駁阿波里拿留 第 1 章 第 3/7 段

and it is evident to all that these two names do not signify the same thing, but the defining account of the Godhead is one thing, and that of humanity is another and different thing.

For God is that which is always in the same state, the cause of all good things, neither ever not existing, nor ever ceasing to exist;

but man, in other respects, stands in kinship with the nature of irrational beings, being governed, like them, through flesh and sensation; yet, separated from the irrational by the addition of mind, he has in this the distinguishing feature of his nature.

For no one, in defining man, would define him from flesh and bones and organs of sense; nor would anyone, by speaking of the faculty of nourishment and of change, thereby indicate what is proper to human nature; rather, it is the capacity for understanding and for reason that has shown what man is.

It is, then, equivalent either to explain the nature through the name, or through that which properly accompanies the nature.

For both the one who says "man" has thereby indicated the rational, and the one who names "the rational" has by this very term pointed out man.

Therefore Apollinarius too, when he named "God" and "man," if he indeed included in that term the meanings that are exhibited in the Godhead, ought not, in the same way, to mutilate through his interpretation what is signified by "man."

But if he is indeed called "man," then the appellation is certainly true and not falsely named;

and the truth of the name is demonstrated by the fact that the one so named is a rational living being, and reason is in every case grounded in the understanding;

so that, if he is man, he is of necessity also possessed of understanding;

but if he is not possessed of understanding, neither is he man.

"But he was man in body," he says, "having borne the inglorious form of men."

This he puts forward from his own resources, and not from the scriptural teaching handed down to us;

nevertheless, so that even from his own statements the very thing he is striving for may be overturned into its opposite, let us examine the argument in this way.

"He bore," he says, "the inglorious form of men."

Let us first examine what the glory of man is, and thus, from what follows, we shall understand its opposite, inglory.

Now the glory of man—that is, true glory—is assuredly a life lived according to virtue.

For to define the glory or inglory of men by a certain fairness of complexion or bloom of flesh, or conversely by a deformity of body, would belong to those of corrupted judgment.

If, then, virtue is acknowledged to be that which is glorious among men, then vice is certainly that which is inglorious.

But indeed Apollinarius says that God has come under the inglorious form of men.

If, then, inglory consists in vice, and vice is a disgrace of moral choice, and it is the understanding that chooses, and the understanding is a certain movement of the mind, then he who beholds human inglory attributed to God does not thereby separate from the understanding the man through whom God conversed with human life.

And this indeed agrees with the divine scriptures, that for our sake he became sin, that is, that he united to himself the sinful soul of man.

"The Lord," he says, "having appeared in the form of a slave;"

Was, then, this slave, whose form the Lord put on, whole, or was he maimed? For one would reasonably call whatever is deficient and mutilated in the completeness of the living being a mutilation.

"Not man," he says, "but as man, because he is not consubstantial with man in what is most essential;"

if not consubstantial, then certainly of a different substance;

for beings that are thus other, neither the nature nor the appellation is common.

The substance of fire is one thing, and that of water another, and the appellations of the two are different;

but Peter and Paul, since their nature is one, also share a common name for their substance;

for each of these is man.

If, then, he was something else in substance and not man, but was shaped in appearance only, as far as man is concerned, while in truth he was altered in his nature, then let him say that everything was a kind of seeming and deceptive phantasm—that, according to him, the eating was false, the sleep was false, that all the miracles of healing did not exist, that the cross did not happen, nor the laying in the tomb, nor the resurrection from the passion;

but all these things merely appeared in seeming, while, in the words of the fable-writer, none of the things that appeared actually was.

For if he was not man, how were the things recorded concerning him real? And how could one say that he who is a stranger to human substance is man? For, he says, he was not consubstantial with man in what is most essential;

but he who takes away from man that which is most essential—and this is the mind—has thereby shown that what remains is a mere beast;

But the beast is not a human being.

Then he says: "Having humbled himself in flesh, yet having been exalted by God with the divine exaltation."

This, again, is more foolish than what preceded, and impious besides.

He says that one thing was humbled and another exalted.

"The flesh," he says, "was humbled" — though it had no need whatsoever of being humbled, since it possesses lowliness by nature — and he says that the divinity was exalted.

And yet the Most High has no need of exaltation.

Where, then, was the divinity exalted — the divinity that is set above all things and stands higher than every exaltation? Rather, it is that which is by nature lowly that is exalted, even if the pamphleteer does not wish it so, just as the argument concerning these matters was set forth a little earlier.

Again, like those who mutter incoherently in their sleep, he has abandoned the logical sequence of his own construction and mixed in our words; and whatever a person of sound judgment concerning the doctrine might say, these things too he blends in with his own words.

For he distinguishes between the one who is glorified and the one who possesses the glory.

And he has glory before the world, as God pre-existing the ages.

But if what was said by him were confined to these statements, one might perhaps have supposed that out of a change of heart he had come to more pious opinions;

but now, as though he had circled round this sound line of thought in his discourse as one rounds a turning-post, he runs back again to the racecourse of error; and having heaped many insults upon us, and having equated our position with that of Jews and Greeks, he takes up again in his discourse the vomit which he had already vomited forth earlier — plastering the pre-eternal flesh onto Christ through the vanity of his words, and saying that the Son, being an enfleshed mind, was born of a woman, not having become flesh in the virgin, but having passed through her only as through a passage, being such as he was before the ages, and that then that very thing which appears — being fleshly — was made manifest as God, or, as he himself names it, an "enfleshed mind."

Therefore he says that the crucified one is named "Lord of glory," and is called "Lord of powers" by the prophecy, and that he utters those authoritative and masterful words: "I say to you," and "I command you," and "I work," and whatever else pertains to a loftier import.

The flesh empties itself, sleeps, grieves, is troubled, groans, feels thirst and hunger, runs to the fig tree, is ignorant of the tree's season of bearing fruit, does not know the day or the hour, is struck, is bound, is slapped, receives the nails through itself, bleeds, becomes dead, is buried, is laid in a new tomb.

Does he then agree that all this is proper to, and in accordance with, the nature of the pre-eternal divinity — that it would not have been nourished had it not nursed, nor would it exist in life at all, unless what had been exhausted of its strength were relieved by partaking of food? And how is it that his enfleshed God does not know that day and that hour? And how does he not know the season of figs — that at Passover no fruit fit for eating would be found on the tree? Let him say — who is it that is ignorant? Who is it that grieves? Who is it that is straitened in helpless distress? Who is it that cried out to have been forsaken by God, if the divinity of Father and Son is one? And by whom is the forsaking effected, which he cried out upon the cross? For if it is the divinity that suffers, and yet those who are pious agree that the Son is of one divinity with the Father — but the sufferer says, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" — how, if the divinity is one, is it divided in the suffering, so that the one forsakes and the other is forsaken?

The one is in death, while the other remains in life;

the one is put to death, while the other raises up that which has been put to death? Either, then, he will not confess one divinity in the case of Father and Son, and will thereby be shown to be an advocate of Arius; or, if in opposing Arius he should say it is one, he will not, in any case, agree even with himself, being unable to make his fabricated fable stand consistent within itself.

But of necessity he will testify that these passionate and lowlier utterances and dispositions belong to that which is human, and will agree that the nature of God, even in its communion with human sufferings, has remained unchangeable and impassible.

For surely the disgrace belongs wholly to the passible nature of the flesh;

while the eternal glory, then, belongs to the impassible and incorruptible power.

But so that we may not seem to be slandering him in what has been said, I shall also set forth the very wording of the passages we have already examined as to their sense.

"For Greeks," he says, "and Jews plainly disbelieve, not accepting to hear that the one born of a woman is God."

Why has he now, in speaking of the birth, passed over the flesh in silence? And yet that which was born of the flesh was assuredly flesh, just as the Lord somewhere says.

But since he wishes the very flesh that was born to be divinity itself, and to establish that God did not appear in flesh, he says:

"But God, being enfleshed before the ages, afterward was born through a woman, and came to the trial of sufferings and to the necessity of nature."

And in saying these things, he does not even grant him to be a human being at all;

but he subjects him to the sufferings as though he were a human being, yet does not grant him any share in human nature.

For how can that which is said not to be from the earth be a human being? For Scripture says that humanity came to be from Adam, and that Adam himself was first formed from the earth by divine power.

For this reason Luke also, when tracing the genealogy of him who was reputed to be the son of Joseph, attaches the beginning of the generation, through each of the forefathers, back to Adam.

He, then, who did not come to be from the race of human beings is assuredly something else, and not a human being.

He, then, who is neither a human being, since he has nothing of the human race, nor God, since he is not incorporeal — what, then, might that enfleshed God of the pamphleteer be? Let the disciples and advocates of his deception declare it.

"But," he says, "Greeks and Jews would have accepted it, had we said that the one who was born was a divinely-inspired man, as Elijah was."

And which of the Greeks ever accepted as true the wonders concerning Elijah — that fire, shaped into two forms, the one into the likeness of a chariot and the other into the shape of horses, moves in a direction contrary to its own nature, being borne downward from above —

— that in the horses drawing that in the chariot? For if one were to accept these things in the manner one ought, he would, through these very words, be shown to be advancing toward the acceptance of the mystery, seeing in the narrative a typological prophecy concerning the Lord's becoming human, prefigured through the events that took place.

For just as fire, though upward-tending by nature, becomes earthbound by divine power, and Elijah, enveloped by the heavenly fire as it runs back again to its motion according to nature, is himself caught up together with it — so also the power of the Most High, being immaterial and formless, took hold of the servile form which had subsisted through the Virgin, and led it up to its own height, transforming it into the divine and incorruptible nature;

so that he who is stubbornly disinclined toward this would not even assent to the wonder-working concerning Elijah;

but he who has already learned, in that account, the truth sketched out in shadow, would not be set in opposition to the truth itself.

Then he turns his abuse against us, who do not accept his fabricated myth, and says:

"Those who, under the guise of faith, are unbelieving, are ashamed — just like the Jews — of the God who was born of a woman and crucified."

As for resorting to curses against one's opponents — who does not know that this is characteristic of those who are weak in the very matters about which they are earnest? But we say only this: that with two pits lying before us — on the one side the fall pertaining to Apollinarius, and on the other the collapse pertaining to Arius — the shattering is equal for those who fall into either.

Yet, in a choice between evils, the fracture pertaining to Arius seems the lighter.

For both drag the incorruptible nature of the Only-Begotten down toward the lowlier;

but Arius assimilates the Master of the angels to the incorporeal nature of the angels, declaring that both he and they are equally diminished from the uncreated nature, and that both this one and those exist through creation;

but this one [Apollinarius] intensifies the absurdity to such a degree that he judges him to be of equal honor even with man, who is diminished below the angels, and determines that his nature is fleshly.

And by as much as the incorporeal nature is superior to bodies, by so much is the impiety of Arius more preferable than the error of Apollinarius.

Who, then, is unbelieving under the guise of faith in interpreting the mystery of the birth from the Virgin? For I shall lay before the public both our faith — which is derided by the pamphleteer — and his own opinion.

For we say that he who is, in essence, immaterial, formless, and incorporeal God, through a certain benevolent dispensation, near the end of the completion of the universe, when wickedness had already grown to its utmost pitch, then, for the abolition of sin, mingled himself with human nature — like a sun taking up residence in a gloomy cave and, through its light, by its presence causing the darkness to vanish;

for having taken our filth upon himself, he himself is not defiled by the stain, but purifies the filth within himself;

for, as it is said, "The light shone in the darkness,"

"and the darkness did not overtake it."

just as also happens in the case of healing;

for when the cure is applied to the disease, the sickness passes away into non-existence — it is not transferred into the medical art itself.

But he says that God was enfleshed from the very beginning, and that thus, in the last days, that visible and tangible body which was born — growing, through human nourishment, by small increments — was that very thing which existed before all things that are, which also made human beings and every creation, both visible and invisible, which also feels weariness and, in anguish, undergoes the trial of death.

I do not know how this wise man, though attributing no weariness at all to the Maker when the heavens and the earth and all the wonders in creation were being formed, yet says that he became weary merely in order to pass from Judea to Galilee;

and [attributes to him the power] to turn the rock into pools of water for the Israelites, yet [says] that he himself asked to drink from a Samaritan woman;

and that in forty years he did not grow weary pouring out heavenly food upon so many tens of thousands, yet [says] that he ran to the fig tree in hope of food that did not exist.

Let the intelligent hearer judge for himself, weighing both these opinions concerning the doctrine, who it is that is unbelieving under the guise of faith.

But he says that we assert that the crucified one had nothing divine in his own nature, not even that most sovereign element, which is spirit.

But against such a slander, the defense by simple denial is readily at hand.

For if Apollinarius supposes "spirit" to mean "mind," no Christian says that the man united with God is half [a man]; rather, [they say] that he was joined whole to the divine power.

One might, then, choose to designate the parts of a human being by any of these names — whether mind, or spirit, or heart;

for all three of these are used by Scripture with reference to the governing faculty:

"Create in me a clean heart, O God";

and "The one who has understanding will obtain guidance";

and "No one knows the things of a man except the spirit that is in him."

He is, therefore, neither without spirit, nor without mind, nor without heart, through the overshadowing of the power of the Most High and the coming of the Holy Spirit.

The abuse, then, would not actually be directed at us — as though we said that man came into being without having in himself the spirit, that is, the mind — but rather at that very perpetrator of the abuse, who assails us with reproaches that are properly his own.

For it is he who names the mind "spirit," yet says that the man according to Christ does not have mind, who is the one making the Lord out to have no spirit.

But what is the charge that follows? He says that we do wrong in saying this: that the man had, beyond his own nature, something else greater — the divinity dwelling within him.

But if this is reckoned among the charges, we do not flee the accusation, being cast out together with the apostle.

For it was from him that we learned this, and thus we believe: that he who, according to what is understood, exists in the form of God, comes, according to what is apparent, to be in the form of a slave.

But if the divine form is more honorable than the servile appearance, then surely what is apparent is not of equal honor with what is hidden.

Therefore that which was seen according to the flesh, and consorted with human beings, had within itself something more honorable than itself — which the pamphleteer makes into an accusation against the faith.

But also, he says, the apostle states that in him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily;

and he who said 'in him' did not signify half of what was meant, but comprehended the whole subject within the signification.

If then it was a human body in which the Godhead dwelt, and the body is not soulless, and the intellectual part is proper to the human soul — for if this were removed, as we have often said, what is left is brutish — does not our noble champion then fasten his abuse not upon us, but upon the apostle?

Or rather, upon the great voice of John, which says, 'The Word became flesh and dwelt among us';

for it was not in part of us, but by the plural expression he signified together everything that is contemplated in [our] nature; and he first distinguished the Word from the flesh, and only then thus brought them into union.

For the Word was in himself, and was with God;

and whatever God was, this also the Word was;

but when he came to his own, and shone in the darkness, then the Word became flesh, becoming flesh in the virgin by his own power.

Let him therefore spare us this abuse, lest through his outrage he should also implicate the saints.

But passing over what lies between, by which he supposes he can convict of denying the truths of the mystery those who do not share his opinion, I shall recall one of the things said in his tirade for the purpose of slandering us.

For he says that we, unless we say that, [thereby fail to] say either that he pre-existed his earthly birth, or that he was before all things, or that he is of the same tribe as God.

But we do confess that he pre-existed his earthly birth, since it is not disputed that the flesh is of earthly composition;

but as for his being 'of the same tribe' as God — far be it! Let no one among Christians coin such lowly words, so alien to the divine majesty, as to proclaim him who truly is God to be 'of the same tribe' as God, rather than proclaiming him the true God.

Not even Eunomius, I think, would have spared such an expression when applied to the Lord.

...of deity — [namely, the claim] that he is 'of the same tribe' as God — inasmuch as those who have received faith in him also become fellow-members of Christ's body, and joint-partakers, not being that very thing which the Lord is, but partaking of him, and being named together with that in which they partake;

so that he who accuses us of not saying these things, which are confessed by the pious, has thereby himself borne witness to the piety and blamelessness of our teaching.

Then, in order to establish that the flesh is deity, he adds also this to what has been said.

'For who,' he says, 'is holy from birth?' — as if he had not read the scripture concerning Jeremiah, of whom it says, 'Before I formed you in the womb, I sanctified you.'

For that one is testified by scripture to be holy not only from his birth, but even before his coming into being.

But he too who leapt in his mother's womb, who received with exultation the sound of the greeting given to the Lord's mother, he also would be holy from birth, as the angel's word concerning him declares, saying:

'And he will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb.'

But he adds this too to what has been said:

'Who is wise without being taught?' But we say that the wisdom from God, which is Christ, is not something taught;

but as for the portion of our flesh that was united to the divine Wisdom, we do not doubt that it received the good of wisdom by participation, being persuaded by the Gospel, which relates thus: 'And Jesus advanced in stature and in wisdom and in grace.'

Just as in the body the gradual increase, through the cooperation of nourishment, advances toward the perfection of nature, so also in the soul the progress toward the perfection of wisdom is added, through discipline, to those who pursue it.

'Who,' he says, 'works the things of God with authority?' How he belittles, with such childish contentions, the ineffable majesty of the Lord! For to do the things of God with authority belongs also to human beings deemed worthy of divine power — such as Elijah was, who by his own authority both released and shut up the rain for men, brought fire down upon his adversaries, made the flour in the jar abound, made the oil overflow in the flask, and by his breath granted life to what was lifeless, and whatever else the account records concerning him — so that to do, by divine power, some of the wonders that belong to God's authority is nothing beyond man; but to be oneself that surpassing power is what is beyond man.

which indeed is believed both by us and by all who have received the word in truth.

But the distinction which he adds, unintelligibly, to what has been said, we shall pass over, since it is not fitting for us to refute it in earnest with the concepts proper to the learned.

'What he has,' he says, 'is again equality in power, but a distinction of activity according to the flesh, according to which,' he says, 'he did not give life to all, but to some, whom he willed.'

But we, having grasped the simple and unadorned sense of the divine scripture, understand what has been said in this way:

when we hear the Lord relating that 'The Father raises the dead and gives life' and 'The Son gives life to whom he wills,' we do not on this account understand it as though some were being cast off from the life-giving will.

but since we have both heard and believe that all the things of the Father are the Son's, it is clear that we also perceive the Father's will, as one among all things, to be in the Son.

If then the Father's will is in the Son, and the Father, as the apostle says, 'wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth,' then clearly he who has acquired all the things of the Father, and has the whole Father wholly within himself, certainly has wholly within himself, together with the Father's other goods, also the saving will.

as Apollinarius says, that he willed some, not all, to be given life.

For it is not because of the Lord's own will that some are saved and others perish (otherwise the cause of those who perish would revert back to him), but it is because of the choice of those who receive the word that it comes about that some are saved or perish.

But he adds to his arguments that 'No one died and rose with authority.'

And having said this, he adduces the Gospel's word: 'No one takes my soul from me;'

'I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it up again.'

Which soul — rational or irrational? I would say this to those who make the mindless soul co-extensive with God.

If they say it is irrational, they will be saying that Christ is a beast, and not a man;

but if they say it is rational, what else do they suppose discursive thought to be, apart from reason itself? For reason is not an inarticulate sound, but the movement of thought becomes the origin and basis of reason.

Therefore he who spoke of a 'rational' soul has, by that very fact, also confessed it to be a soul endowed with discursive thought;

and if discursive thought is a movement and activity of the mind, how could the mind, if not present, be active — if indeed one should define the Lord's soul as having no share in the mind? So that, if the Lord has a soul which he both takes up and lays aside with authority — and it is a soul not bestial and irrational, but of the human composite — it is altogether confessed that, in having assumed a human soul, he also assumed one endowed with discursive thought.

Having said these things, whatever he says concerning the grain of wheat that dies and thus rises again with many more grains — since it is on our side and confirms our own argument — I shall willingly pass over.

For who is the grain that dies, and in its own ear of resurrection raises up within itself a multitude of grains? I do not think anyone is so uninitiated in the divine doctrines as not to see that the mystery of the Passion pertains to man.

The proof of this teaching is that we too die with him, and are buried with him, and are raised with him.

For toward what is of the same kind, imitation becomes easy for those who wish it, but likeness to what has transcended that kind is impossible;

so that if it is the flesh that underwent death, it would be easier for us also, who live in the flesh, to imitate death by death;

but if it is deity that has died, how shall we, who are in the flesh, die together with deity? Flesh dies together with flesh, and rises together with flesh;

but since it is deity that suffered this, as Apollinarius would have it, it is fitting to seek out other deities, which will die together with, and rise together with, this deity;

for just as Christ died and rose, so also we do, says the apostle.

What are we, according to our own nature? Divine power, or blood and flesh, as scripture says? Therefore he who, for our sake, became as we are, has shared with us, on our account, in flesh and blood.

Therefore that which we are in essence, this also was he who died for us — he to whom imitation is set before those of the same kind.

The proof of the impiety of the argument that shows deity to be mortal is this very thing that happens within ourselves.

For in the common death of human beings, what is it that dies and perishes? Is it not that the flesh dissolves into the earth, while the mind remains with the soul, not even harmed in its existence by the change of the body? The proof is that the rich man remembers those who are above the earth, and entreats Abraham concerning those of his kin joined to him.

And one could not call it folly, that, since he knew his own fate to be inescapable, he made some provision for those dear to him.

If then our mind remains even after death unaffected and unaltered, how is it likely that Apollinarius' 'one-third' god should have undergone fleshly death? How could he be said to have died, or in what manner did he suffer the dissolution of death? For to none of all is this unknown: that death is the separation of soul and body from one another; but how does the soul and discursive mind itself become divided from itself, so as to receive death even within itself? If then our soul is incapable of receiving death, how does it receive death? Let those who chop Christ up into a mere portion say.

'But,' he says, 'they are troubled with the trouble of unbelievers.'

He resorts to abuse, calling those who attend without over-scrutiny to the evangelic voice 'troubled' and 'unbelieving' — the voice which says, 'If it is possible, let this cup pass from me;'

'yet not as I will, but as you will.'

To these he adds his own statement, which runs as follows:

'And they do not remember,' he says, 'that this will is said to be proper not to a man of earth, as they suppose, but to God who came down from heaven.'

What could one discover to say more outrageous than this? I do not speak of any of those condemned for heresy;

but I do not think even the father of impiety and falsehood himself could find anything among such sayings more grievous for blasphemy.