For since time is the interval of the motion of the world, and motion cannot come to be prior to that which is moved, but must necessarily arise either later than it or together with it, it is therefore necessary that time also either came to be of the same age as the world, or younger than it; but to venture to declare it older would be unphilosophical.
But if 'the beginning' is not here taken in a temporal sense, it is likely that a numerical sense is indicated, so that 'in the beginning he made' is equivalent to 'first he made the heaven.'
Then he goes on to say: 'First, then, the Maker made an incorporeal heaven, and an invisible earth, and the idea of air and of void; of these he named the one darkness, since air is by nature black, and the other the deep, for the void and the vast is exceedingly deep.'
Then [he made] the incorporeal essence of water and of spirit, and above all these, a seventh, light, which was likewise incorporeal, and the intelligible pattern of the sun, and of all the light-bearing stars that were about to come to be in the heaven.
Both spirit and light were deemed worthy of special privilege; for the one he called 'of God,' because spirit is most life-giving, and God is the cause of life; and the other, light, because it is surpassingly beautiful; for the intelligible [light] is by so much brighter and more radiant than the visible, as the sun, I think, [surpasses] darkness, and day surpasses night, and [as] the faculty of judgment—intellect, the guide of the whole soul—[surpasses] the eyes of the body.
That invisible and intelligible light has become the image of the divine Word who interpreted its coming-to-be; and it is a supercelestial star, the source of the sensible stars, which one would not be off the mark in calling 'all-radiance,' from which the sun and moon and the other planets and fixed stars draw, each according to its own capacity, its appropriate brightness—that pure and unmixed radiance growing dim as soon as it begins to be transformed from the intelligible to the sensible. For nothing in the realm of sense is unadulterated.
And a little further on he adds: 'Now since light came to be, and darkness withdrew, and boundaries were set in the intervening spaces—evening and morning—a measure of time, in accordance with necessity, was straightway completed, which, rightly doing so, he called "day"; and not "the first day," but "one day," which is so called on account of the singleness of the intelligible world, which has a unique nature.'
The incorporeal world, then, already had its completion, established in the divine Word; while the sensible world was being brought to perfection after the pattern of this. And of its parts, the first—which is also the best of all—the demiurge made the heaven, which he fittingly called 'firmament,' since it is corporeal. For body is by nature solid, being that which is extended in three dimensions. And what other notion is there of the solid and of body, except that which is extended in every direction? Fittingly, then, opposing the sensible and body-like to the intelligible and incorporeal, he called this [heaven] solid. These are the words of Philo. Clement, too, agrees with him, saying as follows in the sixth book of the Stromateis:
Again, barbarian philosophy knows a twofold world: the intelligible and the sensible—the one archetype, the other the image of the beautiful pattern. And it assigns the one to the monad, as being intelligible, and the sensible to the hexad; for among the Pythagoreans the hexad is called 'marriage,' as being a fruitful number.
And within the monad it establishes the invisible heaven, the holy earth, and the intelligible light. For it says: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth; and the earth was invisible.' Then it goes on: 'And God said, Let there be light, and there was light.' But in the sensible creation of the world it fashions a solid heaven—and the solid is sensible—a visible earth and a light that is seen.
Does it not seem to you, then, that Plato from this [source] leaves the ideas of living creatures in the intelligible world, and forms the sensible species according to the intelligible kinds?
Fittingly, then, Moses says that the body was formed out of earth—that which Plato calls the earthly 'tent'—while the rational soul was breathed into the face from above by God.
For there, they say, the ruling faculty is established, thereby explaining the entrance of the soul into the first-formed man as an incidental entry through the senses; wherefore man came to be 'according to image and according to likeness.' For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man; and the image of the image is the human intellect. Let us also hear what will be said further.
Furthermore, in addition to these things, Plato, following the words of the Hebrews, says that there are not only incorporeal and good powers, but also opposing ones, writing somewhat as follows in the tenth book of the Laws:
'A soul that governs and dwells within all things that move in every direction—how could one not say that it must also govern the heaven?' 'Of course.' 'One soul, or more?' 'More—I will answer on your behalf. Let us posit not fewer than two, at any rate: the one beneficent, and the other capable of working the contrary effects.'
Then, further on, he says: 'For since we have agreed among ourselves that the heaven is full of many good things, but also of their opposites, though the latter are fewer, this, we say, is an immortal conflict, requiring a wondrous vigilance; and our allies are gods and daemons, while we, in turn, are possessions of gods and daemons.'
Whence Plato got these ideas too, I myself could not say; but what I can affirm as true is that this doctrine had been agreed upon by the Hebrews countless ages before Plato came into being.
So then, their scripture says: 'And it came to pass on a certain day, that the angels of God came to present themselves before God, and the devil also came among them,' having gone about the earth and walked about in it—[scripture] calling the opposing power 'devil,' and the good powers 'angels of God.'
And it calls these good powers also 'divine spirits' and 'ministers of God,' in the passage where it says: 'Who makes his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.'
And, moreover, he who said the following presents the ongoing conflict of these opposing powers thus: 'For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of the darkness of this age, against the spiritual [hosts] of wickedness in the heavenly places.'
Plato, indeed, seems directly to be paraphrasing the oracle of Moses which says: 'When the Most High divided the nations, as he scattered abroad the sons of Adam, he set the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the angels of God'—through whom he determined that the whole race of men should be the possessions of gods and daemons.
And in matters concerning the immortality of the soul, Plato differs not at all in opinion from Moses. For the first [Moses] determined that the soul in man is an immortal essence, saying that it is the image of God, or rather that it came to be according to the image of God. For he says, 'God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness. And God made man; according to the image of God he made him.'
And next, dividing by reasoning the composite [man] into the visible body and that which is conceived with reference to the soul, he adds: 'And God took dust from the earth, and formed man, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.'
But he also says that man came to be ruler and king over all things on earth. Thus he says: 'And God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea, and the birds of the heaven, and the cattle, and all the earth. And God made man in his image; according to the image of God he made him.'
But how else could an image and likeness of God be conceived, except in accordance with the powers that are in God, and in accordance with the likeness of virtue? Now hear what Plato, as though he had been a disciple of Moses in these matters too, says in the Alcibiades:
'Can we, then, say what is more divine in the soul than that faculty by which knowing and understanding take place?' 'We cannot.' 'This part of it, then, resembles God; and one who looks to this, and comes to know all that is divine—both God and understanding—would in this way come to know himself best also.' 'It appears so.' 'Then, just as mirrors are clearer, purer, and brighter than the mirror in the eye, is not God also purer and brighter than the best part in our soul?' 'It would seem so, Socrates.' 'Looking, then, toward God, we would use him as the fairest mirror also for human things, with respect to the virtue of the soul, and thus we would best see and know ourselves.' 'Yes.'
This, then, is in the Alcibiades. But hear how, in the [dialogue] On the Soul, he explains these matters more expansively concerning these topics. 'Shall we, then, if you wish,' he said, 'posit two kinds of existing things, the one visible, the other invisible?' 'Let us posit this,' he said. 'And the invisible always remaining in the same state, the visible never in the same state?' 'Let us posit this too,' he said.
'Come then,' he said, 'are we not something else besides—the one part being body, the other soul?' 'Nothing else,' he said. 'To which kind, then, would we say the body is more similar and more akin?' 'It is clear to everyone,' he said, 'that it is to the visible.' 'And what of the soul? Is it visible, or invisible?' 'Not visible to men, at least, Socrates,' he said. 'But surely we were speaking of the visible and the invisible with reference to human nature—or do you think we meant some other nature?' 'With reference to human [nature].'
'What, then, do we say concerning the soul—is it visible or invisible?' 'Not visible.' 'Invisible, then?' 'Yes.' 'The soul, then, is more similar to the invisible, and the body to the visible.' 'That is altogether necessary, Socrates.'
'Did we not also say earlier that, whenever the soul makes use of the body to investigate something—whether through sight, or through hearing, or through some other sense (for this is what it means to investigate something through the body, that is, through sense-perception)—then it is dragged by the body toward those things that never remain in the same state; and it itself wanders and is confounded and grows dizzy as though drunk, inasmuch as it lays hold of such things?' 'Quite so.'
'But whenever it investigates by itself alone, it departs yonder, to that which is pure and ever-existing and immortal and unchanging, and, being akin to it, it comes to be ever with that, whenever it comes to be by itself and it is permitted to it; and it ceases from its wandering and, in relation to those things, remains ever in the same, unchanging state, inasmuch as it lays hold of such things. And this condition of it is called understanding.'
'You speak altogether well and truly, Socrates,' he said. 'To which kind, then, in turn, does it seem to you, both from what was said before and from what is now being said, that the soul is more similar and more akin?' 'Everyone, it seems to me,' he said, 'even the slowest to learn, would agree, Socrates, on the basis of this method, that the soul is altogether and entirely more similar to that which remains ever in the same state than to that which does not.'
'And what of the body?' 'To the other [kind].' 'Consider it also in this way: that when soul and body are together in the same [union], nature ordains that the one [body] should be enslaved and ruled, while the other [soul] should rule and be master; and in accordance with this, again, which of the two seems to you to be like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or does it not seem to you that the divine is, as it were, naturally fitted to rule and to lead, while the mortal is fitted to be ruled and to be enslaved?' 'It does seem so to me.'
"To which, then, is the soul like?" "Clearly, O Socrates, that the soul is like the divine, and the body like the mortal." "Consider then," he said, "O Cebes, whether the following follows for us from all that has been said: that the soul is most like that which is divine and immortal and intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and ever remaining constantly the same in relation to itself, while the body, in turn, is most like that which is human and mortal and unintelligible and multiform and dissoluble and never remaining the same in relation to itself."
"Have we anything else to say beyond this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?" "We have not." "What then? Since these things are so, is it not fitting that the body should be quickly dissolved, while the soul, on the other hand, is altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?"
"How could it not be?" "Do you understand, then," he said, "that when a man dies, his visible part, the body, lying in the visible world — which indeed we call the corpse, and to which it belongs to be dissolved and fall apart and be dissipated — does not immediately suffer any of these things, but remains for quite some time, and rather a long time, if a man dies with his body in good condition, and at such a season of life, and especially so. For the body, having collapsed and been embalmed, as those embalmed in Egypt are, remains almost entirely intact for an inconceivably long time. And some parts of the body, even if it decays — bones and sinews and all such things — are nevertheless, so to speak, almost immortal, are they not?" "Yes."
"But the soul, then (that invisible thing, which departs to another such place, noble and pure and invisible, truly to the house of Hades, to the good and wise god, whither, if god wills, my own soul too must presently go) — does this soul of ours, then, being of such a nature and so constituted, upon its release from the body, immediately get blown apart and perish, as most men say?"
"Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias; rather, the truth is much more like this: if it departs pure, dragging nothing of the body with it, since it had no willing communion with it in life, but fled from it, and was gathered together into itself, inasmuch as it was always practicing this — (and this is nothing other than practicing philosophy rightly, and truly practicing to die with ease; or would this not be the practice of death?) "Absolutely so."
"Then, being in this state, it departs to that which is like itself, the invisible, the divine and immortal and wise; and arriving there, it is granted to be happy, freed from wandering and folly and fears and fierce desires and the other human ills, and, as is said of the initiated, truly spending the rest of time thereafter with the gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or otherwise?" "So, by Zeus," said Cebes.
"But if, I suppose, it departs from the body defiled and impure, as having always been in company with the body, and served it, and loved it, and been bewitched by it and by its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing else true except what is bodily — what one could touch and see and eat and drink and use for sexual pleasures — but had grown accustomed to hate and tremble at and flee from that which is dark and invisible to the eyes, yet intelligible and embraced by philosophy — do you think that a soul in such a state will depart pure and by itself alone?" "Not in the least," he said.
First of all, there is the argument that seemed strong to Plato for establishing the immortality of the soul: the argument from similarity. For if it is like the divine and immortal and invisible and undispersed and indissoluble and established in essence and constituted in incorruptibility, how would it not belong to the class corresponding to that paradigm?
For whenever, of two extremes that are clearly opposite, such as the rational and the irrational, some third thing is disputed as to which portion it belongs, this too was one method of proof: to show which of the opposites it resembles. For thus, although the human race in its first age was held fast in irrationality, and many, even into old age, abound in the errors of irrationality, nevertheless, because it bears many resemblances to that which is purely rational, this race was believed from the beginning to be rational.
Since, then, the order of the gods is manifestly divine and undefiled and self-subsistent, while, on the other hand, that which is earthly and dissoluble and lying in corruption is likewise evident, and since it is disputed among some to which of these two proposed portions the soul has attached itself, Plato thought it necessary to track down the truth by means of similarity.
And since it in no way resembles that which is mortal and dissoluble and unintelligible and without a share in life, and therefore tangible and perceptible and subject to coming-to-be and perishing, but resembles that which is divine and immortal and invisible and intelligent and living and akin to truth — and he reasons about it accordingly in every respect — he thought it wrong to grant that the soul has the other resemblances to God while wishing to reject the likeness in respect of essence; and it is on this very account that it has come to possess these attributes.
For just as the things unlike God in their activities are immediately also different in the constitution of their essence, so it follows that those things which share in some way the same activities have already attained the likeness of essence which they possess. For it is on account of a certain kind of essence that the activities too are of a certain kind, inasmuch as they flow from it and are, as it were, its offshoots.
If the soul is indeed immortal and a nature superior to all destruction, one ought to wait for many arguments, and, having surveyed them, then declare oneself.
That, however, of the things pertaining to us, nothing has come to be more like God than the soul, one might believe without needing much labor — not only on account of the continuous and unceasing character of the motion which it imparts in us, but also on account of the intellect it possesses in itself.
With an eye to this, the natural philosopher of Croton also said that the soul, being immortal, by nature flees all rest, just as the divine bodies do.
But moreover, if one considers, once and for all, the form of the soul, and especially the intellect that rules within us — what great deliberations and impulses it often stirs up — a great likeness to God would appear to one who has understood this.
And next he adds: "For if the soul is shown to be, of all things, most like the divine, what further need is there of other arguments as a preface for proving its immortality, instead of counting this one too as a single argument among the many, sufficient in itself to turn fair-minded people, on the ground that it would not have partaken of activities resembling the divine unless it too were itself divine?"
"For if, though buried in that which is mortal and dissoluble and unintelligible and in itself dead and ever perishing and dissolving into the change of destruction, it both makes and holds this together, and displays its own divine essence, even though overshadowed and hindered by the utterly corruptible form set before it — how, were it separated out in reason, like gold encased in clay, would it not at once manifest its own form, as being like only to God, but also, because it is a partaker of him, and preserves the likenesses in its activities even in its most mortal part, as is the case when it is shut up within the mortal — how, on this very account, would it not fail to be dissolved, seeing that it was of a nature having no share in corruption?"
And a little further down he says: "And it appears divine, reasonably enough, from its likeness to the indivisible, and mortal from those things by which it draws near to what is divisible; and it goes down and it goes up, and it is mortal-like, and it resembles the immortals."
For man is he who indulges his belly and is eager to be sated, like the beasts; but man is also he who, through knowledge, is able to save his ship amid dangers on the sea, and he who saves men in illnesses, and he who discovers the truth, and who has devised methods leading to the apprehension of knowledge — the invention of fire-drills, and the observation of horoscopes, and who has contrived imitations of the works of the Demiurge.
For man devised how to construct on earth the conjunctions of the seven heavenly bodies together with their motions, imitating through mechanisms the things in heaven. And indeed, what has he not devised, thereby demonstrating the divine intellect within himself, made equal to God?
By displaying feats that are Olympian and divine and in no way mortal, man has persuaded the many — who, on account of the self-love arising from their own downward inclination, are unable to see him as he truly is — to judge him, from outward appearances similar to their own, to be likewise merely mortal-seeming; this being but one manner of the consolation that comes from vice: that men, finding rest in the reflection of their own wretchedness through outward appearances, persuade themselves that all men are alike, both in their outward and inward being.
Moses has proved to be the teacher of all these things, who, in recounting the first genesis of man according to the words cited above, confirmed the doctrines concerning the immortality of the soul by means of its likeness to the divine.
But since it has been established that the teachings concerning the incorporeal and unseen essence are consonant and of one mind between Moses and Plato, it is time also to review the remaining parts of Plato's philosophy, and to show that the man is in all things a friend to the Hebrews, except perhaps where he was led astray and brought forward some statement in a more merely human way than accords with the true account.
Thus, of the things said, whatever has been aptly stated by the man would run in agreement with what has been decreed by Moses; but whatever he supposed that did not please Moses and the prophets would not hold together as sound doctrine. This will be shown to us at the fitting time. For now, since it has been discovered, in our contemplation of intelligible things, that what has been laid down is harmonious and consonant, it is time, returning again to the natural philosophy of sensible things, to run briefly through the man's agreement with the Hebrews.
Since Moses has declared this universe to be generated, having come into being by God — for indeed, at the beginning of his own writing, he says, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth," and afterwards, in due order, he adds, "This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth, when it came to be, in the day that God made heaven and earth" — hear how Plato too does not fall short of this thought, writing somewhat as follows:
And again, everything that comes into being necessarily comes into being through some cause; for it is altogether impossible for anything to have a genesis without a cause.
And he adds: "Now this whole heaven, or cosmos, or whatever other name it would most readily accept, let it be so named by us; we must first consider concerning it that which is laid down as necessary to consider first concerning everything: whether it always existed, having no beginning of generation, or whether it came into being, having begun from some beginning."
"It has come into being; for it is visible and tangible and has a body. And all such things are perceptible; and things perceptible, being apprehensible by opinion, have appeared to be generated. And of that which has come into being, we say it is necessary that it came into being through some cause. Now to find the maker and father of this universe is a task, and having found him, to declare him to all is impossible."
And again, next, he says: "Thus, then, according to the likely account, one must say that this cosmos came to be, in truth, a living being endowed with soul and intelligence, through the providence of God."
Again, since Moses has taught that these too are generated, through what he said: "And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven, to give light upon the earth; and let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and for years. And God made the two great lights, and the stars; and he set them in the firmament of heaven" —
Likewise Plato: "From the reason and thought of God (he says), such being the cause with a view to the generation of time, that time might come into being, the sun and moon and five other stars, called by the name of wanderers, came into being for the distinguishing and guarding of the numbers of time. And God, having made bodies for them, set them in their orbits."
But observe whether what has been said by Plato, concerning "the reason and thought of God," would not be similar to that which is said among the Hebrews: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the breath of his mouth all their host." Moreover, since Moses said, "and he set them in the firmament," Plato too has used a similar expression, "set," saying, "And God, having made their bodies, set them in their orbits."
Since the Hebrew scripture, at each of the works of creation, exclaims, "And God saw that it was good," and at the summation of all things says, "And God saw all things, and behold, they were very good" — hear how Plato says: "If, then, this cosmos is beautiful, and its craftsman good, it is clear that he looked to the eternal." And again: "For it is the most beautiful of things that have come to be, and he the best of causes."
And concerning this the whole of Hebrew scripture speaks throughout: at one time through what it says, "And the heaven shall be rolled up like a scroll"; at another time through what it adds, "And there shall be a new heaven and a new earth, which I make to remain before me, says the Lord"; and again elsewhere through what it says, "For the fashion of this world passes away."
And Plato — hear, then, how he establishes this doctrine, saying in the Timaeus: "And he constructed a heaven visible and tangible; and for this reason, out of these and such things, to the number of four, the body of the cosmos was generated, made to agree by means of proportion; and it obtained friendship from these, so that, having come together into the same with itself, it became indissoluble by any other, save by the one who bound it together."
Then he says next: "Time, then, came into being together with heaven, so that, having been generated together, they might also be dissolved together, should some dissolution of them ever occur."
And again, having said: "Gods of gods, of whom I am the craftsman and father of works, which, having come to be through me, are indissoluble so long as I am unwilling that they be dissolved" — he adds, saying next: "Now everything that has been bound is dissoluble; yet to wish to dissolve that which has been well fitted together and is in good condition is the mark of an evil being. Wherefore, since you have come into being, you are not immortal nor altogether indissoluble; yet you shall by no means be dissolved, nor shall you meet the lot of death, having obtained a bond of my will greater still and more sovereign than those bonds with which you were bound together when you came into being."
And in the Statesman the same man says the following: "For this universe, at one time, God himself guides along its course together with it, journeying with it and revolving it together with himself; but at another time he lets it go, whenever its revolutions have already received the measure of time appropriate to it, and it turns again of its own accord in the opposite direction, being a living creature and having received intelligence from the one who fitted it together in the beginning. Now this reversal has become innate to it of necessity, on account of the following." "On account of what, then?"
"To remain forever in the same state and in the same manner, and to be self-identical, befits only the most divine of all things, and the nature of body is not of this order. But that which we have named heaven and cosmos has received a share of many blessed things from him who begot it, yet it has also had a share in body; wherefore it is impossible for it to be entirely without change; yet, so far as it is able, it moves in one and the same motion, in the same place and in the same manner, because it has obtained the cyclical revolution, this being the smallest possible deviation from its own proper motion. But to turn itself continually is possible for scarcely anyone, except for him who leads all things that are moved; and for this one, to move things now in one way and again in the opposite way is not lawful."
"From all these considerations, then, one must say neither that the cosmos always turns itself, nor that it is turned wholly by God in two contrary revolutions, nor again that two gods, thinking things contrary to each other, turn it in opposite directions; but rather, as has just now been said and remains the only alternative, that at one time it is guided along by another divine cause, gaining life again and receiving a renewed immortality supplied by the Demiurge; while at another time, when it has been let go, it goes of itself, released at the proper season in such a way that it travels backward through many myriads of revolutions, because, being the greatest and most perfectly balanced thing, it moves upon the smallest possible pivot."
"It appears, then, that all you have gone through has indeed been said quite reasonably. Let us then, reasoning it out, consider together the phenomenon, from what has now been said, which we affirmed to be the cause of all the marvels. For this is indeed the very thing."
"Which is that?" "That the motion of the universe is at one time carried in the direction in which it now revolves, and at another time in the opposite direction." "How so?" "This change must be considered to be, of all the reversals that occur concerning heaven, the greatest and most complete reversal."