駁歐諾米 第 1 章 第 2/4 段

Again, those things which are wholly without subsistence, but are formed only according to a kind of pictorial representation of the mind and by imagination alone—such as all the marvels that the fable-makers and painters fashion to astound those who encounter them—these too are said by usage to be contemplated according to conception.

Of none of these did this man make mention, but either ignorantly or maliciously he philosophized to us about the conception of non-existent things alone;

and not even this did he expound as it is in its nature.

For he does not say that conception signifies something, though this be false;

but rather that the name is wholly without signification, and has its subsistence in utterance alone.

And yet so far is this name "conception" from being applied only to vain and unsubstantial imaginings, that, after the first notion which arises in us from sense-perception, the finer and more exact reflection upon the thing thought is called "conception";

whence common usage calls it "reckoning-upon," even if not quite properly.

For instance, of wheat there is a simple notion present in all, by which, when it appears, we recognize it;

but in the exact examination concerning it, both the contemplation of more things comes in, and diverse appellations significant of the things thought.

For we call the same wheat now fruit, now seed, and again nourishment;

fruit, as the end of the past husbandry;

seed, as the beginning of the husbandry to come;

nourishment, as suited for addition to the body of the one who partakes of it.

Each one of these things said is contemplated according to conception, and does not depart together with the noise of the tongue;

but the notions are seated in the soul of the one who has thought them.

And, in a word, all things known to sense-perception, which seem to be simple in their substrate, but admit a manifold account according to contemplation, are said to be contemplated by conception.

Near to this manner of conception we have also been taught its use from the divine word.

I will pass over the other instances, having many to mention, but I will recall one only, the most pertinent.

Our Lord Jesus Christ, in the words concerning himself, disclosing to men the love-of-mankind of the Godhead and the grace that is by the economy, signified this by certain properties contemplated about himself, calling himself a door, and a way, and bread, and a vine, and a shepherd, and light—not being someone of many names;

for not all these names bear toward one and the same thing as one another.

For the thing signified by "light" is one, and that by "vine" another, and that by "way" another, and that by "shepherd" another.

But being one according to the substrate, and one essence both simple and uncompounded, he names himself now in one way, now in another, refashioning the appellations, which differ from one another, by the conceptions.

For according to the difference of the operations, and the relation toward the things benefited, he sets diverse names also for himself.

For he calls himself the light of the world, by this name signifying both the unapproachable character of the glory in the Godhead, and that by the splendor of knowledge he illuminates those whose eye of the soul has been cleansed;

and a vine, as nourishing those rooted in him by faith unto the fruit-bearing of good works;

and bread, as being the most proper nourishment of the rational being, in that he maintains the constitution of the soul and preserves its proper character, ever supplying from himself what is lacking, and not allowing it to be borne down toward the sickness that comes from irrationality.

And thus, going through each of the names, one would find the conceptions manifold for each single one of the things that are one and the same according to essence as the substrate of them all.

Who, then, has so whetted his tongue toward blasphemy as to dare to say that these conceptions are dissolved together with the sounds? What absurdity, then, is there if in the case of the God of all also something be taken according to conception—and this very thing first, concerning which our whole discourse has been set in motion? For we shall find that "unbegotten" is in no other way spoken.

For we say that the God of all is both incorruptible and unbegotten, calling him by these names according to different impressions.

For when we look back to the ages behind, finding the life of God to overpass every beginning, we call him unbegotten;

but when we extend our mind to the ages to come, we name him incorruptible, as the boundless and infinite, and comprehended by no end.

As, then, the endlessness of life was named "incorruptible," so its beginninglessness was named "unbegotten," we contemplating both by conception.

What argument, then, will gainsay both that each of these names is conceived, and that it is a confession of what truly belongs to God? But he sets these things apart from one another as warring and wholly incompatible:

namely, that something is said according to conception, and that one renders to God the confession of his being what he is.

For let us not pass by even this: what a guise of piety has been devised by him, for the overthrow of his hearers, in saying: {EUNOMIUS.} "Not to glorify God according to human conception by the appellation of unbegotten, but to pay to him the most necessary debt of all, in the confession of his being what he is."

{BASIL.} What argument could worthily reach the crookedness of these contrivances? He attempts to terrify the simpler folk, as though they were not rendering what is owed to God, unless they confess unbegottenness to be his essence;

and he names his own impiety "the discharge of a debt," so that he might not seem to say anything from himself, but to be fulfilling what is necessarily owed to God. And he intimates to the rest that, while those who place unbegottenness in the essence will be let off blameless,

but if they should suppose otherwise, according to the godly manner—as having failed to discharge the oldest and most necessary debt of all—they will receive inexorable wrath. Gladly, then, would I examine him: does he preserve this good-conscience alike in all the things said concerning God, or only with respect to this one word? For if he contemplates nothing at all according to conception, lest he should seem to glorify God by human appellations, he will alike confess all the things attributed to God to be essence.

How, then, is it not ridiculous to say that the creative power is essence? Or again that the providential power is essence? Or again likewise that the foreknowing power is so? And, in a word, to set down every operation as essence? And if all these tend toward one signification, it is altogether necessary that the names have the same force as one another;

just as when we say that Simon and Peter and Cephas are the same person.

Therefore the one who has heard "the unchangeableness of God" will be led on to "the unbegotten";

and the one who has heard "the indivisible" is carried off to "the creative."

And what could be more absurd than this confusion—to strip off the proper signification of each of the names, and to legislate against both the common usage and the teaching of the Spirit? And yet, when we hear concerning God that "he made all things in wisdom," we are taught his creative skill;

and when we hear that "he opens his hand and fills every living thing with good pleasure," the providence that has gone through all things;

and when we hear that "he made darkness his hiding-place," we are instructed in the invisibility of his nature.

Again, the saying spoken from the person of God, "I am, and I change not," we learn the ever-self-same and unchangeable character of the divine essence.

How, then, is it not manifest madness to say that no proper signification underlies each of the names, but that, apart from the operation, all the names can be defined as the same with one another? Then, even if we should grant this, not even so would there be anything more to them, nor would it tend toward their aim.

For if all these, taken in the case of God and Father, signify his essence—I mean the unchangeable, and the invisible, and the incorruptible—then plainly also in the case of the only-begotten Son of God they will be indicative of essence.

For we name the only-begotten Son also invisible, and unchangeable, and incorruptible, and indivisible, and all such things.

And thus their cleverness will turn round to the opposite.

For they will not be more able, by reason of the difference in a single appellation, to demonstrate unlikeness according to essence, than they will be compelled, by the very necessity of what has been granted, to confess likeness by reason of the community in the more numerous names.

But if he should say that he employs this caution only in the case of the word "unbegotten," while in the case of the others he is unguarded,

let us again ask him: what is the principle of selection, that, of so many things said concerning God, he displays exactness in this one alone, and in this one alone discharges to him the confession of his being what he is, while in countless other human conceptions he does not refuse to glorify him? For one who is debtor of more is not more well-disposed in the payment of one than he is overflowing in ingratitude in the withholding of the more numerous.

Thus, then, like the cunning beasts, he is caught by his own arts, being the more refuted by the very things by which he attempts to escape notice.

But consider what the things following in the argument are.

Having shown, as he thinks, that it is impossible to take the unbegotten by conception, he adds:

{EUNOMIUS.} "But neither indeed according to privation;

if indeed privations are privations of things according to nature, and are second to the possessions."

{BASIL.} That he prates these things out of the wisdom of the world—by which he has been thrown headlong, and so applied himself to such innovations of words—it is not hard to show.

Those who have read might say that, in the work entitled his Categories, the discussions concerning possession and privation are there, where he (Aristotle) says that privations are second to the possessions.

For us it would suffice, having shown that he speaks not from the teaching of the Spirit, but from the wisdom of the rulers of this age, to utter against him the word of the psalm: that "the lawless have recounted to me idle babblings, but not as your law, O Lord";

and, having learned that the things said are not from the teachings of our Lord Jesus Christ, to be reminded of his own word: that "when he speaks the lie, he speaks of his own";

and in this way to cut short for ourselves the many words, having from this made it evident to all that we have no fellowship with them.

For what concord has Christ with Belial? Or what part has a believer with an unbeliever? But lest we should seem, for lack of refutations, to flee to silence, come, let us discourse briefly concerning these things also.

Many, O Eunomius, of the things said concerning God we see brought forth according to a like form: such as the incorruptible, the immortal, the invisible.

And of the same form we hold "unbegotten" also to be.

If, then, some name such things "privative," the argument is not with us.

For we neither know the technical terminology of words, nor do we emulate those who do.

Except indeed this: that wherever the rest of the names which we have enumerated be placed, there we shall say that the appellation "unbegotten" also belongs.

As, then, "incorruptible" signifies that corruption does not belong to God;

and "invisible," that he transcends every apprehension through the eyes;

and "incorporeal," that his essence is not extended in three dimensions;

and "immortal," that dissolution will never accrue to him;

so we say that "unbegotten" also makes plain that begetting does not belong to him.

If, then, none of these names is privative, neither is that one.

But if in the case of those you grant that they are said according to privation, while in the case of the appellation "unbegotten" you do not concede it, say: of what prior possession does "incorruptible" exhibit the privation? And how is not "unbegotten" able to do the same as it? But he practices his evil craft about this one word alone, because from here the occasions of his impiety hang.

And that his contrivance may become clear, do thus:

those arguments which he will exercise upon "unbegotten"—that it is reasonable to say it concerning God neither according to human conception nor according to privation—transfer these to some other of the things said concerning God, and observe.

For you will find them fitting each one exactly.

And, if you wish, let us say these things in the case of "incorruptible," transferring his very expression:

"But in calling him incorruptible, we think we ought not to glorify him according to human conception;

but to pay to him the most necessary debt of all—the confession of his being what he is;

but neither indeed according to privation;

if indeed privations are privations of things according to nature, and second to the possessions."

Why is it more fitting to philosophize these things in the case of "unbegotten" than also in the case of "incorruptible," and in general in the case of every word brought forth according to the same form? But none of the others cooperates with him toward impiety.

Wherefore he does not even mention the rest, although there are countless things said concerning God.

There is indeed no single name which, embracing the whole nature of God, suffices to declare it adequately;

but many and diverse names, each according to its own signification, gather together a notion that is altogether dim and very small as compared with the whole, yet for us at least sufficient.

Among the names, then, said concerning God, some are indicative of the things belonging to God, and others on the contrary, of the things not belonging.

For from these two there arises in us, as it were, a certain character of God: both from the denial of the things incongruous, and from the confession of the things that belong.

For instance, when we name him incorruptible, we say in effect to ourselves or to our hearers: "Do not suppose God to be subject to corruption";

and when invisible, that "do not conceive him to be apprehended by the sense through the eyes";

and when immortal, that "never

suppose death to accrue to God."

So, too, when unbegotten, that "do not think the being of God to be hung upon any cause or beginning."

And, in general, from each of these we are taught not to fall into unbecoming notions in our suppositions concerning God.

Therefore, in order that we may recognize the distinctive property of God, we forbid one another, in the words concerning God, to bring down our minds to the things which we ought not, lest at any time men should suppose God to be one of the corruptible things, or one of the visible, or one of the begotten.

So that, through all these forbidding names, there is, as it were, a certain denial of what is alien, our understanding being articulated, and laying aside the suppositions concerning the things that do not belong to him.

Again, we call God good, and just, and creator, and judge, and all other such things.

As, then, in the former case the words signified a kind of setting-aside and forbidding of the things alien to God, so here they make plain the positing and existence of the things proper to God and rightly contemplated about him.

From each kind of appellation, therefore, we are taught either concerning the things that belong, that they belong, or concerning the things that do not belong, that they do not belong.

Now "unbegotten" is significant of the things not belonging;

for it makes plain that begetting does not belong to God.

And this, whether one should wish to call it privative, or prohibitive, or negative, or some such thing, we shall not dispute.

But that "unbegotten" is not significant of the things belonging to God, I think is sufficiently made plain by what has been said.

But the essence is not one of the things that do not belong, but the very being of God, which to reckon among non-existent things is madness of the highest degree.

For if the essence be among non-existent things, hardly could anything else of the things spoken of exist.

But "unbegotten" has been shown to be ranged with the things not belonging;

so that he who holds this word to be indicative of the essence itself is false.

But he, being vexed as at an absurdity that anything should be said concerning God according to privation, flees, as it were, to the more godly course—that of placing "unbegotten" in the essence itself—and gathering up the argument for himself toward the main point, he writes thus:

{EUNOMIUS.} "Therefore, if it is neither according to conception, nor according to privation, nor in a part (for he is partless), nor in him as something other (for he is simple), nor something other beside him (for he is one and the only unbegotten), it would be unbegotten essence."

{BASIL.} He has led the argument to the things he wished, and, having torn "unbegotten" away from every other relation, he has driven it together, as he supposed, into the essence itself;

having said concerning the God of all that "it would be unbegotten essence."

But I, for my part, would myself also say that the essence of God is unbegotten; yet not that the unbegotten is the essence.

Then, moreover, it is worth attending also to that point: that the partless and the simple, being the same according to the notion (for the partless is that which is not composed of parts, and likewise the simple is that which does not have its constitution from a plurality), this man separates from one another as differing in their substrate.

Then he forbids, saying that one ought not to divide God into parts, nor to suspect one part of him to be unbegotten and another begotten;

nor again to think the unbegotten to be lodged in him as one thing in another.

But the vanity of these things I shrink from refuting.

For somehow the one who contradicts is apt to be made like the one who talks vanity.

Wherefore, I think, the wise Solomon enjoins not to answer the fool according to his folly.

For he brought under division the arguments which had never been stated nor ever spoken, so that he might seem, among the many things he had enumerated, to find, in only one manner, "unbegotten" being properly said.

But for us perhaps more argument would have been needed for the establishment of the falsehood, and to show that the unbegotten is not the essence of God, had not the things enumerated by him in the division been clearly refuted.

For if his argument held firmly, that the unbegotten is taken neither according to conception nor according to privation, not even so would the conclusion gathered have any consequence:

namely that, of the things enumerated, unbegottenness should fall away? Nevertheless, since he himself, as something necessarily linked to what precedes, brings in the words: "Therefore, if it is neither according to conception, nor according to privation, nor according to any other of the enumerated manners, it would be unbegotten essence";

so let us, reversing it, say: "Therefore, since it is contemplated according to conception, and the name is privative, the unbegotten is not the essence of God."

For so long as he does not refute the things that have been said, nor restore strength to his own premises, the conclusion will have no place for him.

But altogether, to suppose that one has discovered the very essence of the God who is over all—of how great arrogance and conceit is this!

For with their grandiloquence they almost cover over even him who said:

"I will set my throne above the stars";

they who venture not upon the stars, or heaven, but vaunt themselves that they tread upon the very essence of the God of all.

For let us examine him: whence does he say he has come to a comprehensive knowledge of it?

Is it from the common notion? But this suggests to us that God is, not what God is.

But is it from the teaching of the Spirit? What teaching? Or where is it set down? Does not the great David, to whom God made known the hidden and secret things of His own wisdom, openly confess that knowledge is unattainable, saying:

Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it.

And Isaiah, who beheld the vision of the glory of God, what did he disclose to us concerning the divine essence? He who, in his prophecy concerning Christ, solemnly testifies, saying:

Who shall declare His generation? And what of Paul, the chosen vessel, who had Christ speaking within him, who was caught up to the third heaven, who heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter—what teaching concerning the essence of God did he leave us? He who, when he stooped to consider even the partial truths of the economy, as though seized with dizziness before the impassable depth of contemplation, cried out that exclamation:

O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!

How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!

But if these things are unattainable even to those who have reached the measure of Paul's knowledge, how great is the conceit of those who profess to know the essence of God? Whom I would gladly ask concerning the earth on which they stand and from which they were made—what then do they say? What essence of it do they declare to us? So that if, regarding the things that lie at our feet upon the ground, they can argue with us irrefutably, then we may believe them also when they strain themselves toward things beyond all conception.

What then is the essence of the earth? What is the manner of its comprehension? Let them answer us: did reason reach it, or perception? And if they say perception, by which of the senses is it comprehended? By sight? But sight apprehends colors.

Or by touch? But touch too discerns hardness and softness, heat and cold, and such things—none of which anyone would call essence, unless he were carried away to the utmost folly.

And what need is there even to speak of taste and smell? Of which the one apprehends flavors, the other vapors.

And hearing perceives sounds and voices, which have no kinship at all with the earth.

It remains, then, for them to assert that they have discovered its essence by reason.

By what reason? Set down where in Scripture? Handed down by which of the saints? For he who discoursed to us about the creation taught us only this much, that 'In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth';

and 'the earth was invisible and unformed';

thinking it sufficient to declare the One who made it and set it in order;

but he declined to busy himself with what its essence is, as being a vain and unprofitable thing for his hearers.

If therefore the knowledge of it is established neither by the testimony of the senses nor by the teaching of reason, whence will they yet claim to have obtained the comprehension of it? For whatever is perceptible of it is either color, or bulk, or weight, or lightness, or density, or porousness, or resistance, or softness, or coldness, or

heat, or the qualities pertaining to flavors, or the differences pertaining to shape;

none of which these men would call essence, not even if they were ready to say everything.

And again, by no reason has it become an object of contemplation to the wise and blessed men;

what manner of knowledge, then, still remains? Let them answer us—those who despise all things at their feet, yet stride across heaven and all the supramundane powers, and join themselves through the intellect to the very first essence.

But conceit seems to be the most grievous of all the passions among men, and truly to involve those whom it besets in the same condemnation as the devil.

Whence these men too, not even understanding the nature of the earth which they trample—what it is—yet boastfully claim to enter into the very essence of the God of all.

And to His saints—to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob—God, because they attained to every virtue and were therefore honored even to be called by the name of God, as something choice and befitting His own majesty, gave preference, calling Himself the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob;

'For this is My name forever,' He says, 'and My memorial unto all generations.'

To these, then, God did not reveal even His own name—much less did He disclose His essence, what it is.

'And I appeared to Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, being their God;

and My name I did not make known to them';

as being evidently too great to be contained by human hearing.

But to Eunomius, it seems, God has manifested not only His name, but His very essence;

and that which is so unspeakable, which was revealed to none of the saints, he himself, writing it in books, publishes and blurts out to all men without reverence.

And the things laid up for us in the promises are beyond all human knowledge, and the peace of God surpasses all understanding;

yet he does not admit that the very essence of God is beyond all understanding and beyond all knowledge of men.

And I think that the comprehension of it transcends not only men, but every rational nature.

By 'rational' I now mean that which is within creation.

For the Father is known to the Son alone, and to the Holy Spirit;

since 'No one knows the Father except the Son';

and 'The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.'

'For who knows,' he says, 'the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him?

Even so the things of God no one has known except the Spirit which is from God.'

What, then, will they leave as exclusive to the knowledge of the Only-Begotten or of the Holy Spirit, if they themselves have the comprehension of the very essence? For surely they will not, after assigning to the Only-Begotten the contemplation of the power and goodness and wisdom of God, set down for themselves a comprehension of the essence commensurate with His.

For altogether the contrary is likely, that the essence itself is beyond the view of all, except for the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit;

but that we, being led up from the operations of God, and conceiving the Maker through the things made, attain to an understanding of His goodness and wisdom.

For this is 'that which may be known of God, which God has manifested to all men.'

Since whatever seems to have been written concerning the essence of God among the theologians in certain tropological or even allegorical expressions, those words carry us toward other conceptions.

So that if anyone should contentiously insist, without examination, on clinging to the bare letter according to its obvious surface meaning, he will be turned aside to Jewish and old-wives' fables, and will grow old utterly destitute of conceptions worthy of God.

For besides conceiving the essence of God as something material, and on this account siding with the atheists among the Greeks, he will further suppose it to be manifold and composite.

Since the prophet describes God as being of electrum from the loins upward, and as composed of fire in the lower parts;

and he who does not ascend through the letter to loftier conceptions, but remains there among the bodily descriptions, and is thus taught such an essence of God from Ezekiel, will again hear that God is fire, from Moses and from the wise Daniel,

and will be carried off to yet other suppositions;

and thus he will be found gathering up from the Scriptures imaginings that are not only false, but even mutually contradictory.

Letting go, therefore, of the meddlesome inquiry into the essence as unattainable, we must obey the simple exhortation of the Apostle, who says:

'For he that comes to God must first believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.'

For it is not the investigation of what He is, but the confession that He is, that procures salvation for us.

Since therefore it has been demonstrated that the essence of God is incomprehensible to human nature and altogether unspeakable, it remains to set forth concerning its unbegottenness both what it is, and how it is contemplated in the God of all.

We find, then, on reflection, that the notion of the Unbegotten falls under our conception not in the inquiry into what it is, but rather—if I may force the expression—in the inquiry into how it is.

For our intellect, examining whether the God who is over all has some cause superior to Himself, and then being unable to conceive of any, called the beginningless quality of His life 'unbegotten.'

For just as in our discourse about men, when we say that 'so-and-so came from such a one,' we are explaining not what each is, but whence he came;

so also in things concerning God, the word 'unbegotten' signifies not what He is, but that He is from nowhere.

And in this way what I say may become clearer.