致馬里努斯神學小品 第 1 章 第 6/12 段

For the doctrine of one and the same operation, or will, or nature, concerning the same and one Lord and God of ours, is not patristic but rather heretical;

Such, then, was the manner of our praise toward that man, namely Pyrrhus, as we were eager gently to draw him away from the opposing opinion, and to lead him back up to the correct doctrine of the faith;

But if anyone, missing our purpose, is still displeased at this praise, not accepting the reasoning of our economy especially in this matter, let the praise be set aside and cast away for him as he sees fit, being no longer pleasing to us either, but rather distasteful, after the man's complete apostasy;

but let the force of what was orthodoxly set forth as doctrine to him remain valid together with us;

You have, holy Fathers, the account of full assurance through our defense;

but be manly, and be strengthened in spirit, not turning aside to the right or to the left, on account of adversary men and doctrines;

but being established and guided along the royal road by him who said, "I am the way, and the life, and the truth," being of one soul, minding the same thing — "and the God of peace shall be with you all" — ever piously proclaimed, and devoutly worshiped by you;

and, as the goal of your blessed conduct and confession here, offering himself there as a more blessed inheritance and rest to you;

with whom, to the Father, together with the Holy Spirit, be glory, honor, dominion, and worship, now and ever, and unto the ages of ages.

Guided according to God by the divine law, O father honored by God, you disregarded human custom, surpassing moderation through self-emptying, and through poverty magnifying as complete my inexperience in thinking and speaking — or, to speak more properly, my rashness;

for I am not ashamed duly to confess my own faults and the passions of my weakness, and to reveal them with all the more eagerness in the measure that you were zealous, out of loving-kindness, to conceal them;

For who would ever so have welcomed the speech of one bereft of reason, and received the mind of a frenzied understanding — not to say entirely so — or so honored mine, O father honored by God, as you have: not only having, out of love, overlooked my lack of learning, but having honored it in the extreme;

which indeed was a very great thing, lending good repute to what was disordered; but also, inasmuch as, by grace, applying that reverence with which you are wont most excellently to adorn your own understanding, you illumined it to excess;

from which both the reason and the manner of true nobility are constituted — or, to speak more truly and more fittingly, of kinship with God;

knowing not so much how to exalt;

for indeed it is naturally disposed to nothing so much as acting with moderation;

for indeed it is somehow ever accustomed unalterably to settle toward abatement, disclosing all the more, by the very excess of what is not truly present, the deficiency, and making known the destitution;

and by the display of what is beyond one's worth, instilling a stricter sense of what accords with worth, whenever, having taken hold of the depth of the soul, it makes one see, without concealment, the magnitude of the incongruity;

having especially experienced this, through the clear manifestation of your prayers, I took hold of the divine ordinances, which the principle of the economy beyond comprehension has seen fit providentially to preserve and set forth for those, like me, who are in need and want of guidance;

Indeed, then, of the synodical letters of the present most holy Pope, in as many articles as you have written of, those of the queen of cities took issue;

yet with only two: the one concerns theology, namely, that he is said to have stated that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son;

and the other, concerning the divine incarnation;

And as for the first, they adduced concordant citations of the Roman Fathers;

and further, also of Cyril of Alexandria, from the sacred work he labored over on the holy Evangelist John;

from which they demonstrated themselves not to make the Son the cause of the Spirit;

for they know the Father to be the one cause of both the Son and the Spirit;

of the one, according to generation;

and of the other, according to procession;

but they said this in order to show that the Spirit proceeds forth through him, the Son;

and thereby to demonstrate the conjunction and unchangeable identity of the essence;

As for the second point, they have no need at all of any defense;

For what dispute is there in this?

even if it is so reckoned by those who make excuses on account of their perverse disposition;

Nevertheless, they gave satisfaction to their opponents, saying that Christ has neither the sin according to the mind — in respect of which Adam appears somehow to have been the first to be affected — nor the practice and operation of evil proceeding from it through the body;

These men, then, spoke these things, concerning matters for which they were not reasonably called to account;

but those others, concerning matters for which they were quite justly called to account, have to this very day made no defense whatsoever, since they have not even rejected the things introduced by themselves;

But I exhorted the Romans to render their own documents anew in translation, for the sake of escaping the surreptitious distortions of those who lie open to censure, in accordance with your command;

yet, since custom has prevailed to act and to send documents in this manner, I do not know whether, perhaps, they would be persuaded to do otherwise;

and besides, there is also the fact that they cannot render their own thought as precisely in another wording and tongue as in their own, which nurtured them — just as, indeed, we too cannot render ours as precisely in a tongue other than our own;

But there will certainly come to them also concern about this, once they have learned by experience the harm it causes;

As for the treatise concerning essence and nature, and hypostasis and person, and the following chapters, I came upon a short treatise of Theodore of Pharan;

and, as being perhaps in the manner of an introduction, they are not without usefulness;

but in the discourse concerning person and hypostasis, he appears to have followed, somehow, not so much the rules concerning these matters as himself, calling the operation "hypostatic";

and him do the proponents of the contrary opinion put forward as the leader and advocate of their own view;

having formulated and dictated almost their entire Ekthesis from him and from his very words;

For indeed, in these respects, he somehow obscured and darkened the doctrine, by attributing to the person, as to a person, the operation that characterizes the nature;

not the manner and character of its outcome according to it, the person;

according to which the difference between both those who act and the things done is recognized — whether they are in accordance with nature, or contrary to nature.

For it is as being something, in the primary sense, that each of us acts — not as being someone.

But it is as someone — as Paul, say, or Peter — that one shapes the mode of the operation, perhaps by remission or by intensification, being formed this way or that by himself according to his gnome.

Hence, in the mode, the variation among persons in respect of the action is recognized;

but in the principle, the invariable identity of the natural operation [is recognized].

For it is not that one is more, another less, operative or rational;

but we all equally possess reason, and its operation according to nature.

But there is a more and a less:

and one is just or unjust in this way or that, in that one man conforms to what accords with nature more than another does;

One must observe with precision those who have been led astray in some respect,

seemingly transferring [texts] as if by an injunction, so that they may thereby, through this distortion, establish what is properly their own.

As for the quires that were sent — though I have not gone through them at leisure; I mean those concerning the soul and the remaining chapters — I make known my judgment concerning them.

For the haste of him who was setting out did not allow me to go through these;

since even after many days of arriving in Byzacium, it reached my insignificant self in Carthage.

Moreover, I was also hindered by the weakness of my eyes, so to speak, which besets me;

since I wished to fulfill your command concerning these matters as quickly as possible, I have sent [this].

The arrangement decided upon for the transcription of the volume — containing the interpretation of the Evangelist John — has, for your most holy selves, appeared very fitting also to me, one of our company, so that it may not become an occasion for assault against him who set it forth, on the part of those who wrongly attempt to alter everything according to their own opinion.

For these are the ends of the inhabited world; and those who confess the Lord sincerely and orthodoxly everywhere on earth look straight, as toward the sun of eternal light, to the most holy Church of the Romans and to her confession and faith, receiving from her the flashing splendor of the patristic and holy dogmas, just as the God-seized and divinely-inspired holy six synods sincerely and most piously set forth, declaring most manifestly the symbol of the faith.

For from the very beginning of the descent to us of God the Word incarnate, all the churches of the Christians everywhere have acquired, and possess, as their sole base and foundation, that greatest Church there;

since, according to that same promise of the Savior, it is in no way overcome by the gates of Hades;

but possesses the keys of the orthodox faith and confession in him;

and opens, to those who approach piously, the piety that truly and by nature is the only one;

while shutting and stopping up every heretical mouth that speaks injustice on high —

[mouths that] are eager to destroy and to nullify the great, all-luminous, and all-hymned mystery of the Christians' orthodox religion.

Arius confesses the three hypostases;

but denies the Monad;

and does not say the Holy Trinity is consubstantial.

But Sabellius confesses the Monad;

but denies the Trinity;

for he says that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the same one.

But the Church of God both confesses the Monad and proclaims the Trinity.

Macedonius holds views similar to Arius;

for he supposes the Holy Spirit to be a creature;

but the Church proclaims the Holy Spirit to be consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and firmly affirms Him to be God in every respect.

Nestorius asserts the natural difference;

but does not confess the union, for he does not say that it came to be according to hypostasis.

But Eutyches confesses the union;

but denies the difference according to essence, and introduces a confusion of the natures.

But the Church holds both the union according to hypostasis, on account of the indivisibility, and the difference according to essence, on account of the unconfusedness.

How does the utmost union possess both identity and otherness?

Either identity of essences and otherness of persons, or the reverse.

For instance, in the case of the Holy Trinity, there is identity of essence;

for we confess one essence;

But in the case of man, there is identity of person;

for, there being one man, the soul is of one essence, and the flesh of another.

There is identity of person;

for, there being one person — that is, one hypostasis — the divinity is of one essence, and the humanity of another.

For just as it is impossible, in the case of the Holy Trinity, to confess the union while not declaring the difference;

so it is altogether necessary, in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity, to proclaim both the union and the difference.

For just as the difference and the union are not signified by the same words in the case of the Holy Trinity;

but the difference is signified by saying 'three hypostases';

while by confessing 'one essence' the union is confessed;

so also in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity;

by acknowledging the two natures, the difference is signified;

while by proclaiming one composite hypostasis, the union is confessed.

For just as we anathematize Arius, not as one who proclaims the difference according to hypostasis in the case of the Holy Trinity;

but as one who does not affirm the natural union;

so also we anathematize Nestorius, not as one who acknowledges the natural difference in Christ;

but as one who does not affirm the union according to hypostasis.

Just as we anathematize Sabellius, not as one who proclaims the natural union in the case of the Holy Trinity;

but as one who does not affirm the difference according to hypostasis;

so we anathematize Eutyches, not as one who fails to affirm the union according to hypostasis in Christ;

but as one who does not acknowledge the natural difference.

The difference according to hypostasis in the case of the Holy Trinity, and the natural difference in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity, must not be spoken of in terms of sense-perception, but must be understood with the eyes of the mind.

And how is it that, in the case of the Holy Trinity, you declare the three hypostases on account of the difference according to hypostasis,

while, in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity, you do not declare two natures in one hypostasis, on account of the natural difference?

Just as, on account of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity, [you say] one essence;

and on account of its being distinct in hypostases, you say three hypostases;

so, on account of the difference of essence between the Word and the flesh, say two essences;

and on account of its not having its own hypostasis, say one hypostasis.

Just as, in the case of the Holy Trinity, we do not say 'one essence' with a view to the confusion of the three hypostases;

Nor do we speak of the three hypostases unto the destruction of the one essence;

so also, in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity, we speak of the one hypostasis, not unto the confusion of his two natures;

nor do we speak of the two natures unto the division of the one hypostasis.

He who, on account of the difference of natures, does not affirm the union according to hypostasis in the case of Christ, is a Nestorian;

and he who does not affirm, in the union according to hypostasis, the natural difference, is a Eutychianist;

but he who proclaims both the union according to hypostasis and the natural difference in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity holds the royal and blameless faith.

He, therefore, who affirms both difference and union in the case of Christ, neither destroys the difference nor confuses the union.

those who, on account of the difference, destroy the union according to hypostasis;

and the ecumenical council anathematizes those who, on account of the union according to hypostasis, destroy the natural difference in the case of the One of the Holy Trinity.

Essence and nature are identical;

for both are common and universal, as being predicated of many things differing in number, and are never in any way circumscribed to one person.

'Enhypostatic' is that which is common according to essence, that is, the species, subsisting really in the individuals under it, and not contemplated by bare conception alone.

Or otherwise again, 'enhypostatic' is that which, together with another differing in essence, is composed and co-subsists for the constitution of one person and the generation of one hypostasis, and is in no way known by itself.

'Consubstantial' is that which happens to be of the same essence as another, but is different from it in hypostasis;

as is the case with man and the other species.

If, then, something is identical with another according to essence, it is not identical with the same also according to hypostasis;

and if something happens to be one and united with the same according to essence, it does not happen to be one or united with the same also according to hypostasis;

and if something has difference from another according to hypostasis, this has union with the same according to essence.

'Essential union,' then, is that which brings together the hypostases, differing and many in number, into one and the same essence.

'Essential difference,' moreover, is the principle according to which the essence, that is, the nature, remains undiminished and unchanged, unmixed and unconfused, and, though effecting its concurrence with another differing in species into one hypostasis, does not depart at all from its own proper nature.

Hypostasis and person are identical;

for both by nature possess particularity and propriety, having circumscription in themselves, but not predication in many.

'Enousion' (essenced) is that which is not only contemplated as having in itself the aggregate of properties by which one thing is distinguished from another, but also really possesses the common element of essence.

'Cohypostatic' is that which is composed together with another into one and the same hypostasis;

but happens to be different from the same in essence;

as is the case with soul and body, and the other things which, differing in otherness of nature, are united according to hypostasis.

If, then, something composed with another by union is identical according to hypostasis — that is, one hypostasis has come to be with it — it is different from the same according to essence.

And if something happens to be one and united with another according to hypostasis, this is not one, nor of the same kind with the same, also according to essence.

And if something composed with another has difference according to essence, this has union with the same according to hypostasis.

'Hypostatic union,' then, is that which brings together and binds the different essences, that is, natures, into one person and one and the same hypostasis.

'Hypostatic difference,' however, is the principle according to which the otherness — constituted by the aggregate of properties contemplated in each — in relation to the common element of essence, dividing one from another in number, produces the multitude of individuals.

'Relational union' is that which brings together the different inclinations into one will.

'Relational union' is a friendly common disposition, or a like-minded concurrence and assent of wills.

'Relational difference' is otherness of inclination, or dissimilarity of wills, or division of disposition.

'Confusive union' is a composition, coming about by concurrence out of hypostases into some whole, which does not have the entire existence of its own parts preserved in species and form after the union;

but rather that existence obliterated, confounded, and unknown together, and possesses no difference whatsoever of the things that have concurred in it, signifying the essential propriety of these.

It is the property of hypostasis to be seen by itself, and to be distinguished in number from things of the same species.

It is the property of the enhypostatic either to be known, together with another differing in essence, in a hypostasis by an indissoluble union;

or to happen naturally to exist, according to existence, in individuals.

It is the property of essence to be naturally predicated of, and manifested in, all and of all.

It is the property of the 'enousion' (essenced) to subsist really, and to bear in itself the true characteristics of all the personal properties.

Or again, operation is the effect of a natural power.

Natural will is the essential appetite for the things constitutive according to nature.

Gnomic will is the self-determined impulse and movement of reasoning toward either alternative.

'Identity' is invariability, according to which the principle of the thing signified possesses what is altogether singular, being known by no manner of difference.

A spiritual and dogmatic tome, demonstrating that the innovatively introduced Ekthesis of the Emperor Heraclius — issued at the instigation of Sergius, president of Constantinople — is discordant with the sacred Oracles and the Fathers;

but concordant with the unholy heretics, who monstrously proclaim both confusion and division together concerning the mystery of Christ our God.

The Lord, having likened the present life to night, its motion to a mill, and rest to a bed, determined that, of those in each — I mean the mill and the bed — the one is taken and the other is left.

And the one who is taken, perhaps, is the one who has been released from the former through contemplation, and from the latter through practice;

and who has remained, in disposition, neither in the circumscription of the intervals in which the motion of visible things is seen, nor in the enervation of the passions, in which is rest;

but the one left behind is the one who has voluntarily become fixed in these, on account of the soul's love of pleasure and love of restless vanity.

of the poor and needy, who have been so raised up from the earth by the grace of God, and so exalted, as to lift their life to reason, and their mind to the Lord of the things here below, and beyond the things here below;

assimilating and uniting the image to the archetype;

or rather, to speak more truly, wishing to make the voluntary lowering of your most supreme beauty a demonstration of loftiness, so that by its abundance you might also lead us to the measure of God the Word, who, by his kenosis toward us, displays the uncircumscribed height of his own glory;

in order to refashion us the more longingly, in the very degree that he himself, in the flesh, for our sake, fashioned himself toward what is lowlier;

having, by nature, become man without change and without confusion, he who is exceedingly loving of mankind;

leaving out nothing in the assumption of what is ours, lest, by not giving the whole to nature — as one who had not received the whole nature — he should fail to give grace to himself and salvation to us;

but rather diminished that nature in the very respect in which he did not assume this nature.

For 'that which is not assumed is unhealed,' says the great Gregory.

For how shall the supra-essential God the Word, incarnate for our sake from the Holy Spirit and Mary the Ever-Virgin Mother of God, by the assumption of flesh possessing a soul both noetic and rational — thereby styled new by nature and having become man — renew the one grown old, if he did not assume him wholly and entirely, apart only from sin, from which comes the growing old;

and on account of which death was condemned upon nature — death having us as nourishment to the same degree that we have tasted of it, having been bitterly gorged on the tree of transgression.

And how shall the same one, having emptied himself, raise up the one who has fallen, if he has not united him wholly and entirely to himself according to hypostasis from the very moment of conception, apart only from the slip itself, from which comes the shattering, and on account of which comes the penalty?

In this way, then, having assumed a noetic and rational soul together with the body naturally conjoined to it — that is, having assumed a perfect man without any blemish — and having united him to himself according to hypostasis, he himself, God who is above nature, having also taken its natural will, certainly possessed a self-determined act of willing.

If, in transgressing the commandment, we transgressed not without an act of willing — indeed, not without will at all — we stood in need of the healing that corresponds to it;

the incarnate God himself healing like by like, through the assumption of the like;

and having assumed also its rational and vital operation, he possessed it;

by which operation, having conceived and enacted sin — would that we never had! — we stood in need of the salvation that corresponds to it; he cleansing it of all defilement by his assumption, and deifying our whole nature by the incarnation.

For if the Word, being God, created this nature essentially possessing these — I mean the will and the operation — and established the one as self-determined, the other as operative, it is clear that, having assumed the nature in this way, he united it to himself according to hypostasis just as he had created it from the beginning, that is, as by nature volitive and operative;

lest, by assuming the nature only as passible without also assuming its innate powers, he should not have assumed the nature at all, but should have made the economy a mere appearance.

For it is impossible for our nature, or that of any other beings, ever to exist or be named a nature, apart from its innate powers, by which everything is by nature essentially characterized.

Hence our nature is not without will, since not even that of man is.

Nor indeed is it without operation, since it is not even without soul.

But if that which is according to us were without will and without operation, as has seemed to some heretics both of old and now, then he who is above us would not have come to be according to us at all — not confirming what is ours by what is ours, nor by those [properties] with which he himself, having from the beginning created man, naturally characterized him, making him, according to nature, self-determined and operative.

Yet the composition of the holy Gospels confirms incontrovertibly that he has assumed the capacity of both of these, in that it presents the supra-essential Logos, become man for our sake, as both willing and operating, proclaiming in one place:

'In the watch of the night he comes to them, walking upon the sea, and he wished to pass by them;'

'And rising from there [and going] to the region of Tyre and Sidon, and entering into a house, he wished no one to know it, yet he could not escape notice;'

'Going out from there, they passed through Galilee, and he did not wish that anyone should know it;'

'On the next day he wished to go into Galilee.'

'Jesus walked in Galilee, for he did not wish to walk in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him;'

'Where do you wish that we prepare for you to eat the Passover?'

'They gave him vinegar mixed with gall, and having tasted it he was not willing to drink it.'

For these things — I mean, 'he wished to pass by them,' and 'he wished to go out,' and 'he did not wish to walk,' and 'to wish to eat the Passover,' and 'not to wish to drink the vinegar' — confirm his human act of willing and operation, that which is according to us.

Such as the willing and not willing to pass by, or to eat, or to walk, or to drink — this is plainly an act of willing, by which he was known to be, by nature, possessed of the faculty of will.

But by tasting and eating, and going out, and journeying and walking from place to place — that is, by the operation — he was shown to be possessed, by nature, of the power to operate, according to that [nature] by which he later became man for our sake, but not according to that by which he existed, without beginning, in himself, by nature, God.

Since it does not belong by nature to the Logos, insofar as he was God and by nature Son of God, to will something bodily and to eat, or to be circumscribed locally by movements from place to place, being everywhere and beyond the universe, infinitely, infinite times over;

so likewise Scripture, presenting him as possessing, supra-essentially, the divine and paternal will and operation, teaches clearly:

'As the Father raises the dead and gives life, so also the Son gives life to whomever he wishes.'

Here too, then, the wishing to give life to the dead attests his divine act of willing;

while the actual giving of life [attests] properly his all-effecting operation.

And simply, if there is anything else of this kind, it belongs to [his] nature that is set apart from [all other] beings, for the manifestation, so far as possible, of this [nature].

But through these [words], the Logos himself, through his own disciples, presents himself, according to both his natures — out of which and in which he consists — as being by nature both volitional and operative, for our salvation;

while those who succeeded them thereafter, and the expositors of the theophany of the Logos in the flesh, the Fathers of the catholic Church approved by God, [proclaimed] likewise both natures of the same [Christ] — the divine and the human —

and not only [the natures], but also proclaiming the will and the operation, they declare the following in a loud voice:

For he who is named for immortality [Athanasius], in his treatise On the Incarnation and the Trinity, [says]:

'And when he says, "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not my will, but yours be done" —'

'"The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak" — he shows here two wills;'

'the human [will], on account of the weakness of the flesh, declines the suffering, while his divine [will] is ready.'

But Gregory, named for theology, in his second oration On the Son:

'Let it be said, seventh, that the Son has come down from heaven, not that he might do his own will, but [the will] of him who sent him' —

'Now if these things were not said concerning him who had come down, we would say that the statement is framed with reference to man [in general], not to the man conceived of in respect to the Savior.'

'For that one's will — even when wholly deified — is in no way opposed to God; but [I mean] that which is according to us,'

'inasmuch as the human will does not always follow the divine, but for the most part resists and struggles against it.'

'The leper approaches, already wasting away and rendered useless in body,'

'How does the healing come about for this man from the Lord?'

'The soul wills, the body touches; through both the affliction flees.'

'for,' as it is said, 'immediately the leprosy [departed] from him.'

And again the same [Gregory], in the same oration:

'Again, those who in many thousands were attending upon him in the desert, he was not willing to send away fasting;'

'but with his hands he breaks the loaves.'

'Do you see how the Godhead, accompanying [him] through both, is made manifest — both by the operating body, and by the impulse of the will arising in the soul?' And in his second oration, composed against the impious Eunomius:

'How did the Lord, in reconciling the world to himself, distribute between soul and body the benefaction that came from him to mankind — willing by means of the soul, but touching by means of the body?' And again the same [Gregory] says, in [his work] against Apollinarius: