But we must come to the examination of the evils, and of necessity inquire into the things among men. Are the evils among men species of evil, or parts of it? For if you should wish to say that these are species of that, there is nothing else besides these that is evil in itself, since the genera are examined within the species. For instance, 'living being' is a genus predicated according to species — that is, according to man and the like, all that, being ensouled, have voluntary motion; but it is shown that this cannot be the case. For we do not say that the genus is some other thing existing in itself apart from the species; thus indeed it is necessary to speak also concerning evil. For we said that the genus has its constitution within the species, and is not some other thing existing in itself. And if this is so, the evil will be created; for the species are shown to be created — for instance, murder and adultery and the things like these. But if again, on the other hand, you should wish these to be parts of some evil, while these are created, it is necessary that that too be created. For things whose parts are created are likewise of necessity created; for the whole is composed of parts. And the whole will not exist if the parts do not exist, while the parts will exist even if the whole is not present. But of none of the things that are is one part created and another part again uncreated. And even if I should concede this to the argument, there was once a time when the evil was, while it was not whole — that is, before God fashioned matter. And it becomes whole then, when man came to be by God; for man is the maker of the parts of evil. And of evil's being thereafter whole, the cause will be God who fashioned — which it does not seem to me to be well to say this concerning God. And if you should wish to say neither of these, but should say that it is a certain action of some evil, you signify that it is created; for the action of someone takes a beginning of being. Moreover, besides these, you cannot say that evil is anything else besides these. For what other evil action can you point to besides those among men? For that the one who acts is evil not according to the account of substance, but according to the manner of choice, choosing to do such things from which he takes the appellation of being called evil — this I showed beforehand in the argument.