書信與論戰集（CSEL） 第 40 章 第 1/4 段

There is a great question about lying, which often troubles us in our very daily doings, lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or think that sometimes we must lie with a certain honorable, dutiful, and merciful lie. This question we shall treat so carefully that we inquire together with those who inquire; but whether we shall find anything at all, the treatment itself will sufficiently show to the reader who attends well, since we affirm nothing rashly. For it is exceedingly hidden, and with certain, as it were, cavernous windings it often eludes the intention of the inquirer, so that now what had been found seems to slip out of the hands, now it reappears and is again swallowed up.

Yet at last a more certain tracking will grasp our conclusion. If there is any error in it, since truth frees from all error and falsehood entangles in all error, I think one is never in error more safely than when he errs through an excessive love of truth and an excessive rejection of falsehood. For those who severely reprove say that this is 'too much'; but truth itself perhaps still says, 'It is not yet enough.' By all means, whoever you are that read, reprove nothing until you have read the whole; and so you will reprove less. Do not look for eloquence; for we have labored much upon the matters, and upon the speed of finishing a work of daily life so necessary: whence our care for words was slight, and almost none.

Setting aside therefore jests, which have never been thought to be lies—for they have from their delivery and from the very disposition of the jester a most evident signification of a mind by no means deceiving, even though not stating what is true; whether such a kind is to be used by perfect souls is another question, which we have not undertaken to unravel just now—setting aside jests, then, we must first deal with this: that one who does not lie should not be thought to lie. Wherefore we must see what a lie is. For not everyone who says what is false lies, if he believes or supposes to be true what he says.

Now between believing and supposing there is this difference: that sometimes he who believes perceives that he is ignorant of what he believes, although about the matter which he knows himself to be ignorant of, he in no way doubts, if he believes it most firmly; but he who supposes thinks he knows what he does not know. Whoever, however, states that which he holds either believed or supposed in his mind, even if it be false, does not lie. For he owes this to the fidelity of his statement, that through it he brings forth what he holds in his mind, and that he has it as he brings it forth. Nor is he for that reason without fault, although he does not lie, if he either believes what ought not to be believed, or thinks he knows what he is ignorant of, even if it be true; for he holds as known what is unknown.

Wherefore he lies who has one thing in his mind and states another by words or by any signs whatsoever. Hence too the heart of one who lies is said to be double—that is, a double thought: one of that thing which he either knows or thinks to be true and does not utter; the other of that thing which he utters in place of it, knowing or thinking it to be false. From which it follows that one can say what is false without lying, if he thinks it to be as he says, although it is not so; and that one can say what is true while lying, if he thinks it to be false and utters it as true, although in reality it is as he utters it. For it is from the intention of his own mind, not from the truth or falsity of the things themselves, that one is to be judged lying or not lying.

He therefore who states what is false as true, but nevertheless thinks it to be true, may be called mistaken and rash; but he is not rightly called lying, because when he states it he has no double heart, nor does he desire to deceive, but is himself deceived. But the fault of one who lies is, in stating what is against his own mind, the desire of deceiving—whether he deceives, when the one who is told what is false believes him; or does not deceive, either when he is not believed, or when he states what is true with the will of deceiving because he does not think it true. When he is believed in this last case, he does not indeed deceive, although he wished to deceive—unless he deceives to this extent, that he is thought also to know or think as he states. Although it may be asked most subtly whether, when the will of deceiving is absent, a lie is altogether absent. For what?

What if someone, speaking what is false—which he judges to be false—does it nevertheless because he thinks he is not believed, so that in that way, by a false trust, he may frighten away the one to whom he speaks, whom he perceives to be unwilling to believe him? For here he lies out of a zeal for not deceiving, if a lie is to state something otherwise than you know or think it to be; but if there is no lie except when someone states something with the will of deceiving, then this man does not lie, who therefore speaks what is false—although he knows or thinks to be false what he speaks—so that the one to whom he speaks, by not believing him, may not be deceived, because he knows or thinks that this man will not believe him.

Whence, if it appears that it can happen that someone speaks what is false so that the one to whom it is said may not be deceived, there arises on the contrary another kind: that of one speaking what is true in order to deceive. For he who speaks what is true because he perceives that he is not believed, speaks the truth precisely in order to deceive; for he knows or judges that what is said can be thought false for this reason, that it is said by himself. Wherefore, when he speaks the truth in order that it may be thought false, he speaks the truth in order to deceive. It must therefore be asked which of the two rather lies: he who speaks what is false lest he deceive, or he who speaks what is true in order to deceive—since both the former knows or thinks he speaks what is false, and the latter knows or thinks he speaks what is true.

For we have already said that he who does not know that what he states is false does not lie, if he thinks it true; and that he rather lies who even states what is true when he thinks it false, because they are to be judged from the intention of their own mind. Concerning those, therefore, whom we have proposed, there is no small question:

the one, who knows or thinks he is speaking falsely and therefore speaks so, lest he deceive—as if someone knew a certain road to be beset by robbers, and fearing lest a man, for whose safety he is concerned and whom he knows not to believe him, should go by it, says that road has no robbers, to this end, that he should not go that way, while for this reason he believes robbers are there, because that man said they were not there, whom, thinking him a liar, he has resolved not to believe; and the other, who, knowing or thinking that what he says is true, nevertheless says it to this end, that he may deceive—as if he should say to a man not believing him that robbers are on that road, where he has in reality learned them to be, so that the one to whom he says it should rather go by that road and so fall among the robbers, while thinking false what that man had said.

Which then of these lies: he who chose to speak what is false lest he deceive, or he who chose to speak what is true in order to deceive? He who by speaking what is false acted so that the truth might follow for the one to whom he spoke, or he who by speaking what is true acted so that falsehood might follow for the one to whom he spoke? Or have perhaps both lied?—the one, because he wished to speak what is false; the other, because he wished to deceive. Or rather has neither of them lied?—the one, because he had the will of not deceiving; and the other, because he had the will of speaking the truth. For it is not now being discussed which of them sinned, but which lied.

For it soon seems that he sinned who by speaking the truth acted so that a man fell among robbers, but that the other did not sin, or even did well, who by speaking what is false acted so that a man avoided destruction. But these examples can be reversed, so that the one may wish something graver to befall him whom he does not wish to be deceived—for many, by coming to know certain true things, have brought destruction upon themselves, if such things were as ought to have remained hidden from them—and the other may wish some advantage to accrue to him whom he wishes to be deceived. For some, who would have brought death upon themselves had they learned some evil thing which had truly happened concerning their dear ones, spared themselves by thinking it false; and thus being deceived profited them, just as to learn true things harmed others.

It is not therefore being discussed with what mind, of counseling or of harming, either the one spoke what was false lest he deceive, or the other spoke what was true in order to deceive; but setting aside the advantages or disadvantages of those to whom they spoke, as far as pertains to truth and falsity themselves, it is asked which of them—or whether both, or neither—has lied. For if a lie is a statement made with the will of stating what is false, then rather he has lied who wished to speak what is false and said what he wished, although he said it lest he deceive; but if a lie is any statement made with the will of deceiving, then not the former but the latter has lied, who wished to deceive even by speaking what is true.

But if a lie is a statement made with the will of some falsity, both have lied—because the one wished his statement to be false, and the other wished that what was true of his be believed false. Further, if a lie is a statement of one wishing to state what is false in order to deceive, neither has lied—because the one had the will of persuading truth by speaking falsely, and the other, in order to persuade falsehood, of speaking truly. There will therefore be absent all rashness and every lie, when we both state what we have come to know as true and to be believed, when there is need, and wish to persuade that which we state.

But if, either thinking to be true what is false, or holding as known what is unknown to us, or believing what ought not to be believed, or—when there is no need—stating it, yet trying to persuade nothing other than that which we state: the error of rashness is indeed not absent, but every lie is absent. For none of those definitions is to be feared, when the mind is well conscious to itself that it states this which it either knows or supposes or believes to be true, and wishes to persuade nothing except what it states. But whether a lie is ever useful is a far greater and more necessary question.

Whether therefore anyone lies who has no will of deceiving, or even acts so that the one to whom he states something may not be deceived, although he wished the statement itself to be false—because he wished it for this reason, that he might persuade what is true; and whether anyone lies who, even willingly stating what is true, does so for the sake of deceiving—can be doubted. But no one doubts that he lies who willingly states what is false for the sake of deceiving. Wherefore it is manifest that a false statement brought forth with the will to deceive is a lie. But whether this alone is a lie is another question. Meanwhile, concerning this kind, on which all agree, let us inquire: whether it is ever useful to state something false with the will of deceiving.

For those who hold this view bring forward testimonies for their opinion, recalling that Sarah, when she had laughed, denied to the angels that she had laughed; that Jacob, being questioned by his father, answered that he himself was Esau, his elder son; that the Egyptian midwives too, lest the Hebrew infants being born should be killed, lied—even with God approving and rewarding them; and choosing many examples of this sort, they recall the lies of those men whom you would not dare to blame, and thus they contend that a lie can sometimes be not only not worthy of reproof, but even worthy of praise. They add also, so as to press not only those devoted to the divine books, but also all men and the common sense, saying:

If someone flees to you who could be delivered from death by your lie, will you not lie? If a sick man asks something which it is not expedient for him to know, who might even, if you do not answer, be more grievously afflicted, will you dare either to speak the truth to the man's ruin, or to keep silent rather than to succor his health by an honorable and merciful lie? By these and such arguments they think they press most copiously the conclusion that, if the cause of counseling demands it, we should sometimes lie. On the contrary, those to whom it is pleasing that one should never lie act far more strongly, using first the divine authority, since in the very Decalogue it is written: 'Thou shalt not bear false witness'—by which kind is comprised every lie;

for whoever states anything bears witness to his own mind. But lest anyone contend that not every lie is to be called false witness, what will he say to that which is written: 'The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul'? And lest anyone suppose that this can be understood with certain liars excepted, let him read in another place: 'Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.' Whence the Lord Himself with His own mouth says, 'Let your speech be Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these is of evil.' Hence too the apostle, when he commanded that the old man be put off—by which name all sins are understood—consequently says, placing it among the first: 'Wherefore, putting away lying, speak ye the truth.'

Nor do they say that they are frightened by those examples of lies brought forward from the old books, where whatever was done can be taken figuratively, although it really happened; but whatever is done or said figuratively is not a lie. For every statement is to be referred to that which it states. But everything done or said figuratively states this, which it signifies to those to whom it was brought forth to be understood. Whence it is to be believed that those men, who are recorded to have been worthy of authority in prophetic times, did and said prophetically all things that are written of them; and no less prophetically did there befall them whatever things so befell that they were judged worthy to be committed to memory and to letters by the same prophetic spirit.

But concerning the midwives, because they cannot say that these women, by a prophetic spirit of signifying, for the sake of a true future, reported one thing for another to Pharaoh—even if what was done through them signified something without their knowing it—they say that they were, according to their degree, approved and rewarded by God. For he who is wont to lie for the sake of harming, if he now lies for the sake of counseling, has made much progress. But it is one thing which is set forth as praiseworthy in itself, another which is preferred in comparison with something worse. For we rejoice in one way when a man is healthy, in another way when a sick man is better. For in the Scriptures themselves even Sodom is said to be justified in comparison with the crimes of the people of Israel.

And to this rule they direct all the lies which are brought forth from the old books and are not found to be reproved, or cannot be reproved, so that they may either be approved by the disposition and hope of those making progress, or, for the sake of some signification, may not be lies at all. And therefore, from the books of the New Testament, setting aside the figurative significations of the Lord, if you consider the life and character of the saints and their deeds and words, nothing of the sort can be brought forth which would provoke to the imitation of lying. For the dissimulation of Peter and Barnabas was not only recorded, but even reproved and corrected.

For it was not, as some suppose, out of that same dissimulation that Paul the apostle either circumcised Timothy or himself celebrated certain rites according to the Jewish manner, but out of that liberty of his own judgment, by which he preached that circumcision neither profited the Gentiles nor harmed the Jews. Whence he judged that neither should the former be bound to the custom of the Jews, nor the latter be deterred from that of their fathers. Whence these words of his are: 'Was any man called being circumcised? let him not draw on the foreskin. Is any called in uncircumcision? let him not be circumcised. Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God. Let each one abide in that calling wherein he was called.' For how can the foreskin be drawn on which has been cut off?

But when he said 'let him not draw it on,' he meant 'let him not so live' as though he had drawn on the foreskin—that is, as though he had again drawn a covering of flesh over that part which he had bared, and as though he had ceased to be a Jew, just as he says elsewhere: 'Thy circumcision is made uncircumcision.' And this the apostle said, not as though compelling either those to remain in uncircumcision or the Jews in the custom of their fathers, but that neither should be forced into the other, while each should have the power of remaining in his own custom, not the necessity.

For neither, if a Jew wished—where he would disturb no one—to withdraw from the Jewish observances, would he be prohibited by the apostle; seeing that he gave counsel of remaining in them for this reason, lest the Jews, disturbed by superfluous things, should not come to those things which were necessary for salvation; nor would he be prohibited by him, if any of the Gentiles wished to be circumcised for this purpose, to show that he did not detest it as though harmful, but held it indifferently, as a seal whose usefulness had already passed with time. For if there was now no salvation from it, neither was destruction to be feared from it.

And so Timothy too, although he had been called while still uncircumcised, was nevertheless circumcised by the Apostle. For, since he was born of a Jewish mother, he had to show his kinsmen — so as to win them over — that he had not learned in the Christian discipline to abhor those sacraments which belonged to the old Law. In this way they might demonstrate to the Jews that the Gentiles do not refuse to accept these observances because they are evil or because they were kept by the fathers to their ruin, but because, after the coming of so great a sacrament, they are no longer necessary for salvation — that sacrament which, through so long an age, all that old Scripture was in travail to bring forth by its prophetic figures.

For he would even have circumcised Titus, since the Jews pressed for this, had not certain false brethren who had crept in wished it done precisely so that they might have something to spread abroad concerning Paul himself — as though he had yielded to their notion of truth, they who proclaimed that the hope of gospel salvation lay in the circumcision of the flesh and in observances of that kind, and who contended that without these Christ profited no one — whereas, on the contrary, Christ profited nothing those who were circumcised with the mind that salvation lay therein. Hence comes that saying: 'Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.' Out of this liberty, therefore, Paul observed his ancestral observances, guarding and proclaiming this one thing: that no one should suppose Christian salvation could not exist without them.

Peter, however, by his dissimulation was compelling the Gentiles to Judaize, as though salvation lay in Judaism. This is shown by Paul's words when he says: 'Why do you compel the Gentiles to Judaize?' For they would not have been compelled, had they not seen him so observing these things as if apart from them there could be no salvation. Peter's dissimulation, therefore, is not to be compared with Paul's liberty.

And therefore we ought gladly to love Peter as one corrected, and not, on the other hand, to build up a lie even out of Paul's authority. For Paul both recalled Peter into the right way in the presence of all, lest the Gentiles should through him be compelled to Judaize, and himself gave testimony to his own preaching. For though he was thought to be an enemy of the ancestral traditions — because he was unwilling to impose them upon the Gentiles — yet by not scorning to observe them himself after the manner of his fathers, he sufficiently showed that this had remained in them at the coming of Christ: namely, that they should be neither ruinous to the Jews, nor necessary to the Gentiles, nor any longer salutary to any human being at all.

But if authority for lying can be drawn neither from the ancient books — either because that is no lie which is received as done or said figuratively, or because what is praised in evil men, once they have begun to make progress, is set forth not for imitation but in comparison with something worse — nor from the books of the New Testament, because it is correction rather than dissimulation that is to be imitated, just as Peter's tears rather than his denial: then, with much greater confidence, they assert that no credence is to be given to those examples which are drawn from common life. For first they teach, by many testimonies of the sacred writings, that a lie is iniquity, and above all by what is written: 'Thou hast hated, O Lord, all who work iniquity; Thou wilt destroy all who speak a lie.'

For either, as Scripture is wont, the following verse has expounded the preceding — so that, since iniquity commonly extends more widely, we may understand that by naming the lie He wished to signify, as it were, a particular species of iniquity — or, if they think there is some difference, then a lie is worse in proportion as the graver word ('destroy') is set against the milder ('hate'). For perhaps God hates someone somewhat more mildly, so as not to destroy him; but whom He destroys, Him He hates the more vehemently the more severely He punishes. Now He hates all who work iniquity; but all who speak a lie He even destroys. This being established, which of those who make these assertions will be moved by such examples, when it is said: 'What then? If a man should flee to you who could be freed from death by your lie?'

For that death which men foolishly fear — men who do not fear to sin — kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord teaches in the Gospel, whence He commands that it not be feared. But the mouth that lies kills not the body but the soul. For in these words it is most plainly written: 'The mouth that lies slays the soul.' How then is it not most perversely said that one man ought to die spiritually so that another may live bodily? For love of one's neighbor also received its limit from each man's love of himself. 'Thou shalt love,' He says, 'thy neighbor as thyself.' How then does anyone love as himself the man for whom, that he may grant him temporal life, he himself loses eternal life?

Since indeed, if for another's temporal life he should lose his own temporal life, that is no longer to love as himself, but more than himself — which exceeds the rule of sound doctrine. Much less, then, will he lose his own eternal life for another's temporal life by lying. His own temporal life, plainly, the Christian will not hesitate to lose for his neighbor's eternal life; for this example went before, that the Lord Himself died for us. For to this end He also said: 'This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.'

For no one is so foolish as to say that the Lord provided for anything other than the everlasting salvation of men, whether by doing what He commanded or by commanding what He did. Since therefore eternal life is lost by lying, one must never lie for anyone's temporal life. But indeed these men, who are vexed and indignant if someone is unwilling to destroy his own soul by a lie so that another may grow old in the flesh — what if a man could be freed from death even by our theft, what if by adultery? Are we therefore to steal or to commit adultery?

For they do not perceive that they are driving themselves to this: that if a man should bring a noose and demand defilement, declaring that he will hang himself unless what he asks be granted, then — for the sake of freeing a soul, as they themselves put it — one ought to consent. But if this is absurd and wicked, why should anyone corrupt his own soul with a lie so that another may live in the body, when, if he were to hand over his own body to be corrupted for that reason, he would by the judgment of all be condemned for abominable baseness? Accordingly, in this question nothing is to be considered except whether a lie is iniquity. And since this is asserted by the testimonies mentioned above, we must see that to ask whether one ought to lie for another's salvation is just the same as to ask whether one ought to be iniquitous for another's salvation.

But if the salvation of the soul, which cannot be preserved except by righteousness, rejects this, and bids us prefer itself not only to another's but even to our own temporal salvation — what remains, they say, that ought to make us doubt that one must never lie at all? For it cannot be said that there is anything among temporal goods greater or dearer than bodily salvation and life. Hence, if not even this is to be preferred to truth, what can be objected on account of which those who think one ought sometimes to lie may contend that one must lie?

As for bodily chastity — because it seems to present itself as a much more honorable consideration and to plead on its own behalf for a lie (so that, if a ravisher should attack who could be evaded by a lie, one ought without doubt to lie) — it can easily be answered that there is no chastity of the body unless it depends on the integrity of the mind; and when this is broken, the body must necessarily fall, even though it appear untouched; and therefore it is not to be numbered among temporal things, as though it were something that could be taken away from the unwilling. In no way, then, does the mind corrupt itself with a lie for the sake of its own body, which it knows remains uncorrupted so long as incorruption does not depart from the mind itself. For what the body suffers by violence, with no lust preceding, is to be called an affliction rather than a corruption.

Or if every affliction is corruption, still not every corruption is shameful, but only that which lust has procured or to which lust has consented. And in proportion as the mind is more excellent than the body, so it is corrupted more wickedly. There, then, can chastity be preserved, where there can be no corruption except a voluntary one. For surely if a ravisher assails a body which can be evaded neither by opposing force nor by any counsel or lie, we must needs confess that chastity cannot be violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no one doubts that the mind is better than the body, the integrity of the mind — which can be preserved for eternity — is to be preferred to the integrity of the body. But who would say that the mind of a liar is intact?

For indeed lust itself is rightly defined as an appetite of the mind by which any temporal things whatever are preferred to eternal goods. No one, therefore, can prove that one ought ever to lie, unless he can show that some eternal good can be obtained by a lie. But since a man departs from eternity in the same measure as he departs from truth, it is most absurd to say that by departing thence anyone can arrive at some good. Or if there be some eternal good which truth does not embrace, it will not be true, and therefore neither will it be good, because it will be false. And as the mind is to be preferred to the body, so is truth to be preferred even to the mind itself, so that the mind may seek after it not only more than the body, but even more than itself.

For in this way it will be the more whole and the more chaste, when it enjoys rather the immutability of truth than its own mutability.