ℹ️ This corpus has no morphological tagging. Glosses are matched by word form against a dictionary — a match does not prove it is the same word (an inflected form can coincide with another word’s lemma). Verify against the original and a specialist lexicon where precision matters.
ℹ️ The Chinese and English alongside are this site's own translation, made directly from the original text on this page (not the CUV or the WEB, which follow the Masoretic Text and a different textual tradition).
But when we apply the word 'good' to the outcomes of things—that is, to those things which are stated by propositions and which are set forth as coming to pass through them, so that we say, namely, that this is or is not good—it is as if it were said that that thing is necessary for the fulfilling of some most excellent disposition of God, even though that disposition lies entirely hidden from us. For it is not good even for someone to do well, if his doing this does not accord with some divine ordination, but rather resists it; for what does not have a reasonable cause why it should come to pass cannot even come to pass well. And it does not then have a reasonable cause why it should come to pass, if something disposed by God would necessarily be hindered, were that to occur.
And so, being often deceived, we say that it is good for us to do this or that, which is judged by everyone as something that ought to be done. But when it dissents from the divine ordination, we speak falsely through error; yet we are not guilty of a lie, since we hold the opinion just as we state it. Likewise, through error we often ask in prayer for many things that will profit us not at all, which by divine disposition are most fittingly denied us by God, who knows better than we ourselves what is necessary for us. Whence that supreme teaching of Truth, by which together with prayer it must always be said to God:
"Thy will be done." Unless I am mistaken, for the present it is enough that I have said this, to show, namely, how the name 'good' is to be understood—when it is taken simply for a good thing, or when it is also applied to the outcomes of things, or to those things which are stated by propositions. And since this depended upon the inquiry into the highest good, if anything remains which you may judge ought to be further inquired concerning it, you are free to interpose it, or to hasten on to the rest . . .