BOOK ONE. The first question, most beloved brother Pollentius, of those which, writing to me as though consulting me, you have treated, is what the Apostle says: 「But to those who are in wedlock I command—not I, but the Lord—that the wife depart not from her husband; but if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband;」
「and the husband is not to put away his wife」—whether it is to be so understood that he is understood to have forbidden her to marry who has departed from her husband without cause of fornication (for this you hold), or whether, as I held in those books which many years ago I wrote On the Gospel Discourse which the Savior had on the mountain according to Matthew, he commanded those to remain unmarried who have withdrawn from their husbands for that one cause which alone is permitted, that is, of fornication. For it seems to you that a woman then departing from her husband ought not to marry, if she has departed compelled by no fornication of the husband; and you do not observe that, if her husband has had no cause of fornication, she ought not, having departed, to remain unmarried, but ought not to depart at all.
For assuredly, to her who is commanded that, if she depart from her husband, she remain unmarried, the license is taken away not of departing but of marrying. But if this is so, then license is given to women who wish to be continent to await no consent of their husbands, so that what was said—「that the wife depart not from her husband」—would seem to have been enjoined upon those who are able to choose not continence but such a divorce whereby it would be lawful for them to enter into the marriages of others. Accordingly, those who love to desire no intercourse, to endure no wedlock, will be permitted to leave their husbands even without any cause of fornication and to remain unmarried according to the Apostle.
And husbands likewise—since the case is equal in both—if they should wish to be continent, will forsake their wives even without their consent and will remain without any marriages. For then, as you suppose, it would be lawful for them to seek other unions, if the divorce arose from a cause of fornication. But when this cause is absent, it remains, according to what you suppose, that either the spouse depart not from the spouse, or, if he depart, remain without marriage, or return to the former union. With no cause of fornication existing, therefore, it will be lawful for any spouse to choose one of three: either not to depart from the spouse, or, if he depart, so to remain, or, if he remain not so, not to seek another but to render himself to the former.
And where is that which the same Apostle willed—that spouses should not, even for a time, that they may be free for prayer, defraud one another of the carnal debt except by consent? How will that stand which he says: 「But on account of fornications, let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband. Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and likewise also the wife to the husband. The wife has not power over her own body, but the husband; likewise also the husband has not power over his own body, but the wife」? How will this be true, unless because, the spouse being unwilling, it is not lawful for the spouse to be continent? For if it is lawful for a woman so to dismiss her husband that she remain unmarried, then not the husband has, but she herself has, power over her own body: which is understood also of the husband. Then, when it was said:
「Whoever shall put away his wife, save for the cause of fornication, makes her to commit adultery,」 how are we to understand it as said, unless that it is forbidden a man to put away his wife if no cause of fornication has arisen? And it is said why—namely, lest he make her to commit adultery; assuredly for this reason, because, even if she herself have not put him away but have been put away, she will be an adulteress if she marry. On account of this so great evil, therefore, it is not lawful for a man to put away his wife except from a cause of fornication. For then he does not by dismissing make her an adulteress, but dismisses an adulteress. What then? If, therefore, he say: 「I do indeed dismiss my wife without any cause of fornication, but I will remain continent,」 shall we for that reason say that he has done with impunity what he has done?
Who will dare to say this, who understands the will of the Lord speaking these things? For He willed that a spouse should not be dismissed even for the cause of continence, who excepted the sole cause of fornication. Let us return, therefore, to the very words of the Apostle, saying: 「But to those who are in wedlock I command—not I, but the Lord—that the wife depart not from her husband; but if she depart, that she remain unmarried」; and let us as it were interrogate him and, as though he were present, consult him in a certain manner: Why did you say, O Apostle, 「but if she depart, that she remain unmarried」? Is it lawful to depart, or is it not lawful? If it is not lawful, why do you command her who departs to remain unmarried? But if it is lawful, then assuredly there is some cause by which it may be lawful.
But this, when sought, is not found except the one which alone the Savior excepted, that is, the cause of fornication. And through this the Apostle does not command a woman, if she depart, to remain unmarried, except her who departs from her husband for that cause by which alone it was lawful for her to depart from her husband. For where it is said: 「I command not to depart; but if she depart, to remain unmarried,」 far be it that she should act against this command who so departs as to remain unmarried. Unless, therefore, she be understood for whom it is lawful to depart—and it is not lawful except when the husband is fornicating—how is she commanded to remain unmarried if she depart? Who is there who would say: 「If a woman depart from a husband who is not fornicating, let her remain unmarried,」
since it is by no means lawful for her to depart except from a fornicating husband? How much, therefore, this notion of yours is opposed to the conjugal bond—where the Lord willed that continence itself should not be undertaken except by equal accord and consent—I think you now understand. But let us set forth the matter itself a little more openly and, as it were, place it before our eyes. Behold, continence has pleased a woman; it does not please her husband. The woman has departed from him and has begun to live continently—she indeed about to remain chaste, but about to make (what the Lord does not will) an adulterous husband: who, since he will not contain himself, will seek another. What are we to say to the woman, except what sound doctrine says to the Church? Render the debt to your husband, lest, while you seek whence you may be the more honored, he find whence he may be damned.
For this we would say also to him, if, you being unwilling to be continent, he had wished to be so. For you have not power over your own body, but he; just as neither has he power over his own body, but you. 「Do not defraud one another, except by consent.」 When we shall have said these things and many more of this kind which pertain to this matter, does it please you that the woman should answer us out of this your reasoning: 「I hear the Apostle saying: 'I command that the wife depart not from her husband; but if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.' Behold, I have departed; I do not wish to be reconciled to my husband, but I remain unmarried. For he did not say: if she depart, let her remain unmarried until she be reconciled to her husband, but 'let her remain,' he says, 'unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.' Let her do this,' he says, 'or that.'
He permitted one of two to be chosen, but did not compel into either of these two. To remain unmarried I choose, and thus I fulfill the command. Rebuke, reprove, chide, use what severity you will—if I shall have married.」 What shall I gainsay to her except: You do not understand the Apostle well? For he would not have commanded that a woman, if she departed from her husband, remain unmarried, except her to whom it had been lawful to depart—that is, for that one cause which is there for this reason left unspoken, because it is most well known, namely, of fornication. For this alone God the Master excepted, when He was speaking of the wife to be dismissed, and gave to understand that such a form was to be observed by the husband also, since not only the woman has not power over her own body, but the husband;
but likewise also the husband has not power over his own body, but the woman. Since, therefore, you cannot accuse your husband of fornication, how do you think to excuse yourself, in that you depart from him by not marrying, from whom it is not at all lawful for you to depart? When the woman shall have heard these things from us, I think that you would not wish her to answer thus, so as to say that she therefore remains unmarried because she departed without any fornication of the husband; for if he had committed fornication, it would have been lawful for her not only to depart but even to marry. By no means would she say this, since you yourself were abashed to give this license to women. For you said: 「If a husband dismiss an adulterous wife and take another, the woman only will bear the reproach.」
「But if a woman dismiss her husband for the aforesaid cause and take another, not the husband only, but also the woman will bear the reproach.」 Rendering the reason of this your opinion, you say: 「For they will say that she departed for this reason, that she might join another husband to herself, even if perchance he be such as the one from whom she departed; for it is exceedingly easy for men to rush into this vice of disease. But if she dismiss even that one too and marry another, they will say more and more that she has sought a multitude of husbands.」 Having rendered this reason, you conclude and say: 「These things, then, being handled or even discussed, it behooves a woman either to bear with her husband or to remain unmarried.」
You have clearly given good counsel to women: that, although they know it to be permitted them, if they dismiss adulterous husbands, to be joined to others, they nevertheless should not do so on account of the reproach, but should rather bear with even adulterous husbands, lest they seem by this occasion to wish to mingle with many, seeing that it is difficult for a woman not to find one to marry such as was the one she dismissed, since men are very much inclined to this disease. When, therefore, we say that even to that woman who has dismissed a fornicating husband it is not lawful to marry another, but you say that it is indeed lawful but not expedient, we both without doubt say that she who dismisses a fornicating husband ought not to marry.
But this is the difference: that we, when both spouses are Christians, say to the woman that, if she has departed from a fornicating husband, it is not lawful to marry another, but from a husband who is not fornicating it is not at all lawful to depart; but you say that, if a woman has departed from a husband who is not fornicating, it is not lawful for her to marry another on account of the command; but if she has departed from a fornicating one, it is not expedient for her to marry on account of the reproach. And so you allow a woman not about to marry to depart from her husband, whether he be fornicating or not fornicating. But the blessed Apostle—nay, through the Apostle the Lord—since He does not permit a woman to depart from a husband who is not fornicating, it remains that He forbids her, if she has departed, to marry, whom He permits to depart from a fornicating one.
For of her concerning whom it is said: 「If she depart from her husband, let her not marry,」 she is permitted to depart on this condition, that she marry not. If, therefore, she shall have chosen not to marry, there is no reason why she should be forbidden to depart, just as she of whom it is said: 「If she contain not herself, let her marry,」 is permitted, of course, not to contain herself on this condition, that she nevertheless marry. If, therefore, she shall have chosen to marry, she cannot be compelled to be continent. As, therefore, this incontinent woman is compelled to marry, that what she does not contain may not be damnable, so that woman departing from her husband is compelled to remain unmarried, that what she does in departing may not be blameworthy. But blameworthily does she depart from a husband who is not fornicating, even if she shall have remained unmarried.
She, then, is commanded to remain unmarried if she departs — she who departs from a fornicating husband. Since these things stand thus, if we were to understand the Apostle in such a way as to say to women, 'Do not depart even from chaste husbands in such a manner that, if you should wish to depart, you may remain unmarried,' then all to whom continence is pleasing would think it permitted to them to depart even without their husbands' consent. But since without doubt we ought not to allow this, it remains that we must show that what was said — 'if she departs, let her remain unmarried' — was said of the woman described.
We have learned that it is indeed permitted to her to depart from a fornicating husband, lest, if we should teach otherwise, we throw Christian marriages into confusion under the pretext of continence, and, against the Lord's most merciful precept, drive incontinent husbands who are dismissed by continent wives, or incontinent wives dismissed by continent husbands, into adultery. Therefore that saying of the Lord — which He spoke not indeed in the very sermon that was being expounded by us, but nevertheless elsewhere: 'Whoever shall dismiss his wife except for the cause of fornication and shall marry another, commits adultery' — if it is to be understood in this way, namely that whoever for the cause of fornication ...
... dismisses his wife and marries another does not commit adultery, then it does not appear that the case of husband and wife is of equal form, seeing that a woman, even if she departs from her husband for the cause of fornication and marries another, commits adultery, whereas a man, if for the same cause he dismisses his wife and marries another, does not commit adultery. But if the form is equal in both, then each commits adultery — if he joins himself to another — even when he has separated himself from a fornicating spouse. That the form in this matter is truly equal for husband and wife, the Apostle shows there (a point which must often be recalled) where, when he had said, 'The wife has not power over her own body, but the husband,' he added and said, 'Likewise also the husband has not power over his own body, but the wife.'
'Why then,' you ask, 'did the Lord interpose the cause of fornication, and not rather say generally: Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery — if he too is an adulterer who dismisses a fornicating wife and marries another?' I believe it is because the Lord wished to point out that which is the greater. For who denies that it is a greater adultery to dismiss a non-fornicating wife and marry another, than if one dismisses a fornicating wife and then marries another? Not that the latter is not adultery, but that it is less, when, after a fornicating wife is dismissed, another is married. For the Apostle James too, using a similar manner of speech, says: 'To him therefore who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin.'
Is it then no sin for him too who does not know to do good and therefore does not do it? Surely it is sin; but this is graver, if he both knows and does not do it — nor is the former no sin because it is less. So that we may say both in the same manner: just as 'whoever dismisses his wife, except for the cause of fornication, and marries another, commits adultery,' so 'whoever knows to do good and does it not, sins.' But just as here it cannot rightly be said, 'Therefore if he does not know, he does not sin' — for there are sins even of the ignorant, though lesser than those of the knowing — so neither there can it rightly be said, 'Therefore if for the cause of fornication he dismisses his wife and marries another, he does not commit adultery.'
For there is adultery even in those who marry others after leaving their former wives on account of fornication, but assuredly a lesser one than in those who dismiss their wives not on account of fornication and marry others. Indeed, just as it was said, 'To him who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin,' so in the same manner it can also be said: 'To him who dismisses his wife without the cause of fornication and marries another, there is adultery.' As therefore, if we say, 'Whoever marries a woman dismissed by her husband apart from the cause of fornication, commits adultery,' we without doubt speak truly, and yet not on that account do we absolve from this crime the man who marries a woman dismissed on account of fornication, but we in no way doubt that both are adulterers — so likewise him ...
... who apart from the cause of fornication dismisses his wife and marries another, we pronounce him an adulterer; nor yet on that account do we defend from the stain of this sin him who on account of the cause of fornication dismisses his wife and marries another. For both, though the one is graver than the other, we nonetheless recognize to be adulterers. For no one is so absurd as to deny that he is an adulterer who marries a woman whom her husband has cast off on account of the cause of fornication, while he calls that man an adulterer who marries a woman who has been cast off apart from the cause of fornication. Since therefore both these men are adulterers — whence, when we say:
'Whoever marries a woman dismissed by her husband apart from the cause of fornication commits adultery,' we speak indeed of one of them, and yet not on that account do we deny that he commits adultery who marries the woman whom her husband dismissed on account of the cause of fornication — so, since both are adulterers, namely both he who dismisses his wife apart from the cause of fornication and marries another, and he who, having dismissed his wife on account of the cause of fornication, joins himself to another, assuredly when we read of one of them, we ought not so to understand it as if by this the other is denied to be an adulterer, because the one is expressly stated.
But if the evangelist Matthew, because he expressed one case and was silent about the other, made this hard to understand, did not the others generally embrace this same thing in such a way that it can be understood of either? For according to Mark it is thus written: 'Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery against her; and if a wife dismisses her husband and marries another, she commits adultery'; according to Luke thus: 'Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery; and he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery.' Who then are we, that we should say: there is one who commits adultery by dismissing his wife and marrying another, and there is one who, doing this, does not commit adultery — when the Gospel says that everyone who does this commits adultery?
Accordingly, if whoever does this — that is, everyone who does this, namely dismisses his wife and marries another — commits adultery, without doubt both are there: both he who dismisses his wife apart from the cause of fornication and he who does so on account of the cause of fornication; for this is what 'whoever dismisses' means, that is, 'everyone who dismisses.' But — as, I know not why, it seemed to you — when I was quoting the words of the Gospel according to Matthew, I did not omit what is written, 'and marries another,' and so say only 'commits adultery'; rather I set down those words which are read in that lengthy sermon which the Lord delivered on the mount; for it was this that I had undertaken to treat. Which words are there read as I set them down, that is:
'Whoever dismisses his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her commit adultery; and he who marries her that is loosed from her husband commits adultery.' Where, even if certain copies have the same sense rendered in differing words, they nonetheless do not diverge from what is understood. For some indeed have 'whoever dismisses,' others 'everyone who dismisses'; and likewise some 'except for the cause of fornication,' others 'apart from the cause of fornication,' others 'unless on account of the cause of fornication'; again some 'he who marries her that is loosed from her husband commits adultery,' others 'he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery.' In which I think you see that it makes no difference to one and the same meaning.
Although that last clause — that is, 'he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery' — some codices, both Greek and Latin, do not have in that sermon which the Lord delivered on the mount. I believe the reason is that even there this sense could be thought to have been unfolded by what was said above: 'makes her commit adultery'; for how does the dismissed woman become an adulteress, unless he who marries her becomes an adulterer? But the words which you yourself set down — from which it seemed to you that he does not commit adultery who dismisses his wife on account of the cause of fornication and marries another — were indeed obscurely placed. Hence I do not wonder that the reader labors in understanding them; but they are not in that sermon of the Lord which was then being treated by me when I wrote those things which, when you read them, disturbed you.
For elsewhere the same Matthew related that the Lord said these things, not when he made that lengthy sermon on the mount, but when he was asked by the Pharisees whether it was lawful to dismiss a wife for any cause whatsoever. But what is less clearly understood in Matthew can be understood in the other evangelists. Wherefore, when we read in the Gospel according to Matthew, 'Whoever dismisses his wife unless for fornication' — or, as is rather read in the Greek, 'apart from the cause of fornication' — 'and marries another, commits adultery,' we ought not straightway to suppose that he does not commit adultery who dismisses his wife on account of the cause of fornication and marries another, but should still remain in doubt, until we consult the Gospel according to the other evangelists by whom this was narrated.
What then? What if in Matthew not indeed the whole of what pertains to this matter was stated, but a part was stated in such a way that the whole was to be understood from the part — which Mark and Luke, as if explaining, preferred to state in full, so that the complete meaning might be clear? Since therefore, first not doubting that what is read in Matthew is true — 'Whoever dismisses his wife apart from the cause of fornication and marries another commits adultery' — if we ask whether only that man commits adultery by marrying another wife who dismissed his former wife apart from the cause of fornication, or everyone who, having dismissed his wife, marries another, so that there too is included even he who dismisses a fornicating wife — will it not according to Mark be answered us:
'Why do you ask whether the one is an adulterer and the other is not? Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.' Will it not also according to Luke be said to us: 'Why do you doubt whether he who dismisses his wife on account of the cause of fornication and marries another does not commit adultery? Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.'
And by this, since it is not right that we should say the evangelists, though speaking of one matter in differing words, dissent from one sense and the same meaning, it remains that we understand Matthew to have wished to signify the whole by a part, yet to have held the same meaning: that of one who dismisses his wife and marries another a certain one indeed commits adultery — namely he who dismisses her apart from fornication — while a certain one does not commit adultery — namely he who dismisses her on account of fornication — but that everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another is by no means to be doubted to commit adultery. For that too which follows according to Luke — 'he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery' — how is it true?
How does he commit adultery, unless because she whom he married, while he lives from whom she was dismissed, is still another man's wife? For if he now unites with his own wife, not with another's, surely he does not commit adultery; but he does commit adultery. Therefore she with whom he unites is another's. Furthermore, if she is another's, that is, belongs to him from whom she was dismissed — even if she was dismissed on account of the cause of fornication — she has not yet ceased to be the wife of him who dismisses her. But if she had ceased to be his, she now belongs to him whom she has married as another husband; and if she is his, he is to be judged not an adulterer but a husband. But since Scripture calls him not a husband but an adulterer, she still belongs to him by whom she was cast off even for the cause of fornication.
And therefore whatever woman he himself, after she is dismissed, marries, because he lies with one who has another husband, she is an adulteress. And how can it come about that he too is not an adulterer, who, it is clear, commits adultery with the woman whom he has married? Now let us at last consider that which the Apostle says: 'But to the rest speak I, not the Lord' — intending, namely, to speak of unequal marriages, that is, where both had not been Christians. This seemed to me to have been said by him by way of admonition. For because a faithful spouse could lawfully leave an unbelieving spouse, therefore it is not the Lord but the Apostle who forbids this to be done. For what the Lord forbids is by no means lawful to do.
The Apostle therefore admonishes — a thing which could be the occasion of winning many — that faithful spouses should not use the permitted liberty in leaving their unbelieving partners. But to you it seems that unbelievers too may not lawfully be dismissed by the faithful, because the Apostle forbids this, whereas I say it is lawful. For he does not forbid it, but rather it is not expedient, wherefore the Apostle admonishes that it not be done: and he also gives a reason why it is not expedient to do it, although it be lawful. 'For what do you know, O wife,' he says, 'whether you shall save your husband? or how do you know, O husband, whether you shall save your wife?' — since he had also said above: 'For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother,' that is, in the Christian; 'otherwise your children,' he says, 'would be unclean;
but now they are holy.' Thus, by examples too which had already occurred, he seems to have exhorted toward the winning of spouses and children for Christ. Why then it is not expedient that even unbelieving spouses be dismissed by the faithful, the reason is clearly expressed. For the Apostle forbids withdrawal from unbelieving spouses not because the conjugal bond must be preserved with such persons, but that they may be gained in Christ. But many things are to be done not because the law commands, but out of free charity; and those are the more pleasing among our services which, though we might lawfully not expend them, we nevertheless expend for the sake of love.
Hence the Lord himself first, when he had shown that he did not owe the tribute, nevertheless paid it, lest he should scandalize those whom, bearing manhood, he was counseling unto eternal salvation. But now how the Apostle commends these things, his own words testify, where he says: 'For though I be free from all men, I have made myself the servant of all, that I might gain the more,' when a little above he had said: 'Have we not power to eat and to drink? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as also the rest of the apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have we not power to forbear working? Who ever serves as a soldier at his own charges? Who plants a vineyard and eats not of its fruit?
Who feeds a flock and does not partake of the milk of the flock?' And a little after he says: 'If others are partakers of this power over you, are not we rather? Yet we have not used this power, but suffer all things, lest we should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ.' Then after a few words he says: 'What then shall be my reward? That, preaching the Gospel, I may present the Gospel without charge, that I abuse not my power in the Gospel.' And he immediately subjoins what I recalled a little before: 'For though I be free from all men, I have made myself the servant of all, that I might gain the more.' Likewise in another place, concerning certain things which pertain to food, he says: 'All things are lawful for me, but not all things are expedient; all things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any.'