The volume preceding the one now in hand, being on the subject of the Evangelical Preparation, established -- not by my own statements, but by testimonies from outside -- that it is not unreasonable [to hold] that the Greeks, having contributed nothing wise of their own beyond mere skill in speech and eloquence, but having contrived everything from the barbarians, were not even ignorant of the oracles of the Hebrews, and indeed laid hold of a portion of these as well, because they did not even keep their hands clean of theft in the ambitious composition of their own writings. For it was not our own argument, as I said, but their own, that proved them to be thieves.
Nevertheless, we also learned at the same time, through the comparison of chronologies, that they were exceedingly young -- both in wisdom and in age -- falling far, far short of Hebrew antiquity.
These things, then, [were treated by] the previous [volume]. But the present one is now eager, at last, as though [discharging] a debt, to render the undertaking that was promised, and to reveal the agreement, in some things -- even if not in all -- of the doctrinal speculations of the philosophers among the Greeks with the oracles of the Hebrews. And, setting aside the superfluous ones among them, it summons forth the foremost of them all, holding that it is necessary to use Plato alone, in place of all the rest, as the standard for this inquiry, since he alone, having in reputation outstripped all others, seems likely to be sufficient for us for establishing what is sought.
And if it should be needful anywhere, for the sake of clarity concerning the man's thought, I shall also employ as witnesses those who have emulated his philosophy, setting forth their own words for the establishment of the matter proposed.
But let it be observed by me that not everything has been felicitously stated by the man, even though most of what he has declared has been proclaimed with truth. And this very point I shall also set forth at the proper time -- not to slander him, but for the sake of our own defense, on account of which we confess that we have preferred the barbarian philosophy to the Greek.
Since Plato divided the whole account of philosophy into three parts—physical, ethical, and logical—and then again divided the physical part into the contemplation of sensible things and the comprehension of incorporeal things, you would find among the Hebrews as well this same threefold form of teaching, seeing that similar things had been philosophized among them even before Plato came to be.
It is worth hearing first what belongs to Plato, and then thus to survey also what belongs to the Hebrews. I will set forth Plato's views from those who champion his teaching, among whom Atticus, an eminent man among the Platonist philosophers, expounds this man's opinions in the following manner, in which he takes his stand against those who claim to derive Plato's doctrines through Aristotle.
Since, then, complete philosophy is divided in three ways—into what is called the ethical topic, and the physical, and further the logical—and the first fashions each of us to be noble and good, and sets whole households right toward what is best, and moreover adorns an entire people with the finest constitution and the most exact laws, while the second extends to the knowledge concerning divine things, both the first principles themselves and the causes, and all else that comes to be from these—which Plato has named the inquiry concerning nature—
while for the discrimination and discovery concerning both of these the third is employed—that Plato first, and above all others, gathering together into one all the parts of philosophy, which till then lay scattered and thrown about like the limbs of Pentheus, as someone has said, showed philosophy to be a single body and a complete living creature, is a statement plain to all who speak of it.
For neither are those around Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras, and all who arose at the same time as these, unknown for having spent their time occupied solely with the inquiry concerning the nature of existing things; nor indeed do Pittacus, Periander, Solon, Lycurgus, and those like them escape notice for having applied their own philosophy to statecraft. And Zeno and this whole Eleatic school is itself well known for having been especially devoted to the art of arguments.
After these came Plato, a man by nature perfect from the outset and far surpassing others, as one truly sent down from the gods, so that through him the philosophy might be seen whole and entire; he left out nothing and worked out each point with precision, neither falling short of what was necessary nor being carried away into what is useless.
Since, then, we have said that the Platonic philosopher has a share in all things, both in speaking of morals and in engaging in dialectic, come, let us examine each point in turn.
Thus far Atticus. And the Peripatetic Aristocles bears witness to the same things, speaking word for word in this manner in the seventh book of what he composed On Philosophy.
Plato philosophized, if any other ever did, genuinely and perfectly. For those from Thales onward continued occupied with natural philosophy, while those around Pythagoras concealed everything; and Xenophanes and those who followed him, having stirred up contentious arguments, cast great dizziness upon the philosophers, yet provided no help whatsoever.
Not least also Socrates, as the very saying goes, became "fire upon fire," as Plato himself said. For being most gifted by nature and clever at raising difficulties about anything whatsoever, he introduced ethical and political inquiries, and was moreover the first to attempt to define the theory concerning the Forms; but while stirring up every argument and inquiring about everything, he happened to die too soon.
Others, cutting off certain parts for themselves, occupied their time with these—some with medicine, others with the mathematical sciences, some with the poets and with music. Most, however, admired the powers of argument, of whom some called themselves rhetoricians, others dialecticians.
Those, however, who succeeded Socrates became altogether various and opposed to one another in their opinions. For some sang the praises of Cynic austerity, freedom from vanity, and freedom from passion, while others again praised pleasures. And some boasted of knowing everything, others simply of knowing nothing.
Further, some rolled about in the midst and in the sight of all, consorting with the many, while others, on the contrary, continued to be inaccessible and unapproachable.
Plato, however, having perceived that the knowledge of things divine and things human was somehow one, was the first to divide it, and said that one branch of study concerns the nature of the universe, another concerns human affairs, and a third concerns arguments.
He held that we cannot discern human affairs unless the divine things be seen first; for just as physicians, when treating certain parts, first take care of the whole body, so too must the one who is going to observe the things here below first know the nature of the whole; and that man is a part of existing things, and that the good is twofold—one ours, the other belonging to the universe—but the good of the universe is the more sovereign, for through that the other too comes to be.
Aristoxenus the musician says that this account belongs to the Indians. For at Athens one of those men met Socrates, and then asked him what he was doing in philosophizing; and when Socrates said that he was inquiring concerning human life, the Indian laughed at him, saying that no one could discern human affairs while ignorant of the divine.
Whether this is true, no one could assert with confidence. Plato, then, divided philosophy into that concerning the whole, and the political, and further the logical.
Such being the philosophy according to Plato, it is time also to examine that of the Hebrews, who had philosophized in a similar manner long before Plato came to be. You would indeed find among them also this same threefold division in agreement—of ethical, logical, and physical studies—if you attend to it in the following way.
That ethics, then, was cultivated among them first of all things and with the greatest zeal, far more in deeds than in words, you may learn by examining the affairs of these men, since as the end of goods and the ultimate boundary of the blessed life they admired and pursued piety, and the friendship with God attained through the correction of morals—not bodily pleasure, as Epicurus held, nor again the threefold classification of goods, as Aristotle held, who honored bodily and external goods equally with the goods of the soul.
Nor indeed did they honor the extreme of ignorance and unlearnedness, which some have named "suspension of judgment" by a more dignified term; but neither, on the other hand, did they honor virtue of soul by itself; for how great is this among men, and what, by itself, apart from God, could it contribute toward a life free from grief? For this reason, having fastened all things to hope in God as to an unbreakable cable, they declared that only the one beloved of God is blessed.
For God, the steward of all good things, being the provider of life and the very fountain of virtue itself, and the supplier of all things pertaining to the body and to externals, alone would be sufficient for the blessed life to the one who has secured friendship with him through true piety.
Hence the all-wise Moses, first of all men to commit to writing the life of the God-beloved Hebrews before him—a life at once civic and practical—set it forth by way of historical narrative. Beginning this from universal principles, he made his teaching, establishing God as the cause of all things, and describing the coming-to-be of the cosmos and of mankind.
Then, proceeding thus from the universal to the particular in his account, and through the remembrance of the ancient men urging his disciples on to zeal for their virtue and piety toward God, and moreover being himself declared the author of the pious laws which he enacted, he would in every respect clearly appear to have exercised providence over the God-loving way of life through his care for morals—just as, indeed, our account, having anticipated this above, has already made evident.
It would be a long task to set down here also the prophets who came after Moses, and their words exhorting to virtue and dissuading from every vice. But what if I should set before you the ethical teachings of the most wise Solomon, to which he devoted a fitting treatise, naming the composition "Proverbs," gathering under a single theme concise maxims resembling apothegms?
And in this way the children of the Hebrews, from ancient times before even the Greeks had learned their first letters, were themselves instructed in the ethical way of life, and shared this same instruction ungrudgingly with those who came to them.
As for the logical part of Hebrew philosophy, they did not think it necessary to pursue it, as the Greeks are fond of doing, by cleverness in sophistries and reasonings artfully devised for deception, but rather by the apprehension of truth itself, which the God-inspired sages among them—their souls illumined by divine light—both discovered and were themselves enlightened by.
Sharpening toward this those being educated in their own studies, they handed down to them—from earliest infancy—the recitation of sacred discourses, the narratives of solemn histories, the metrical compositions of odes and incantations, and further problems and riddles, and certain wise and allegorical contemplations joined with beauty of expression and with fluent delivery in their own tongue.
Indeed, they also had certain "second teachers" of the primary studies (for so it is customary to call the interpreters of their scriptures), who made clear through interpretation and explanation the things overshadowed by riddles—if not to all, at least to those fit to hear them.
Thus again the most wise Solomon among them made this the very starting point for his treatise of Proverbs, almost teaching that this was the reason for his writing, when in these words he said that every man must know wisdom and instruction, and understand words of prudence, and receive the turns of speech, and understand true righteousness and direct judgment aright, "that he may give shrewdness to the simple, and to the young child perception and understanding. For the wise man, hearing these things, will become wiser, and the man of understanding will acquire guidance; and he will understand a parable and a dark saying, the sayings of the wise and their riddles."
Such, then, were the professed aims of the treatise in question; but as for the particular propositions among the things said, and their solutions, and the logical treatment carried throughout all their prophetic scriptures in a manner suited to the wisdom and speech of these men—whoever wishes will come to know this by taking in hand at leisure the books that contain them, and reading them.
And if anyone should also become experienced, out of love of beauty, in the language itself, he would see, even among these barbarians, men most skilled in logic, in no way inferior to sophists or rhetoricians in their own tongue.
They also have metrical compositions, such as the great Ode of Moses, and the 118th Psalm of David, composed in what the Greeks call heroic meter. They say, at any rate, that these are hexameters, made of sixteen syllables. And the rest of their poetic pieces are said to be composed, according to their own tongue, in verses of trimeters and tetrameters.
As for the diction of their words, it possesses, in some such way, logical understanding; but as for their thought, it is not even to be compared with that of ordinary men—for through them are uttered the oracles of God and of truth itself, and they comprise divine pronouncements and predictions, pious teachings, and doctrines of the knowledge of existing things.
You might take proof of the logical precision found among these men from the correctness of the assigning of names, concerning which Plato too, bearing witness to the opinion of the Hebrews, would evidently be found—and precisely on this point—in agreement with the philosophy of these men, as indeed it is easy to discern from what follows.
Long before the name "philosophy" came to the Greeks, Moses had already, throughout the whole of his writing, treated at great length concerning the assigning of names—at one time arranging the appellations of all things among his people in the most natural way, at another entrusting to God the judgment concerning the renaming of pious men, and having taught that names are set upon things by nature and not by convention. Plato, following him, agrees with the same views, mentioning none other than barbarians, and saying that among these this practice is preserved—perhaps hinting at the Hebrews, since it is not easy to observe such a doctrine even among other barbarians.
He says, then, in the Cratylus: "And this is not a name which certain people, having agreed to call it so, call it, uttering merely a portion of their own speech; but there is a certain correctness of names, by nature the same for all, both Greeks and barbarians."
And going on he says next: "Will you not then hold that the lawgiver here and the lawgiver among the barbarians, so long as he renders the form of the name proper to each thing in whatever syllables, is no worse a lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else whatsoever?"
Then again, next, having said that the one who knows the correctness of names is the dialectician and lawgiver, he speaks thus: "It is then the work of a carpenter to make a rudder, under the supervision of a helmsman, if the rudder is to be a good one." "So it appears."
"And the name of the lawgiver, it seems, has a dialectician as overseer, if a name is to be well established." "So it is." "It is likely, then, Hermogenes, that the giving of names is no trivial matter, as you think, nor a task for trivial men, nor for chance persons. And Cratylus speaks the truth in saying that names belong to things by nature, and that not every craftsman is a maker of names, but only that one who looks to the name which is by nature proper to each thing, and is able to set its form into letters and syllables."
Having said this much, after a great deal more he again brings up the mention of barbarians, and then confesses in plain words that most of the names came to the Greeks from barbarians, saying in these very terms:
"I observe that the Greeks, especially those who dwell under the barbarians, have taken many names from the barbarians." "What then?" "If someone should inquire whether these are rightly established according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that from which the name happens to come, you know that he would be at a loss." "Likely so."
Thus far Plato. Yet Moses anticipates him, who, being a wise lawgiver and at the same time a dialectician, hear what he says: "And God formed out of the earth all the wild beasts of the field and all the birds of heaven, and brought them to Adam, to see what he would call them; and whatever Adam called each living creature, that was its name."
For by saying "that was its name," what else does he establish than that the appellations were set according to nature? For that which has just now been named, he says, was also formerly and previously contained within nature; this name did exist, and pre-exist, for each of the things named—the name which the man in question, having been divinely inspired by a power greater than himself, has set in place.
And Adam itself, being a Hebrew name, would in Moses' usage be an appellation of the earth-born man, since among the Hebrews the earth is called "adamah"—for which reason also the first earth-born man has been truly and fittingly named Adam by Moses.
The appellation might also bear another meaning, if taken over into "red," representing the nature of the body. But it is the earthy, earthly, and earth-born man—or the bodily and fleshly man—that he has designated by the term "Adam."
The children of the Hebrews also call man by another name, calling him "Enosh," which they say is the rational part in us, being different in nature from the earthy Adam. And "Enosh" too contains its own particular meaning, being interpreted in the Greek tongue as "forgetful."
Such is by nature the rational part in us, because of its entanglement with the mortal and irrational. For that which is entirely pure, incorporeal, divine, and rational has, through the utmost excellence of contemplation, comprehended not only the memory of things past but also the knowledge of things to come; but that part which is compressed within flesh, fixed fast with bones and sinews, and burdened with the great and heavy mass that is the body—this the Hebrew sage, perceiving its great forgetfulness and ignorance, has called by an aptly aimed term, naming it "Enosh," which signifies "the forgetful one."
It stands, at any rate, in a certain prophet: "What is man, that you are mindful of him? Or the son of man, that you visit him?" In place of this, the Hebrew text, in the first designation of man, has used "Enosh," as if saying more clearly: "What is this forgetful one, that you, O God, are mindful of him, though he is forgetful?"
And the phrase "or the son of man, that you visit him" stands in the text as "or son of Adam," so that the same one is both Adam and Enosh, the fleshly aspect being represented through "Adam," the rational through "Enosh."
Thus the Hebrew oracles somehow divide the etymology. But Plato says that man (anthropos) in the Greek tongue is so named from "looking up" (anathrein), saying: "Man, the moment he has seen—that is, has perceived—both looks up and reasons about what he has perceived, so that he may be one who looks up at what he has perceived."
Again, the Hebrews call the man (husband) "esh." And the name is derived by them from "esh," by which they signify "fire," so that the man is named from the heat and fiery nature of the male.
And the woman, since it is said that she was taken from the man, shares also the appellation with the man; for she is called "eshah" among them, just as "esh" is the man. But Plato says that the man (aner) is named from the "upward flow" (ano rhoe); and he adds: "The woman (gyne) seems to me to wish to be 'gone' (birth, offspring)."
Again, Moses truly and fittingly calls the heaven, in the Hebrew tongue, "firmament" (stereoma), because it is, after the incorporeal and intelligible substance, the first solid and perceptible body of this world. But Plato says that the name "heaven" (ouranos) is rightly given because it makes one "look up" (horan ano).
Again, the Hebrews say that the highest and proper name of God is unutterable and unspeakable, not even graspable by the imagination of the mind; but this very thing by which we name 'God' they call Elohim, derived, it seems, from 'El'; and this they interpret as 'strength' and 'power', so that among them the name of God is reckoned from the power and strength surrounding him, by which he is understood to be almighty and powerful over all things, as having constituted the universe. But Plato says that 'god' and 'gods' are so named from 'theein', which means 'to run', because the luminaries in heaven were so called.
Such, then, in outline, is the precision that has been observed among the Hebrews and in Plato concerning the correctness of names. And Plato says that even the appellations given among men were established with a certain purpose in mind, and he tries to give an account of them—somehow, I know not how—saying that Hector was so named from 'having' and 'holding sway', because he was king of the Trojans; and Agamemnon from 'remaining exceedingly', because he remained vigorously and steadfastly attached to the opinions held concerning the Trojans; and Orestes from the mountainous, wild, and beast-like quality of his character; and Atreus, because he had become a man of destructive character; and Pelops, as one who looked not at things far off but only at what was near and close at hand; and Tantalus, he says, signifies 'most wretched', because of the misfortunes that befell him.
These and countless other such things you would find said by Plato, as he attempts to teach that names were given to the first things by nature, and not by convention.
But you would not say that the names in Moses are forced, nor contrived by some sophistical ingenuity, once you learn that Cain among the Hebrews is rendered among the Greeks as 'jealousy'; and the one so designated was deemed worthy of this appellation because he was jealous of his brother Abel.
And Abel is interpreted as 'mourning', since he himself became the cause of such suffering for his parents, who, by a certain more divine foresight, gave these names to their children at their birth.
But what if I should bring forward Abraham for you? This man, before he became a certain observer of celestial phenomena, versed in the contemplation of the stars and the sciences pertaining to the heavens, at the time when he was pursuing Chaldean wisdom, was called Abram; and this, in the Greek tongue, signifies 'exalted father'.
But God, leading him on from things here to the unseen and beyond what is visible, made use of a fitting change of name, saying, 'Your name shall no longer be called Abram, but your name shall be Abraham, because I have made you a father of many nations.'
What understanding this holds would be a long discourse to relate. But it suffices, even here, to cite Plato as a witness to the argument, since he affirms that some names were established by a more divine power. He speaks, then, in these very words:
'For it is fitting that the establishing of names be undertaken with great care here above all; and perhaps some of them came into being by a power more divine than that of men.'
This very thing is confirmed at greater length by the sacred Scripture of the Hebrews; and Moses, first of all, taught that Abraham, and his son Isaac, and further Israel, were named by a more divine power. Isaac is interpreted as 'laughter', bearing the symbol of virtuous joy, which God has promised to give as an exceptional reward to those who love him.
And his son Israel formerly bore the name Jacob; but in place of Jacob, God bestowed upon him the name Israel, transposing him from the ascetic and practical to the contemplative.
For Jacob is interpreted as 'supplanter' (one who takes by the heel), as one contending in the contest of virtue; while Israel means 'one who sees God', that is, whatever the knowing and contemplative mind in a human being might be.
Why should I now, by countless other examples, unfold the correctness of the establishing of proper names found in the all-wise Moses or in the sacred oracles of the Hebrews, matters which require a longer leisure than this occasion allows?
For instance, even concerning the primary elements of grammar, the Greeks would not be able to state their etymologies, nor could Plato himself give the account or the reasoning behind the vowels or the consonants.
But the children of the Hebrews could state the reason both for Alpha, which among them is called Aleph, and this signifies 'learning'; and for Beta, which they are wont to call Beth, and by this they name 'house'; so that the sense signified is 'the learning of a house'; as if it were said more plainly, a certain teaching and learning of household management.
And Gamma, the third among them, is called Gimel; and by this they name 'fullness'. Then, since they call writing-tablets 'Deleth', they gave this name to the fourth element as well, signifying together, through these two elements, that written learning is the filling of tablets.
And one who goes through the remaining elements of grammar would find that each was named among them for some cause and reasoning; since they say that the combination of the seven vowels together contains the utterance of a certain unspeakable appellation, which the children of the Hebrews, marking it out by four letters, assign to the highest power of God—each child having received from his father that this is something ineffable and secret for the many.
And one of the wise men among the Greeks, having learned this from I know not where, hinted at it in verses somewhat like these, saying: 'Seven vowel-letters proclaim me, the great imperishable God, the tireless father of all things. And I am the imperishable tortoise-shell of all, who fitted together the lyre-songs of the heavenly whirl.'
You would also find, if you attended to each of the remaining Hebrew letters, what they signify; and this has already been established by us earlier, when we demonstrated that the Greeks have benefited from the barbarians in all things.
One who investigates the Hebrew language closely would discover much correctness of names current among these men, since even the appellative name of the whole nation has taken its derivation from Eber. This signifies 'one who crosses over', since 'crossing' and 'one who crosses over' is called 'Eber' in the Hebrew tongue.
And the account teaches us to cross over and pass from the things here to the divine things, in no way remaining fixed and standing still in the contemplation of visible things, but rather to pass from these to the unseen and invisible realities of the theology concerning the maker and craftsman of all things. For this reason they called the first men, who were devoted solely to the sovereign ruler and cause of all things, and who clung to pure and true piety, 'Hebrews', calling such men certain 'crossers-over' and ones who had passed across in their understanding.
And why should I prolong things further, gathering all the evidence for the correctness and precision of the Hebrew names, since the topic requires its own proper treatise? Yet, to speak in outline, I consider that through what has been said I have furnished proof of the logical teaching among the Hebrews—if indeed, according to Plato, it belonged not to base men, nor to just anyone, but to some wise and dialectical lawgiver, to devise a nature of names proper to the things they name; such a man Moses, and the oracles of the Hebrews, have been shown to us to be. What, then, follows after the logical part, but to examine the physical part—how, in fact, the sons of the Hebrews stood with regard to this as well?