Those of quicker and better ability, for whom the preceding books more than suffice for this matter, ought patiently and calmly to bear with me as I strive rather diligently to tear up and root out those depraved and ancient opinions, hostile to the truth of true religion, which the long-standing error of the human race has fixed the more deeply and tenaciously in darkened minds; and as I, according to my small measure, cooperate with the help of that grace which, being the true God, is alone able to do this. Nor, for the sake of others, should they think superfluous what they already feel to be unnecessary for themselves.
A matter exceedingly great is at stake, when the true and truly holy Godhead is proclaimed as to be sought and worshipped—although from it are furnished to us the aids necessary even for this frailty which we now bear—yet not for the sake of the transitory vapour of mortal life, but for the sake of the blessed life, which is none other than eternal.
This divinity, or, if I may so speak, deity (for our writers do not now shrink from using this word, so as to render more expressly from the Greek what they call theotēs)—this divinity, then, or deity, is not to be found in that theology which they call civil, which Marcus Varro expounded in sixteen volumes; that is, one does not attain to the felicity of eternal life by the worship of such gods as the states have appointed to be worshipped, and in whatever manner. Whoever has not yet been persuaded of this by the sixth book, which we have just completed, when perhaps he has read this present one, will have nothing further to desire for the settling of this question.
For it may happen that someone should suppose at least the select and chief gods, whom Varro embraced in his last volume and of whom we have said too little, ought to be worshipped for the sake of the blessed life, which is none other than eternal. In this matter I do not say what Tertullian remarked, perhaps more wittily than truly: If gods are chosen like onions, then surely the rest are judged worthless. I do not say this; for I see that even from the select ones some are further chosen for something greater and more excellent, just as in warfare, when recruits have been selected, from these too some are chosen for some greater feat of arms; and when men are chosen in the church to be set over others, the rest are not thereby rejected, since all good faithful are rightly called the elect.
In a building, cornerstones are chosen, without the rest being rejected, which are assigned to other parts of the structure. Grapes are chosen for eating, nor are the others rejected which we leave for drinking. There is no need to run through many examples, since the matter is plain. Wherefore, not because certain gods have been selected out of many is either he who wrote of them, or their worshippers, or the gods themselves to be blamed; but rather it is to be observed who exactly these are, and for what purpose they seem to have been selected. These select gods, at any rate, Varro commends in the compass of a single book:
Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Genius, Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, Sol, Orcus, Father Liber, Tellus, Ceres, Juno, Luna, Diana, Minerva, Venus, Vesta—in all some twenty, of whom twelve are male and eight female. Are these deities said to be select because of their greater administrations in the world, or because they became better known to the peoples and greater worship was rendered to them? If it is because greater works are administered by them in the world, we ought not to have found them among that, as it were, plebeian multitude of deities assigned to petty little tasks.
For first, Janus himself, when a conception is begun—whence all those works take their beginning, minutely distributed among minute deities—opens the entrance for receiving the seed. There too is Saturn, on account of the seed itself; there Liber, who frees the male by the emission of seed; there Libera, whom they also identify with Venus, who confers this same benefit upon the woman, that she too may be freed by the emission of seed. All these are of those who are called select. But there too is the goddess Mena, who presides over the menstrual flows, though a daughter of Jupiter, yet ignoble.
And this province of the menstrual flows the same author, in his book of the select gods, assigns to Juno herself, who among the select gods is even queen, and here, as Juno Lucina, together with this same Mena, her stepdaughter, presides over the same blood. There too are two obscure ones I know not whom, Vitumnus and Sentinus, of whom the one bestows life, the other sense, upon the offspring. And truly they render far more, ignoble as they are, than all those so many magnates and select ones. For assuredly, without life and sense, what is that whole thing which is carried in the womb but some most abject thing, comparable to mud and dust?
[III] What cause, then, compelled so many select gods to these least of tasks, where in the sharing of this bounty they are surpassed by Vitumnus and Sentinus, whom an obscure reputation conceals? For the select Janus confers the entrance and, as it were, the door for the seed; the select Saturn confers the seed itself; the select Liber confers the emission of that same seed in males; Libera, who is Ceres or Venus, confers this same in females; the select Juno confers—and this not alone, but together with Mena, daughter of Jupiter—the menstrual flows for the increase of what has been conceived; and Vitumnus, obscure and ignoble, confers life; Sentinus, obscure and ignoble, confers sense;
which two things are so much more excellent than those others, by as much as they themselves surpass them in understanding and reason. For just as those beings which reason and understand are assuredly superior to those which live and feel like cattle without understanding and reason, so too those things which are endowed with life and sense are deservedly preferred to those which neither live nor feel. Accordingly, among the select gods, Vitumnus the life-giver and Sentinus the sense-giver ought to have been reckoned rather than Janus the admitter of seed, and Saturn the giver or sower of seed, and Liber and Libera the stirrers-up or emitters of seed;
seeds which it is unworthy to consider unless they attain to life and sense—gifts that are not given by the select gods, but by certain unknown ones neglected in comparison with the dignity of those. But if it is answered that Janus has power over all beginnings, and therefore that even the opening for conception is not undeservedly attributed to him; and Saturn over all seeds, and therefore that the seeding of man too cannot be sundered from his operation; and Liber and Libera over all emissions of seed, and therefore that they also preside over what pertains to the reproduction of men; and Juno over all purgings and births, and therefore that she is not absent from the purgings of women and the births of men:
then let them ask what they will answer concerning Vitumnus and Sentinus—whether they wish these too to have power over all things that live and feel. If they grant this, let them consider how much more sublimely they will be placing them. For to be born from seeds is in the earth and from the earth; but to live and to feel they suppose belongs even to the starry gods. If, however, they say that to Vitumnus and Sentinus only these things are attributed which grow to life in the flesh and are aided by the senses: why does not that God who makes all things live and feel grant life and sense to the flesh also, bestowing this gift by a universal operation upon births as well? and what need is there of Vitumnus and Sentinus?
But if by him who universally presides over life and the senses these fleshly matters, as the lowest and meanest, have been committed to these as it were to servants: were those select gods so destitute of a household that they could not find any to whom they too might commit these things, but with all their nobility, for which they seemed worthy to be chosen, were compelled to do their work with ignoble ones? Juno is select and queen, and "both sister and consort of Jupiter"; yet she is Iterduca (guide of the journey) to boys, and does her work with the most ignoble goddesses Abeona and Adeona. There too they have placed the goddess Mens, who gives boys a good mind, and among the select ones she is not placed—as though anything greater could be bestowed upon man;
but Juno is placed there, because she is Iterduca and Domiduca (leader home)—as though it were of any profit to take a journey and be led home, if the mind be not good, the goddess of which gift these selectors placed least of all among the select deities. She assuredly ought to have been preferred even to Minerva, to whom, through these petty tasks, they attributed the memory of boys. For who would doubt that it is far better to have a good mind than a memory however vast? For no one is evil who has a good mind; whereas certain most wicked men have a marvellous memory, so much the worse as they are the less able to forget what they wickedly devise. And yet Minerva is among the select gods; but the goddess Mens a vile throng has buried. What shall I say of Virtue? what of Felicity?
concerning whom we have already said much in the fourth book; who, though they held them as goddesses, would give them no place among the select gods, where they gave a place to Mars and Orcus, the one the worker of deaths, the other the receiver. Since therefore in these petty tasks, which are minutely distributed among many gods, we see even the select ones themselves working, as it were, a senate together with the plebs, and find that by certain gods, who were by no means thought worthy of selection, far greater and better things are administered than by those who are called select: it remains to conclude that they were named select and chief not on account of more excellent administrations in the world, but because it came about that they became better known to the peoples.
Whence even Varro himself says that to certain father-gods and mother-goddesses, as to men, ignobility had befallen. If, therefore, Felicity perhaps for this reason ought not to have been among the select gods, that they attained to that nobility not by merit but by chance: then at least among them, or rather before them, Fortune should have been placed, whom they say to be a goddess who confers her gifts upon each not by rational arrangement, but as it may chance to fall out. She ought to have held the summit among the select gods, since in them she especially showed what she could do; seeing that we behold them chosen not by pre-eminent virtue, nor by rational felicity, but, as their worshippers think concerning her, by the reckless power of Fortune.
For the most eloquent Sallust too perhaps had regard even to the gods themselves when he said: "But assuredly Fortune bears sway in every matter; she makes all things famous or obscure according to caprice rather than according to truth." For they cannot find a reason why Venus should have been made famous and Virtue obscured, when the deities of both were consecrated by these people, and their merits are not to be compared. Or if Venus deserved to be ennobled because more people seek her—for more seek Venus than Virtue—why was the goddess Minerva made famous and the goddess Money (Pecunia) obscured?
seeing that in the human race greed allures more than skill, and even among those who are skilled you will rarely find a man who does not have his art up for sale at a money price, and that for the sake of which something is done is always esteemed more than that which is done for the sake of something else. If, then, this selection of gods was made by the judgment of the foolish multitude, why was not the goddess Money preferred to Minerva, since it is on account of money that there are many craftsmen? But if this distinction belongs to the few wise, why was not Virtue preferred to Venus, since reason far prefers her?
At any rate, as I said, Fortune herself, who, as those who ascribe most to her think, bears sway in every matter and makes all things famous or obscure according to caprice rather than according to truth—if she has had such power even over the gods, that by her reckless judgment she made famous whom she would and obscured whom she would—ought to have held a chief place among the select ones, she who is of so pre-eminent a power even over the gods themselves. Or, that she might not be able to be there, is even Fortune herself to be supposed to have had nothing else but adverse fortune? She then was adverse to herself, who, while making others noble, was not herself ennobled.
[IV] But any seeker after nobility and renown might congratulate these select gods and call them fortunate, did he not see them selected rather for insults than for honours. For that lowest throng their very ignobility covered, lest it be overwhelmed with reproaches. We laugh indeed when we see them, by the figments of human opinions, distributed among tasks parceled out among themselves, like petty toll-farmers of the revenues, or like craftsmen in the silversmiths' quarter, where a single little vessel, in order that it may come forth finished, passes through many artisans, though it could have been finished by one skilled workman.
But it was thought that provision could be made for the multitude of workers only by this means, that individuals should learn the separate parts of the craft quickly and easily, lest all should be forced to become masters in one whole craft slowly and with difficulty. Nevertheless, scarcely any of the non-select gods is found who has drawn upon himself an infamous reputation by some crime; but scarcely any of the select ones who has not received upon himself the mark of some notable disgrace. The former descended to the humble works of the latter; the latter did not come to the sublime crimes of the former. Concerning Janus indeed nothing readily occurs to me that pertains to disgrace. And perhaps he was such a one, that he lived more innocently and more remote from misdeeds and enormities. He kindly received the fugitive Saturn;
he shared his kingdom with his guest, so that each even founded his own city, the one the Janiculum, the other Saturnia. But those who in the worship of the gods seek out every sort of unseemliness, when they found a life less base in him, disfigured him with the monstrous deformity of his image, making him now two-faced, now even four-faced, as it were twin. Or perhaps they wished that, since very many of the select gods had by committing shameful deeds lost their 'face' (frons, forehead/shame), the more innocent this one was, the more 'faced' (frontosus) he should appear. [V] But let us rather hear their physical interpretations, by which they attempt to color the baseness of a most wretched error with the appearance, as it were, of loftier doctrine.
First, Varro commends these interpretations by saying that the ancients fashioned the images of the gods, and their emblems and adornments, so that those who had approached the mysteries of the doctrine, when they had observed them with their eyes, might behold with the mind the soul of the world and its parts, that is, the true gods; and that those who made images in the form of a man seem to have followed this reasoning, that the mind of mortals, which is in the human body, is most like the immortal mind; just as if vessels were set up for the purpose of denoting the gods, and in the temple of Liber a wine-jar (oenophorum) were placed, which would signify wine, by that which contains signifying that which is contained;
so through an image which had the human form, the rational soul is signified, because in that kind of vessel, as it were, that nature is wont to be contained, of which nature they hold that a god or gods exist. These are the mysteries of the doctrine which that most learned man had penetrated, whence he might bring these things forth into the light. But, O most acute man, have you in these mysteries of doctrine lost that prudence by which it soberly seemed to you that those who first set up images for the peoples both took away fear from their fellow-citizens and added error, and that the ancient Romans observed the gods more chastely without images? For these were your authorities, that you dared to say these things against the later Romans.
For if those most ancient men too had worshipped images, perhaps you would have suppressed by the silence of fear that whole opinion about images not being set up—true for the meantime—and would have proclaimed the more loquaciously and loftily, in figments of this pernicious and vain kind, these mysteries of doctrine. Yet your soul, so learned and ingenious (wherein we greatly grieve for you), by these mysteries of doctrine could in no way arrive at its God—that is, at Him by whom it was made, not with whom it was made, nor whose portion it is, but whose creation it is; nor who is the soul of all things, but who made every soul, by whose sole illumination the soul becomes blessed, if it be not ungrateful to His grace. But what these mysteries of doctrine are, and how they are to be esteemed, what follows will show.
Meanwhile this most learned man confesses that the soul of the world and its parts are the true gods; whence it is understood that his whole theology, that is, that very natural theology to which he ascribes so much, could extend itself even to the nature of the rational soul. For concerning the natural theology he prefaces very little in this book, which he wrote last, concerning the select gods; in which we shall see whether, by physiological interpretations, he can refer the civil to this natural. If he can, the whole will be natural: and what need was there to sever the civil from it with so great a care of distinction? But if it is separated by a correct discrimination:
since not even that which pleases him as natural is true (for it reaches as far as the soul, not as far as the true God who made even the soul), how much more abject and false is this civil theology, which is chiefly occupied about the nature of bodies, as its very interpretations will demonstrate—of which it behooves me to record some necessary ones—drawn out and unfolded by them with such great diligence. [VI] The same Varro, then, still prefacing concerning natural theology, says that he judges God to be the soul of the world, whom the Greeks call kosmos, and that this world itself is God; but that, just as a wise man, though he is composed of body and soul, is yet called wise from the soul, so the world is called God from the soul, though it is composed of soul and body.
Here he seems in some way to confess one God; but in order to introduce even more, he adds that the world is divided into two parts, heaven and earth; and heaven in two ways, into ether and air; but earth into water and land; of which the highest is ether, the second air, the third water, the lowest earth; all which four parts are full of souls—in ether and air of immortal ones, in water and earth of mortal ones. And from the highest circuit of heaven to the circle of the moon are ethereal souls, the stars and constellations, and these heavenly gods are not only understood to be, but even seen; but between the orbit of the moon and the summits of clouds and winds are aerial souls, but these are seen by the mind, not by the eyes, and are called heroes and lares and genii.
This, evidently, is the natural theology briefly propounded in that preface, which pleased not only him but many philosophers; concerning which it must then be more diligently discussed, when, with the help of the true God, I shall have completed what remains concerning the civil, as far as pertains to the select gods. [VII] Janus, then, from whom he took his beginning, I ask who exactly he is. It is answered: He is the world. This is plainly a brief and open answer. Why, then, are the beginnings of things said to pertain to him, but the ends to another, whom they call Terminus? For on account of beginnings and ends they declare that two months are dedicated to these two gods, besides those ten of which Martius is the head down to December—January to Janus, February to Terminus.
Therefore they say the Terminalia are celebrated in the same month of February, when the purificatory rite is performed, which they call Februm, whence the month received its name. Does it follow, then, that to the world, which is Janus, the beginnings of things pertain but the ends do not, so that another god had to be set over them? Do they not confess that all things which they say come to be in this world are also brought to an end in this same world? What is this vanity, to give the one a half power in his work, a double face in his image? Would they not interpret this two-faced god far more elegantly, if they said the same one was both Janus and Terminus, and gave one face to beginnings, the other to ends? For whoever works ought to attend to both; for in every movement of his action, he who does not look back to the beginning does not look forward to the end.
Whence it is necessary that the forward-looking intention be connected with the memory that looks back; for whoever has forgotten what he began will not find how to finish it. But if they thought that the blessed life is begun in this world but perfected outside the world, and therefore attributed to Janus, that is, to the world, only the power over beginnings: assuredly they would prefer Terminus to him and would not alienate him from the select gods. Although even now, when in these two gods the beginnings and ends of temporal things are treated, more honor ought to have been given to Terminus. For there is greater gladness when any matter is perfected;
but beginnings are full of anxiety until they are brought to their end, which he who begins anything especially seeks, aims at, awaits, longs for, nor does he exult over a thing begun unless it be brought to a term. [VIII] But now let the interpretation of the two-faced image be brought forth. They say he has two faces, before and behind, because our gape, when we open the mouth, seems like the world; whence the Greeks also call the palate ouranon (heaven), and some Latin poets, he says, have called the palate 'heaven'; from which gaping of the mouth there is an entrance both outward toward the teeth and inward toward the throat. Behold to what the world has been brought on account of a word for our palate, whether Greek or poetic. But what has this to do with the soul, what with eternal life?
Is this god to be worshipped merely on account of the saliva, for the swallowing of part and the spitting out of part of which each door of the palate is opened beneath the 'heaven'? What, moreover, is more absurd than not to find in the world itself two doors set opposite each other, through which it might either admit something into itself inward or emit it from itself outward, and yet to wish to compose from our mouth and throat—whose likeness the world does not have—an image of the world in Janus on account of the palate alone, whose likeness Janus does not have? But when they make him four-faced and call him Janus Geminus, they interpret this of the four parts of the world, as if the world looked outward through all its faces as Janus does.
Then, if Janus is the world, and the world consists of four parts, the image of the two-faced Janus is false; or if it is true for this reason, that the whole world is also wont to be understood by the name of East and West, would anyone—when we name the two other parts, North and South—say the world is twin, as they call the four-faced Janus 'Janus Geminus'? They have no way at all whereby to interpret four doors, which might lie open to those entering and going out, after the likeness of the world, as concerning the two-faced one they found at least in the mouth of man something they might allege—unless perhaps Neptune should come to their aid and hold out a fish, whose throat, besides the gape of the mouth and gullet, lies open also on the right and left.
And yet no soul escapes this vanity through so many doors, except the one that hears Truth saying: I am the door. [IX] But let them expound whom they wish Jove—who is also called Jupiter—to be understood as. "He is a god," they say, "having power over the causes by which anything comes to be in the world." How great this is, that most noble verse of Virgil attests: Happy is he who has been able to know the causes of things. But why is Janus set before him? Let that most acute and learned man answer us this. "Because with Janus," he says, "are the first things, with Jove the highest. Deservedly, therefore, is Jupiter held to be king of all.
For first things are surpassed by highest things, because, although first things precede in time, highest things excel in dignity." But this would be rightly said, if the firsts and the highests of things done were being distinguished; as the beginning of a deed is to set out, the highest to arrive; the beginning of a deed the commencement of learning, the highest the full attainment of the doctrine; and thus in all things the firsts are the beginnings and the highests are the ends. But this business has already been discussed between Janus and Terminus. The causes, however, which are given to Jove, are efficient causes, not effects; nor can it in any way come to pass that they be anticipated in time by the deeds or the beginnings of deeds. For the thing which makes is always prior to that which is made.
Wherefore, if the beginnings of things done pertain to Janus, they are not on that account prior to the efficient causes which they attribute to Jove. For as nothing comes to be, so nothing is begun in order to come to be, without a making cause having preceded. If the peoples call this god, in whose power are all the causes of all created natures and natural things, by the name of Jupiter, and yet worship him with such great insults and such wicked charges of crime, they bind themselves with a fouler sacrilege than if they thought there were no god at all.
Whence it would be better for them to call some other by the name of Jupiter, one worthy of base and shameful honors, substituting a vain figment which they might rather blaspheme (just as a stone is said to have been substituted for Saturn, which he might devour in place of his son), than to call this god both the thunderer and the adulterer, both the ruler of the whole world and one dissolute through so many defilements, and one holding the highest causes of all natures and natural things and yet not holding good causes for himself. Next I ask what place among the gods they now assign to this Jupiter, if Janus is the world. For he defined the true gods to be the soul of the world and its parts; and by this, whatever is not this is assuredly, according to them, not a true god.
Will they then say that Jupiter is the soul of the world, so that Janus is its body, that is, this visible world? If they say this, there will be no way in which they can call Janus a god, since the body of the world is not a god even according to themselves, but the soul of the world and its parts. Whence the same man says most plainly that he judges God to be the soul of the world, and this very world to be God; but that, just as a wise man, though he is of soul and body, is yet called wise from the soul, so the world is called God from the soul, though it is of soul and body. Accordingly, the body of the world alone is not God, but either its soul alone, or soul and body together, yet in such a way that it is God not from the body but from the soul.
If, then, Janus is the world and Janus is a god, will they say that Jupiter, in order that he may be a god, is some part of Janus? For they are more wont to attribute the universe to Jove; whence is the saying: All things are full of Jove. Therefore Jupiter also, in order that he may be a god and especially king of the gods, they cannot reckon to be any other than the world, so that, according to them, he may reign over the other gods as over his own parts. To this same opinion the same Varro also expounds certain verses of Valerius Soranus in that book which he wrote separately from these concerning the worship of the gods; which verses are these: Almighty Jupiter, begetter of kings and of things and of gods, and mother of the gods, one god and all. But they are expounded in the same book thus: