But lest some, on the basis of what we have said, should suppose us to be saying that things happen according to the necessity of fate, because we have said that they are foreknown and foretold, we shall resolve this too. Having learned from the prophets that punishments and chastisements and good rewards are rendered to each according to the merit of his deeds, we declare it also to be true; for if this is not so, but all things happen by fate, then there is no such thing as what is within our power at all. For if it is fated that this man be good and that man bad, then neither is the one to be commended nor the other to be blamed. And again, if the human race does not have the power by free choice to flee what is base and to choose what is noble, then it is not responsible for anything that is done in any way whatsoever. But that it is by free choice that man both does right and goes astray, we thus demonstrate. We see the same man pursuing opposite courses. But if it were fated that he be either bad or good, he would never be receptive of opposites and change so many times; nor would some be good and others bad — since then we should be declaring fate to be the cause both of good and of bad, and to act contrary to itself — or else that which was said before would seem to be true, namely that there is no virtue and no vice, but that things are reckoned good or bad by opinion only; which, as the true reason shows, is the greatest impiety and injustice. But we say that this is the unalterable destiny: that fitting rewards come to those who choose the noble, and likewise fitting recompense to those who choose the opposite. For God did not make man like the other things, such as trees and four-footed beasts, which can do nothing by choice; for then he would not be worthy of reward or praise, not having chosen the good of himself but having merely been made so; nor, if he were bad, would he justly meet with punishment, not being such of himself but unable to be anything other than what he had been made.