagoras and Plato, according to the most general account, [hold that] the soul is twofold — the one part rational, the other irrational; but according to the more precise and exact account, [it is] threefold, for they divide the irrational into the spirited and the appetitive.

The Stoics [hold that the soul] consists of eight parts: five sensory [faculties] — sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch; a sixth, the vocal [faculty]; a seventh, the generative [faculty]; and an eighth, the ruling faculty itself, from which all these are directed through their own proper organs, in a manner resembling the tentacles of a polyp.

Democritus and Epicurus [hold that] the soul is twofold: the rational part is seated in the chest, while the irrational part is dispersed throughout the whole compound of the body.

But Democritus [further holds] that all things by nature partake of some quality, even dead bodies — because they imperceptibly partake of something warm and sentient, the greater part of which, however, is dissipated.

On the ruling faculty. Plato and Democritus [place it] in the whole head.

Strato [places it] between the eyebrows.

Erasistratus [places it] around the membrane of the brain, which he calls the 'epicranis.'

Herophilus [places it] in the ventricle of the brain, which is also its base.

Parmenides [places it] in the whole chest.

Epicurus and all the Stoics [place it] in the whole heart.

Diogenes [places it] in the arterial cavity of the heart, which is [filled with] breath.

But Empedocles [places it] in the composition of the blood.

Others [place it] in the membrane surrounding the heart; others in the diaphragm. Some of the more recent [thinkers hold] that it extends from the head all the way to the diaphragm.

Pythagoras [places] the vital [faculty] around the heart, but the rational and intelligent [faculty] around the head.

So much, then, concerning these matters as well. Does it not, therefore, seem to you that we have rightly withdrawn, by judgment and reasoning, from all this useless and wide-wandering vain labor, and that we do not busy ourselves at all with what has been said [by these philosophers] — for we see in it nothing profitable, nothing that tends of itself toward benefit and the acquisition of good for mankind — but instead hold fast only to piety concerning God, the Maker of all things, and strive, through a life of self-control and the rest of our God-beloved conduct according to virtue, to live so as to please the God of all?

But if you too, out of envy and malice, are reluctant to accept from us this true testimony, then Socrates himself — the wisest of all the Greeks — will forestall you once again, having, out of love of truth, already cast his vote on our behalf. For he used to demonstrate that those idle babblers about celestial matters were fools, and said that they differed in no way from madmen, refuting them explicitly not only as reaching after things unattainable, but also as wearing themselves out over things useless and unprofitable for life. And to this Xenophon also, the most renowned of Socrates' companions, will bear witness for you from of old, writing somewhat as follows in his Memorabilia.

No one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or unholy. For he did not discourse concerning the nature of the universe or other such things, as most [philosophers do], examining how the cosmos, as the sophists call it, is constituted, and by what necessities each of the heavenly phenomena comes to be; rather, he even demonstrated that those who concerned themselves with such matters were fools.

And first he would examine, concerning them, whether it was because they thought they already knew human affairs sufficiently well that they came to concern themselves with such matters, or whether, having set aside human affairs and turned their attention to divine [i.e. cosmic] things instead, they supposed they were doing what was fitting.

And he marveled that it was not evident to them that these things are impossible for human beings to discover, since even those who pride themselves most on speaking about such matters do not hold the same opinions as one another, but are disposed toward one another just like madmen.

For among madmen, some do not even fear things that are truly terrible, while others fear even things that are not fearful at all; and to some it seems no shame to say or do anything whatsoever, even in a crowd, while others think they ought not even go out among people at all; and some honor neither shrine nor altar nor anything else divine, while others worship even chance sticks and stones, and wild beasts. So too, among those who concern themselves with the nature of the universe, some hold that Being is one only, while others hold that its multitude is infinite; some hold that all things are always in motion, while others hold that nothing could ever be moved at all; and some hold that all things come into being and perish, while others hold that nothing could ever come into being or perish at all.

He would also examine this about them: whether, just as those who learn human matters suppose that whatever they learn they will be able to do for themselves and for whomever else they wish, so too those who inquire into divine things suppose that, once they know by what necessities each of these phenomena comes to be, they will be able to produce winds and rains and seasons, and whatever else of this kind they may need, whenever they wish; or whether they hope for no such thing at all, and it is enough for them merely to know how each of these things comes about.

Such, then, were the things he used to say about those who occupied themselves with these pursuits; but he himself always discoursed about human affairs, examining what is pious, what is impious; what is honorable, what is shameful; what is just, what is unjust; what is soundness of mind, and what is madness.

Such, then, was Socrates. After him, Aristippus of Cyrene and his followers, and later still Ariston of Chios and his followers, undertook to say that one ought to philosophize only about ethical matters; for these, they held, are both attainable and beneficial, whereas accounts concerning nature are altogether the opposite — neither comprehensible, nor, even if they should be grasped, of any benefit.

For it would be no advantage to us at all, even if, borne aloft higher than Perseus above the stream of the sea and above the Pleiades, we should behold with our own eyes the whole cosmos and the nature of existing things, whatever it may be.

For not on account of this would we become more prudent, or more just, or more courageous, or more temperate; nor indeed strong, or beautiful, or wealthy — without which it is not possible to be happy.

Wherefore Socrates rightly said that of existing things, some are beyond us, and others are of no concern to us at all. For natural things are beyond us, and the things after death are of no concern to us, while only human affairs concern us.

And for this reason he said farewell to the natural philosophy of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, and sought instead [to know] 'what of good and evil has been wrought in the halls' [of men].

And besides, [he held that] accounts of nature are not only difficult and impossible [to attain], but also impious and contrary to the laws. For some maintain that there are no gods at all, while others [maintain that god is] the infinite, or Being, or the One — anything, in fact, rather than the gods [commonly] recognized.

And again, [he pointed to] their disagreement, which was very great: for some declare the universe to be infinite, others finite; and some maintain that all things are in motion, others that nothing whatsoever is.

And indeed, if there is anything else that seems to me best said of all concerning these very matters, it is what Timon of Phlius has said in his Silloi: 'For who brought these men together to fight in ruinous strife? A crowd running together like an echo. For [some god], angered at their silence, roused among men a talkative disease, and many perished.'

Do you see how these noble [philosophers] now even mock one another? As for their mutual rivalry, their battles and dissensions, in addition to what has already been said, the aforementioned man [Timon] depicts them further in this manner: 'And man-destroying Strife roams about, shrieking emptily, sister and helper of murderous Contention, who blindly rolls about among all things; and then at last she plants her head among mortals and casts them into vain hope.'

But now that the strife and conflict of these men among themselves has been demonstrated — [strife] that in no way concerns us, and that belongs to a superfluous and unknowable education and learning in all the rest [of their doctrines], in which the disciples of the philosophers still to this day take such solemn pride — refuted not by our arguments, but by their own proofs; and now that the reason has also been made plain, on account of which we have turned away from their [teachings] and preferred the oracles of the Hebrews — let the contents of the Preparation for the Gospel be brought to a close for us at this point.

As for the more complete treatise, that of the Demonstration of the Gospel, we must now go on to consider it from a different starting-point of argument — namely, the one still lacking to complete the problem — in order to provide the teaching [that remains].

For what remains is to answer those of the circumcision who have raised the objection: why, being of another race and of foreign stock, do we make use of their [the Hebrews'] books, which, as they themselves would say, in no way pertain to us; or again, why, while embracing their oracles, do we not also conform our manner of life to the law that is theirs?