The book which you sent, most dear sons Timasius and James, I read through — laying aside for a little while the things that were in hand — cursorily indeed, yet with no slight attention; and I saw a man kindled with the most ardent zeal against those who, when they ought to accuse the human will in their own sins, rather accuse the nature of men and attempt through it to excuse themselves. He blazed exceedingly against this pestilence, which even the authors of secular letters gravely reproved, exclaiming: 'The human race complains falsely of its own nature.' This very sentiment indeed he too pressed home with all the powers of talent he could. Yet nevertheless I fear that he may rather give support to those who have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge;
for being ignorant of God's righteousness, and wishing to establish their own, they have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God. But what the righteousness of God is, of which he here speaks, he consequently discloses, adding: 'For the end of the law is Christ, unto righteousness to every one that believeth.' This righteousness of God, therefore — established not in the precept of the law, whereby fear is struck into us, but in the aid of the grace of Christ, to which alone the fear of the law, as of a schoolmaster, usefully leads — he who understands to be so established, himself understands why he is a Christian. For if righteousness is through the law, then Christ died in vain.
But if he did not die in vain, then in him alone is the ungodly justified — the ungodly for whom, believing in him who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned unto righteousness. 'For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God, being justified freely through his blood.' But whosoever are thought not to belong to these 'all who have sinned and come short of the glory of God,' assuredly have no need to become Christians, because they that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick; whence he came not to call the righteous, but sinners.
And through this, the nature of the human race, procreated from the flesh of that one transgressor — if it can suffice for itself to fulfill the law and perfect righteousness — ought to be secure concerning its reward, that is, concerning eternal life, even if in some nation or in some earlier time the faith of Christ's blood was hidden from it. For God is not unjust, who would defraud the just of the reward of righteousness, if the sacrament of Christ's divinity and humanity, which was manifested in the flesh, was not announced to them. For how shall they believe what they have not heard? or how shall they hear without a preacher? For faith comes by hearing, as it is written, and hearing by the word of Christ. But I say, he says: have they not heard?
'Their sound went out into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.' But before this began to happen, before, in fine, that very preaching should reach unto the ends of the whole earth — since there are not yet lacking the remotest nations, though, as is reported, very few, to whom this has not yet been preached — what is human nature to do, or what has it done, which either did not hear beforehand that this was to come, or does not yet know that it has been done, except by believing in God, who made heaven and earth, by whom it perceives that it too was naturally made, and by living rightly to fulfill his will, though imbued with no faith in the passion and resurrection of Christ? But if this could be done, or can be done, this too I say, which the apostle said concerning the law:
'Then Christ died in vain.' For if he said this of the law which one nation, the Jews, received, how much more justly is it said of the law of nature, which the whole human race received: 'If righteousness is through nature, then Christ died in vain'! But if Christ did not die in vain, then the whole of human nature can in no way be justified and redeemed from the most just wrath of God — that is, from vengeance — except through faith and the sacrament of the blood of Christ. For the nature of man was at first created blameless and without any fault; but this nature of man, in which each one is born of Adam, now needs a physician, because it is not sound. All the good things indeed which it has in its formation, its life,
its senses, its mind, it has from the most high God, its Creator and Maker. But the fault which darkens and weakens these natural goods, so that it has need of illumination and healing, was not contracted from the blameless Maker, but from original sin, which was committed by free will. And through this, the penal nature belongs to the most just vengeance. For if we are now in Christ a new creature, yet we were by nature children of wrath, even as others; but God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, by whose grace we are saved.
This grace of Christ, therefore, without which neither infants nor those grown in age can be saved, is not rendered for merits, but is given freely — on account of which it is called grace. 'Being justified,' he says, 'freely through his blood.' Whence those who are not freed through it — as, because they could not yet hear, or because they would not obey; or even, when through their age they could not hear, they did not receive the laver of regeneration which they could have received, through which they might have been saved — are assuredly justly condemned, because they are not without sin, whether that which they drew originally, or that which they added by evil habits: for all have sinned — whether in Adam or in themselves — and come short of the glory of God.
The entire mass, therefore, owes penalties; and if the due punishment of damnation were rendered to all, it would without doubt be rendered not unjustly. Those, therefore, who are freed from it through grace, are called not vessels of their own merits, but vessels of mercy. But of whose mercy, save his who sent Christ Jesus into this world to save sinners, whom he foreknew and predestined and called and justified and glorified? Who then would be so utterly and madly insane as not to render unspeakable thanks to the mercy that frees whom it willed — the mercy which could in no way rightly be blamed for justly condemning absolutely all?
If we are wise in this according to the Scriptures, we are not compelled to argue against Christian grace and to say those things by which we might try to prove that human nature has no need of a physician in little children, because it is healthy, and that in grown persons it can, if it wills, suffice of itself for righteousness. For these things seem to be said acutely, yet they are said in the wisdom of speech by which the cross of Christ is made void; this is not that wisdom which comes down from above. I am unwilling to say what follows, lest we be thought to do an injury to our friends, whose most vigorous and swift talents we desire to run not into what is perverse but straight ahead.
With how great a zeal, then, was the author of this book, which you sent, kindled against those who seek a defence for their sins out of the weakness of human nature, so much and with far more ardent zeal ought we to be kindled, lest the cross of Christ be made void. But it is made void if it be said that anyone can, in any way apart from His sacrament, attain to righteousness and eternal life. This is what is being done in this book — done, I am unwilling to say, by one who knows, lest I should judge him who wrote it not even to be reckoned a Christian, but rather, as I more readily believe, by one who does not know, with great strength indeed; but I would have that strength be healthy, not such as the frenzied are wont to have.
First he distinguishes that 'it is one thing to ask whether something can be, which concerns mere possibility, and another whether it actually is.' No one doubts that this distinction is true; for it follows that what actually is could have been, but it does not follow that what can be also is. For because the Lord raised up Lazarus, without doubt He could; but because He did not raise up Judas, must it be said, 'He could not'? He could, then, but He would not. For had He willed, He would by the same power have done this also, since the Son gives life to whom He wills. But mark whither this true and manifest distinction tends and what it attempts to effect. 'We,' he says, 'are treating of possibility alone;'
'concerning which, unless something certain be established, we hold it most grievous and out of order to pass on to another matter.' In this he turns about in many ways and with lengthy discourse, lest anyone should suppose him to be inquiring about anything other than the possibility of not sinning. Whence, among the many things by which he pursues this, he also says this: 'The same thing I say again: I say that a man can be without sin. What do you say? That a man cannot be without sin. Neither do I say,' he says, 'that a man is without sin, nor do you say that a man is not without sin; we contend about the possible and the not-possible, not about the being and the not-being.'
Then he thus mentions that certain of those testimonies which are wont to be brought forward from the Scriptures against them do not pertain to this question, in which it is asked whether or not a man can be without sin: 'For "there is none clean from filth," and "there is no man who does not sin," and "there is no righteous man on earth," and "there is none that does good,"' and other things like these, he says, 'avail to prove not-being, not not-being-able. For by examples of this kind it is shown what sort of men some persons have been at some time, not that they could not have been otherwise; whence they are also rightly found to be blameworthy. For if they were such because they could not have been otherwise, they are free from fault.' See what he has said.
But I say that a little child, born in a place where it could not be succoured through the baptism of Christ, and forestalled by death, was on that account such — that is, departed without the washing of regeneration — because it could not be otherwise. Let him therefore absolve it and open to it, against the sentence of the Lord, the kingdom of heaven; but the Apostle does not absolve it, who says: 'By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so it passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.' Rightly therefore, by that condemnation which runs through the whole mass, it is not admitted into the kingdom of heaven — although it was not only not a Christian, but could not even be one. But:
It is not condemned,' they say, 'because "in Adam all have sinned" was said not on account of sin contracted by the origin of birth, but on account of imitation.' If, then, Adam is on this ground called the author of all the sins that followed, because he was the first sinner among men, why is not Abel rather than Christ set as the head of all the righteous, because he was the first righteous man among men? But of the infant I do not speak: a young man or an old man has died in that region where he could not hear the name of Christ. Could he have become righteous through nature and free will, or could he not? If they say he could, behold — this is to make void the cross of Christ, to contend that anyone can be justified apart from it, by natural law and the choice of the will.
Let us here too say: therefore Christ died in vain; for all men could do this even if He had not died; and if they were unrighteous, they would be so because they willed, not because they could not be righteous. But if without the grace of Christ he could not be justified at all, then let him too — if he dares — absolve this man according to his own words, because 'if he was such because he could not be otherwise, he was without fault.' But he raised an objection against himself as though spoken by another, and says: 'It can indeed be, but through the grace of God, you will say.' Then, as if in answer, he adds: 'I give thanks to your humanity, that my assertion, which but now you were assailing, you are so far content not only not to assail or not merely to confess, but you do not even shrink from approving it. For to say:
It can indeed be, but through this or that, what else is it than not only to consent that it can be, but even to show how or in what manner it can be? And so no one better proves the possibility of some thing than he who confesses also its quality, since quality cannot exist apart from a thing.' Having said this, he again objects to himself: 'But you, you will say, in this place seem to refuse the grace of God, since indeed you do not mention it.' Then he replied: 'Do I refuse it — I, who in confessing the thing must of necessity confess also that through which the thing can be brought about? Or do you rather, who by denying the thing without doubt deny also whatever it is through which the thing is effected?'
He has now forgotten that he is answering one who does not deny the thing, whose objection he had a little before set forth, saying: 'It can indeed be, but through the grace of God.' How, then, does he deny that possibility for which he labours so much, when he now says to him: 'It can be, but through the grace of God'? Yet, nevertheless, since — that man being dismissed, who now confesses the thing — he still argues against those who deny that it is possible for a man to be without sin: what is that to us? Let him argue against whomever he will, provided only he confesses this, which is denied with a most wicked impiety, that without the grace of God a man cannot be without sin. He says therefore:
Whether through grace, or through help, or through mercy, and whatever it is through which a man can be without sin, whoever confesses the thing itself confesses it.' I confess to your love that, when I read these things, I was suddenly suffused with joy, because he did not deny the grace of God, through which alone a man can be justified; for this above all I detest and shudder at in the disputations of such men. But going on to read the rest, I began first to hold him suspect from the comparisons he had given. For he says: 'Now if I shall have said: a man can dispute, a bird fly, a hare run, and shall not also have mentioned the things through which these can be effected — that is, the tongue, the wings, the feet — surely I have not denied the qualities of these functions, I who have confessed the functions themselves?'
He certainly seems to have mentioned things that avail by nature; for these members were created with natures of this kind — the tongue, the wings, the feet. He did not adduce any such thing as we wish to be understood concerning grace, without which a man is not justified, where the question is of natures to be healed, not of natures to be established. Hence, then, made anxious, I began to read the rest, and found that I had not suspected falsely. But before I come to that, see what he has said. When he was treating the question of the difference of sins, and objected to himself that some say that certain light sins cannot all be avoided by their very multitude, because they so often rush upon us, he denied 'that even light sins ought to be censured with correction, if they cannot at all be avoided' — not, indeed, heeding the Scriptures of both Testaments,
where we have learned that this is the intent of the law which convicts: that on account of those things which are done amiss, refuge may be taken in the grace of the pitying Lord, the law as it were shutting us up, like a schoolmaster, unto the same faith which was afterward revealed — where both the things done ill are forgiven, and, that same grace helping, they are not done. For it is the way of those who make progress; although the good who make progress are called perfect travellers. But that is the summit of the perfect, to which nothing is added, when that to which one strives shall have begun to be possessed. And indeed that which is said to them, 'Are you yourself without sin?' truly does not pertain to that matter about which the question turns.
But when he says that 'it is rather to be imputed to one's negligence that one is not without sin,' he says it well indeed; but let him also deign thereupon to pray the Lord, lest this wicked negligence should have dominion over him — the Lord whom a certain man was entreating when he said: 'Order my steps according to Thy word, and let not any iniquity have dominion over me' — lest, while he trusts to his own diligence as to his own powers, he arrive neither here at true righteousness, nor there where without doubt perfect righteousness is to be desired and hoped for. And that which is said to them by certain persons, that 'it is nowhere written in these exact words that a man can be without sin,' he easily refutes, since the question there is not by what words any given sentence is expressed.
Yet perhaps not without cause, since it is sometimes found in the Scriptures that men were said to be without blame. But no one is found who was said to be without sin, except one only, of whom it is openly said: 'Him who knew no sin'; and in that place where it was treating of holy priests: 'For He was tempted in all things after the likeness, without sin' — namely in that flesh which had the likeness of the flesh of sin, although it was not the flesh of sin; which likeness, however, He would not have, unless the rest of every man's flesh were the flesh of sin. Now how that is to be received:
'Everyone who is born of God does not sin and cannot sin, because His seed remains in him' — whereas the Apostle John himself, as though he were not born of God, or were speaking to those who were not yet born of God, has openly set down: 'If we shall have said that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us' — this I have taken care to explain, as I was able, in the books which I wrote on this matter to Marcellinus. And that which is said, 'cannot sin,' to have been said as if it were said 'ought not to sin' — this man's assertion does not seem to me to be disapproved. For what madman would say that one ought to sin, since it is for this reason sin, because it ought not to be done? Truly, as for what the Apostle James says:
'But the tongue no man can tame' — it does not seem to me to be understood as he wished to expound it, as though it were said by way of reproach, as if it were said: 'Can then no man tame the tongue?' — as one chiding and saying: 'You can tame wild beasts, and the tongue you cannot?' — as though it were easier to tame the tongue than beasts. I do not think this is the sense in this place. For if he wished it to be understood of the ease of taming the tongue, the rest would follow in the comparison with beasts. But now there follows: 'a restless evil, full of deadly poison' — assuredly more harmful than that of beasts and serpents; for the one kills the flesh, but this the soul; for 'the mouth that lies slays the soul.'
Not, therefore, as though it were easier than the taming of beasts did holy James pronounce that sentence, or wish it to be pronounced beforehand, but rather showing how great is the evil of the tongue in man, that it can be tamed by no man, whereas even beasts are tamed by men. Nor did he say this in order that we should suffer the dominion of this evil to remain over us through negligence, but that for the taming of the tongue we should beg the aid of divine grace. For he did not say: 'the tongue no one can tame,' but 'no man'; so that, when it is tamed, we may confess it to be done by the mercy of God, by the help of God, by the grace of God. Let the soul, then, strive to tame the tongue, and, while it strives, let it beg for aid; and let the tongue pray,
so that the tongue may be tamed by the gift of Him who said to His own: 'For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you.' And so by the precept we are admonished to do that which, striving and not prevailing by our own powers, we should implore the divine aid to accomplish. Accordingly, he too, when he had magnified the evil of the tongue, saying among these things: 'These things, my brethren, ought not so to be done,' immediately, when he had finished what he was saying on this point, admonished by what help these things should not be done which he said ought not to be done: 'For who is wise and instructed among us? Let him show his work by good conversation, in the meekness of wisdom.
But if you have bitter zeal and contentions in your hearts, do not glory and be liars against the truth. This is not that wisdom which comes down from above, but earthly, sensual, devilish. For where zeal and contention is, there is inconstancy and every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above is first indeed chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be persuaded, full of mercy and good fruits, unappraisable, without dissimulation.' This is the wisdom which tames the tongue, coming down from above, not leaping forth from the human heart. Or does anyone dare to take away even this from the grace of God, and with most proud vanity place it in the power of man?
Why, then, is it prayed for that it may be received, if it is from man that it may be possessed? Or is even this prayer gainsaid, lest an injury be done to free will, which suffices for itself by the possibility of nature for fulfilling all the precepts of righteousness? Let then that same Apostle James himself be gainsaid, who admonishes and says: 'But if any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all liberally and upbraids not, and it shall be given him; but let him ask in faith, nothing doubting.' This is the faith unto which the precepts compel, so that the law may command, faith may obtain. For by the tongue, which no man can tame — but the wisdom that comes down from above tames it — 'in many things we all offend.'
For this too that Apostle pronounced in no other manner than that which he said: 'the tongue no man can tame.' Nor let anyone likewise object against these men, in favour of the impossibility of not sinning, that which is said: 'The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be. But they who are in the flesh cannot please God.' For he spoke of the wisdom of the flesh, not of the wisdom that comes down from above; and it is manifest that by 'those who are in the flesh' were signified not those who have not yet departed from the body, but those who live according to the flesh. Nor is the question that is discussed to be found there. This is what I look to hear from this man, if I can.
Whether those who live according to the Spirit, and on this account, even while still living here, are already in a certain manner not in the flesh, live according to the Spirit by the grace of God, or whether they suffice for themselves by the possibility of nature already given when they are created, and by their own proper will — seeing that the fullness of the law is nothing but love, and the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, not by ourselves, but by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. This man treats also of the sins of ignorance, and says that 'a man ought to keep watch beforehand, lest he be ignorant, and therefore ignorance is to be blamed, because a man is ignorant of that through his own negligence which, diligence being applied, he ought to have known' — while yet he disputes everything rather than pray and say: 'Give me understanding, and I will learn Thy commandments.'
For it is one thing not to have cared to know — which sins of negligence seemed even to be expiated by certain sacrifices of the law — and another to wish to understand and not be able, and to act against the law by not understanding what it wills to be done. Whence we are admonished to ask of God wisdom, who gives to all liberally — that is, to all those who so ask, and only ask, in the manner and measure in which so great a thing is to be asked. Yet he confesses that 'sins committed are to be expiated by God, and the Lord is to be entreated for them,' namely for the sake of obtaining pardon, because that which has been done cannot be made undone — even, he himself confessing it, by that power of nature and will of man which he has so much praised. Wherefore by this necessity it remains that he pray to be forgiven.
But that he may be helped, lest he sin — this he has nowhere said; I have not read it here; strange is his utter silence on this matter, when the Lord's Prayer admonishes that both are to be asked — both that our debts may be forgiven us, and that we may not be led into temptation: the one, that things past may be expiated; the other, that things future may be avoided. And although this is not done unless the will be present, yet, that it may be done, the will alone does not suffice; therefore concerning this matter a prayer neither superfluous nor shameless is offered to the Lord. For what is more foolish than to pray that you may do what you have in your own power? Now then see what most of all pertains to the matter: how he tries to show that human nature is, as it were, altogether without any fault whatever, and, against the most manifest Scriptures of God, delights in the wisdom of the word,
by which the cross of Christ is made void. But plainly that will not be made void; rather this wisdom of his will be overthrown. For when we shall have shown this, perhaps the mercy of God will be present, so that he too may repent of having said these things. 'First,' he says, 'we must dispute concerning that which is said, that nature has been weakened and changed through sin. Whence before all things I think it must be asked,' he says, 'what sin is: some substance, or a name altogether lacking substance, by which is expressed not a thing, not an existence, not any body, but the act of a deed wrongly done.' Then he adds: 'I believe it is so. And if it is so,' he says, 'how could that weaken or change human nature which lacks substance?'
See, I pray you, how in his ignorance he strives to overthrow the most healthful words of medicinal utterances: 'I said: Lord, have mercy on me; heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee.' What is healed, if nothing is wounded, nothing hurt, nothing weakened and vitiated? Moreover, if there is that which is to be healed, whence has it been vitiated? You hear one confessing; why do you desire one disputing? 'Heal,' he says, 'my soul.' Ask of Him whence it has been vitiated, that which he begs to be healed, and hear what follows: 'for I have sinned against Thee.' Let this man interrogate him, let him ask of him what he thinks must be asked, and say: 'O you who cry, Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee, what is sin?
Some substance, or a name lacking all substance, by which is expressed not a thing, not an existence, not any body, but only the act of a deed wrongly done?' That man answers: 'It is as you say; sin is not any substance, but only by this name is expressed the act of a deed wrongly done.' And against him this one says: 'Why then do you cry, Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee? How could that vitiate your soul which lacks substance?' Would not the other, worn out with the grief of his wound, lest by disputation he be turned away from prayer, briefly answer and say: 'Depart from me, I beseech you; dispute rather, if you can, with Him who said: They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.
'I came not to call the righteous, but sinners' — where by the righteous He meant the whole, but the sinners He called the sick. Do you not perceive whither this disputation tends, and whither it stretches out its hand? So that it may be thought said altogether in vain: 'You shall call His name Jesus; for He shall save His people from their sins.' For how shall He save, where there is no sickness? For sins, from which the Gospel says the people of Christ are to be saved, are not substances, and cannot save that man. O brother, it is good that you remember you are a Christian. To believe these things will perhaps have sufficed;