[I 1] Now then let us inquire more diligently, so far as God grants, into what we deferred a little before: whether each single person in the Trinity can also be called, by itself and not together with the other two, God, or great, or wise, or true, or omnipotent, or just, and whatever else can be said of God, not relatively but with respect to itself; or whether these things are not said except when the Trinity is understood. For this makes the question, because it is written: 'Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God'—whether the Father is so the father of his own wisdom and power that he is wise by this wisdom which he begot, and powerful by this power which he begot; and because he is always powerful and wise, he always begot power and wisdom.
For we had said: if it is so, why is he not also the father of his own greatness by which he is great, and of his goodness by which he is good, and of his justice by which he is just, and of other such if there are any? Or if all these are understood by many names in the same wisdom and power, so that that is greatness which is power, that goodness which is wisdom, and again that wisdom which is power, as we have already treated, let us remember that when I name any one of these, it is to be taken as if I mentioned them all. It is asked, then, whether the Father is wise even singly, and is himself his own wisdom, or is wise in the way in which he is speaking.
For he is speaking by the Word which he begot—not by a word which is uttered and sounds and passes away, but by the Word which 'was with God, and God was the Word, and all things were made through him,' by the Word equal to himself, by which he always and unchangeably utters himself. For he himself is not the Word, just as he is not the Son nor the Image. But speaking (apart from those temporal voices of God which come to be in the creature, for they sound and pass away)—speaking, then, by that coeternal Word, he is understood not as single, but with that Word itself, without which he is assuredly not speaking.
Is he then also wise as he is speaking, so that his wisdom is as the Word is, and to be the Word is the same as to be wisdom, and this too is to be power, so that power and wisdom and the Word are the same thing and are said relatively, as are Son and Image; and is he not powerful or wise singly, but with that very power and wisdom which he begot, just as he is not speaking singly but by that Word and with that Word which he begot, and thus great by and with that greatness which he begot?
And if he is not great by one thing and God by another, but great by that whereby he is God—because to him to be great is not one thing and to be God another—it follows that he is not God singly either, but by and with that deity which he begot, so that the Son is the deity of the Father just as he is the wisdom and power of the Father, and just as he is the Word and Image of the Father. And because to him to be is not one thing and to be God another, so let the Son also be the essence of the Father just as he is his Word and Image.
And through this, even setting aside that which is 'Father,' the Father would not be anything except because there is a Son to him; so that not only that which is called 'Father' (which manifestly is said not with respect to himself but relatively to the Son, and is therefore Father because there is a Son to him), but altogether that he is that which he is with respect to himself, is so because he begot his own essence. For just as he is great by no other than the greatness which he begot, so also he is by no other than the essence which he begot, because to him to be is not one thing and to be great another. Is the Father, then, so the father of his own essence, as he is the father of his own greatness, as he is the father of his own power and wisdom? For his greatness is the same as his power, and the same essence as his greatness. This disputation was born from what is written:
'That Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.' Wherefore our discourse is straitened into these narrows, when we desire to speak the ineffable, so that either we say that Christ is not the power of God and the wisdom of God, and thus shamelessly and impiously resist the Apostle; or we confess that Christ is indeed the power of God and the wisdom of God, but that his Father is not the father of his own power and wisdom, which is no less impious (for thus he will not even be the Father of Christ, since Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God); or that the Father is not powerful by his own power nor wise by his own wisdom—which who would dare to say?—
or that in the Father to be is one thing and to be wise another, so that he is not wise by that very thing whereby he is—which is wont to be understood of the soul, which is now unwise, now wise, as being a mutable nature and not supremely and perfectly simple; or that the Father is not anything with respect to himself, and that not only that he is Father, but altogether that he is, is said relatively to the Son. How then is the Son of the same essence as the Father, since with respect to himself he is not even essence, nor is at all with respect to himself, but even to be is to him relative to the Son? But rather much more they are of one and the same essence, because the essence of the Father and of the Son is one and the same, since to the Father to be is not with respect to himself but relative to the Son—the essence which he begot, and by which essence he is whatever he is.
Neither, then, is with respect to himself, and each is said relatively to the other. Or is the Father alone said not only what he is called 'Father,' but altogether whatever he is called, relatively to the Son, while the Son is said both with respect to himself and to the Father? And if it is so, what is said of him with respect to himself? Is it essence itself? But the Son is the essence of the Father, as he is the power and wisdom of the Father, as the Word of the Father and the Image of the Father. Or if the Son is called essence with respect to himself, while the Father is not essence but the begetter of essence, and is not with respect to himself but by that very essence which he begot—just as he is great by that very greatness which he begot—then the Son also is called greatness with respect to himself, and therefore also power and wisdom and Word and Image. But what is more absurd than that an image should be said with respect to itself?
Or if Image and Word are not the same thing as power and wisdom, but those are said relatively while these are said with respect to itself, not to another, then the Father begins to be wise not by that wisdom which he begot, because he cannot himself be said relatively to it while it is not said relatively to him. For all things that are said relatively are said to one another. It remains, therefore, that the Son too, even as essence, is said relatively to the Father. From which is deduced a most unexpected sense: that essence itself is not essence, or at any rate that, when 'essence' is said, not essence but something relative is indicated. Just as when 'lord' is said, not essence is indicated but the relative which is referred to a servant;
but when 'man' is said, or anything such as is said with respect to itself and not to another, then essence is indicated; a man, therefore, when he is called lord, the man himself is essence, but 'lord' is said relatively; for 'man' is said with respect to himself, 'lord' with respect to a servant. But in this matter of which we are treating, if essence itself is said relatively, essence itself is not essence. Add to this that every essence which is said relatively is also something apart from the relative, as a man who is lord and a man who is servant, and a horse which is a beast of burden, and a coin which is a pledge; man and horse and coin are said with respect to themselves and are substances or essences; but lord and servant and beast of burden and pledge are said relatively to something.
But if there were not a man, that is, some substance, there would not be one who could be called lord relatively; and if there were not a horse, some essence, there would not be that which could be called a beast of burden relatively; so if a coin were not some substance, neither could a pledge be said relatively. Wherefore, if the Father too is not anything with respect to himself, there is altogether no one who could be said relatively to another. For a colour is not referred to something coloured as its colour, nor is colour said with respect to itself at all, but is always the colour of something coloured; while that thing of which it is the colour, even if it is referred to the colour by that whereby it is called coloured, yet that which is called body is said with respect to itself: is it in any way thus to be thought that the Father is not said anything with respect to himself, but that whatever is said is said to the Son?
But the same Son is said both with respect to himself and to the Father, since 'great greatness' and 'powerful power' are said with respect to itself, and greatness and power are said of the great and powerful Father, by which the Father is great and powerful. Not so, then; but each is substance, and each one substance. And as it is absurd to say that the white is not whiteness, so it is absurd to say that the wise is not wisdom; and as whiteness is called white with respect to itself, so wisdom is called wise with respect to itself. But the whiteness of a body is not essence, since the body itself is essence and that whiteness its quality, whence the body is also called white by it, to which to be is not the same as to be white.
For there form is one thing and colour another, and both are not in themselves but in some mass, which mass is neither form nor colour but is formed and coloured. But wisdom is both wise and is wise by its very self. And since whatever soul is made wise by participation in wisdom, if it again grows foolish, wisdom nevertheless remains in itself; nor when the soul is changed into folly is wisdom changed. It is not in him who is made wise by it as whiteness is in a body which is white from it; for when the body is changed into another colour, that whiteness will not remain and will altogether cease to be.
But if the Father too, who begot wisdom, is made wise by it, and to be is not the same to him as to be wise, then the Son is his quality, not his offspring, and there will no longer be the supreme simplicity there. But far be it that it should be so, since there truly is there a supremely simple essence; therefore to be there is the same as to be wise. And if to be there is the same as to be wise, the Father is not wise by that wisdom which he begot; otherwise it is not he that begot it, but it that begot him. For what else do we say when we say 'to be is to him the same as to be wise,' than 'he is by that whereby he is wise'? Wherefore, that which is the cause to him of being wise is itself the cause to him of being. Accordingly, if the wisdom which he begot is the cause to him of being wise, it is also the cause to him of being.
Which cannot happen except by begetting him or making him. But no one would in any way call wisdom the mother or the maker of the Father. For what is more insane? Therefore the Father himself also is wisdom, and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father in the same way as he is called the light of the Father—that is, that as light from light, and both one light, so wisdom from wisdom is understood, and both one wisdom. Therefore also one essence, because there to be is the same as to be wise. For what to wisdom is to be wise, and to power to be able, and to eternity to be eternal, and to justice to be just, and to greatness to be great, this to essence is to be itself.
And because in that simplicity to be wise is nothing other than to be, wisdom there is the same as essence. [II 3] The Father, therefore, and the Son together are one essence and one greatness and one truth and one wisdom. But the Father and the Son together are not both one Word, because they are not together both one Son. For as the Son is referred to the Father, and is not said with respect to himself, so also the Word is referred to him whose Word it is, when it is called Word. For he is Son by that whereby he is Word, and Word by that whereby he is Son. Since therefore the Father and the Son together are assuredly not one Son, it follows that the Father and the Son together are not both one Word.
And therefore he is not Word by that whereby he is wisdom, because 'Word' is not said with respect to itself but only relatively to him whose Word it is, as the Son to the Father; but wisdom is said by that whereby it is essence. And therefore, because it is one essence, it is one wisdom. But since the Word too is wisdom, yet is not Word by that whereby it is wisdom (for 'Word' is understood relatively, 'wisdom' essentially), let us take it that when 'Word' is said, it is as if 'born wisdom' were said, so that it is both Son and Image. And when these two things are said, that is, 'born wisdom,' in one of them, that which is 'born,' both Word and Image and Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not shown, because they are said relatively;
but in the other, which is 'wisdom,' since it is also said with respect to itself (for it is wise by its very self), essence too is demonstrated, and this to it is to be that which is to be wise. Whence the Father and the Son together are one wisdom, because one essence, and severally wisdom from wisdom, as essence from essence. Wherefore, not because the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, or the one unbegotten and the other begotten, are they therefore not one essence, because by these names their relatives are shown. But both together are one wisdom and one essence, where to be is the same as to be wise; but both are not together Word or Son, because to be is not the same as to be Word or to be Son, as we have already sufficiently shown that these are said relatively.
[III 4] Why then in the Scriptures is almost nothing anywhere said of wisdom except to show it as begotten or created by God? Begotten, namely, as that through which all things were made; but created or made, as in men, when they are turned toward that which is not created and made but begotten, and are enlightened; for in them there comes to be something which is called their wisdom. Or as the Scriptures foretell or narrate that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us'; for in this way Christ was made wisdom, because he was made man.
Is it not for this reason that in those books Wisdom does not speak, nor is anything said of her, except what shows her to be born of God or made by him — although the Father himself is also Wisdom — because it was that Wisdom which had to be commended to us and imitated by us, by whose imitation we are formed? For the Father utters her so that she may be his Word, not in the way that a sounding word is uttered from the mouth or is thought before its pronouncement (for the latter is completed within intervals of time, whereas the former is eternal); and by enlightening us he tells us, both concerning himself and concerning the Father, what must be told to men. Therefore he says: 'No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and him to whom the Son wills to reveal him' — because the Father reveals through the Son, that is, through his Word.
For if this word which we utter, though temporal and transient, shows both itself and that of which we speak, how much more the Word of God, through whom all things were made, which so shows the Father as the Father is, because it too so is, and this is what the Father is, inasmuch as he is Wisdom and Essence? For inasmuch as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is, because the Word is not the Father, and 'Word' is said relatively, just as 'Son,' which is certainly not the Father. And therefore Christ is 'the power and wisdom of God,' because from the Father who is power and wisdom he too is power and wisdom, as light from the Father who is light, and 'the fountain of life' with God the Father who is likewise the fountain of life.
'For with you,' it says, 'is the fountain of life; in your light we shall see light,' because, as the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself; and 'that was the true light which enlightens every man coming into this world,' and this light was the Word with God, but the Word also was God. 'Now God is light, and in him there are no darknesses at all' — light, however, not corporeal but spiritual; nor spiritual in such a way that it was made by illumination, as it was said to the apostles, 'You are the light of the world,' but the light which enlightens every man, that very and supreme Wisdom, God, of whom we now treat.
Therefore the Son is Wisdom of the Father who is Wisdom, as light of light and God of God, so that the Father alone is light and the Son alone is light, and the Father alone is God and the Son alone is God; therefore the Father alone is Wisdom and the Son alone is Wisdom. And as both together are one light and one God, so both are one Wisdom. But the Son 'was made for us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification,' because in time we turn ourselves to him, that is, from some point of time, so that we may abide with him for eternity. And he himself, from a certain point of time, 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.'
For this reason, therefore, when in the Scriptures something is pronounced or narrated concerning Wisdom, whether she herself is speaking or something is said about her, it is chiefly the Son who is intimated to us. By the example of this image let us too not depart from God, since we too are the image of God — not indeed an equal one, being made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father as she is; and we are so because we are enlightened by the light, whereas she is so because she is the light that enlightens; and therefore she, without an example, is an example to us. For she does not imitate anyone going before her toward the Father, from whom she is never in any way separable, since she is the very same thing as he from whom she is.
But we, striving, imitate the one who abides, and follow the one who stands, and walking in him we press on toward him, because he was made for us a temporal way through his humility, he who is our eternal habitation through his divinity.
For inasmuch as he — being 'in the form of God and equal to God,' and himself God — offers an example to the pure intellectual spirits who have not fallen through pride, so that he might offer that same example of returning even to fallen man, who because of the uncleanness of his sins and the penalty of mortality could not see God: he 'emptied himself,' not by changing his divinity, but by taking on our mutability, and 'taking the form of a servant' he came to us into this world, he who was in this world, since 'the world was made through him' — that he might be an example to those looking upward at God, an example to those below marvelling at man, an example to the healthy for persevering, an example to the sick for growing well again, an example to the dying for not fearing, an example to the dead for rising again, himself 'holding the primacy in all things.'
For since man ought to follow none but God unto blessedness, yet could not perceive God, by following God made man he would follow at once both the one he could perceive and the one he ought to follow. Let us therefore love him and cleave to him, 'through the charity poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.' It is no wonder, then, if for the sake of the example which the image equal to the Father offers to us, that we may be reformed to the image of God, when Scripture speaks of Wisdom it speaks of the Son, whom we follow by living wisely — although the Father also is Wisdom, as he is light and God. The Holy Spirit too, whether he be the supreme charity joining both together and subjoining us, which is therefore not unfittingly said, because it is written:
'God is charity,' how is he not also himself Wisdom, since he is light, seeing that 'God is light'? Or whether the essence of the Holy Spirit is to be named singly and properly in some other way, since he is God, he is surely light, and since he is light, he is surely Wisdom. That the Holy Spirit is God, Scripture proclaims through the Apostle who says: 'Do you not know that you are the temple of God?' And immediately he added: 'and the Spirit of God dwells in you.' For God dwells in his temple. For the Spirit of God does not dwell in the temple of God as a servant, since in another place he says more evidently: 'Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own? For you were bought with a great price.'
'Therefore glorify God in your body.' Now what is Wisdom but a spiritual and unchangeable light? For that sun too is light, but corporeal; and the spiritual creature is light, but not unchangeable. The Father, therefore, is light; the Son is light; the Holy Spirit is light; yet together they are not three lights but one light. And therefore the Father is Wisdom, the Son is Wisdom, the Holy Spirit is Wisdom; and together they are not three wisdoms, but one Wisdom; and because in that realm to be is the same as to be wise, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one essence. Nor is it anything else there to be than to be God. One God, therefore, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.
[IV 7] And so, for the sake of speaking about ineffable things, that we might in some way express what we can by no means fully utter, it has been said by our Greeks 'one essence, three substances,' but by the Latins 'one essence or substance, three persons,' because, as we have already said, in our language, that is Latin, 'essence' is not customarily understood otherwise than 'substance.' And provided that what is said be understood at least as in a riddle, it seemed good to speak thus, so that something might be said when it was asked what the three are — which three the true faith declares to be, since it says that the Father is not the Son, and that the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son.
When, therefore, it is asked what three, or which three, we betake ourselves to finding some special or general name by which we may embrace these three; but none occurs to the mind, because the surpassing eminence of the Godhead exceeds the capacity of ordinary speech. For God is more truly thought than he is uttered, and he more truly is than he is thought. For when we say that Jacob is not the same as Abraham, and that Isaac is neither Abraham nor Jacob, we surely confess that there are three, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. But when it is asked what three, we answer 'three men,' calling them plurally by a special name; or by a general name, if we should say 'three animals' (for man, as the ancients defined, is a rational, mortal animal);
or, as our Scriptures are wont to speak, 'three souls,' when it is pleasing to name the whole from its better part, that is from the soul — although both body and soul is the whole man. For thus it is said that 'seventy-five souls' went down into Egypt with Jacob, meaning that many men. Likewise, when we say that your horse is not the same as mine, and that a third belonging to someone else is neither mine nor yours, we confess that there are three, and to one asking 'what three,' we answer 'three horses' by a special name, but by a general name 'three animals.' And again, when we say that an ox is not a horse, and that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we speak of three certain things;
and to those inquiring what three, we no longer say by a special name 'three horses' or 'three oxen' or 'three dogs,' since they are not contained under the same species, but by a general name 'three animals,' or by a higher genus, 'three substances' or 'three creatures' or 'three natures.' Now whatever things are enunciated in the plural number specially by one name can also be enunciated generally; but not all things which are generally called by one name can we also call specially by one name. For 'three horses,' which is a special name, we also call 'three animals'; but a horse and an ox and a dog we call only 'three animals' or 'substances,' which are general names, and whatever else can be said of them generally;
but 'three horses' or 'oxen' or 'dogs,' which are special terms, we cannot use of them. For those things we enunciate by one name, though in the plural, which have in common that which is signified by that name. For Abraham and Isaac and Jacob have in common that which is 'man,' and so they are called 'three men'; a horse also and an ox and a dog have in common that which is 'animal,' therefore they are called 'three animals.' Thus of certain three laurels we say also 'three trees'; but of a laurel and a myrtle and an olive, only 'three trees' or 'three substances or natures.' And thus of three stones we say also 'three bodies'; but of a stone and a piece of wood and iron, only 'three bodies,' or by whatever still higher general name they can be called.
Therefore, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three, let us ask what the three are, what they have in common. For that which the Father is, is not common to them, so that they should be Fathers to one another, as friends, since they are called relatively to each other, can be called 'three friends' because they are so to one another; but this is not so there, because there only the Father is Father, and Father not of two but of the one and only Son. Nor are there three Sons, since there the Father is not a Son, nor is the Holy Spirit. Nor are there three Holy Spirits, since the Holy Spirit also, in the proper signification by which he is also called the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son. What, then, are the three? For if three persons, that which 'person' is, is common to them.
Therefore this name 'person' is to them either special or general, if we regard the custom of speaking. But where there is no diversity of nature, several things are so enunciated generally that they can also be enunciated specially. For a difference of nature is what makes it that a laurel and a myrtle and an olive, or a horse and an ox and a dog, are not called by a special name — these 'three laurels,' or those 'three oxen' — but by a general one, both these 'three trees,' and those 'three animals.' But here, where there is no diversity of essence, these three ought to have a special name also, which nevertheless is not found. For 'person' is a general name to such a degree that even a man can be called this, though there is so great a difference between a man and God.
Then, within that same general term, if we say 'three persons' for this reason, that that which 'person' is is common to them (otherwise they can in no way be so called, just as they are not called 'three Sons' because that which 'Son' is is not common to them), why do we not also say 'three Gods'? For certainly, because the Father is a person and the Son is a person and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are three persons. Since, then, the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, why are they not three Gods?
Or, since on account of the ineffable conjunction these three together are one God, why not also one person, so that we might likewise be unable to say 'three persons,' though we call each single one a person, just as we cannot say 'three Gods,' though we call each single one God, whether Father or Son or Holy Spirit? Is it because Scripture does not say 'three Gods'? But neither do we find that Scripture anywhere mentions 'three persons.'
Is it because Scripture calls these three neither three persons nor one person (for we read of 'the person of the Lord,' not 'the person the Lord') that for this reason it has been permitted, by the necessity of speaking and disputing, to say 'three persons' — not because Scripture says so, but because Scripture does not contradict it, whereas if we were to say 'three Gods,' Scripture would contradict, saying: 'Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one God'? Why, then, is it not permitted to say 'three essences' either, which likewise Scripture, as it does not say, so neither contradicts? For if 'essence' is a special name common to the three, why should they not be called 'three essences,' as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are 'three men,' since 'man' is a special name common to all men?