論人的本性 第 1 章 第 7/9 段

Since, then, every voluntary act lies in some action, and what is reckoned involuntary is itself also in an action (this will be shown a little later;

for some place the truly involuntary not only in suffering but also in acting), we must define before all else what an action is.

An action is a rational activity.

Upon actions there follows either praise or blame; and some of them are performed with pleasure, others with pain; and some are choiceworthy to the one acting, others to be shunned; and of those that are choiceworthy, some are always choiceworthy, others choiceworthy for a certain time;

and it is likewise with those that are to be shunned.

And again, some actions are pitied and deemed worthy of pardon, others are hated and punished.

Let the criteria of the voluntary, then, be these: that praise or blame invariably follows upon it; that it is performed with pleasure; and that the actions are choiceworthy to those who perform them, either always or at the time when they are performed.

And the criteria of the involuntary are these: that it is deemed worthy of pardon or pity; that it is performed with pain; and that the actions are not choiceworthy.

Now that these things have been thus distinguished, let us speak first about the involuntary.

On the Involuntary. Of the involuntary, one kind is by constraint, the other through ignorance. Of the involuntary acts that are by constraint, the productive origin is from without, for it is something else that is the cause of the constraint, and not ourselves.

The involuntary is that of which the origin is from without, the one who is constrained contributing nothing according to his own impulse.

By 'origin' here is meant the productive cause.

But it is inquired whether these too are involuntary: for instance, the jettisonings of cargo which sailors make when they are caught in a storm, or when someone consents to suffer or to do a shameful thing in order to save friends or fatherland.

But these seem rather to be voluntary.

For this reason there was added to the definition the clause 'the one who is constrained contributing nothing according to his own impulse'; for in such cases the men themselves willingly move their bodily organs by their own agency, and thus cast the cargo into the sea.

Likewise also those who endure something shameful or terrible for the sake of a greater good, as Zeno, who bit off his own tongue and spat it out at Dionysius the tyrant so as not to divulge to him at all the secrets entrusted to him; and likewise Anaxarchus the philosopher, who endured being pounded in a mortar by Nicocreon the tyrant rather than betray his friends.

In general, then, whenever, out of fear of greater evils, someone chooses the lesser evil, or in hope of a greater good someone accepts a lesser evil which cannot otherwise be accomplished, he does not undergo an involuntary action or passion;

for he acts according to deliberate choice and selection, and then such actions are choiceworthy when they are performed, even though in themselves they are not choiceworthy.

They are therefore mixed, compounded of the involuntary and the voluntary;

involuntary in themselves, but voluntary at that moment on account of the circumstance.

For apart from the circumstance no one would choose to do these things.

And the praise or blame that arises upon such actions makes it clear that they are voluntary.

For of involuntary deeds there will be neither praise nor blame.

It is not easy, however, to discern what ought to be chosen instead of what.

For the most part one ought to choose what is painful rather than what is shameful, as Susanna and Joseph did; yet not always.

Origen, at any rate, in order not to fall into the shame of the Ethiopians, offered sacrifice and thereby fell away from everything;

so the discernment of such matters is not easy.

And still more difficult than this is to abide by one's resolutions.

For terrible things do not strike us in the same way when they are expected as when they are actually brought upon us; but sometimes, having made a judgement, we depart from that judgement once we find ourselves amid the terrors, as has happened to some in the case of martyrdom;

for having held out at the beginning, at the end they gave way, being softened in the actual trial of hardships.

But let no one suppose that the desire or the anger belonging to intemperance is among the involuntary offences, on the ground that these too have their productive origin from without;

for the beauty of the harlot goaded to intemperance the one who beheld it, and the one who provoked him stirred up his anger.

For even if they have their origin from without, yet the men themselves act by their own agency and by their bodily organs, and they do not fall under the definition of the involuntary, seeing that they themselves also furnish the cause of the origin, being easily taken captive by the passions through evil upbringing.

At any rate, those who do such things are blamed, as men who undergo a voluntary evil.

And that it is voluntary is clear, for they take pleasure in the act;

but the involuntary was shown to be painful.

Concerning the involuntary that is by constraint, then, so much; but it remains to speak of that which is through ignorance.

On the Involuntary through Ignorance. We do many things through ignorance, at which we rejoice after the deed, as when someone unwillingly kills an enemy yet rejoices at the killing.

These, then, and such as these, they call not-voluntary, yet not involuntary either.

And again, we do certain things through ignorance and are grieved at what has occurred.

These they called involuntary — namely, those which, once done, are followed by grief.

Of things done through ignorance, then, there are two kinds: one is the not-voluntary, the other the involuntary.

But our present concern is to speak only of the involuntary; for the not-voluntary is rather to be classed with the voluntary, being of a mixed nature;

for it has an involuntary beginning but a voluntary end, since from the outcome the involuntary has become voluntary.

Wherefore they define the involuntary in this way also:

the involuntary is that which, besides not being voluntary, is attended with pain and repentance.

Again, it is one thing to do something through ignorance, and another to do it in ignorance.

For if the cause of the ignorance lies within our power, we act in ignorance, but not through ignorance.

And in doing something base, the one has drunkenness, the other has anger, as the cause of the things done by him — things which were voluntary.

For it was in his power not to become drunk.

He therefore became the cause of his own ignorance.

These things, then, he is said to do not through ignorance, but to act in ignorance; and such deeds are not involuntary but voluntary.

For this reason those who do such things are also blamed by upright men.

For had he not become drunk, he would not have done it;

but he became drunk willingly, and therefore he also did these things willingly.

We do things through ignorance, however, whenever we ourselves do not furnish the cause of the ignorance, but it simply happened so;

as when someone shooting arrows in his customary place, striking by chance his father who was passing by, killed him.

From what has been said, then, it is demonstrated that neither the one who is ignorant of what is beneficial, nor the one who supposes evil things to be good, undergoes an involuntary passion;

for his ignorance belongs to his own wickedness, and so this man too is blamed; and blame pertains to voluntary acts.

It is not, therefore, of universal and generic matters, nor of things done by deliberate choice, that ignorance is involuntary, but of particular matters;

for we are ignorant of particulars unwillingly, but of universals willingly.

These matters being thus determined, we must next state what the particulars are.

These are what the rhetoricians call the 'circumstantial elements':

who, whom, what, by what means, where, when, how, and why.

that is: person, deed, instrument, place, time, manner, cause.

Person means the one who acts, or the one about whom the action takes place;

as when a son struck his father in ignorance.

Deed means the very thing that was done, as when someone, wishing to slap, blinded another;

Instrument, as when someone hurled a stone supposing it to be pumice;

Place, as when, rounding a narrow alley, he knocked down in ignorance the one he met;

Time, as when at night, supposing his friend to be an enemy, he slew him;

Manner, as when he struck gently and not violently, yet killed;

for he did not know that the one struck gently would die.

Cause, as when one gave a drug as a healing remedy, but the one who took it died because the drug proved to be a poison.

But not even a madman would be ignorant of all these things at once;

yet whoever has been ignorant of most of these, or of the more principal ones, this man has acted through ignorance.

The most principal among these are the purpose for which and the thing being done—that is, the cause and the deed.

Concerning the voluntary. Since the involuntary is twofold—that which is through ignorance and that which is by force—the voluntary is opposed to both.

For it is that which comes about neither by force nor through ignorance.

And it is not by force when the origin lies within the agents themselves, and it is not through ignorance provided that nothing among the particulars—those through which and in which the action takes place—is unknown.

Combining both, then, we define the voluntary as that whose origin lies within the agent himself, who knows the particulars in which the action takes place.

It is inquired, however, whether things that occur by nature are voluntary—such as digestion and growth.

It is shown that these are neither voluntary nor involuntary;

for the voluntary and the involuntary belong to what is within our power, whereas digestion and growth are not within our power.

Hence, even if we are not ignorant of the particulars, yet because these things are not within our power, they are neither voluntary nor involuntary.

But things done through spirited anger and desire were shown to be voluntary;

for when done rightly they are praised, and when done wrongly they are blamed or hated; pleasure and pain follow upon them, and the origin lies within us.

For it lay within us not to be easily overcome by the passions, since such things are set right through habit.

Moreover, if these were involuntary, then no irrational animal would do anything voluntarily, nor even would children.

But this is not so; for we see them coming to their food voluntarily, and neither by force—

for they are the very ones setting themselves in motion by their own impulse—nor in ignorance;

for it is not ignorant of its food; indeed, upon seeing food it takes delight, and rushes toward it as toward a familiar object, and when it misses it is grieved.

And the marks of the voluntary are pleasure upon attaining and pain upon failing to attain;

from which it is clear that it has desire and spirited anger voluntarily (for anger too arises with pleasure).

And again, if someone should not call things done through anger and desire voluntary, he does away with the ethical virtues;

for these virtues consist in a mean between the passions; and if the passions are involuntary, then the actions according to the virtues are also involuntary, since these too come about in relation to passion.

But no one calls involuntary that which is done according to reasoning and deliberate choice, and according to one's own impulse and striving, together with a knowledge of the particulars.

And it was also shown that the origin lies within them.

But since we have often made mention of deliberate choice and of what is within our power, we must also treat of deliberate choice.

Concerning deliberate choice. What, then, is deliberate choice? Is it the voluntary, seeing that everything done by deliberate choice is also voluntary? But the relation is not convertible—which would be the case if the voluntary and deliberate choice were the same thing;

but as it is, we find the voluntary to be of wider extent.

For every deliberate choice is voluntary;

but not everything voluntary is a matter of deliberate choice.

For children and irrational animals act voluntarily, yet not indeed by deliberate choice.

And whatever we do through anger without prior deliberation, these things we do voluntarily, yet not indeed according to deliberate choice.

So too our friend suddenly stood before us:

voluntarily, in that we take delight, yet not as having chosen it beforehand.

And he who unexpectedly found a treasure met with a windfall voluntarily, yet not by deliberate choice.

From all these, then, it is gathered that the voluntary is not the same as deliberate choice.

Is deliberate choice, then, appetite? But it is not this either.

For appetite is divided into three: into desire, spirited anger, and wish.

But that deliberate choice is neither spirited anger nor desire is evident from the fact that men have no fellowship with irrational creatures in respect of deliberate choice, but only in respect of desire and anger.

For if we share with them in these, but differ in respect of deliberate choice, it is clear that deliberate choice is one thing, and spirited anger and desire another.

This is also shown by the incontinent man, who is mastered by desire and acts according to it, yet not according to deliberate choice;

for in his case deliberate choice resists desire.

But if they were the same, they would not be at war.

And the self-controlled man, acting according to deliberate choice, does not act according to desire.

That deliberate choice is not wish, either, is evident from this:

for not to all things to which it is fitting to choose does it also belong to wish.

For we say that we wish to be healthy, yet no one would say that he chooses to be healthy;

and we speak of wishing to be rich, yet it is not likewise said that one chooses to be rich.

Further, wishing is applied even to things impossible, whereas choice is applied only to things that lie within our power;

thus, at any rate, we say: 'I wish to become immortal';

but we do not say: 'I choose to become immortal.'

For wishing is of the end, but choice is of the things that lead to the end, according to the same analogy that the object of wish bears to the object of deliberation.

For the object of wish is the end, but the objects of deliberation are the things that lead to the end.

Further, we choose only those things which we suppose can come to pass through ourselves;

but we also wish for things that cannot come to pass through ourselves, such as that a certain general should be victorious.

That choice, then, is neither anger, nor desire, nor wishing has been sufficiently demonstrated;

and that it is not opinion either becomes clear both through the same demonstrations and through others.

For opinion is not only of the things within our power, but also of things eternal.

Further, we speak of an opinion as true and false;

but we do not speak of a choice as true or false.

And opinion is of universals, whereas choice is of particulars;

for choice is concerned with things to be done, and these are particulars.

But neither is choice deliberation, that is, counsel.

For deliberation is an inquiry concerning things to be done by oneself,

whereas the object of choice is what has been preferred as a result of counsel.

It is clear, then, that deliberation is concerned with things still under inquiry;

but choice is concerned with things already decided upon.

What choice is not, then, has been stated;

it is, then, a certain mixture of counsel, judgment, and appetite;

and it is neither appetite in itself, nor judgment, nor counsel alone, but something composed of these.

For just as we say that the living creature is composed of soul and body, and that the living creature is neither body by itself nor soul alone, but the union of both, so also is choice.

That it is, then, a kind of counsel and deliberation together with a judgment, even if it is not counsel itself, is evident also from the etymology;

for the object of choice (proaireton) is that which is chosen (haireton) in preference to (pro) another.

But no one prefers anything without having deliberated, nor chooses without having judged.

Since we are not eager to bring into action everything that has seemed good to us, then that which has been preferred as a result of counsel becomes choice and an object of choice, when it takes on appetite in addition.

Necessarily, then, choice is concerned with the same things as counsel is.

It is a deliberative appetite for things within our power, or an appetitive deliberation about things within our power; for in choosing we reach out toward that which has been preferred as a result of counsel.

Since we have said that choice is concerned with the same things as counsel, let us make clear with what things counsel is concerned, and about what things we deliberate.

About what things we deliberate. Before saying about what things we deliberate, it is better to distinguish in what respect counsel differs from inquiry;

for counsel and inquiry are not the same thing, even though he who deliberates does deliberate by inquiring into something; rather they differ greatly.

For we inquire whether the sun is greater than the earth;

but no one says, 'I am deliberating whether the sun is greater than the earth.' For inquiry is the genus of counsel;

for it is said of more things.

For all counsel is an inquiry;

but the word 'to consider' we sometimes use in the sense of deliberating, as 'I am considering whether I should set sail,' and sometimes in the sense of understanding, as 'I am considering the sciences'—yet one does not deliberate about the sciences. And we are often confused, hearing the words without distinction and supposing that to be the same which is not the same.

Now that the difference between these has become clear, it remains to say about what things we deliberate.

We deliberate, then, about things that are within our power and can come to pass through ourselves, and whose outcome is uncertain—that is, things that can come to pass in this way or in another way.

The phrase 'within our power' was used because we deliberate only about things to be done, for these are within our power.

For we do not deliberate about what is called theoretical philosophy (nor about God);

nor about things that come to pass by necessity (by necessity I mean the things that always come to pass in the same way), such as the cycle of the year;

nor about things that do not always exist but always come to pass in like manner, such as the setting and rising of the sun;

nor about things that come to pass by nature, not always in like manner but for the most part, such as a man of sixty growing gray, or one of twenty growing a beard;

but neither about things that come to pass by nature, yet at different times differently and indeterminately, such as rains or droughts or hail;

nor yet about things said to come to pass by chance, which are among the things that happen only rarely.

For these reasons, then, the phrase 'within our power' was used;

and the phrase 'through ourselves' was used because we do not deliberate about all men nor about every matter;

for we do not deliberate about how our enemies, or those settled far away from us, might govern themselves well—although among them this is a matter for deliberation.

But neither do we deliberate about all the things that come to pass through us and are within our power; rather, it must be added, 'whose outcome is uncertain,' for if it is evident and agreed upon, we no longer deliberate;

for counsel is not concerned with works or actions that follow a science or an art;

for the principles of these are fixed, except for a few arts that are called conjectural, such as medicine, gymnastics, and navigation.

For we deliberate not only about these, but about things that are within our power and come to pass through us, whose outcome is uncertain, and which can be done in this way or in another way.

And it was shown that counsel is not about the end, but about the things that lead to the end.

For we deliberate not about being rich, but about how and by what means we shall become rich;

and, to put it briefly, we deliberate only about these things—about things that admit of being either way equally.

And it is necessary to define this too, so that nothing may be lacking to the argument in point of clarity.

'Powers' are so called with respect to which we are able to do something;

for of everything we do we have a power, but of the things of which we have no power, of these we have not the actions either.

The action, then, depends on power, and power on substance;

for the action proceeds from power, and power from substance and resides in substance.

These three, then, as we have said, are dependent on one another:

that which is able, power, and that which is possible.

Power is that from which we have the capacity to be able;

and the possible is that which is naturally fitted to come to pass according to a power.

Of possible things, some are necessary and some are contingent.

Necessary are those which cannot be prevented, or those whose opposite also is impossible;

and contingent is that which can be prevented, or that whose opposite also is possible.

For instance, it is necessary that a living man breathe;

and the opposite of this is impossible, namely, that one who is alive should not breathe.

That it should rain today

—but its opposite too is possible, namely, that it should not rain today.

Again, of that which is contingent, some things are said to happen for the most part, others rather seldom, and others in equal measure either way.

For the most part, as that a man of sixty should turn grey;

more seldom, as that some man of sixty years should not turn grey;

in equal measure, as to walk or not to walk, and quite simply to do a thing or not to do it.

It is concerning these things alone, then—the things that may equally happen either way—that we deliberate.

That is equally contingent which both itself and its opposite lie within our power;

for if we were not able to do both—the thing itself and its opposite—we would not deliberate about it;

for no one deliberates either about things agreed upon or about things impossible.

But if we were able to do only one of the two opposites, this one would be a thing agreed upon and in no way in doubt, while its opposite would be impossible.

ON FATE. Those who ascribe to the revolution of the stars the cause of all things that come to pass not only war against the common notions of mankind;

but they also render every form of civil government useless.

For laws would be absurd, and law courts superfluous in punishing those who are in no way guilty, and blame and praise would be irrational;

and prayers too would be of no avail, since all things come to pass according to fate;

and Providence is banished together with piety, in addition to the fact that man is found to be merely an instrument of the revolution on high;

for by this revolution not only the members of the body but also the reasonings of the soul are, they say, moved toward their actions;

and in general those who say these things do away, together with what is in our power, with the very nature of the contingent as well;

and thus they do nothing else but bring ruin upon the universe.

And the stars themselves would be unjust, making some men adulterers and others murderers;

and before these, God their Maker carries off the blame, if He fashioned such things as necessarily lay upon us the onslaught of evils;

so that the absurdity of their view not only stands as regards civil government, but also declares God to be the cause of the greatest evils, in addition to the fact that their hypothesis is proved to be impossible.

But there is no need even to listen to these things, since they carry their blasphemy and absurdity plainly upon their face.

Now those who say that both what is in our power and what is according to fate are preserved—for to each of the things that come to be, they say, something is granted according to fate: as to water the power of cooling, and to each of the plants the bearing of such-and-such a fruit, and to the stone the tendency to fall downward, and to fire the tendency to rise upward, so likewise to the living creature the power of assenting and of impulse;

and when nothing external and according to fate falls in the way of this impulse, then walking is entirely in our power, and we shall by all means walk)—

those who say these things—and among the Stoics they are Chrysippus and Philopator and many others, illustrious men—prove nothing else than that all things come to pass according to fate.

For if they say that even our impulses are given to us by fate, and that these are sometimes impeded by fate and sometimes not,

it is clear that all things come to pass according to fate, even the things that seem to be in our power.

And again we shall employ the same arguments against them, demonstrating the absurdity of their opinion.

For if, when the same causes are present, as they themselves say, it is by every necessity that the same things come to pass, and it is not possible for things to happen sometimes in one way and sometimes in another, because they have from eternity been thus allotted;

then it is necessary that the impulse of the living creature also, when the same causes are present, should in every way and altogether come to pass thus.

But if the impulse too follows of necessity, where then is what is in our power? For that which is in our power must be free;

and it would be free if, when the same things were present, it lay in our power sometimes to feel the impulse and sometimes not to feel it.

But if the impulse too follows of necessity, it is clear that the workings of impulse will also come to pass according to fate, even though they come about through us and in accordance with our own nature and impulse and judgment.

For if it were possible for it not to come to pass, then the premise that says 'when the same causes are present, the same things must necessarily follow' would be false.

And thus the same will be found to hold in the case of irrational and inanimate things as well.

Since fire burns by nature—as Philopator too seems in a way to hint in his treatise 'On Fate.'

Therefore that which comes about through us by fate is not in our power.

For by the same reasoning there will be something also in the case of a lyre and pipes and the other instruments, and in all irrational and inanimate things, whenever certain persons act by means of them.

ON FATE AS DETERMINED BY THE STARS. And against the wise men of the Egyptians, who say that the fate determined by the stars is indeed true, but that it is turned aside by prayers and averting-rites—for they say that there are certain services rendered to these very stars, which appease them, and certain other higher powers that are able to turn it aside, and that for this reason prayers and services of the gods and averting-rites have been devised—

we shall reply that they make fate to belong to the contingent things and not to the necessary things;

but the contingent is indeterminate;

by this, therefore, all divination is done away with, and most especially that of the so-called casters of nativities, which they above all others hold in honour as a strong and true thing.

But if they say that the results of the configurations are manifest, and are recognized by those skilled in the art;

and that when the configuration does not turn out according to its own power, it was God who hindered it;

we shall reply that this too is absurd.

First, because they lay it down that prayer alone and the service of the gods are in our power, but nothing else.

Then we shall raise a dispute with them: how is it that, when all other human actions and choices lie in the particular disposition of the stars, prayer alone is in our power?

For it is a matter of perplexity for what cause this is so, and what the necessity is.

Next, if there is some art and method of the averting-rites which hinders the things that come from fate, is this method attainable by all men, or by some and not by others?

For if it is attainable by all, nothing prevents fate from being, by this reasoning, utterly overthrown, since all would learn the art that hinders its effects;

but if it is attainable by some and not by others, to which men, then, and who is it that determines this? For if fate itself makes some men worshippers of the deity and makes others not, all things again will be found to be according to fate.

For the matter of prayer and service, which alone was in our power, has now appeared to be inferior to fate;

and if it is not fate but some other thing that is the cause of these, that other thing will rather appear to be fate.

For in the power to succeed by prayer, or the inability to do so, the whole sovereignty of fate is comprised.

For to those who are able, fate is nothing;

but to those who are not able, all things are according to fate.

And it will be found that for some men all things are according to fate, but for some men nothing is according to fate;

and it is clear that he who determines this is himself the most sovereign fate, and thus again all things will be found to be according to fate, in addition to the fact that the one who thus apportions is unjust, whether he be some daemon, or some other kind of fate.

For he does not apportion to men according to desert the method of serving the gods.

For why is this man any more worthy than that one, when all are instruments of fate and no one does anything of any kind from his own purpose—or rather, when no one exercises any choice at all? For among things that come to pass in this way, no one is either just or unjust, and therefore no one is either worthy or unworthy of favour;

but he who apportions unequal things to equals is unjust.

CONCERNING THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE CHOICE OF THINGS TO BE DONE IS IN OUR POWER. Now those who say that the choice of the things to be done is in our power, but that the outcome of the things chosen rests with fate—and these are the wisest of the Greeks—are partly right and partly in error.

For in placing the choices of things to be done in our power, but not by all means the outcomes as well, they speak most rightly;

but in attaching these outcomes to fate, they do not speak rightly.

For they will be convicted, first, of making fate incomplete, if it has one part but does not have the other;

and then, of making it something that follows upon our own resolve;

for they say that the works of fate follow upon this resolve.

And thus it will be found to be moved by us rather than to move us;

whereas one ought rather to call providence the cause of the outcome of affairs;

for this is the work of providence rather than of fate.

For it is proper to providence to allot to each thing according to what is beneficial to each;

and for this reason the outcome of the things chosen will sometimes be according to what is beneficial, and sometimes will not be so.

But fate, being a certain inviolable chain of causes (for so the Stoics define it, that is, an inviolable order and interconnection), leads matters to their ends not according to what is beneficial, but according to its own proper movement and necessity.

But what would they say concerning those who are utterly foolish and stupid, and for that reason without deliberate choice? Does the being of such a kind belong to them according to fate, or not?

For if it is not according to fate, they will fall outside of fate;

but if it is according to fate, it follows of necessity that not even deliberate choice is in our power.

For if that which is without choice falls under fate, then of necessity so also does that which involves choice;