致非洲總督喬治書 第 1 章 第 8/14 段

for the denial of things that exist and are preserved is truly an annulment.

For either the natures, according to them, are not annulled after the union, and they exist and are preserved, and it is right that they, being preserved, be confessed after the union;

or, if indeed it is not right for them to be confessed after the union, then, according to them, it is right to say that they neither exist nor are preserved in Christ, and they have been annulled.

For as for that which it is not altogether right to name, it is, I think, much better and more just to say that it does not exist at all,

than that they should persuade us by argument how it is right, in Christ, not to confess the [natures] out of which Christ is, which exist and are preserved after the union without any change or alteration whatsoever, and without transformation into one another according to the essential principle,

and [that] we should submissively embrace the deprivation of the confession of the [natures] that are preserved and exist in Christ.

But just as Christ, after the union, is not, according to every principle and mode, one, so again, after the union, Christ is not, according to every principle and mode, two.

And if Christ is not, after the union, two according to every principle and mode,

then certainly, according to some principle and mode, on account of the hypostatic identity, that is, the one hypostasis, according to which he cannot have difference, Christ is one.

Since, then, the same [Christ] is both one and two according to one principle and mode and another, it is necessary to examine according to which principle he, the same, is one, and according to which he is two.

If, then, they should say that he is one according to the principle of nature, then evidently, according to them, the whole will simply be one nature, without any difference whatsoever;

and if we should grant them to say this, then, according to them, Christ will be neither God nor indeed man;

nor at all a creature, nor a creator.

For a nature spoken of simply/absolutely does not admit, at all, the signification of either of these.

But if, fleeing this manifest absurdity, they should say that Christ is one composite nature, they have truly failed to realize how the darkness of impiety has driven them to the furthest error.

Concerning composite nature more precisely, and the principle pertaining to it;

and how those who say that Christ is one composite nature are impious.

For every composite nature is understood, in the first place, to have the coming-together of its parts with one another, in the composite union, without [their own] choice;

and next, it also possesses its parts as coeval with one another, and with itself, coexisting with respect to their coming into being, neither part temporally preexisting the other;

and furthermore, it is recognized to have been made for the completion of that totality which magnificently comprehends the universe;

none of which is observed at all in the case of Christ by those who wish to be pious,

lest we make the union of the Word with the flesh involuntary and without choice;

and [lest we make] either God the Word coeval with the flesh with respect to [their] coming into being, or the flesh co-eternal with the Word with respect to [his] beginningless existence;

or [lest] we define Christ as having nothing more than the rest of the species considered with respect to universal nature, as [merely] a part brought forth by the power that constituted the universe, for the completion of the whole, according to the rest of the species.

For this is the definition, and principle, and law of every composite nature, just as the power of truth, and the course of logical sequence, guide those who make their examination of beings with understanding, to say.

And who could still belong to the portion of the pious, thinking thus concerning God the Word, who exists before all the ages;

or rather, to speak more properly, [thinking of him as] maker of the ages, and as having made his self-emptying toward us human beings voluntary according to will, and self-determined;

and [as having become man] for correction and renewal, but not for the completion of the universe, having become man

For it was by the mode of economy (dispensation), and not by the law of nature, that the Word of God ineffably sojourned among men through flesh.

Therefore Christ is not a composite nature, according to the innovation of those who empty the Gospel [of its meaning];

being altogether unenslaved to the law of composite nature, in respect of the mode by which he comes into being;

but rather a composite hypostasis, which does not have any composite nature according to species predicated of it;

which is indeed paradoxical—to behold a composite hypostasis without the composite nature according to species being predicated of it.

But if, according to those men—the wondrous citadel of the arguments of Severus—Christ is a composite nature, then it is assuredly either generic or singular.

For it is impossible to conceive of any other [option] intermediate between these two.

And if Christ is a generic nature, he will evidently be predicated of many things that also differ in number;

and he will exist only in conception, among the things in which he has his existence;

and he will not be known in himself within any particular hypostasis of his own;

apart from the accidents observed in the individuals subordinate to it.

For such is the definition and rational principle of every generic nature;

and thereby, on account of Severus's excessive and unrestrained madness against the truth, a multitude of Christs would be introduced to us instead of one, having in no way whatsoever any identity with God or with men.

But if Christ is a singular nature—to pass over saying that a nature is by no means at all circumscribed as a whole by one person—

even if in the end they put forward, especially, the fabled bird, the phoenix, as though it were some great and unassailable example constituting their own opinion;

concerning which I am even afraid to say anything, lest I incur the laughter of folly among sensible people, by attempting to show that a myth is [merely] a myth.

For if the phoenix is a bird, it is certainly also an animal.

But if it is an animal, then, first of all, it is by no means altogether singular insofar as it is an animal.

And furthermore, if indeed it is an animal, it is also an ensouled, sentient body.

But if the phoenix is an ensouled, sentient body, it clearly also falls under generation and corruption.

We must consider whether it is possible for any of the ensouled and sentient bodies subject to generation and corruption to exist as a nature that is singular according to hypostasis;

for the succession of such [bodies] from one another according to species is the most evident mark and definition of their being.

just as the divine Scripture also testifies, providing through itself confirmation for this argument, when it presents God as giving these commands to the great Noah:

"And God said to Noah, 'Enter, you and all your household, into the ark, for I have seen you righteous before me in this generation.'"

"And of all the clean cattle, bring in to yourself seven and seven, male and female;"

"and of the cattle that are not clean, two and two, male and female;"

"and of all the clean birds of heaven, seven and seven, male and female, and of all the unclean birds of heaven, two and two, male and female, to preserve seed alive upon all the earth."

Among these—if indeed the phoenix, as a winged animal, is numbered—it does not exist as a nature singular in hypostasis, according to the divine pronouncement; though, as I said, let us not press these things [in earnest];

for it is not our wish to contend over matters that are not necessary.

It is evident to all that if Christ is indeed a singular nature, he is consubstantial neither with God the Father, nor with men.

For that which is altogether singular according to nature is completely estranged from natural kinship with anything else whatsoever.

But if, according to those men, as the argument has shown, Christ is according to nature altogether estranged from all beings—

we shall urge those very new dogmatists to say what they consider him to be according to nature, and by what reasoning they worship Christ, who—so far as their own premises of argument go—is nothing, being thus blasphemed by them.

If, then, a great and fearsome danger necessarily follows—according to the force of the argument set forth—upon those who say that Christ is one according to nature, that is, one nature, whether called simple or composite;

and this [one nature], whether generic, that is, common, or singular, that is, particular—

let us with all vigilance keep our own hearts pure from such an opinion, so that we may also be freed from the threat that impends upon it.

And let us piously confess the 'two' with respect to Christ according to the principle of natural otherness—that is, the difference of the natures of which he consists being preserved even after the union, as of parts within a whole;

according to which the parts never naturally coincide with one another, so long as each preserves, in relation to the other, its own principle of nature unimpaired;

but let us confess the 'one' according to the principle of hypostatic identity, according to which Christ as a whole admits, with respect to himself as a whole, no distinction—that is, no division—arising from difference;

inasmuch as he is believed to be one hypostasis both before the flesh and after the incarnation;

and he is worshiped and glorified by us as one of the holy and royal Trinity.

For the hypostasis of Christ is singular, as a whole, being in no way apportioned among the extremes according to its characterizing property—that property by which it is distinguished from them.

By 'the extremes' I now mean: God the Father, from whom Christ was divinely begotten before the ages;

and the holy, all-glorious Virgin and Mother, from whom the same [Christ] was humanly begotten for our sake—[the hypostasis], by the affinity of its own parts toward both extremes, preserving its identity according to essence without diminishment;

in respect of which parts Christ, while admitting the principle of difference, does not depart from his own singular hypostasis.

For every whole—especially one contemplated by composition, as being from things that differ—while singularly preserving the identity of its own hypostasis, also has the unconfused difference of its own parts in relation to one another, according to which it preserves undefiled the essential principle of each part in relation to the other.

And likewise the parts, in their composition with one another, while preserving their principle according to nature pure and undiminished, possess the undivided identity of the single whole to which they belong;

according to which it singularly preserves the principle according to hypostasis altogether undivided.

If, then, as the argument, proceeding together with truth, has shown, it is altogether impious to lay down, concerning Christ, that the 'one' be established according to the principle of nature, just as, conversely, [it is impious to lay down] that the 'two' [be established] according to the principle of hypostasis;

for the former is characteristic of the stench of Apollinaris, who blends and confuses the natures into one nature, and renders the [divine] economy altogether indiscernible;

positing that, properly speaking, there is no nature at all after the union.

For each of these [natures], passing over into the other and lapsing into it, ceases to be what it is.

And the other belongs to the Judaic derangement of mind of Nestorius, who divides the one hypostasis into two hypostases, and denies the whole economy, refusing to say that God the Word was essentially united to the flesh according to hypostasis.

Let us, then, use the argument rightly and fittingly, turning back toward the straight [path] the utterances of those who are perverted;

namely, [saying] the 'two,' according to the principle of natural otherness, that is, difference;

but the 'one,' according to the principle of hypostasis;

so that both the diversity of the natures of which Christ consists may be preserved in Christ after the union,

and likewise the sameness and singularity of the hypostasis of God the Word incarnate may be preserved without multiplication.

For the mutual interchange of the predication and confession of the realities produces, according to the heretics, the disappearance of the underlying subjects;

truth not permitting the proper designations of the realities to be interchanged with one another at all—

as [when we say that] the same one is both God and man after the union.

For he who says that Christ is God and man after the union necessarily confesses, together with the names, the natures also after the union, having chosen to believe rightly.

For if Christ is God and man after the union, according to the common confession, then evidently, having the realities together with the names, he is truly so even after the union.

For realities are conceived prior to their proper names;

and a name could never exist at all apart from the reality, which of itself grants the name its standing, and in turn receives signification [from it].

But if, according to them, Christ does not possess, at the union, the realities of which these are the names, then he will be shown to have these appellations as bare—set forth attached to nothing, and bereft of realities;

and Christ, according to them, will be God and man only in name, and not in reality.

than which what could be more godless?

But if, declining to be so mad, they should say that the appellations applied to Christ after the union are not devoid of realities,

just as they do not refuse to say the two appellations of Christ after the union, so let them also say, after the union, the two natures of Christ, out of which and in which he consists, to which also the appellations belong;

if indeed they truly and faithfully confess that the things united are preserved, in a real manner, according to nature, after the union.

And concerning the one incarnate nature of the Word there is a pious confession, according to the Fathers;

and a denial of the one composite nature.

And again we believe the same one to be, indivisibly, in two natures, as in Godhead and manhood.

For just as, when saying that Christ is out of two natures, we understand him to be out of Godhead and manhood, as a whole out of parts;

so also, saying that after the union he is in two natures, we believe him to be in Godhead and manhood, as a whole in its parts.

And the parts of Christ are his Godhead and his manhood, out of which and in which he subsists.

And again we have been taught to believe, to say, and to proclaim one incarnate nature of God the Word, incarnate in flesh possessing an intellective and rational soul, according to holy Cyril;

by saying incarnate, understanding the essence of the nature that is according to us to have been brought in.

And again the miracles and the sufferings belong to the same and one Christ, and to the same one the two births: the one before the ages, incorporeally from the Father, and the temporal one, from a Mother and Virgin, corporeally, brought about for our sake.

But we entirely refuse to call Christ one composite nature;

not only for the reasons already stated, but also because not one at all of the approved Fathers has been shown, up to this point, to have spoken this expression;

and because it is evidently the offspring of Apollinarius the heretic and his disciples;

having accepted whose error, Severus reasonably also adorns himself with their expressions.

For Christ is not, according to Apollinarius and Severus, a natural unity by composition, so long as he preserves intact, even after the union, the otherness of the natures out of which he is.

Nor indeed is he a hypostatic dyad, according to Nestorius, so long as the things that have come together, though distinguished from one another, do not subsist entirely by themselves;

and so long as God the Word incarnate is one even after the incarnation, and did not assume flesh that had pre-subsisted according to its own principle of nature, [flesh] united to him and rationally and intellectively ensouled;

but, according to the Fathers, one composite hypostasis, according to which the same one is wholly God, and one of the holy and all-praised Trinity together with the manhood, on account of the Godhead; and the same one is wholly man, and one of mankind together with the Godhead, on account of the manhood.

A more precise, natural-philosophical exposition concerning the composite hypostasis;

and an accurate demonstration that those who confess Christ to be one composite hypostasis do not fall into the same absurdities as those who say he is one composite nature.

But if someone should suppose that, because every composite hypostasis possesses its parts as contemporaneous with one another, the same absurdity is likewise entailed for those who say Christ is one composite hypostasis, such a person, in my judgment, does not suppose rightly.

For not every composite hypostasis, without qualification, has its parts contemporaneous with one another as regards their origination;

but only that hypostasis which evidently falls under a composite nature, and has such a species predicated of it;

which [hypostasis], having the aggregate of the properties concerning it interwoven with the common and universal element of the predicated essence or nature, is a nature — that is, [a nature] with properties.

If, then, the nature under which a hypostasis falls, and the species predicated of it, is composite, then it is altogether necessary that the hypostasis too be composite, and possess its parts as contemporaneous with one another, on account of its predicated essence, that is, nature, which exists in such a way as to be the same as the species, apart from its distinguishing characteristics.

For just as, defining hypostasis spoken of simply, we say: Hypostasis is a certain essence with properties, or, a certain essence inclusive of the particulars, namely of all the properties in its own individual instance;

so too, defining the hypostasis spoken of with further qualification, but not simply, we say: A composite hypostasis is a certain composite essence with properties;

inclusive of the particulars, namely of all the properties in its own individual instance.

For the things which are commonly observed in the individuals under the same species characterize primarily, in the individuals under it, that which is generic to the essence, that is, the nature.

And composite is common to all the individuals under the composite species;

therefore, the composite characterizes the nature in its individuals as composite primarily, but not the hypostasis.

And moreover, again, every definition of the individuals falling under them is derived from the common and universal elements;

and from the generic elements all the things under them naturally have the beginning of their own description;

because it is clear what the thing defined properly and primarily is.

If this is true — as indeed it is — it is clear that he who has spoken of a composite hypostasis referred back to a nature, has thereby expressed together, in the individual of the hypostasis, that which generically inheres in the common element of the essence, along with the properties that characterize it individually.

So that he who has said a composite hypostasis falling under a certain nature has said nothing other than a composite nature, that is, essence, with properties.

If, therefore, as has been shown, every composite nature has, without deliberate choice, the coming-together of its own parts with one another according to composition, and possesses its parts as contemporaneous with one another, and has come to be for the completion of that wholeness which is observed, according to species, in each thing among the things that exist;

then evidently every hypostasis, according to what is natural to it, has, with respect to its own genus and species, an unvarying constitution as regards its being.

So long as they cannot establish this, they build the foundations of their own doctrines upon sand.

For he who ignorantly forces Christ to be subjected to the aforesaid absurdities, on the ground that he both is a composite hypostasis and is piously confessed as such by us, has strayed far from the road leading to the truth — or rather, to speak more properly, from the truth itself.

For this great and awe-inspiring mystery of Christ neither, as an individual, has some universal and generic nature of his predicated as a species;

nor indeed is it itself a genus, or a species predicated of the individuals naturally under it;

so that it could be subjected to any of the aforementioned rules;

since it does not even have, as compared to composite things as regards their mutual coming-together, an equal and similar concurrence of God the Word with the flesh according to composition.

Because the union of the Word with the flesh alone came about by way of assumption, since he pre-existed, and willed to empty himself for union with flesh.

For in the case of all things generally composite by nature, it is not the coming-together of this with that by way of assumption that produces the constitution of the species, as a whole out of parts;

but the simultaneous coming-into-being of the parts from non-being into being, according to their coming-together with one another at the very moment of their being, produces the composition of the whole.

But the mystery of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ did not come about in this manner;

but he, existing by nature as God, and by nature Son of God, simple and incorporeal, and co-eternal with the Father, and creator of all the ages, willing by a will that loves mankind, became man by way of assumption of flesh;

calling back to himself, and raising up, the extremity of humanity, out of which the simple Jesus was ineffably compounded;

and the eternal one has taken on temporal extension;

and he who has transcended, super-substantially, every order according to nature has come to be within our nature. If, then, this happened not according to the law and order of the nature of composite things, but by another law beyond the nature of composite things;

for it was by way of assumption, ineffably, that the Word of God was composed with the flesh;

but not by receiving his being for composition together with the flesh by way of generation, unto the completion of some whole according to species, as the account of truth resoundingly cries aloud to all;

in vain do the ignorant lawlessly attempt to subject to the laws that fall under nature that composition which transcends every boundary and principle of nature.

and it preserves unconfused the difference between the assuming Word himself and the assumed flesh, even after the union.

But he who does not confess that God the Word became man unchangeably by way of assumption of flesh will not, in any manner whatsoever, be able truly to confess any of the things stated.

For how, if the Word did not pre-exist without beginning, could he, by will, assume flesh differing from himself in essence?

in whose case especially, as I suppose, the union of that which is of another nature is properly said to have come about by way of assumption;

inasmuch as he alone, and alone in this manner, impassibly and truly assumed that which is of another essence, and preserved himself unchangeable in every principle and manner, and unmultiplied, and kept the thing assumed unaltered;

which is impossible to come about in the case of created nature;

in the case of which every composition naturally comes to be simultaneously with the origination of the parts, unto the completion of some whole according to species, according to the parts' sudden concurrence with one another, preserving throughout the whole an equal proportion of the parts to one another;

just as is the case with us, and with as many things as have obtained a composite nature according to species.

For in our case the soul has, corresponding to its own operations, the natural powers of the body, since the body is by nature receptive of them, on account of the soul's own sudden origination together with the flesh unto being.

But God the Word, having in no principle or manner the powers of the nature assumed by him corresponding to his own natural operations;

for that which is above nature is not measured by nature;

nor is there anything whatsoever among existing things that is by nature receptive of him.

Therefore he alone, by the assumption of flesh animated rationally and intellectually, willingly and ineffably became man;

as one who is and who pre-existed, and who is capable of all things;

innovating the natures by the mode that is above nature, in order that he might save man.

This is the faith I learned, and was taught, both from our holy and blessed Fathers who have already departed this life, and from those now living who have been entrusted with the helm of the catholic holy Church of God, and who rightly steer her toward the harbor of the divine will;

with which faith, by their supplications, I shall also depart when I leave this present life;

offering to God, in place of every dignity, this confession, undefiled and unstained, and higher than every heretical storm.

For I have no life adorned with the works of righteousness to boast of, having become, throughout my entire life here, a willful transgressor of the divine laws.

And these things I have written to you, my blessed lords, as concisely as was possible, so that you may know—if there be anything useful in what has been written—how, even to some extent, you may drive away the wolves clothed in sheepskin, who with their meaningless howling terrify the divine and gentle sheep of Christ's holy flock, and that you may not be carried away by falsehood that maliciously feigns truth;

The voices of the Fathers, as advocates of the ecclesiastical faith, I have not for the time being been able to insert into this letter, on account of my great lack of books here.

For there where you are, you have my blessed lord, father and teacher, the lord abbot Sophronius, who is truly sober-minded and a wise advocate of the truth, and an unconquered champion of the divine dogmas, mighty to contend both in deed and in word against every heresy, who, along with all his other virtues, is rich in a multitude of divine books, and who eagerly enriches those who wish to learn the divine things.

Frequenting him, therefore, you will, I know well, obtain the correct and unerring knowledge of all the divine and salvific dogmas.

By the same author, to the same addressee, a dogmatic letter.

God, being good by nature, does nothing of what he is naturally disposed to do that is evil.

But man, becoming good through the diligence of his intention, is always shown to rejoice in the things which God is naturally disposed to do.

For man has no other criterion for being good, except solely his sympathetic disposition toward that which is done by God.

For the doing of good things is proper to God;

but to man belongs the sympathetic disposition toward them.

For it is the virtue of a man to show that what has been done by God is cherished by the disposition of his intention.

Therefore, if everything that has God as the cause of its own coming-into-being is good, then reasonably the union of things that stand apart is good, and indeed the greatest of goods, since it constitutes a manifest work of God.

And if this is altogether true, I know that you rejoice to see those who have been scattered gathered together into one, being good men yourselves on account of your sympathetic disposition toward good things.

and if there should be need to lodge, on his behalf, an entreaty before the pope honored by God, so that he might recover his own rank of ministry in the Church in which he had been appointed, do not hesitate to do so.

For so genuinely did the pious man embrace the teaching of the Church's divine dogmas, that he even fervently championed it, and knew this to be the boundary and ordinance of piety: to deny nothing of what Christ is, after the ineffable union—

being truly, at once and in the same subject, both God and man.

For he did not cast off what he was, in truly becoming what he was not;

nor did he alter what he became, by remaining what he had been;

but he is wholly both, naturally, according to hypostasis;

as one out of both, and through his one self preserving both, without alteration and without diminution, inasmuch as he truly is these natures according to the union that is according to hypostasis.

For the hypostatic union, standing in opposition to division, but not to the natural difference of the things united according to it, effects the complete removal of the former, but produces the firm preservation of the latter;

of which number constitutes an indication.

Since no one could ever conceive of a difference that is wholly devoid of quantity;

even if he be most wise in argumentation and most formidable in contention.

For as long as the parts of the composite whole, out of which the whole is constituted, are preserved without confusion, the natural difference of the parts of the whole preserved in union, one from another, is not unrecognized—

how number is indicative of quantity.

But if number is by nature suited to indicate quantity, and not relation, then he who, piously, uses number after the union solely for the indication of the difference—preserved in Christ—of the natures of which he consists, does not at all divide the union, but only knows that the natures have remained unconfused after the union;

out of which the one Christ and Lord and Son and God exists, namely, having been made flesh, and having fully become man.