論靈魂與復活 第 1 章 第 5/7 段

kindred, and whether through their bodies the fire is kindled, or the mixing-bowl is mixed, or the food is prepared? For to think that through each of these the soul of a man becomes a plant or an animal, yet that no marks are imprinted to show which is the plant or animal that came from a human and which is the one that came to be otherwise—he who is taken beforehand by such a supposition will be disposed alike toward all things: so that of necessity either he must behave harshly even toward the very humans living within nature, or, if by nature he inclines toward love of mankind in the case of his own kind, he must be similarly disposed toward every living thing, whether it happen to be among creeping things or among wild beasts;

but moreover, even if it becomes a tree in the forest, he who has accepted this doctrine will suppose the trees to be a populace of human beings.

What sort of life, then, is that of such a man—either cautious toward all things on account of their kinship, or even harsh toward humans on account of his indifference toward the rest? Therefore, from what has been said, such a doctrine would be cast aside, since many other considerations also lead us reasonably away from such a supposition.

For I have heard those who dogmatize such things say that certain nations of souls are set apart, living in a distinctive polity prior to life in a body, revolving along with the rotation of the universe by the subtle and easily-moved character of their nature; but that by a certain inclination toward evil the souls shed their feathers and come to be in a body;

first into human beings, then in this way, through the association of their passions with the irrational creatures, after entering into human life, they are made bestial, and from there they fall down to this natural and insensible life—so that what is by nature subtle and easily-moved, which is the soul, first becomes heavy and downward-tending, being lodged in human bodies through evil;

then, with its rational power extinguished, it lives among the irrational creatures;

and from there, when even such grace of the senses has been taken away, it partakes of this insensible life that is in plants;

and from this again it ascends through the same steps, and is restored to the heavenly region.

But such a doctrine is refuted at once by those who have set themselves to judge even moderately, as having no consistency in itself.

For if the soul is dragged down from the heavenly life through evil to the woody existence, and from this again runs back up through virtue to the heavenly, their argument is found to be at a loss as to which it considers preferable, whether the woody or the heavenly life.

For it is a kind of circle that goes round through similar states, the soul being always unstable in whatever state it may be.

For if from the incorporeal life it falls back to the bodily, and from this to the insensible,

and from there again runs back up to the incorporeal, nothing other than an undifferentiated confusion of evils and goods is implied by those who dogmatize these things.

For neither does the heavenly mode of existence remain in blessedness, if evil lays hold of those who live there;

nor will the trees be without a share in virtue, if indeed they suppose that from here the soul runs back to the good, but from there begins again upon evil.

For if the soul, revolving in heaven, becomes entangled with evil, and through this is dragged down to the material life, and again from here is pushed back up to the lofty mode of existence;

then the opposite is established by them: namely, that the material life is a purification from evil, while the unerring revolution becomes the originator and cause of evils for the souls—if indeed from here, having grown wings through virtue, they soar aloft, but from there, when their wings fall off through evil, they become earthbound and ground-creeping, being mingled with the grossness of material nature.

And the absurdity of such doctrines does not stop at this—at the suppositions being turned about to their contrary.

But neither does this very conjecture of theirs remain firm and steadfast throughout all points.

For if they say that the heavenly nature is unchangeable, how does passion have a place in the unchangeable? And if the nature below is subject to passion, how is impassibility achieved in what is passible? But they confound things unmixable and unite things that have nothing in common, beholding the unchangeable in passion, and again the impassible in the changeable.

And not even in these positions do they remain forever consistent;

for the soul which through evil they had banished, that very same soul they again resettle there out of the material realm, as into a secure and undefiled life—as though they had forgotten that it was from there that evil, welling up, caused it to be mingled with the nature below.

So then the disparagement of this present life and the praise of heavenly things are confounded with one another and inverted, the disparaged life leading, according to their opinion, to the good;

while that which is supposed to be superior gives the soul the occasion for its inclination toward the worse.

Therefore every erring and unstable supposition concerning such things must be cast out from the doctrines of the truth;

neither should we follow those who think that souls descend from female bodies to the manly life, and that conversely the souls separated from male bodies come to be in women, or who say that they pass from men to men, and that women come to be from women, as though such persons had aimed at the truth.

For the former argument was rejected not only because it is unstable and deceptive, turning round within itself toward contrary suppositions, but also because it is impious, dogmatizing that none of the things that exist is brought into being, and that evil supplies the beginning to the nature of each.

For if neither humans, nor plants, nor cattle come to grow unless a soul has fallen upon them from above,

and this fall comes about through evil, then they think that evil presides over the very constitution of existing things.

And somehow it comes about that both happen at the same time—that a human being grows from marriage, and that the soul's downfall coincides with the eager pursuit of marriage.

And what is even more irrational than this: if in spring the greater part of the irrational nature mates.

Is it then possible to say that spring, by being implanted into the upper revolution, produces evil, so that it happens at once both that the souls, being filled with evil, fall, and that the wombs of the irrational creatures conceive? And what would one say about the farmer who fixes the cuttings of plants into the earth? How does his hand bury the human soul along with the plant, with a shedding of wings running concurrently with the man's impulse toward planting? The same absurdity, then, applies also to the other of the two arguments—to the supposing that the soul busies itself about the unions of those living in conjugal pairs, or watches over the birth-pangs, in order that it may be smuggled into the bodies that are coming to be.

But if the man should renounce marriage, and the woman should free herself from the necessity of birth-pangs—will evil then not weigh down the soul? Therefore either marriage gives to the evil above the signal to act against the souls, or even apart from this the disposition toward the contrary lays hold of the soul.

Therefore the soul, homeless and a wanderer, will roam about in the midst, having flowed away from heavenly things,

yet, should it so chance, deprived of a body to receive it.

Then, moreover, how will they suppose that the Divine presides over existing things through these processes, when they ascribe the beginnings of human life to this random and irrational falling-down of the souls? For it is wholly necessary that the things that come after the beginning be in harmony with the beginning.

For if life took its beginning from some spontaneous accident, then surely its whole course also comes about by mere chance.

And such men make the divine power's relation to existing things to be in vain—those who say that the things in the world come into being not by the divine will, but who trace the first principles of all that comes to be back to some evil concurrence, as though human life could not have been constituted unless evil had supplied life with its starting-impulse.

If, then, the beginning of life is of such a kind, clearly what follows will also be set in motion according to its beginning.

For no one would say that from evil there springs good, nor that from good there springs its opposite.

Rather, we await the fruits according to the nature of the seed.

Therefore this spontaneous and chance-governed motion presides over all of life, since no providence pervades the things that are.

And the forethought of our reasonings will be utterly useless;

there will be no gain from virtue, and to be estranged from evil would count for nothing.

For all things will in every case lie at the mercy of whatever bears them along, and life will differ in no way from ships without ballast, carried by spontaneous chances—as if by certain waves—now toward one thing,

now toward another, removed by chance into good things or base ones.

For there can be no gain arising from virtue for those whose nature has its beginning from the opposite.

For if our life is ordered by God, then it is agreed that evil rules at the very head of our life [in their view—which is absurd].

But if it is through that [evil] that we come into being, then in every way and altogether we shall live according to it.

By these arguments, then, the places of judgment after this present life will be shown to be nonsense;

and so too the recompense according to desert, and whatever else is said and believed concerning the abolition of evil.

For how is it possible for a man to be outside that [evil], if he came to be through it? And how could there have arisen in man any deliberate impulse toward the life of virtue, if his nature, as they say, has its beginning from evil? For just as none of the irrational creatures attempts to utter human speech, but uses the voice native to it and according to its nature, and reckons it no loss to have no share in reason;

in the same way, those for whom evil is supposed to be the beginning and cause of life would never come to desire virtue, as being outside their nature.

But in fact, for all who have cleansed their souls by sound reasonings, the life of virtue is the object of zeal and desire.

Therefore by these things it is clearly demonstrated that evil is not older than life, nor did our nature take its first beginnings from there; rather, the wisdom of God, which administers all things, presides over the beginning of our life.

And when the soul has come into being in the manner pleasing to its Creator, then by its own authority it chooses, out of its power of free will, that which accords with its judgment—becoming whatever it wills.

We may learn the principle from the example of the eyes, in which seeing is by nature, but not seeing is by choice or by some affliction.

For there might at some time come to be the unnatural in place of the natural—either when one voluntarily shuts his eye, or when he is deprived of sight by some affliction.

So too one may say of the soul, that its constitution is from God; and since no evil is conceived as belonging to the Deity, the soul is outside any necessity toward it;

but having come into being thus, it is led by its own judgment toward what seems good to it—either, by deliberate choice, closing its eye to the good, or, by the plotting of the war that dwells together with us in our life, having its eye harmed and living in the darkness of deception; or, on the contrary, looking purely toward the truth and coming to be far from the dark passions.

When, then, will one say the soul comes into being, and how? But the inquiry into how each thing has come to be must be set wholly outside the discussion.

For not even concerning things readily at hand for our understanding—of which we have apprehension through sense-perception—would it be possible for inquiring reason to comprehend how the visible thing came to subsist, so that even by inspired and holy men such a thing is not deemed comprehensible.

"For by faith," says the Apostle, "we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were made out of things not visible";

he would not, I think, have said this, if he had supposed that the thing sought could be known through reasonings.

But that by the divine will the age itself was framed, and all that has come to be in it (whatever this age may be, in which is contemplated all creation, visible and invisible)—this the Apostle says he has believed; but the how he left unexamined.

For I think such a thing is not attainable to those who search it out, since the inquiry concerning these matters sets many perplexities before us: how does the moved come from the stationary nature? how does the extended and composite come from the simple and undimensioned? Does it come from the very transcendent Essence itself? But [reason] does not concede that existing things are of a different kind from that [Essence]—rather [they must come] from somewhere else.

And yet reason sees nothing outside the divine nature.

For our supposition would be split apart into different first principles, if anything were thought to be outside the creative Cause, from which the artful Wisdom gathers the materials for creation.

Since, then, the cause of existing things is one, and yet the things brought by it into being are not of the same kind as the transcendent nature;

and since in either of the things supposed the absurdity is equal—both to suppose that creation comes from the nature of God, and to suppose that it comes from some other

substance, that all things subsist from it;

for either the Deity will be supposed to be among the properties of creation, if the things made are of the same kind as God;

or some material nature outside the divine essence will be set up over against God, made equal to Him in being unbegotten, by reason of the eternity of being.

Which indeed the Manichaeans imagined, and certain men of Greek philosophy, who were carried along by like notions, made this fantasy into a doctrine.

In order, then, that we may best escape the absurdity on either side in our inquiry into existing things, following the Apostle's example, we shall leave uninvestigated the discussion of how each thing is, noting only this much in passing: that the impulse of the divine will, whenever it wills, becomes a deed, and the design is at once given substance, becoming nature; for the all-powerful authority does not leave its will without substance—whatever it wills wisely and skillfully.

And the coming-into-existence of the will is substance.

Now, existing things being divided in two, into the intelligible and the bodily,

the creation of intelligible things does not seem in any way to be out of tune with the nature of the incorporeal, but rather, by being near akin to it, shows itself to be formless, intangible, and undimensioned.

Which indeed one will not err in supposing also of the transcendent nature.

But the bodily creation is contemplated in properties that are incommunicable as regards the Deity;

and this especially produces much perplexity for reason, which is unable to discern how the visible comes from the invisible, the solid and resistant from the intangible, the bounded from the unbounded, the thing in every way confined by measures contemplated in quantity from that which is without quantity and magnitude. And as to each of the things that are apprehended concerning bodily nature, of these we say only this much: that nothing of the things contemplated concerning body is in itself body—not shape, not color, not weight, not extension, not size, nor any other of the things contemplated as quality, but each of these is a concept;

but the concurrence and union of these with one another becomes body.

Since, then, the qualities that complete the body are apprehended by mind and not by sense, and the Deity is intelligible, what difficulty is there in the intelligible One bringing the intelligible concepts into effect—those whose concurrence with one another has generated for us the nature of body?

But these things have been examined apart from the matter before us.

The thing sought was this: whether souls pre-exist their bodies—when, and how, they come to be.

And for this reason the discussion left uninvestigated, as unattainable, the inquiry concerning the "how."

Concerning when souls have the beginnings of their existence, it remains to inquire, as being consequent upon what has already been examined.

For if it be granted that before the body the soul lives in some peculiar state of its own,

there is every necessity to think that those absurd dogma-fabrications have force—those of the men who lodge souls into bodies because of evil.

But that souls come into being later, and are younger than the molding of bodies, no one of those who think soundly would suppose, since it is plain to all that nothing of the inanimate things has within itself a power of motion and growth.

But of the things nourished in the womb, neither the growth nor the local movement is in doubt.

It remains, therefore, to think that there is one and the same beginning of the constitution both of soul and of body.

And just as the earth, receiving from the husbandmen the slip taken from the root, made it a tree—not herself implanting the growth-power in the thing nourished, but only supplying to that which was set there the starting-points for growth;

so we say that the thing torn away from man for the planting of man is itself in a certain way a living being—animate from the animate, nourished from the nourished.

And if the smallness of the slip did not contain all the activities and movements of the soul, that is nothing to wonder at.

For neither is the grain in the seed at once, in visible appearance, an ear of corn (for how could so much be contained in so little?); but as the earth nurses it with suitable nourishment, the grain becomes an ear, not changing its nature in the casting, but manifesting itself and being perfected by the

[nourishment]. Just as, then, in the case of growing seeds the growth proceeds toward its end according to a fixed principle,

in the same way also in the constitution of man, in proportion to the bodily quantity, the power of the soul also is made manifest;

first, through the nutritive and growth-giving [faculty], coming to be in the things being molded within;

after these things, bringing the gift of perception upon those who have come forth into the light; then so, like a kind of fruit, when the plant has now grown, moderately manifesting the rational power—not all at once and in a mass, but increasing together with the upward growth of the plant by a consequent advance.

Since, then, that which is torn from animate beings for the starting-point of the constitution of an animate being cannot be dead (for deadness comes about by privation of soul;

and a privation surely would not take on the positive state)—

from these things we apprehend that the coming-into-being of the compound formed from both [soul and body] is common to it, neither this one taking precedence nor that one coming after;

but reason necessarily foresees that there will at some time be a halt to the increase in the number of souls.

Lest nature should forever flow on, ever being poured forward through those who are added on, and never ceasing from its motion.

And the cause why our nature too must at some point become stationary, we think to be this: that since all the intelligible nature stands fast in its own fullness, it is likely that the human race too should at some time come to its limit—for neither is this [race] alienated from the intelligible nature;

so that it should not always seem to be contemplated as still wanting.

For the perpetual addition of those who are added on becomes an accusation that the nature is in a state of deficiency.

When, then, the human race attains to its proper fullness, this flowing motion of the nature will altogether come to a stand, having arrived at its necessary limit, and some other state succeeds the life that is now carried on in generation and corruption, a state separated from it.

For when there is no generation, then by all necessity neither will there be anything that perishes.

For if composition begins before dissolution—and we call composition the passage through generation—

it altogether follows that, when composition does not lead the way, neither does dissolution follow.

Therefore the life after these things is shown by consequence to be a certain stable and indissoluble one, altered neither by generation nor by corruption.

{Gregory:} And when the Teacher had gone through these things—since to the many who sat by it seemed that the discourse had reached a fitting end—I, fearing that there would no longer be one to resolve for us the objections brought from outside concerning the resurrection, if the Teacher should suffer anything from her illness (which indeed also came to pass), said:

"Not yet," I say, "has the discourse touched upon the most authoritative of the matters sought according to doctrine."

For the God-inspired Scripture says, according to both the new and the ancient teaching, that surely at some time, when our nature has run through its passing course by the motion of time in a certain order and sequence, this flowing onrush, advancing through the succession of those who are added on, will come to a stand; and, the completion of the whole no longer admitting of further increase, the entire fullness of souls will return again from the formless and scattered state to the compacted and visible state, the same elements running together again to one another according to the same sequence.

And such a state of life is, in the Scriptures of divine teaching, called resurrection—the whole motion of the elements being denoted together by [the term for] the raising up of that which is of earth.

{Macrina:} "What then," she says, "of these things has been left unmentioned in what has been said?" {Gregory:} "The very doctrine," I say, "of the resurrection."

{Macrina:} "And yet," she says, "many of the things now said at length bear upon this very aim."

{Gregory:} "For you do not know," I said, "how great a swarm of contradictions is brought against us by our opponents on account of this hope." And at the same time I attempted to set forth all that is devised by the contentious for the overthrow of the resurrection.

{Macrina:} And she said, "It seems to me that we ought first to run briefly over the things scattered through the divine Scripture concerning this doctrine, so that from there the finishing flourish may be set upon our discourse."

"I have heard, then, David hymning in his divine songs, when he had made the ordering of the universe the theme of his hymn, saying this at the end of the hymnody in the hundred and third psalm: 'You will take away their spirit, and they will fail, and to their dust they will return.

You will send forth Your Spirit, and they will be created, and You will renew the face of the earth.' He calls the power of the Spirit, which works all things in all, life-giving to those in whom it comes to be, and again withdrawing life from those from whom it departs.

Since, then, he says that by the withdrawal of the spirit comes the failing of the living, and by its presence comes the renewal of those who have failed, and in the order of the discourse the failing precedes the renewing;

by this we say that the mystery of the resurrection is announced to the Church, David by the prophetic Spirit having proclaimed this grace beforehand.

But also from another place this same prophet says that the God of the universe, the Lord of all that is, has appeared to us for the establishing of the feast among those who keep the Feast of Tabernacles densely [adorned]—interpreting the Feast of Tabernacles by the word 'dense-covering,' which of old had been ordained by the tradition of Moses, the lawgiver, I think, prophetically foretelling the things to come;

for though always coming to be, it had not yet come to be.

For the truth was foreshown in a figurative way by the riddles of the things that happened;

but this true Feast of Tabernacles was not yet, but on this account, according to the prophetic word, the God and Lord of all manifested Himself to us, in order that the building-up [Tabernacle-pitching] of our dissolved dwelling might be constituted for human nature, being again densely covered bodily through the reuniting of the elements.

For the word 'dense-covering' signifies, according to its proper sense, the [bodily] envelope and the order [adornment] that comes from it.

And the saying of the psalmody runs in this manner:

'The Lord is God, and He has appeared to us; establish a feast among those who keep it densely covered, up to the horns of the altar.'

Which seems to me to proclaim beforehand by a riddle this: that one feast is constituted for the whole rational creation, the lesser dancing together with the higher in the assembly of good things.

For since in the figurative construction of the temple it was not permitted to all to come within the outer enclosure, but everything Gentile and foreign was excluded from the entrance, and again, of those who came inside, not all had equal access to the more inward passage, unless they had been purified by some cleaner manner of life and by certain sprinklings;

and again, even among these very ones, the inner temple was not accessible to all, but it was lawful only for the priests, according to the need of priestly service, to come within the veil; while the hidden and innermost sanctuary of the temple, in which the altar was set, adorned with certain projecting horns, was untrodden even by the priests themselves, except for the one set over the priesthood, who alone, once in the year on a certain appointed day, entered within, bringing a more secret and more mystical service;

since, then, there was so great a distinction concerning this temple—that it was a certain image and imitation of the intelligible order, bodily observance teaching this: that not all rational nature draws near to the temple of God, that is, to the confession of the great God;

but those who have gone astray after false notions are outside the divine enclosure.

And of those who have come within through confession, who are more honored than the rest, those who are first cleansed by sprinklings and purifications, and of these the ones already consecrated, have the greater part, so as to be deemed worthy of the inner initiation; and so one might bring the sense of the riddle to greater clarity.

These things one may learn, the discourse teaching that, of the rational powers, some

are, as it were, the holy altar, established in the inmost sanctuary of the Godhead;

and certain others, again, are contemplated even among these in a position of eminence, projecting in the likeness of horns; and others, around those, take precedence and follow in a certain order of sequence.

But the race of men, on account of the evil that has come to be in it, was thrust outside the divine enclosure;

which, being cleansed by the sprinkling-bath, comes inside.

But since the after-partitions are destined at some time to be dissolved—those by which evil walled us off from the things within the veil—when our nature is once more pitched as a tabernacle through our resurrection, and all the corruption that has come to be through evil is made to vanish from among existing things, then the common feast around God will be constituted for those who through the resurrection have been densely covered [reclothed in body], so that one and the same gladness lies before all;

no longer any difference of equal participation cutting the rational nature in two, but those who are now outside on account of evil coming at some time to be within the sanctuary of the divine blessedness, and joining themselves to the horns of the altar—that is, to the eminent powers above the world.

Which indeed the Apostle says more nakedly, interpreting the harmony of the whole toward the good, that 'to Him every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father';

by 'the horns' meaning the angelic and heavenly order, and by 'the rest' signifying the creation conceived as after those—namely, us—all of whom one harmonious feast shall hold fast.

A feast is the confession and recognition of Him who truly is.

"There are also," she says, "many other things of the holy Scripture that may be gathered for the establishing of the doctrine concerning the resurrection."

For Ezekiel too, by the prophetic Spirit, overleaping all the time in between and the interval contained in it, stands at the very moment of the resurrection, and by his foreknowing power brings before the eyes in narrative that which is to be, as though already beheld.

He saw a great plain, spread out to infinity, and upon it a great heap of bones, scattered here and there as it had chanced to fall;