If, therefore, the human body was not taken from Mary, but from some other, and yet was procreated through Mary—that which had been corrupted by the prevarication—it is refuted by the argument stated above. But if Christ was not clothed with that man who had endured death as the penalty of sin, this will follow: that such a one could be born of no man's seed who should be without the penalty of original sin. From none, therefore, was such flesh taken—whence it comes about that it seems to have been newly formed. But this either appeared to the eyes of men in such a way that it was thought to be a human body, when in truth it was not human, inasmuch as it lay subject to no original penalty;
or else some new but true nature of man, not subject to the penalty of original sin, was formed for a time. If it was not a true body of man, the divinity is openly convicted of having lied, which displayed to men a body which, when it was not true, then those were deceived who reckoned it to be true. But if a new and true flesh, not taken from man, was formed, to what end so great a tragedy of the generation? Where the circuit of the passion? For thus indeed I think it not foolishly done—not even in a man—that which was done uselessly. To what true usefulness will be brought about so great a humility of the Divinity, if man, who perished, has not been saved by the generation and passion of Christ, since he is denied to have been assumed?
Again, therefore, just as the error of Eutyches took its origin from the same source as Nestorius, so it falls back to the same end: that according to Eutyches too the human race was not saved, since he who was sick and needed salvation and cure was not assumed. He seems to have drawn this opinion—if indeed this was his error—so as to believe that the body of Christ was not truly from man, but formed outside and by God in heaven; since, he is believed to have ascended into heaven with that, which contains such an example: 'No one ascends into heaven save he who descended from heaven.' CHAPTER VI. That neither divinity was translated into humanity, nor humanity into divinity, nor were the two mingled.
But it seems enough has been said about that part, if the body which Christ took on is not believed to have been assumed from Mary. But if it was assumed from Mary and the perfect human and divine nature did not remain, this could be effected in three ways: for either the divinity was translated into the humanity, or the humanity into the divinity, or both were so tempered and commingled into each other that neither substance retained its proper form. But that divinity was translated into humanity has been shown to be a thing which it is impious to believe—that the divinity should be turned into humanity, its immutable substance not remaining; and that what is by nature passible and mutable should remain immutable;
and that what is by nature believed to be immutable and impassible should be turned into a mutable thing. This, therefore, can by no reasoning come to pass. But perhaps the human nature may seem to have been converted into deity. But how can this happen, if the divinity in the generation of Christ took up both a human soul and a body? For not every thing can be turned and transmuted into every thing: for since of substances some are corporeal, others incorporeal, neither can a corporeal be changed into an incorporeal, nor an incorporeal into that which is a body. Nor indeed do incorporeals change their proper forms into one another in turn: for those things alone can be changed and transformed into one another which have the common subject of one matter;
and not even all of these, but only those which can both act and be acted upon in relation to one another. This indeed is proved in this manner: for bronze cannot be changed into stone, nor again the same bronze into grass, nor can any other body whatever be transfigured into any other whatever, unless the matter of the things passing into one another be the same, and they can both act and be acted upon by one another: as when wine and water are mixed, both are such things as can communicate to each other action and passion.
For the quality of water can suffer something from the quality of wine, and therefore, if there be much water but only a little wine, they are not said to be intermingled, but the one is corrupted by the quality of the other. For if anyone pour wine into the sea, the wine is not mixed with the sea, but corrupted in the sea, for this reason: that the quality of the water, by the multitude of its own body, has suffered nothing from the quality of the wine, but rather has changed the quality of the wine into itself by its own multitude. But if they be moderate and equal to one another, or natures slightly unequal, which can act and be acted upon by one another, these are mixed and are tempered with one another by their moderate qualities.
And these things indeed take place in bodies, and not in all of them, but only in those which (as has been said) can both act and be acted upon by one another, having a common and the same matter as their subject. For every body which subsists in generation and corruption seems to have a common matter; but not every one can either do something or suffer something from every one, or in every one. But corporeal things can by no reasoning be transmuted into incorporeal, since they share no common matter as subject, which, on receiving qualities, might be changed into either: for every nature of incorporeal substance rests upon no foundation of matter;
but there is no body to which matter is not subject. Since this is so, and since not even those things which naturally have a common matter pass into one another, unless there be present in them the power of acting and being acted upon in and by themselves, much more will those things not be mutable into one another which not only have no common matter, but where one thing rests upon a foundation of matter, as a body, while the other has absolutely no need of a subject of matter, as the incorporeal. It is therefore not possible that a body should be changed into an incorporeal species; nor indeed is it possible that incorporeals should be changed into one another by any commingling. For of those things whose matter is no common one, neither can they be turned and transmuted into one another. But to incorporeal things there is no matter.
They cannot, therefore, be mutually interchanged. But the soul and God are rightly believed to be incorporeal substances; therefore the human soul has not been changed into the divinity by which it was assumed. But if neither the body nor the soul could be turned into the divinity, in no way could it come about that the humanity should be converted into God. Much less, indeed, can it be believed that the two should be fused together into one another, since neither can incorporeality pass over into body, nor again, conversely, body into incorporeality; for there is no common matter underlying these, which could be transmuted into the qualities of either of the two substances. But these men say thus: that Christ does indeed consist of two natures, but not at all in two natures.
They mean this, namely, that what consists of two things can become one in such a way that those things from which it is said to be composed do not remain; just as when honey is mingled with water, neither remains, but the one, corrupted by union with the other, has made some third thing. So that which becomes a third thing out of honey and water is said to consist of both, but is denied to be in both; for it will not be able to consist in both, since the nature of each does not endure. For it can consist of both, even though the things from which it is joined have each been corrupted in their quality.
But it will not be able to consist of both in this manner, because those things which have been transfused into one another do not remain, nor are there both those things of which it would seem to consist, since they consist of both transfused into one another by a mutation of qualities. But Catholics reasonably confess both; for they hold that Christ is both of two natures and consists in two natures. But by what reasoning this is said I shall explain a little later.
Now this is manifest, that the opinion of Eutyches has been refuted on this ground: that, whereas one subsistence can come to be from two natures in three ways—either by the divinity being translated into the humanity, or the humanity into the divinity, or by both being commingled—it is declared by the argument set forth above that none of these ways could come to pass. CHAPTER VII. That Christ consists both in and of two natures. It remains for us to show, as the Catholic faith says, that Christ both consists in two natures and of two natures. That something consists of two natures signifies two things: one, when we say that something is joined of two natures, as out of honey and water.
And this means: things confused in any manner whatsoever—whether one is turned into the other, or both are mingled together into one another—yet in no way do both remain. According to this manner Eutyches says that Christ consists of two natures. But there is another manner of consisting of two things, namely, when something is so joined of two that those things of which it is said to be joined nevertheless remain and are not turned into one another; as when we say a crown is composed of gold and gems. Here neither is the gold translated into gems, nor the gems turned into gold, but both remain and do not abandon their proper form. Such things, therefore, composed of certain elements, we say consist in those of which they are predicated to consist.
For then we can say that the crown consists of gems and gold; for there are gems and gold of which the crown consists. For in the former manner, there is not honey and water in which that which is joined of both consists. Since, therefore, the Catholic faith confesses that both natures remain in Christ, and that these same persist perfect, and that neither is transmuted into the other, it rightly says that Christ both consists in two natures and of two natures: in two natures, indeed, because both remain; of two natures, indeed, because by the uniting of the two that remain there comes to be one person of Christ. But the Catholic faith does not hold that Christ is joined of two natures according to that signification by which Eutyches pronounces it.
For he takes such a signification of the conjunction from each nature that he does not confess that Christ consists in two natures, nor that both remain. But the Catholic takes that signification of consisting of two natures which is nearest to that, and preserves the one which confesses that Christ consists in two natures. The phrase 'to consist of two natures' is therefore equivocal, or rather ambiguous, designating two different things by a twofold signification: by one signification, that the substances do not remain of which that which has been coupled is said to be conjoined; in another way signifying that it is so joined of two natures that both remain.
This knot of equivocation and ambiguity being thus untied, there is nothing further that can be objected, to prevent its being that which the firm and true Catholic faith contains: that the same Christ is a perfect man, the same is God, and the same one who is a perfect man and God is one God and the Son of God; nor is a quaternity built up in the Trinity when man is added above the perfect God, but one and the same person fills out the number of the Trinity—so that, though the humanity has suffered, God nevertheless is said to have suffered; not that the deity itself became humanity, but that it was assumed by the deity. Likewise, he who is a man is called the Son of God, not by the substance of the divinity, but of the humanity, which nevertheless is conjoined to the divinity by a natural union.
And although these natures, thus understood, are spoken of and intermingled, nevertheless one and the same is both perfect man and God: God indeed, in that he was begotten of the substance of the Father; man indeed, in that he was procreated of the Virgin Mary. And likewise he who is man is God, because he was assumed by God; and he who is God is man, because he was clothed with man: since in the same person the divinity which took up is one thing, and the humanity which it took up is another; yet the same is both God and man. For if you understand Christ as man, the same is man and God; because man by nature, God by assumption. But if you understand him as God, the same is God and man; because by nature he is God, man by assumption.
And there comes to be in him a twofold nature and a twofold substance, since he is man-God; and one person, since the same is man and God. And this is the middle way between two heresies, just as the virtues also hold to the mean. For every virtue is established and consists in the comely middle of things, since if it should come to be either beyond or below what it ought, virtue is departed from: virtue therefore holds the mean. Wherefore, if these four cannot be in Christ in any other way, then either there are two natures and two persons, as Nestorius says; or one person and one nature, as Eutyches says; or two natures but one person, as the Catholic faith believes; or one nature and two persons. And since indeed two natures and two persons...
...we have confuted, in the reply made against Nestorius; and we have demonstrated, when Eutyches proposes it, that there cannot be one person and one nature; and since no one has hitherto existed so mad as to believe that there is one nature in him but two persons; it remains that that is true which the Catholic faith proclaims: that there is a twofold substance, but one person.
But since we said a little before that Eutyches confesses two natures in Christ before the union, but one after the union, and since we interpreted this error as concealing a twofold opinion—namely, that this union came about either by generation, when the body of the man was by no means taken from Mary, or, the body being indeed taken from Mary, that the union came about through the resurrection—concerning both parts, I think, it has been suitably argued. Now it must be inquired how it could come about that two natures should be mingled into one substance. CHAPTER VIII. What was the state of Christ's life.
Nevertheless there is even now another question which can be raised by those who do not believe that the human body was taken from Mary, but that it was otherwise set apart and prepared, so that in the union it should seem to be born from Mary's womb and brought forth. For they say: if the body was taken from a man, but every man, from the first transgression, was held not only by sin and death but was also entangled in the affections of sins, and this was the penalty of sin for him—that, while he was bound fast by death, he was nevertheless guilty also by the will to sin—why in Christ was there neither sin nor any will to sin? And altogether such a question has a doubt that deserves to be noted.
For if Christ's body was assumed from human flesh, it can be doubted what this flesh which was assumed may seem to be: for he indeed saved him whom he also assumed. But if he assumed such a man as Adam was before sin, he seems to have assumed an entire human nature, but one which had no need whatever of medicine. But how can it come about that he assumed such a man as Adam was, since in Adam there could be a will and affection to sin?—whence it came about that, by transgressing the divine precepts, he was held bound by the offenses of disobedience. But in Christ no will at all to sin is believed to have existed.
Especially since, if he assumed such a body of man as Adam's was before sin, he ought not to have been mortal, since Adam, had he not sinned, would by no reason have experienced death. Since therefore Christ did not sin, it must be inquired why he experienced death, if he assumed Adam's body as it was before he sinned. But if he took on such a state of man as Adam's was after sin, it seems that even in Christ there was not lacking the necessity both of being subjected to offenses and of being confounded by passions, and, the rules of judgment being overdrawn, of not discerning good from evil with unblemished integrity—since Adam took on all these penalties by the transgression of his offense.
Against these it must be answered that three states of men can be understood. One indeed is that of Adam before the offense, in which, although death was absent from him, and he had not yet polluted himself with any offense, there could nevertheless be in him a will to sin. The second is that into which he could have been changed, had he willed to remain firmly in God's precepts: for then it would have to be added that he should not only not sin, or will to sin, but could not even sin, or will to transgress. The third state is after the offense, in which death necessarily followed him, and sin itself and the will to sin. And the places of these extremes and contraries are as follows: there is that state which would have been the reward, had Adam willed to remain in God's precepts;
and there is that which became the penalty, because he did not will to remain: for in the former there would be neither death, nor sin, nor any will to sin; but in the latter, both death and sin, and every inclination to transgress, and all things prone to ruin, and having nothing of help in themselves whereby, after the fall, he might be able to rise again. But that middle state, in which the presence of death or of sin was indeed absent, but the power of either remained, was placed between the two states. From these three states, then, Christ in a certain manner assigned individual causes to his bodily nature: for the fact that he assumed a mortal body, in order to put death to flight from the human race, must be placed in that state which was penally inflicted after Adam's transgression.
But the fact that there was in him no will to sin was taken from that state which could have been, had he not applied his will to the snares of the deceiver. There remains, therefore, the third state, that is, the middle one: namely, that which existed at the time when death was not present, and the will to transgress could be present. In this state, then, Adam was such that he ate and drank, that he digested what he took, that he slipped into sleep, and the other things which were not lacking to him—human indeed, but permitted, and such as inflicted no penalty of death. That Christ had all these things is beyond doubt:
for he both ate and drank and performed the function of a human body. For so great a need is not to be believed to have been in Adam that, unless he ate, he could not live; but if he took food from every tree, he could always have lived, and by these not die: therefore he replenished his need with the fruits of Paradise. That this need was in Christ no one is ignorant of, but by power, not by necessity. And this very need was in him before the resurrection; but after the resurrection he came to be such that that human body was changed, just as Adam's, apart from the bond of transgression, could have been changed.
and this is what the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us to desire in our prayers: that his will be done as in heaven so on earth, that his kingdom may come, and that he may free us from evil. For all these things that most blessed transformation of the human race—of those who faithfully believe—prays for. These are the things which I have written to you out of the trustful belief of my faith. In which matter, if anything has been wrongly said, I am not so great a lover of myself as to strive to prefer the things which I have once poured forth to a better opinion. For if there is nothing of good from ourselves, there is nothing which we ought to love in our own opinions. But if all good things are from him who alone is good, that rather must be believed to be good which that immutable Goodness and Cause of all good things prescribes.