詞源與文集 第 2 章 第 1/6 段

Isidore: Etymologies, Book II. I. ON RHETORIC AND ITS NAME. [1] Rhetoric is the science of speaking well in civil questions, an abundance of eloquence for persuading toward what is just and good. It is called 'Rhetoric' by a Greek appellation, apo tou rhetorizein, that is, from abundance of speech; for among the Greeks 'rhesis' means speech, and 'rhetor' an orator. 2

Rhetoric, moreover, is joined to the art of Grammar. For in Grammar we learn the science of speaking correctly, but in Rhetoric we perceive how we may set forth the things we have learned. II. ON THE INVENTORS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC. [1] This discipline was invented by the Greeks - by Gorgias, Aristotle, and Hermagoras - and was carried over into Latin, namely by Cicero and Quintilian

[and Titianus], but so copiously and so variously that for the reader it is easy to admire it, yet impossible to master it wholly. [2] For while the parchments are held before one, the sequence of the discourse clings, as it were, to the memory, but as soon as they are laid aside all recollection slips away. Perfect knowledge of this discipline makes an orator. III. ON THE NAME OF THE ORATOR AND THE PARTS OF RHETORIC. [1] An orator, then, is

a good man, skilled in speaking. A good man is constituted by nature, character, and accomplishments. Skill in speaking consists of artful eloquence, which is made up of five parts - invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery - and of the end of its function, which is to persuade of something. [2] But the skill of speaking itself consists in three things: nature, learning, and practice.

Nature [lies] in native talent, learning in knowledge, practice in assiduity. For these are what are looked for not only in an orator but in every skilled craftsman, that he may accomplish something. IV. ON THE THREE KINDS OF CASES. [1] There are three kinds of cases: deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial. The deliberative kind is that in which it is treated, concerning any of the useful things of life, what

ought or ought not to be done. The demonstrative kind is that in which a person is shown to be praiseworthy or blameworthy. [2] The judicial kind is that in which, concerning the deed of the person himself, a sentence of either punishment or reward is given. It is called 'judicial' for this reason, that it judges a man and by its verdict shows whether he is praiseworthy and worthy of reward, or else guilty, to be condemned

and freed from punishment. [3] The deliberative kind is so called because in it deliberation is made about each matter. This kind is twofold: persuasion and dissuasion - that is, concerning what is to be sought and what is to be avoided, that is, concerning what is to be done and not to be done. [4] Persuasion is divided into three topics: the honourable, the useful, and the possible. It differs somewhat from the deliberative, because persuasion requires

another person, whereas the deliberative sometimes deals even with oneself. In persuasion there are two things that prevail most: hope and fear. [5] The 'demonstrative' is so called because it demonstrates each matter either by praising or by blaming. This kind has two species: praise and blame. The order of praise is distinguished by three periods: before the man himself, during him, and after him. [6]

Before the man himself, as (Virgil, Aeneid 1,605): 'What ages so glad brought you forth?' During him, as (Aeneid 1,597): 'O you who alone have pitied the unspeakable toils of Troy.' After him, as (Aeneid 1,607): 'While rivers run down into the sea, while shadows sweep across the mountain slopes, ever shall your honour and your name and your praises abide.' [7] In like order, but conversely, in the blame of a man as well

this same form is to be observed: before the man, during the man, after the man. The 'common topic' (locus communis) belongs to the demonstrative kind of blame, yet it differs from it in something. For blame, which is the contrary of praise, is applied specifically to a particular person who does [some deed]. [8] But the common topic is set forth generally against the crime of a deed. Whence indeed it is called a 'common topic,'

because, the person being absent, it is set forth not so much against the man as against the crime itself. For every vice is found not in one man alone, but also in common in many. V. ON THE TWOFOLD ISSUE OF CASES. [1] Among the rhetoricians, the 'status' (issue) is said to be that thing in which the case consists, that is, its constitution. The Greeks call the 'status' from contention, 'stasis.' But the Latins [name it] not only from

the fight by which they overthrow the adversary's proposition, but [name it thus] because in it each party takes its stand. It arises from accusation (intentio) and repulsion (depulsio). [2] The issues of cases are two: rational and legal. From the rational arise conjecture, definition, quality, and transference. From definition arise the judicial and the negotial. From the judicial arise the absolute and the assumptive. From the assumptive arise concession,

the removal of the charge, the transfer of the charge, and counterbalancing. From concession arise exculpation and entreaty. [3] The conjectural issue is when a deed, charged against one man, is utterly denied by that man. The definitive issue is when what is charged is contended not to be this [thing], but what it is is proved by applying definitions. Quality is when it is asked of what character a thing is; and because

the controversy is carried on concerning the force and kind of the matter, it is called the general constitution. [4] Transference is when the case depends on this, that either the one who ought does not seem to be acting, or [the suit is brought] not before those [before whom], nor at the time, under the law, on the charge, or with the penalty that it ought to be. It is a transferential constitution, because the action seems to require transference and change. [5] The judicial issue is that in

which the nature of the equitable and the right, and the reckoning of rewards or punishments, is inquired into. The negotial issue is that in which what is lawful according to civil custom and equity is considered. The assumptive is that which of itself yields nothing firm for refutation [but takes up some defence from without]. [6] Concession is when the defendant does not defend the thing that was done, but asks that it be pardoned.

This we have shown to pertain to penitents. The removal of the charge is when the defendant attempts, by force and power, to shift onto another the charge that is brought against him and against his own fault. [7] The transfer of the charge is when the deed is said to have been done rightfully, because someone had previously been provoked by an injury. Comparison is when it is contended that some other deed of another person was honourable or useful,

and that, in order that it might be done, the thing which is charged is said to have been committed. [8] Exculpation is when the deed is indeed admitted, but the fault is removed. This has three parts: imprudence, chance, and necessity. Entreaty is when the defendant confesses both that he has sinned and that he has sinned deliberately, and yet asks to be pardoned. This kind can very rarely occur. [9] Likewise, from the legal

issue these arise, that is: the letter and the intent (scriptum et voluntas), contrary laws, ambiguity, inference or reasoning, and legal definition. 'The letter and the intent' is when the words themselves seem to be at variance with the writer's meaning. The issue of contrary laws is when two or more laws are recognized to disagree with one another. Ambiguity is when what is written

seems to signify two or more things. Inference or reasoning is when, from what is written, something else also, which is not written, is discovered. Legal definition is when the force [of a term], as in a definitive constitution, in what it is placed, is inquired into. [10] Therefore the issues, both rational and legal, are by some more precisely counted as eighteen

in all. But according to Cicero's Rhetorica nineteen are found, because he principally fixed transference among the rational issues; then Cicero, correcting even himself, applied transference to the legal issues. VI. ON THE THREEFOLD CONTROVERSY. [1] According to Cicero, the threefold controversy is either simple or conjoined. And if it is conjoined,

it must be considered whether it is conjoined out of several questions, or out of some comparison. A simple controversy is one that contains a single, self-contained question, in this manner: 'Do we declare war on the Corinthians, or not?' [2] It is conjoined out of several questions when several things are asked in this way: 'Whether Carthage should be destroyed, or restored to the Carthaginians, or whether a

colony be established there?' From comparison, it is asked which is preferable, or what is most preferable, in this manner: 'Whether an army should be sent into Macedonia against Philip, to be a help to our allies, or whether it should be kept in Italy, so that there may be the greatest possible forces against Hannibal?' VII. ON THE FOUR PARTS OF A SPEECH. [1] The parts of a speech in the art of Rhetoric are four: the exordium,

...narration, argumentation, and conclusion. Of these the first rouses the hearer's mind, the second sets forth the events, the third lends credit to the assertions, and the fourth embraces the end of the whole speech. [2] We must therefore make our beginning in such a way as to render the hearer well-disposed, teachable, and attentive: well-disposed by entreaty, teachable by instruction, attentive by stirring him up. The narration must be delivered

in such a way that we speak briefly and clearly; the argumentation must be conducted so that first we establish our own case, and then we shatter the opposing one; the conclusion must be so framed that we stir the minds of our hearers to fulfil what we say. VIII. ON THE FIVE KINDS OF CASES. [1] The kinds of cases are five: [that is,] the honourable, the astonishing, the lowly, the doubtful, and the obscure. The honourable is that kind of case to which

the hearer's mind at once shows favour without any speech of ours. The astonishing is that from which the minds of those who are to hear are estranged. The lowly is that which is disregarded by the hearer. [2] The doubtful is that in which either the judgement is uncertain, or the case partakes of both honour and baseness, so that it produces both goodwill and offence. The obscure is that in which either the hearers are slow, or

the case is seen to be entangled in matters too difficult to be understood. IX. ON SYLLOGISMS. [1] What in Greek is called a syllogism is in Latin termed argumentation. And it is called argumentation as it were the discourse of a keen (arguta) mind, by which we work out a probable finding. A syllogism, then, is the final conclusion of a proposition, an assumption, and a confirmation, drawn either from the uncertainty of one who is in doubt,

or from the confidence of one who gives approval. [2] For it consists of three parts: the proposition, the assumption, and the conclusion. By the proposition, for example: 'that which is good cannot have a base use.' The hearer agreed; he assumed: 'money has a base use.' It is concluded: 'therefore money is not a good.' [3] Syllogisms, moreover, are used not only by rhetoricians but especially by

dialecticians, although the Apostle often propounds, assumes, confirms, and concludes: which things, as we have said, belong properly to the arts of Dialectic and Rhetoric. [4] Among the rhetoricians there are two principal kinds of syllogism: induction and ratiocination. Induction has three members: the first is the proposition, the second the inference, which is also called the assumption, and the third the conclusion.

[5] Induction is that which by matters not in doubt secures the assent of the person to whom it is directed, whether it is set up among philosophers, or among rhetoricians, or among those engaged in conversation. The proposition of an induction is that which necessarily brings in likenesses of one or more things whose point is to be granted. [6] The inference of an induction, which is also called the assumption, is that which

introduces the matter in dispute, and for whose sake the likenesses were adduced. The conclusion of an induction is that which either confirms the granting of the inference, or declares what is accomplished from it. Ratiocination is a discourse by which the point in question is proved. [7] There are two modes of ratiocination. The first is the enthymeme, which is an imperfect and rhetorical syllogism. The second is

the epicheireme, which is a rhetorical and broader syllogism. [8] The enthymeme, then, is rendered in Latin as 'a conception of the mind,' which the writers of handbooks are wont to call an imperfect syllogism. For its argumentative form consists in two parts, when, passing over the law of syllogisms, it employs that which pertains to producing belief, as in this instance: 'If the storm is to be avoided,

then one must not set sail.' For it is agreed to be complete from the proposition and conclusion alone, whence it has been judged to suit rhetoricians rather than dialecticians. [9] The members of the enthymeme are five: the first the convincing, the second the demonstrative, the third the sententious, the fourth the exemplary, the fifth the collective. [10] The convincing is that which by evident reasoning

is proven, as Cicero did in the speech For Milo (79): 'You sit, then, as avengers of his death, whose life, if you should think it could be restored by you, you would be unwilling to restore.' The demonstrative is that which binds fast by a sure demonstration of the matter, as Cicero in Against Catiline (1,2): 'Yet this man lives, nay, he even comes into the Senate.' The sententious is that which a general maxim brings forward, as in Terence

(Andria 68): 'Compliance wins friends, truth wins hatred.' [12] The exemplary is that which by the comparison of some example threatens a like outcome, as Cicero in the Philippics (2,1): 'I marvel at you, Antony, that you do not dread the ends of those whose examples you imitate.' [13] The collective is when the things that have been argued are gathered into one, as Cicero says For Milo (41):