Disputation at Bizya 1 part 6/10

But if 'newness' is a quality, it does not signify one energy, but the new and ineffable manner of the manifestation of Christ's natural energies, corresponding fittingly to the ineffable manner of the mutual interpenetration of Christ's natures into one another; and it signifies his manner of life according to man, which is strange and paradoxical and unknown to the nature of beings, and the manner of the exchange [of properties] according to the ineffable union.

Nor does 'the theandric [energy]' signify one energy.

On the contrary, this expression, by way of periphrasis, has conveyed, through the natures being numbered, their respective energies;

since, given that there is no middle term between the two extremes, there is nothing intermediate in the case of Christ.

But if it signifies one energy, then Christ, as God, will have an energy other than the Father's.

The Son, then, will be of an energy other than the Father's;

since the Father's energy is not theandric.

For energy, being natural, is a constitutive and innate character of nature.

And those who have treated the inquiries concerning these matters have said that [essence] is one genus distinct from quantity, and another distinct from quality.

'Newness' is neither quantity nor quality;

I am amazed that you dared to say this.

What, then, is set in contrast to essence?

So then, 'newness' is not essence, but quality.

But how, if we should take the expression to mean one energy, would we not be making this God-revealing teacher contradict both himself and the rest of the Fathers?

For all of them expressly and with one accord both said and taught that things which are of the same essence are also of the same energy;

and that things which are of the same energy are of the same essence;

and that things which differ in essence also differ in energy;

and that things which differ in energy also differ in essence.

This was said by the Fathers concerning theology, but certainly not concerning the economy.

Hence it does not belong to a truth-loving mind to transfer what was said by them concerning theology over to the economy, and thereby introduce such an absurdity.

If it was said by the Fathers only concerning theology, then, according to you, the Son is not co-theologized with the Father after the incarnation.

But if he is not co-theologized, neither is he numbered together with the Father in the invocation of baptism;

and the faith and the preaching will be found empty.

And again, if the Son is not co-theologized with the Father after the incarnation, neither will he be of the same essence;

for things that differ in definition will certainly also differ in nature.

And again, if the Son is not co-theologized with the Father after the incarnation, to whom shall we assign the saying, 'My Father is working until now, and I am working'?

Whatever things he sees the Father doing, these the Son likewise does.

If you do not believe me, believe my works.

The works that I do bear witness concerning me.

Just as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whomever he wills.

For all these sayings show him, even after the incarnation, to be not only of the same essence as the Father, but also of the same energy.

And again, if the providence exercised over beings happens to be an energy of God;

and this belongs not only to the Father and the Spirit, but also to the Son even after the incarnation;

then he is also of the same energy as the Father even after the incarnation.

And again, if the miracles happen to be an energy of God;

and from the miracles we have come to know him to be of the same essence as the Father;

then it was from the same energy that he, being of the same essence as the Father, was shown to be so;

and he is co-theologized with him even after the incarnation.

And again, if the creative energy belongs essentially to God;

and things that belong essentially are also inalienable;

it is necessary that they either, by not saying that he is of the same energy as the Father even after the incarnation, also not say that he is of the same essence as him;

for where the operation according to nature is not, neither can the nature ever be;

or, by saying that he is of the same essence as him, must also say that he is of the same energy, and confess him together with the Father as God even after the incarnation;

for where the nature is, there also the common energy that accords with it will unfailingly be.

We do not speak of the one energy for the abolition of the human energy;

but because the nature, when set in contrast to the divine energy, is on that account called 'passion.'

By this same reasoning, those who speak of one nature likewise do not say this for the abolition of the human [nature];

but because the nature, when set in contrast to the divine, is on that account called 'passible.'

It was not in contrast to the divine energy that the Fathers named the human movement 'passion.'

For, generally speaking, the existence of nothing is known or defined from juxtaposition, or from comparison;

otherwise, in this way, things would be found to be the causes of one another.

For if, because the divine movement is 'energy,' the human [movement] is 'passion,'

then surely, because the divine nature is good, the human [nature] will also be evil.

And likewise, conversely, because the human movement is called 'passion,' the divine movement is called 'energy';

and because the human nature is evil, the divine will be good.

For these things are truly the mark of great folly.

The Fathers did not name the human movement 'passion' [in this sense].

They named it in many ways, evidently according to the underlying senses [intended].

They called it also 'power,' and 'energy,' and 'difference,' and 'movement,' and 'property,' and 'quality,' and 'passion' — not in contradistinction to the divine [movement];

but, as being cohesive and unchangeable, [they called it] 'power';

and, as being characteristic and manifesting the invariability present in all things of the same kind, [they called it] 'energy';

and, as being determinative, [they called it] 'difference';

and, as being indicative, [they called it] 'movement';

and, as being constitutive, and belonging to it alone and to no other, [they called it] 'property';

and, as being species-defining, [they called it] 'quality.'

For all things that are from God, and after God, undergo [something] by being moved, since they are not self-movement, or self-power;

not, then, in contradistinction, as has been said, but on account of the principle creatively implanted in them by the Cause that constituted the universe.

Whence also, pronouncing it together with the divine [movement], they called it 'energy.'

For the one who said, 'It operates in each form in communion with the other' — what else has he done [than this]?

For indeed, having remained without food for forty days, he afterward hungered;

for did he not grant to [his] nature, when he willed, to perform its own operations? Or [is this not what] those who spoke of a distinct energy of his [meant]?

Or those who spoke of a twofold [energy]? Or those who spoke of one [energy] and another?

In truth, the inquiry concerning the energies has also shown that the 'one energy,' in whatever way it is spoken of Christ, is absurd.

But I ask pardon, both for myself and for those who came before [me].

For out of ignorance we were carried away into these absurd notions and undertakings;

and I entreat [you] to find a way, so that this imported absurdity may be abolished, and the memory of those who came before [us] may be preserved.

There is no other way, than that the persons be passed over in silence;

but that such doctrines be anathematized.

But if this is done, Sergius, and the synod that took place concerning me, will be found to be cast out along with them.

I cannot but marvel how you call 'synod' that which was held neither according to synodal laws and canons, nor according to ecclesiastical statutes;

for neither was the encyclical letter issued with the consent of the patriarchs;

nor was a place or day of meeting appointed.

There was no one to bring in [the case], nor any accuser.

Those who assembled had no letters of introduction — neither did the bishops have them from the metropolitans, nor the metropolitans from the patriarchs. No letters or legates were sent from the other patriarchs.

Who, then, endowed with reason, would endure to call 'synod' that which has filled the whole inhabited world with scandals and dissension?

If there is no other way than this — preferring my own salvation above all things — I am ready to do this with full conviction;

asking [only] one thing, that I may be deemed worthy —

first, of [visiting] the apostolic shrines;

or rather, of the veneration of the chief apostles themselves;

and finally, also of the sight, face to face, of the most holy Pope;

and to present to him a petition concerning the things that were wrongly done.

When he had said these things, Maximus and Gregory the patrician said:

Since your proposal is good, and beneficial to the Church, so let it also be done.

Having come, then, together with us to this famous city of the Romans, he fulfilled the promise;

condemning the doctrines of the impious Ekthesis;

and uniting himself, through orthodox confession, to the holy, catholic and apostolic Church, by the grace and cooperation of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ, to whom be glory unto the ages of ages. Amen.

ON THE SOUL. First of all, I shall propose by what criterion the soul is by nature apprehended;

then, by what means it is shown to exist;

then next, whether it happens to be an essence, or an accident;

then, following upon these, whether it is simple, or composite;

then again, whether it is mortal, or immortal;

and finally, whether it is rational, or irrational.

For these are the questions most commonly investigated in the discourse 'On the Soul,' as being the most essential, and able to characterize its property.

As proofs for the confirmation of the matters examined, we shall employ the common notions, by which the credibility of the matters at hand is naturally attested.

But for the sake of brevity and usefulness, we shall now employ, as our syllogisms, only those [premises] pertaining to the necessary point of the inquiry that have (not) [further] proof [of their own], so that, becoming clear and easily handled notions, they may produce in us a certain readiness for meeting those who oppose [us].

Let us, then, begin our discourse from this point.

What is the apprehending criterion of the soul?

All existing things are either known by sense-perception, or apprehended by intellection.

And that which falls under sense-perception has sense-perception itself as sufficient proof;

for together with the impression, it also produces in us the image of the underlying object;

but that which is apprehended by intellection is known not from itself, but from its contraries.

The soul, then, being unknowable [in itself], will reasonably be known not from itself, but from its effects.

Our body, when it moves, is moved either from without, or from within.

And that it is not moved from without is clear from the fact that it is moved neither by being pushed nor by being pulled, as inanimate things [are].

And again, when moved from within, it is not moved naturally, as fire [is moved];

for that [fire] does not cease to be moved so long as it is fire, whereas the body, having become a corpse, does not move, [though] still being a body.

Therefore, if it is moved neither from without, as inanimate things [are], nor naturally, as fire [is], it is clear that it is moved by the soul, which also provides it with life.

If, then, to the... [What follows is not part of the original patristic text, but an editorial/transcription note appended to the source file:] 'This text is taken from his Patrologia, volume [illegible]: (it was typed by the mother of Father P[...]' — the note breaks off here, incomplete.

(of Arsenios Meskos), collated with the text of the "TO BYZANTION" editions in the series "GREGORIOS HO PALAMAS," Thessaloniki, PHILOKALIA OF THE NEPTIC AND ASCETIC FATHERS, volume III

Since the soul is shown to be that which supplies life to our body, the soul in itself will be known from its contraries.

That it is indeed an essence is demonstrated thus:

First, because the definition of essence might fittingly be applied also to it, since essence is defined thus: that which, remaining the same and one in number, is receptive of contraries successively.

That the soul, without departing from its own nature, admits contraries successively, is evident to all.

Temperance and intemperance are observed in it as contraries.

If, then, it is a property of essence to be receptive of contraries successively;

and the soul is shown to admit this same definition, the soul is therefore an essence.

Furthermore, since the body too is an essence, the soul must of necessity also be an essence.

For it cannot be that the thing being given life possesses essence

while that which gives life is without essence;

unless one should say that even non-being is the cause of being;

or again, only a man out of his mind would say that the thing which has its very existence in another, and which cannot exist apart from that being, is the cause of that in which it exists.

Whether the Soul Is Incorporeal

That the soul is in the body has been shown above.

And if it lies adjacent to it as pebble to pebble, then the soul would be a body;

but then the whole body would not be ensouled;

for it would lie only alongside some one part.

But if it is mixed or blended with the body, the soul would have to be called composed of many parts, and not simple, and would thereby be excluded from the very definition of soul.

For that which is made of many parts is also divisible, and that which is divisible is also dissoluble;

and that which is dissoluble is composite;

and that which is composite is extended in three dimensions;

and that which is extended in three dimensions is a body;

and body added to body produces bulk.

But the soul, being in the body, does not produce bulk, but rather gives life;

therefore the soul cannot be a body, but is incorporeal.

Furthermore, if the soul were a body, it would be moved either from within or from without;

for it is not pushed or dragged like inanimate things;

nor is it moved from within as animate things are;

for it is absurd to speak of a soul's having a soul.

And again, if the soul were a body, it would also have sensible qualities, and would be nourished;

and if it is nourished, it is not nourished bodily as the body is, but incorporeally;

Therefore it does not have sensible qualities.

For neither justice, nor courage, nor anything of that sort is visible.

For these are qualities of the soul;

for every body is composite;

that which is composed is composed of parts;

it would therefore not be composed of many parts either;

and being incorporeal, it is simple, since it is also non-composite.

I think it necessary that immortality follows upon simplicity;

For nothing that exists is destructive of itself, since otherwise it would not even have come into being in the first place.

For things that perish, perish by their contraries.

and that which is dissoluble is composite;

and that which is composite is composed of many parts;

and that which is composed of parts is evidently composed of differing parts;

and that which differs is not the same as another;

the soul, being simple and not composed of differing parts — being non-composite and indissoluble — will therefore be imperishable and immortal.

And again, that which is moved by another, not possessing its vital principle from itself but from the mover, would persist only so long as it is sustained by the power that acts upon it.

But whenever the operating power ceases, that thing too dissolves.

But that which is not moved by another, but has motion from itself — as the soul is self-moved — never ceases to exist;

for being ever-moving follows upon being self-moved.

And that which is ever-moving will be unceasing.

And that which is unceasing is without end.

And that which is without end is imperishable;

If, then, the soul is self-moved, as was demonstrated above, it will be imperishable, according to the syllogism here proposed.

And again, if everything that perishes, perishes by its own vice;

then that which is not destroyed by its own vice will be imperishable;

for evil is the contrary of the good, and is therefore also destructive of it;

For the vice of the body is nothing other than suffering, disease, and death, just as its virtue is beauty, life, health, and good bodily condition.

If, then, the soul is not destroyed by its own vice;

and the vice of the soul is cowardice, intemperance, envy, and the like;

and none of these deprives it of its living and its being in motion, the soul is therefore immortal.

And that our soul is rational, one might demonstrate from many proofs;

and first, from the fact that it is the soul which has discovered the arts that are useful for life.

For one could not simply say that the arts arose as though by mere chance, since chance would show them to be, from the very outset, without foundation and useless for life.

If, then, the arts contribute to what is useful for life;

and the useful is praiseworthy;

and the praiseworthy is constructed by reason;

Then also, from the fact that our senses are sufficient for the apprehension of things, our soul is proven to be rational.

For we are not content, in coming to know beings, with the mere impression of sense-perception alone, since we do not wish to be deceived concerning them.

For instance, things equal in shape and similar in color, yet distinguished in nature, sense-perception, being irrational, is too weak to discern.

If, then, the senses, being irrational, produce in us a false appearance of things, we must consider whether things are comprehensible;

and if they are indeed comprehensible, there will be another faculty, superior to the senses, by which the apprehension of them is attained.

But if they are not apprehended, then we shall have no way of showing that things are perceived otherwise than as they truly are.

That things are comprehensible is clear from the fact that we make fitting use of each one for what is useful, and again refashion it into what we wish.

Since, then, existing things have been shown to be comprehensible to us, while the senses, being irrational, form false opinions, it will be the intellect that discerns all things and truly knows all things as they are.

And the intellect is the rational part of the soul;

Moreover, we bring nothing into action which we have not first outlined within ourselves.

And this is nothing other than the dignity of the soul.

For the intellect does not come to it from outside, nor does the knowledge of existing things;

but the soul itself, as it were, orders existing things by the conceptions that proceed from it,

and then thus brings them forth into action.

And the dignity of the soul is nothing other than doing all things with reason.

For it has been shown that in this respect it differs also from the senses;

[The soul is] an incorporeal, intellective essence, dwelling as a citizen within a body, cause of life.

[The intellect is] the purest and most rational part of the soul, directed to the contemplation of things that exist, including those already apprehended.

[The faculties are] the soul's operations, moving consequently toward some one of the things that exist.

[Habit is] a disposition of the soul acquired from custom.

[The sense-organ is] an instrument of the soul, a faculty apprehensive of external sense-objects.

[...is] a shapeless essence, preceding all motion.

The end of the treatise of the blessed monk Maximus, On the Soul.

I received my God-protected lord himself, arriving through his all-laudable letters;

him who is indeed ever present, and who cannot in spirit be absent at all;

yet, through abundance of virtue, in a manner imitating God, he associates with his servants, and does not refuse the occasion which God has granted to nature.

And I have established a single love out of both fear and longing, constituted through reverence and good will;

so that fear, stripped of longing, may not become hatred, nor longing, lacking the sober fear joined to it, become contempt;

but that love, being truly a law, may be shown to be an inward law of affection, making its own all that is naturally akin;

through good will subduing hatred;

and through reverence, keeping contempt far away;

"The fear of the Lord is pure, enduring for ever and ever";

knowing this, namely, to be other than the fear which arises from dread of punishment for offenses;

since the latter is cast out, utterly abolished by the presence of love, as the great evangelist John shows somewhere in his own words, saying:

"Love casts out fear";

whereas the other naturally characterizes the law of true affection;

preserving through reverence, for ever, for the saints, both toward God and toward one another, the ordinance and manner of love wholly uncorrupted.

restrained by reverence from writing, lest contempt find a place;

yet impelled by good will toward writing, lest complete refusal to write be taken for hatred.

I write, then, being bidden to do this, not what I myself reckon;

for "the reasonings of men are timid," according to Scripture;

but what God wills, and what by grace He grants toward the production of what is beneficial,

"...of his heart, unto generation and generation";

calling, perhaps, the "counsel" of God the Father the ineffable self-emptying of the only-begotten Son unto the deification of our nature, according to which the end of all the ages is understood to be determined;

and "the thoughts of his heart" as the principles of providence and of judgment;

according to which He wisely conducts both our present life and the life to come, as it were certain different generations, allotting to each its own fitting mode of operation.

If, then, the deification of our nature is a work of the divine counsel,

and the aim of the divine thoughts is the conducting, unto its end, of the things sought after in our life;

then it is profitable to know and to practice, and thus fittingly to set down in writing, the meaning of the Lord's Prayer.

For it contains in its entirety, in summary, the aim that has been described, mystically hidden;

or, to speak more properly, that aim is openly proclaimed to those who are sound in mind.

For of all that the Word of God, having emptied Himself, became through the flesh the direct worker of, the wording of the prayer contains a petition, teaching us to lay claim to those good things of which God and Father alone, through the Son who by nature mediates in the Holy Spirit, is in truth the provider;

since, according to the divine Apostle, the Lord Jesus is the mediator between God and men;

making manifest to men, through the flesh, the Father who was unknown;

and presenting to the Father, through the Spirit, mankind reconciled in Himself;

on behalf of whom, and for whose sake, having become man without change, He becomes the direct worker and teacher of new mysteries, whose multitude and magnitude no reasoning has yet been able to comprehend in measure;

of which He has, by a special generosity, been shown to have bestowed upon men seven that are more generic in number than the rest;

the meaning of which, as I said, the aim of the prayer mystically contains;

theology, adoption in grace, equality of honor with the angels, participation in eternal life, the restoration of nature inclining dispassionately toward itself, the abolition of the law of sin, and the overthrow of the tyranny of the evil one who held us in his power through deceit.

Let us, then, consider the truth of what has been said.

For the Word of God, becoming incarnate, teaches theology, as showing in Himself the Father and the Holy Spirit,

for the Father was wholly, and the Holy Spirit wholly, essentially present in the whole Son perfectly, even as He became incarnate — though they themselves did not become incarnate;

but rather, the one being well-pleased, and the other cooperating, while it was the Son Himself who accomplished the incarnation;

since the Word remained intelligent and living, and was in no way at all contained essentially by any other than the Father and the Spirit alone, and effected, out of love for mankind, a union with the flesh according to hypostasis.

And He gives adoption, bestowing from above, through the Spirit, in grace, a birth that transcends nature;

the guarding and preservation of which, in God, is the free choice of those who are thus born;

which choice, with genuine disposition, embraces the grace given, and through the diligent practice of the commandments, adorns the beauty granted by grace;

and, by the emptying of the passions, lays claim to divinity to the same degree that the Word of God, having in His dispensation, according to His will, emptied Himself of His own unsullied glory, truly became and was called man.

As for the powers: He showed there to be a single festal assembly of both earthly and heavenly powers for the distribution of divine gifts;

human nature, in exultation, according to one and the same will, resounding together with the powers above in the glory of God;

but also that, even after the fulfillment of the dispensation on our behalf, having been taken up together with the body which He had assumed, He united heaven and earth through Himself;

and joined sensible things to intelligible things, and showed the created nature to be one, bound together with itself in the extremities of its own parts, according to virtue and the knowledge of the First Cause;

Showing, I think, through what he mystically accomplished, that reason is the union of things divided;

and that irrationality is the division of things united;

and let us learn to make reason our own through practice, so that we may be united not only with the angels according to virtue, but also with God, in a manner of knowledge, according to the abstraction of beings

And he grants a share of divine life, making himself edible, as he himself knows, and those who from him have received such spiritual perception, so that by the tasting of this food they may know, in truth and full knowledge, that the Lord is good, mingling by a divine quality, unto deification, those who eat;

such being he clearly is, and is called, the bread of life and power

And he restores nature to itself, not only in that, having become man, he kept his gnomic will free of passion and unshaken with respect to nature;

nor at all shaken from the foundation proper to nature, even toward those who crucified him;

but rather, on the contrary, choosing death on their behalf instead of life;

in accordance with which the voluntary character of the Passion is also shown, being confirmed by the loving disposition of the one who suffered;

but also that he abolished the enmity, nailing to the cross the handwriting of sin, on account of which nature waged implacable war against itself;

and calling both those far off and those near, namely those under the law and those outside the law;

and breaking down the dividing wall of the fence, that is, clarifying the law of the commandments in [right] doctrines;

he created the two into one new man, making peace and reconciling us through himself to the Father, and to one another, no longer having the gnomic will set in opposition to the principle of nature;

but, just as in nature, so also being unchangeable in gnomic will

And he establishes nature pure of the law of sin, not permitting pleasure to precede his incarnation on our behalf;

for the conception came about, paradoxically, without seed, and the birth, beyond nature, was incorrupt;

the God who was born drawing tight upon his mother, beyond nature, the bonds of virginity through his birth;

and freeing all nature, in those who are willing, from the dominion of the law that had prevailed [over it], by the sense-perceptible mortification of the members that are upon the earth, imitating his own voluntary death

For the mystery of salvation belongs to those who are willing, not to those who are coerced

And he brings about the destruction of the tyranny of the evil one who, through deceit, had mastered us, putting forward against him, as a weapon, the flesh that had been conquered in Adam, and conquering [him];

so that he might show that the [flesh] which had formerly been captured unto death captured its captor, and by natural death destroyed that one's life;

and became, for him, a poison, so that all whom he had, by his power, swallowed, he was compelled to vomit up, as one who held the dominion of death;

but life for the race of men, pushing all nature, like a lump [of dough], toward the resurrection of life — for the sake of which the Word, though being especially God, becomes man (a thing and a report truly strange indeed), and willingly accepts the death of the flesh

Of all these things, as I said, the discourse of the prayer will be found to hold the petition

For it speaks of the Father, and the name of the Father, and the kingdom;

and again, in grace, it presents the one who prays as being a son of this same Father

And it seeks that those in heaven and on earth may come to be of one will

It bids [us] to ask for the daily bread

It legislates reconciliation for men, and binds nature to itself by forgiving and being forgiven, [nature] not being cut apart by the difference of gnomic will

And it teaches [us] to pray not to enter into temptation, as into the law of sin;

and it exhorts [us] to be delivered from the evil one

For it was fitting that he who is himself the author and giver of good things should also be the teacher, providing, as to disciples, to those who believe in him and imitate his manner of life through the flesh, the very words of this prayer as precepts for [this present] life, through which he disclosed the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge that subsist in him according to form, driving forward the desire of those who ask, evidently unto their enjoyment [of these treasures]

For thus our God-inspired Fathers have set forth definitively concerning prayer, saying that prayer is the petition for those things which God, in a manner befitting himself, is by nature disposed to grant to men;