History of My Calamities & Works 3 part 8/9

'Bind him hand and foot, and cast him into the outer darkness. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.' From the Old Testament no less than from the New it seems to be suggested that what they said concerning hell ought to be understood mystically rather than corporeally; so that, just as that bosom of Abraham, in which the soul of Lazarus was received, is to be understood as spiritual, not corporeal, so too that wrath and hell, that torment in which the soul of the buried rich man is recorded to be, is spiritual.

For so long as souls lack bodies, by what means they could be carried to a place, or moved, or as it were confined within the compass of a body—souls which are in no way local, and which by their proper nature exist far more subtle than any body—or what bodily force the elements, fire as well as the rest, might possess that could touch or torment these souls which are without bodies: this cannot easily be discussed or understood. Hence the demons too, after their fall, that they might also suffer corporeally, are said to have sunk down into certain airy bodies, which they received as a kind of prison.

Hence too they were called 'powers of the air,' namely because they have great power in that element to which they are incorporated, just as men who rule on the earth are called 'earthly powers.' But if the worms of souls are understood as a certain inward gnawing, by which they are already tormented through their own conscience, through despair of pardon and the increase of future punishment; and if the prophet is said to have understood afterward that fire by which they will be tormented when their bodies have been taken up again—then it is easy to define hell as both spiritual and corporeal torment, namely by comparison with other punishments, these being called such as being the lowest or uttermost, whether they are said to be carried out beneath the earth or elsewhere.

For since it is established that the earth is founded upon the waters, how could any corporeal fire be said to exist beneath the earth—unless perhaps 'beneath the earth' be understood as any depth of earth lying below this surface of the earth on which we are? But again: since the number of the reprobate is infinite, and according to the Truth's own assertion the number of the elect will be small, perhaps it will not easily be granted that there exists anywhere on earth so vast a hollow as could contain so many bodies.

Hence if it should seem to anyone that the power of the divine judgment is so great that it can punish in all places equally, wheresoever it wills, and that the qualities of places bear no more upon punishment than upon glory, I do not doubt that this view will find assent the more readily, the more abundantly it seems both to commend the divine power and to approach closer to reason.

For to follow the opinion held by nearly everyone—those who say that of those placed in the same fire, some are tormented more, others less, according to their deserts and not according to the magnitude of the burning—I do not see how, by the divine power, so great a moderation of one and the same fire could be brought about in punishment, and how God could not rather afflict those placed in different places with different torments, or even torture any whatever, wheresoever they may be, with whatever punishments He wills, and convert all the elements to whatever punishments He pleases against them; as it is written: 'He will fight for God against the senseless of the world.'

For according to their estimation, in that very ethereal heaven itself, where the purer the fire is, the more keenly and vehemently it burns and shines, the common faith asserts that the bodies of the blessed remain without any harm, and that this was conferred upon them after the resurrection unto glory—something which beforehand our weakness could in no way have endured. For thus indeed light both restores healthy eyes and oppresses weak ones. Who, moreover, does not daily experience the so diverse natures of living creatures, so that what builds up the life of some extinguishes the life of others, and by a different constitution of bodies, what profits one harms another—and this in animate things as well as inanimate? Men die under water, fish die in the open air.

It is established that salamanders live in fire, which brings premature death to other living creatures. The serpent's venom is its life, yet death to man; and the same things give to other animals a necessary nourishment, to others a deadly one. There is absolutely nothing that can suit all natures. Those who proceed from the same womb, begotten of the same father, in no way live by the same habits, nor are they equally delighted or offended by the same things, nor, when situated in the same heat or cold, are they equally tormented. Assuredly this diversity of sufferings arises not from the quality of the things that punish, but of the things punished.

What wonder, then, if the justice of the divine power so moderates unto punishment the resuscitated bodies—standing, according to each one's deserts, either in the same place or in different ones—that wheresoever they are, all things are equally penal to them? This indeed he diligently attended to, who confessed that he could nowhere flee the vengeance of God, saying: 'Whither shall I go from your spirit, and whither shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend into hell, you are present.' Finally, who would judge that the souls of evil men are tormented more in hell than the spiritual wickednesses dwelling in the air, which equally carry their torments about with them wheresoever they go? These indeed are certainly worthy of so much greater torment as it is in no way doubted that they are more wicked;

who in the same way would deny that the souls of the impious, in bodies taken up again, to whatever place they be moved, carry their torments with them, even if nothing of torment be inflicted from without? For we see that many sufferings are inflicted upon the soul still remaining in the body, either from without or from within, by some disturbance or inequality of the body—sufferings which, once had, can be removed by no change of place. For, to pass over the other sufferings, what avails toward the remedy of pain in what place you now set a dying man, or one laboring under the greatest suffering, if that suffering is in no way to be alleviated by place?

Or since, as the blessed Augustine recalls, in us who are now dying the suffering of death in the body is so great that on account of it the soul is compelled to leave the body, who would not judge that, in bodies taken up again and now made immortal, this very suffering—by which here in dying we are dissolved—would suffice for damnation, if it should rush in perpetually there; or if perhaps there could be some other greater suffering, with no torment added from without? For what better befits justice than that the souls should chiefly take up again their own bodies for torment, the bodies which they have wickedly used for delight?

Indeed it is certain that the suffering in the dissolution of death is so great that for any sin whatever, though it be inflicted ever so briefly, it is nevertheless believed to suffice for the purgation of that sin which was not worthy of eternal damnation; whence, as blessed Jerome asserts, there is that saying of the prophet: 'The Lord will not judge twice for the same thing, and a double tribulation shall not arise.' We read also that some souls of the dead, having been condemned, were unwilling to be restored to the present life that they might be saved by doing well, if they should be compelled to end it again by the intervention of death.

We find it written elsewhere that certain souls of dying saints, through fear of the suffering of their dissolution, at the time of their departure to the blessedness prepared for them, utterly shrank back from going forth, until the Lord commanded them to be received by the angels without pain. From which it is clear how great is the suffering of this death, by fear of which, as we have said, one was unwilling to return to salvation, and another trembled to go forth to blessedness. And yet it is established that to take away this suffering entirely, from whomsoever He wills, belongs to the divine power, as the aforesaid doctor also asserts, saying that the apostle John was free both from the pain of death and from the corruption of the flesh.

He, therefore, who can thus entirely take away the suffering of death in death, everywhere and from whomsoever He wills, seems much more easily able also to confer it wheresoever He wills. For a passible nature is more inclined to incur punishment than to lack it. From all of which I now think it clear that the quality of place bears nothing upon the punishment of the damned, just as neither upon the glory of the blessed; but to be tormented in hell, or handed over to perpetual fire, is the same as to be tortured with those uttermost punishments—which are chiefly compared to fire because the torment of this element seems the sharper.

This too seems greatly to commend the glory of the divine power, if in all places equally He bestows both the punishment of damnation and the glory of blessedness—He who is not doubted to be present everywhere through His power. Philosopher: Equally, as I see, you are eager to turn both the punishment of the damned and the glory of the elect to the praise of the divine power, so as to proclaim His great goods even in the greatest evils. Christian: And so it surely befits, since none of His works are anything but magnificent and full of wonder. But I judge it superfluous to define in what places these things occur, provided we can attain or avoid them. Philosopher:

And on this point indeed the discussion still continues, that—now that both our highest good and our highest evil have been described, as it seemed good to you—according to our purpose you should no less diligently disclose by what ways one arrives at them, that we may the better be able to hold to the one or to avoid the other, the more fully we have come to know them. But since what the highest good or the highest evil is does not yet seem able to be sufficiently understood, until first it has been determined what is to be called good or evil in general, this too, if you are able, I desire you to define. For we know many species of these. Yet nevertheless, in what respect things are to be called good or evil, we are not able sufficiently to understand or to discuss.

For our authorities, who say that some things are good, others evil, others indifferent, have distinguished these by no definitions, but were content to demonstrate them by certain examples. Christian: As far as I estimate, they judged that those things are difficult to define whose names scarcely ever seem to stand in a single signification. For when one says 'a good man,' or 'a good craftsman,' or 'a good horse,' and the like, who does not know that this word 'good' borrows a different sense from what is adjoined to it? For we call a man good from his character, a craftsman from his skill, a horse from its strength and swiftness, or from the things that pertain to its use.

And so much is the signification of 'good' varied by what is adjoined that we do not even hesitate to join it with the names of vices, saying namely a 'good' or 'excellent' thief, because in carrying out this wickedness he is clever or cunning. Nor only to things themselves, but also to those things which are said about things—that is, to the very statements of propositions—do we sometimes so apply the word 'good' that we even say that it is good for evil to exist, although we by no means grant that evil is good. For it is one thing to say, 'evil is good,' which is altogether false; another to say, 'for evil to exist is good,' which is by no means to be denied. What wonder, then, if we, like them, are unable to define the signification of these words, which is so inconstant?

Yet so far as now occurs to me, I judge that a thing is called good simply—that is, called a good thing—which, when it is fit for some use, by it the advantage or dignity of nothing need be hindered. On the contrary, I believe a thing is called evil through which one of these two must be diminished. But indifferent—that is, a thing which is neither good nor evil—I judge to be that through whose existence neither must any good things be brought about nor hindered, such as the chance motion of a finger or any actions of this kind. For actions are not judged good or evil except according to the root of the intention, but all are in themselves indifferent;

and, if we look diligently, those things confer nothing toward merit which are in no way good or evil of themselves, since they manifestly belong equally to the reprobate and the elect. Philosopher: Here I think we must halt a little and linger, in case perchance the things you have said can stand as definitions. Christian: It is indeed most difficult so to circumscribe all things by their proper definitions that they can be separated from all others—especially now, when no length of time is granted us for thinking out definitions. We have learned from the use of reason the things to which most of our names apply. But what is the meaning or understanding of them, we are by no means able to assign.

We find also many things whose naming, no less than their meaning, we cannot delimit by definition. For even if we are not ignorant of the natures of things, nevertheless their names are not in use, and often the mind is readier to understand than the tongue is to utter, or to discuss the things we perceive. Behold: we all know from the use of daily speech what things are called stones. Yet what are the proper differentiae of a stone, or what is the property of this species, I believe we are not yet able to assign by any word, by which some distinction or description of a stone might be brought to completion.

Nor ought it to seem strange to you if you see me fail in these matters, for which we know that even those great teachers of yours, whom you boast of as philosophers, were in no way sufficient. Yet what I shall be able, I will try to answer to the objection of your inquiries concerning the things I promised. Philosopher: The things you now say seem to abound both in reason enough and in proof. But truly, the things that are said, unless they be understood, are uttered in vain, nor can they teach others unless they can be discussed. Now, if you please—indeed since you have thus consented—I wish you to explain a little the very things you have said. Why then, I say, when you were defining a good thing, did it not seem sufficient to say that it is one which is fit for some use, that is, suited to some advantage?

Christian: It is a common and plausible proverb that scarcely anything is good which does not also harm, and nothing evil which does not also profit. For example: behold, someone has for a long while exercised himself in good works to such a degree that thereby, being often praised, or confident in his own virtues, he is lifted up into pride, or another is kindled by envy from this. Thus it is established that evil arises from good, and frequently good too is the cause of evil. For our vices or sins, which are properly to be called evil, can have their existence only in the soul or in good creatures, nor can corruption arise except from something good.

Who, on the contrary, does not see that often men, after great falls of sins, rise up stronger or better through humility or penitence than they were before? Finally, penitence for sin itself, since it is an affliction of the mind and cannot be compatible with perfect blessedness because it brings in grief, is established to be evil rather than good. And yet no one doubts that it is necessary for the pardon of sins. Who, moreover, does not know that the supreme goodness of God, which permits nothing to be done without cause, so well foreordains even evils and even makes the best use of them, that it is even good for evil to exist, although evil is in no way good?

For just as the supreme malice of the devil often uses even good things in the worst way—namely so as to convert them into causes of the worst effects, and thus through things that are good to work certain worst things—so on the contrary, or conversely, God acts, namely making many goods come forth from these very evils, and often using in the best way those very things which the devil contrives in the worst. For both a tyrant and rulers can use the same sword for evil and for good—the one indeed for violence, the other for justice; and there are, I believe, no instruments, nor anything whatever lent to our uses, which we cannot use as ill as well, according to the quality of intentions; for which it matters nothing at all what is done, but with what mind it is done.

Hence too any man, both good and perverse, is the cause of both good and evil things, and through them both good and evil happen to exist. For a good man does not seem to differ from an evil one in this, that he does what is good, but rather in that he does it well. For even if now the usage of speech holds 'to do well' and 'to do good' as the same, nevertheless the force and propriety of the expression perhaps does not so sound. For just as a thing is often said to be 'good,' yet not 'well,' that is, not done with good intention, so too it seems that a good thing can be done, while nevertheless it is not done well. For often it happens that the same thing is done by opposing parties, so that according to their intention one does it well, another ill.

As for instance, if two men should hang some guilty person—the one indeed solely because he hates him, the other because he has this office of executing justice: this just hanging is done justly by the latter, because with a right intention; unjustly by the former, because not from love of justice, but from zeal of hatred or anger. Sometimes too evil men, or even the devil himself, are said so to cooperate with God in the same deed that the same thing is asserted to be done by God as well as by them. Behold: for we see the things which Job possessed taken away by Satan, and yet Job himself professes that these were taken from him by God, saying: 'The Lord gave, the Lord has taken away.' And to come now to that which the minds of Christians more dearly embrace, even if it should seem laughable to you or those like you:

The handing over of the Lord Jesus into the hands of the Jews is recorded to have been done both by Jesus Himself and by God the Father and by Judas the betrayer; for the Father is said to have handed over the Son, and the Son Himself, and Judas the same one, while nevertheless in such matters either the devil or Judas did the very thing that God did. And if perhaps they seem on this account to have done some 'good,' they are nevertheless not to be said to have done 'well.' Or if they did that, or willed to be done, which God wills to be done, or in doing something had the same will which God has—are they on that account to be said to do well, namely because they do what God wills to be done; or to have a good will, because they will that which God wills? By no means!

For even if they do, or will to do, what God wills to be done, nevertheless they do not do it, or will to do it, because they believe God wills it to be done; nor is the intention in that same deed of theirs the same as God's; and although they will that which God wills, their will and God's may on that account be said to be the same, because they will the same thing; yet their will is evil and God's is good, namely since they will it to be done from different causes. So too, since the same action belongs to different parties—namely because they do the same thing—nevertheless, on account of the diversity of intention, the action of this one is good and of that one evil, because, although they do the same thing, yet this one does that very thing well, that one ill.

And (a thing wonderful to say) sometimes the will is even good when someone wills evil to be done by another, because namely he wills it with a good intention. For often the Lord has decreed, through the devil or some tyrant, to afflict those who are innocent or who have not deserved that affliction—namely for the purgation of some sin of those who are afflicted, or for the increase of merit, or to give an example to others, or for whatever reasonable cause, though hidden from us. Hence too, concerning that which, with the Lord permitting, the devil had wickedly done, Job makes mention, saying: 'As it pleased the Lord, so it has been done.' And that he does not doubt this was well permitted by the Lord, he shows by giving Him thanks, when he adds:

'Blessed be the name of the Lord.' The third book of Kings also teaches that a lying spirit was to be sent by the Lord to deceive the impious Ahab. For when the Lord said: 'Who shall deceive Ahab?' a lying spirit went forth and stood before the Lord, and said: 'I will deceive him.' To whom the Lord spoke: 'In what way?' And he said: 'I will go forth and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.' And the Lord said: 'You shall deceive and prevail; go forth and do so.' This indeed the prophet Micaiah, when before Ahab himself he had set forth that it had been revealed to him, added: 'Now therefore behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all your prophets who are here; and the Lord has spoken evil against you.'

Now whether the Lord permit the devil to rage against the holy or against the impious, it is surely established that He Himself permits nothing except well—that which is good to be permitted—and that the devil does nothing except ill, which nevertheless is good to be done; and there is a reasonable cause why it is done, though unknown to us. For as that great philosopher of yours mentions in his Timaeus, when he was proving that God makes all things in the best way, he says: 'Everything that is begotten is begotten from some necessary cause.'

For nothing comes to be whose origin a lawful cause and reason does not precede.' In which it is plainly shown that whatsoever things are done by whomsoever, since these happen by the best dispensation of divine providence, come forth reasonably and well, just as they come about—namely because they have a reasonable cause why they are done—although he who does them does not do them reasonably or well, nor attends, in doing these things, to the same cause as God does.

Since therefore it is established that nothing is done except with God permitting—for nothing can be done with Him unwilling or resisting—and since it is moreover certain that God in no way permits anything without cause, and does absolutely nothing except reasonably, so that both His permission and His action are reasonable: surely, since He sees why He permits each thing that is done to be done, He is not ignorant why these things ought also to be done, even if they be evil or be done ill. For it would not be good for them to be permitted, unless it were good for them to be done; nor would He be perfectly good who, when He could, did not prevent that which it was not good to be done—rather He would manifestly be reproached in this, that He consented, by not preventing, to the doing of what it was not good to do.

It is therefore plain that whatever happens to be done or not done has a reasonable cause why it is done or not done. And therefore it is good for it to be done, or good for it not to be done, even if it be done by him by whom it is not well done, or by him by whom it is not done, it be not ill not-done—that is, with an evil intention it be left undone. Whence even for the evils themselves to exist or to be done is good, although the evils themselves are by no means good. This too the Truth Himself plainly professes, when He says: 'For it must needs be that scandals come. But woe to that man through whom the scandal comes.' As if He should openly say:

It is fitting and conducive to human salvation that certain ones, offended or angered by me, should thereby incur a scandal to their soul, that is, damnation—so that through the malice of certain ones, namely, that may be accomplished by which all may be saved who, that is, are predestined to be healed. But nevertheless woe to him, that is, there shall be damnation, by whose counsel or persuasion this scandal is set in motion. The scandal therefore is evil, but it is good that the scandal exist. So too it is good that any evil whatever exist, while nevertheless no evil is good. This too that great disciple of truth, Augustine, attending to it, and considering how excellently God orders even evils themselves, speaks thus concerning His goodness and the devil's wickedness:

'God, just as He is the best creator of good natures, so is He the most just orderer of evil wills, so that, while the devil uses good natures ill, He Himself uses even evil wills well.' Likewise he says the same concerning the devil: 'God, when He created him, was neither ignorant of his future malignity, and foresaw what goods He would make out of his evils.' Likewise, after some words: 'For God would not have created any—I do not say of angels or of men—whom He had foreknown to be evil, unless He had equally known to what uses of good things He would put them.' Likewise elsewhere: 'Individual things are good, but all together are very good, for out of all consists the lovely beauty of the universe.' Likewise:

'That which is called evil, being well ordered and set in its own place, commends the good more eminently, so that they may please the more and be the more praiseworthy, while it cooperates with the good. For neither would God Almighty, since He is supremely good, in any way allow any evil to exist in His works, unless He were to such a degree almighty and good as to make good even out of evil.' Likewise: 'Nor is it to be doubted that God does well even in allowing to be done whatever evils are done. For He allows this only by a just judgment, and surely that which is just is good. Although therefore those things which are evil, in so far as they are evil, are not good, nevertheless it is good that there be not only good things, but also evil ones.'

'For unless this were good, that evils too should exist, they would in no way be allowed by the omnipotent Good, to whom without doubt it is as easy not to allow to exist what He does not will, as it is to do what He wills. For He is not truly called omnipotent for any other reason than that He can do whatsoever He wills, nor is the effect of the omnipotent will hindered by the will of any creature.' Behold: you have heard it shown by manifest reason that it is good for evil to exist, although it is by no means true that evil is good. For it is one thing to say, 'for evil to exist is good,' another to say 'evil is good.' For there 'good' is applied to the evil thing's existing, here to the evil thing itself—that is, there to the thing, here to the event of the thing.

Now, as has been said, that thing is called good which, when it is fit for some use, by it the advantage or dignity of nothing need be hindered or even diminished; which thing would indeed have to be hindered or diminished if, through its contrary or its defect, that dignity or advantage did not of necessity remain. For example: life, immortality, gladness, health, knowledge, chastity are such things, which, since they have some dignity or advantage, it is established that this does not remain when their contraries supervene.

In the same way it is established that substances of any kind whatever must be called good things, since, when they are able to confer some usefulness, it is not necessary that through them anything of worth or of advantage be hindered. For even a perverse man, who is of a corrupt or even of a corrupting life, could be such that he were not perverse, and therefore it would not be necessary that through him anything be made worse. But for the present I judge this to be enough for the description of a good thing.