And the third part of the philosophy of the Hebrews—this was the physical part, divided among them as well into the contemplation of intelligible and incorporeal things and into the natural science of sensible things—the prophets, perfect in all respects, both knew and, when occasion called for it, mixed it into their own discourses; having learned it not by conjectures and the pursuit of mortal reasoning, nor priding themselves on human teachers, but ascribing their knowledge to divine inspiration and the inbreathing of a superior power and of the divine Spirit.
From this source, countless things concerning the future were prophesied by them, countless things concerning the constitution of the universe were treated in natural science, and again countless things concerning the nature of animals were expounded, and a great many things too concerning plants were set down by each in his own prophecies.
And Moses, knowing full well the powers of stones, made no incidental use of the contemplation of these in the vestment of the high priest. And again Solomon, if anyone, is attested by the divine Scripture to have excelled in the natural science concerning these things, the Scripture containing as follows:
And Solomon spoke three thousand proverbs, and his songs were five thousand; and he spoke concerning trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon even to the hyssop that grows out of the wall. And he spoke concerning cattle, and concerning birds, and concerning fishes. And all the peoples came to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and he received gifts from all the kings of the earth, as many as had heard of his wisdom.
Setting out from this, he who ascribed all-virtuous Wisdom a voice in his own person said: 'For he gave me unerring knowledge of the things that exist, to know the constitution of the world and the operation of the elements; the beginning, the end, and the middle of times; the alterations of the solstices and the changes of seasons; the cycles of the year and the positions of the stars; the natures of living creatures and the tempers of wild beasts; the violent force of winds and the reasonings of men; the diversities of plants and the powers of roots; and I learned all things that are hidden and unseen, for Wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me.'
Again, the same Solomon, treating in natural science the flowing nature of bodily substance, says in Ecclesiastes: 'Vanity of vanities, all is vanity. What profit has a man in all his labor which he labors under the sun?' And he adds: 'What is that which has been? The very thing that shall be. And what is that which has been done? The very thing that shall be done. And there is nothing new under the sun.'
Such, then, and things like these, were treated by him in natural science concerning bodily substance. And you would find, on going through the other wise men of the Hebrews as well, that they were not without a share of the same knowledge. For, as I said already before, countless things have been said by them concerning plants, and concerning the nature of animals, both those on land and those in the water, and moreover of birds.
Indeed, concerning the stars in heaven too—for of the Bear, and the Pleiades, and Orion, and Arcturus (which the Greeks are wont to call Arctophylax and Boötes)—no ordinary mention is found in the writings of those named.
But also concerning the constitution of the world, the matters concerning the alteration and change of the universe, concerning the substance of the soul, and the nature of all rational beings, both visible and invisible creation, and universal providence—and, before all these, the matters concerning the first cause of all things, and the theology of the second, and the accounts and contemplations of the other things graspable by the mind alone—they have grasped these very well and precisely, so that one would not err in saying that those among the Greeks who afterward investigated the nature of these things followed after, as younger men after their elders.
So much, then, concerning the natural science of the universe. But having divided their discourse on these matters in two, they did not think it necessary to bring the account concerning sensible things out to the multitude in its full extremity, nor to teach the common crowd fully the causes of the nature of existing things, except so much as was necessary to know: namely, that the universe has not come to be of itself, nor subsists at random and by chance from irrational motion, but is guided by God's word as by a charioteer, and is governed by the power of an ineffable wisdom.
But concerning the intelligible things—that they exist and what they are, and in what manner they stand as to order, power, and distinction—this has been stated and set down in the sacred books, and handed down as something to be heard aloud by all, so far as it was necessary for those laying claim to piety to know, for the taking up of a reverent and sober life.
But the deep and hidden discourse concerning these matters they left to be sought and taught in secret, for those capable of being initiated into such things. It would be well to go through, briefly and in outline, a little of this contemplation as well, and to show that Plato, in this too, held views congenial to what has been stated.
Not only so, but concerning the instruction and contemplation of intelligible and incorporeal things also, the admirable Plato is clearly shown, through his own words, to have followed the all-wise Moses and the prophets of the Hebrews—whether he learned it from a report that had reached him (since it is established that he spent his time in Egypt at that period, at the very time when the Hebrews, having fallen away from their own land a second time, were sojourning among the Egyptians, the Persians then being in power), or whether he himself, on his own, grasped the nature of things, or whether he was in some manner or other deemed worthy by God of this knowledge. For, as it is said, 'God manifested it to them; for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, both his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse.' You may learn what has been said by considering the matter somewhat as follows:
Moses, in his sacred revelations, having recorded an oracle spoken in the person of God: 'I am the One who is. Thus shall you say to the sons of Israel: the One who is has sent me to you'—thereby setting forth God as, strictly speaking, the only one who truly 'is', and declaring that he alone has been deemed worthy, properly and fittingly, of this appellation.
And again, Solomon having declared concerning the coming-into-being and perishing of sensible and bodily things: 'What is that which has been? The very thing that shall be. And what is that which has been done? The very thing that shall be done. And there is nothing new under the sun, of which one shall speak and say, See, this is new: it has already been in the ages that were before us.'
In accordance with these things, we too divide the universe into two, into the intelligible and the sensible; and we define the intelligible as incorporeal and rational in nature, incorruptible and immortal, while the sensible exists in flux and corruption, in change and alteration of substance; and, summing up all things into one first principle, we hold as dogma that the one Unbegotten and truly and properly Existent is one—the cause of all things, both incorporeal and corporeal.
Observe how Plato, having scraped off not only the thought but even the very words and expressions of the Hebrew Scripture, appropriates the doctrine as his own, explaining it at greater length somewhat as follows: 'What is that which always is and has no becoming? And what is that which is always becoming and never is? The one is apprehensible by thought with reason, ever being in the same state; the other is opinable by irrational sense-perception, coming to be and perishing, and never truly is.'
Has not, then, the admirable man clearly been shown to have transformed the oracle spoken in Moses, 'I am the One who is', into 'What is that which always is and has no becoming?'—and to have explained this even more plainly in saying that the 'existent' is nothing other than that which is not seen by the eyes of flesh, but is apprehended by the mind? For, having asked what the 'existent' is, he answers himself, saying that it is 'that which is apprehensible by thought with reason'.
And the Solomonic saying, 'What has been? The very thing that shall be; and what has been done? The very thing that shall be done', he would clearly appear to have translated in almost the same words, when he says that the other is 'opinable by irrational sense-perception, coming to be and perishing, and never truly existing'. To which he adds:
For all these are parts of time -- the "was" and the "shall be" -- which we, in applying them to the eternal essence, unwittingly and wrongly transfer. For we say that it "was", "is", and "shall be"; but in truth, according to the true account, only "is" belongs properly to it; while "was" and "shall be" are fitting to be said concerning becoming that proceeds in time, for these are motions. But that which is ever in the same state, unmoved, cannot properly become older or younger through time, nor ever come to be, nor have now come to be, nor be about to be at all hereafter, nor any of those things at all which becoming has attached to things borne about in sense-perception; rather, these have come to be as forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to number. And besides these, there are also such statements as: the thing that has come to be is a thing that has come to be, and the thing that is coming to be is a thing that is coming to be; and further, the thing that shall come to be is a thing that shall come to be.
And lest anyone should think that we are misinterpreting the philosopher's words, I shall make use of commentaries that set forth the meaning of these sayings. Many, indeed, have applied themselves to the contemplation of these matters, but for me it suffices for now to cite the words of a distinguished man, Numenius the Pythagorean, which he sets forth somewhat as follows in the second book of his treatise On the Good:
'Come, then, let us, with all the power we have, be led up as close as possible to the Existent, and let us say: the Existent neither ever was, nor will it ever not come to be, but it exists always in a definite time, the present alone.'
'Now if anyone wishes to call this present time "eternity", I too agree; but as for the past time, we must consider that, having already escaped, it has escaped, and has fled away into no-longer-being; and again, the future does not yet exist, but it promises that it will be of such a kind as to come into being.'
'It is not, therefore, reasonable, in any way whatsoever, to suppose that the Existent either is not, or is no longer, or is not yet. For if this were said in this way, one great impossibility would arise in the argument: that the same thing should at once be and not be.'
'But if this is so, then hardly could anything else exist at all, if the Existent itself, according to its very being, were not existent. For the Existent is eternal and stable, ever in the same state; it has neither come to be and then perished, nor has it grown and then diminished; nor has it ever become more or less; and, in fact, among all else, it will not even be moved in respect of place.'
'For it is not lawful for it to be moved-neither backward nor forward; neither ever upward nor downward; nor will the Existent ever pass to the right or to the left; nor will it ever move about its own center; but rather it will stand fixed, and will be firm and stationary, holding itself ever in the same manner and condition.'
And next, after other matters, he adds: 'So much, then, for me by way of preface. But I myself will no longer put on airs, nor will I say that I do not know the name of the incorporeal; for indeed it is now already, I think, more pleasant to speak than not to speak. And so I say plainly that its name is this -- the very thing long sought after.'
But let no one laugh, if I say that the name of the incorporeal is 'being' and 'that which is'. The reason for the name 'being' is that it has not come into being, nor will it be destroyed, nor does it admit any other motion at all, nor any change for the better or the worse; but it is simple and unchangeable, and in the same form, and neither willingly departs from its sameness nor is compelled thereto by another.
And Plato too said in the Cratylus that names are themselves imposed as likenesses of the things they name. Let it then be granted and decided that 'being' is incorporeal.
Then, descending a little further, he adds: 'I said that being is incorporeal, and this is the intelligible.' Such, then, so far as I can recall, were the things said. But I wish to console the one who seeks a further account, by saying just this much: that if these things do not agree with the doctrines of Plato, still one ought to think them the sayings of some other great man, of great power, such as Pythagoras.
At any rate Plato says—come, let me recall how he puts it: 'What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never is? The one is apprehensible by understanding with reason, the other is opinable by opinion with irrational sense-perception, coming to be and perishing, but never really being.'
For he asked what 'being' is, declaring it unquestionably to be unbegotten. For he said that 'being' has no becoming; for otherwise it would be subject to change; and being changeable, it would not be eternal.
Then, going on a little further, he says: 'If then Being is altogether and in every way eternal and unchangeable, and in no way whatsoever departs from itself, but remains fixed according to the same and in the same manner, this surely would be that which is apprehensible by understanding with reason.'
But if body flows and is carried along by unremitting change, it slips away and is not. Whence is it not great madness to deny that this is indeterminate, and opinable only by opinion, and, as Plato says, coming to be and perishing, but never really being?
These, then, are the words of Numenius, interpreting more clearly at once the doctrines of Plato and, much earlier still, those of Moses. Fittingly indeed is that saying passed around concerning him, by which he is remembered to have said: 'For what is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek?'
Consider, in addition to these things, whether Plutarch too, unfolding the present thought at greater length, does not run in accord with both the sayings of the philosophers set forth above and, again, those of the Hebrews laid down in other theological writings, in which at one time God, speaking as an oracle, is introduced saying: 'For I am the Lord your God, and I have not changed.'
And at another time, looking to him, the prophet directs his speech, saying that indeed all visible things might at some time be turned and changed, 'but You are the same, and Your years shall not fail.' Consider, then, whether—taken as it were as premises—the saying in Moses, 'I am He who is,' together with 'I am the Lord your God, and I have not changed,' and 'But You are the same,' might seem to be the very thought that Plutarch interprets in his treatise On the E at Delphi, where he speaks in these very words:
I think, then, that the letter signifies neither number, nor order, nor conjunction, nor any other of the deficient parts of speech; but it is a complete address and invocation of God, which, together with the utterance, establishes the speaker in the conception of the power of God.
For God, as it were greeting each of us who approach here, addresses us with 'Know thyself,' which is in no way less than 'Hail'; and we, in turn, replying to God, say 'Thou art,' rendering to Him alone, as alone fitting, the address 'Thou art,' as true and free from falsehood.
For we in truth have no share at all in being, but every mortal nature, existing in the midst of destruction and generation, presents only a phantom and a dim, unstable semblance of itself.
But if one presses the mind, wishing to grasp it firmly, just as a vigorous grip on water, by squeezing and gathering it together, causes what is enclosed to slip away and be lost, so too reason, pursuing too vigorously the activity of each thing subject to passion and change, is thrown off course, in one direction toward its coming-to-be, in another toward its perishing, being unable to lay hold of anything that abides, or that truly is.
For it is not possible, according to Heraclitus, to step into the same river twice, nor to touch mortal substance twice in the same condition; but by the sharpness and speed of change it scatters and gathers again—or rather, not even 'again' nor 'afterward,' but at once it forms and departs, and approaches and withdraws.
Whence its becoming never arrives at being, since generation never ceases nor comes to rest, but, ever changing from seed, it makes first an embryo, then an infant, then a child, next a boy, a youth, a man, an elder, an old man, destroying the earlier stages of birth and age by those that come after.
But we, ridiculously, are afraid of death, though we have already died and are dying so many times over. For it is not only, as Heraclitus said, that fire's death is air's birth, but even more clearly in our own case: the man in his prime perishes when the old man comes to be; the young man perished into the man in his prime, and the boy into the young man, and the infant into the boy; and he of yesterday has died into him of today, and he of today into him of tomorrow; and not one of us abides, nor is any one of us one, but we become many, revolving around a single phantom and common mold of matter, driven round and slipping away.
Since, if we remained the same, how is it that we now rejoice in different things than before, love and hate opposite things, admire and blame different things, employ different words, different feelings, no longer having the same form, shape, or thought?
For it is not likely that one should undergo different experiences without change, nor could one who changes remain the same. And if he is not the same, he does not truly exist either, but by changing he becomes another out of another; and sense-perception is deceived through ignorance of what truly is, taking the appearance for the reality.
What, then, is that which truly is? That which is eternal, unbegotten, and incorruptible, to which no time brings any change. For time is something movable, imagined together with matter in motion, ever flowing and not holding fast, like a vessel of destruction and generation. Of it, the words 'afterward' and 'before,' and 'it will be,' and 'it has come to be,' are, of themselves, a confession of that which is not.
For to say of that which has not yet come into being, or has already ceased to be, that 'it is,' is foolish and absurd. And that in which we especially fix our thought, uttering of time the words 'it stands,' 'it is present,' and 'now,' this in turn, when reason is loosened and examines it, is destroyed and lost.
For it is squeezed out into the future and the past, like a ray of light, being necessarily divided for those who wish to observe it. And if the nature that is measured undergoes the same experience as that which measures it, then it too neither abides in itself, nor exists, but comes to be and perishes in accordance with its distribution in relation to time.
Whence it is not fitting to say of that which truly is, 'it was' or 'it will be'; for these are certain inflections, transitions, and variations belonging to that which is not by nature able to abide in being.
But God is—if one must say so—and He is according to no time at all, but according to the motionless, timeless, and unbending age, in which there is nothing before, nor after, nor future, nor past, nor older, nor younger; but being one, He has, in one single 'now,' filled up eternity; and He alone is, according to Himself, that which truly is—not having come to be, nor about to be, nor having begun, nor about to cease.
Thus, then, worshipping it, we must greet and address it, or indeed, by Zeus, as some of the ancients did, say 'Thou art One.' For the divine is not many, as each of us is—a motley, festival-mixed aggregate arising out of countless differences in our experiences; rather, that which is must be one, just as 'being' means 'the One'; but otherness, being a difference from that which is, passes over into the becoming of that which is not.
Since Moses and all the prophets among the Hebrews teach that the divine is unspeakable, and indicate the symbol of the unspeakable name by means of the notation among them that cannot be pronounced, hear what Plato too, in agreement with them, says in nearly the same words in the Great Letter:
For it is by no means expressible, as other branches of learning are, but from much converse concerning the matter itself and from living together, suddenly, as a light kindled by a leaping fire, it is born in the soul and from then on nourishes itself. And this very illustration of the light was anticipated and set forth by another Hebrew prophet, who said, 'The light of Your countenance, O Lord, has been marked upon us.' And another again said, 'In Your light we shall see light.'
Since Moses, concerning the God of the universe, said, 'Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord,' Plato again, agreeing with this, teaches that there is one God, just as there is one heaven, speaking somewhat as follows in the Timaeus:
Have we, then, rightly spoken of one heaven, or would it have been more correct to speak of many, indeed infinite, heavens? It must be one, if indeed it is to have been fashioned according to the pattern. For that which comprehends all the intelligible living beings there are could never be a second alongside another.
It is clear that he knew of one God, even though, in accordance with Greek custom, he was accustomed to use the plural designation; and this is evident also from the letter to Dionysius, in which, giving a sign to distinguish the letters written by him in earnest from those otherwise discarded, he said that he would place at the head of those having no serious mark the name 'of the gods,' but of those composed by him with careful thought, the name 'of God.' He speaks, then, word for word, as follows:
Now concerning the sign relating to the letters, distinguishing those which I send in earnest and those which I do not, I think you remember; nevertheless, bear it in mind and pay very close attention. For there are many who urge me to write, whom it is not easy openly to refuse. The earnest letter, then, begins with 'God'; the other begins with 'gods.'
And the same man expressly acknowledges that he had learned the doctrine concerning God from ancient times, saying in the Laws: 'God, then, as the ancient account also has it, holding the beginning, the end, and the middle of all things that are, proceeds straight on, moving in a circuit according to nature. And Justice always follows with him, as avenger of those who fall short of the divine law; and he who is about to be happy follows closely with her, humble and adorned; but whoever, exalted by arrogance, or puffed up by wealth, or honors, or bodily beauty, together with youth and folly, is inflamed in soul with insolence, so as to need neither ruler nor any guide, but even thinks himself fit to lead others—such a one is left destitute of God; and being so abandoned, and moreover taking to himself others of the same kind, he leaps about, throwing everything into confusion together, and to many he seems to be somebody; but after no long time, having paid a penalty to Justice not to be scorned, he utterly ruins himself, his household, and his city.'
These are the words of Plato. But do you, alongside 'God, then, holding the beginning, the end, and the middle of all things that are,' set the saying from Hebrew prophecy: 'I am God, the first, and I am after these things'; and alongside 'proceeds straight on according to nature,' set 'His countenance beholds uprightness.'
And against 'Justice always follows with him, as avenger of those who fall short of the divine law,' compare 'The Lord is righteous and has loved righteousness'; and 'Vengeance is Mine, I will repay, says the Lord'; and 'For the Lord is an avenger, and repays those who exceedingly practice arrogance.' And against 'he who is about to be happy follows closely, humble,' the corresponding thing is 'You shall walk after the Lord your God.'
And against 'he who, exalted by arrogance, is left destitute of God,' set 'God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble'; and 'the joy of the ungodly ends in a monstrous downfall.' These, then, are a few things out of countless many concerning the God over all. But consider also what is said, in thought, concerning the second cause.
Let what concerns the first cause of all things, then, be agreed upon by us in this manner. But examine also what concerns the second cause, whom indeed the oracles of the Hebrews teach to be the Word of God and God from God, just as we ourselves have been taught to speak theologically.
Moses, then, expressly speaks theologically of two Lords, where he says, 'And the Lord rained down from the Lord fire and brimstone upon the city of the impious'; there, as usual, in referring to the two, he made the same juxtaposition of characters among the Hebrews; and this is the theology among them expressed through the four letters, which is not to be pronounced aloud.
And with this David also, another prophet who was at once a king of the Hebrews, agrees, saying: 'The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at My right hand'—indicating the God who is highest by the first 'Lord,' and the second one, who comes after Him, by the second title. For to whom else would it be right to suppose that the right hand of the unbegotten Deity is yielded, except to Him alone of whom our discourse speaks?
This same prophet, in other places, more clearly declares him to be the Word of the Father, positing that the one thus spoken of theologically is the Creator of all things, where he says, 'By the Word of the Lord the heavens were made firm.'
And his son and successor, Solomon, presenting the same thought under a different name, calling it 'Wisdom' instead of 'Word,' relates the following as if from her own person:
'I, Wisdom, dwell with counsel, and I have called upon knowledge and understanding.' Then afterwards he adds: 'The Lord created me the beginning of His ways for His works; He founded me before the age, in the beginning, before He made the earth, before the mountains were settled; and before all the hills He begets me. When He was preparing the heaven, I was present with Him.'
And again from the same book are these words: 'God, by Wisdom, founded the earth, and by understanding He prepared the heavens.' And further, these words too are said to be from the same source: 'I have known both what is hidden and what is manifest; for Wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me.'
Then he adds: 'What, then, is Wisdom, and how did she come to be? I will declare, and will not hide mysteries from you, but will trace them out from the beginning of her generation.'
And next he explains as follows: 'She is a spirit that is intelligent, holy, one of a kind, many-parted, subtle, easily moving, clear, undefiled, all-powerful, all-surveying, and pervading through all spirits that are intelligent, pure, most subtle. For Wisdom is more mobile than any motion. She pervades and passes through all things because of her purity. For she is a vapor of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty. Therefore nothing defiled falls into her. For she is a reflection of eternal light, and a spotless mirror of the working of God, and an image of His goodness. She reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things well.' These, then, are the words of Scripture. But Philo the Hebrew, interpreting the meaning of this doctrine more clearly, sets it forth in the following manner:
For it is fitting for those who have set their fellowship toward knowledge to desire to see That Which Is; but if they are not able, then at least to see His image, the most sacred Word.
And in the same treatise he also says this: 'And even if one does not yet happen to be worthy to be called a son of God, let him strive to be adorned according to His firstborn Word, the eldest of the angels, as being an archangel of many names.'
For he is called Beginning, and the Name of God, and Word, and the Man according to the image, and the one who sees, that is, Israel. Wherefore I was led, a little earlier, to praise the virtues of those who say that we are all sons of one man.
For even if we have not yet become worthy to be considered children of God, still we may strive to be children of His invisible image, the most sacred Word; for the Word, the eldest, is the image of God.
And again he adds: 'I have heard, moreover, that one of the companions of Moses uttered such an oracle: Behold, a man whose name is Dawn.' A most novel appellation, if you suppose it is said of one composed of body and soul; but if of that incorporeal one, bearing the divine form, you will readily acknowledge that the name Dawn was most fittingly applied to him.
For this is the eldest son whom the Father of all caused to rise, whom elsewhere he named the firstborn. And indeed the one begotten, imitating the ways of the Father, looking to His archetypal patterns, formed the visible forms.