論二意志 第 1 章 第 1/4 段

By the blessed John, monk of Damascus, concerning the properties of the two natures in the one Christ our Lord, and, in summary, also concerning the two wills and operations and the one hypostasis.

Those who confess two natures and one hypostasis in our Lord Jesus Christ must together confess that the natural properties of the natures are twofold and diverse, while those of the hypostasis are single.

For it is impossible for a nature to subsist apart from the natural properties proper to it, which constitute it and distinguish it from the other natures — properties whose whole assemblage will not be found together in another species.

Again, conversely, it is impossible for one and the same hypostasis to differ from itself in respect of its constitutive, characteristic properties, defining it apart from the rest of the hypostases of the same species — I mean, the hypostatic properties — the whole assemblage of which cannot possibly be found in another hypostasis.

It is customary among those skilled in these matters to call these accidents and non-essential attributes.

For nature is compared with nature, and is said to differ from nature — that is, species from species — by essential and natural differences.

Likewise a hypostasis is compared with a hypostasis of the same species, and is said to differ from the hypostases of the same species by the characteristic properties of the hypostases;

a hypostasis, however, is not compared as hypostasis with a hypostasis of a different species.

For if, say, Peter's hypostatic properties are compared with this ox, they define a nature rather than a hypostasis;

for we do not say that this man differs from this horse because the one is bald and the other has a fine mane, nor because the one is tall and the other short, but because the one is rational and the other irrational — nor because the one is the son of this man and the other the son of that one.

But if we should say that the one is the son of Nestor and the other the son of this horse, and that the one is wise and the other unwise, these are ranked as natural differences;

for the hypostatic differences of men, when set against the hypostatic differences of horses, are reckoned natural.

Therefore also in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, the shape of the body, the character of the countenance, and his being the Son of the Virgin, as contrasted with his being, without bodily form, the Son of God, are not defining marks of different hypostases, but of different natures; while they define one hypostasis, marking it off from those consubstantial with it according to its divinity — I mean the hypostases of the Father and the Holy Spirit — and from those consubstantial with it according to its humanity — I mean the hypostasis of the Mother and the rest of individual human beings;

for when a single composite hypostasis comes to be from two natures, both these and those — that is, the natural and hypostatic properties both of the divine nature and of the human — become constitutive of that same hypostasis.

Hence Christ, both God and man, the same one hypostasis, is without beginning and yet has a beginning; visible and invisible; created and uncreated; circumscribed and uncircumscribed; passible and impassible; Son of God and Son of the Virgin, that is, of a human being; motherless as begotten of the Father, fatherless as born of the Mother; before the ages and yet recent; without bodily form, and yet in the form of a servant and in the shape of a man; fair in beauty beyond the sons of men.

All these are constitutive and characteristic of the hypostasis of Christ, who is God, and he is named both from all of them together and from each one individually.

In his wisdom, then, the Creator made a very great diversity of natures, that is, of species, to display the riches of his own wisdom and power, so that, being admired, he might be the more desired;

and being desired, might be known; and being known, might render the intelligent and rational creature godlike — for which purpose also he fashioned the multitude of species.

For his invisible things are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that are made, and by analogy from the beauty of created things the Author of their coming-to-be is apprehended. Again, within each species he made both a difference among the hypostases in relation to one another and a bond of union — a natural bond of union, for all the hypostases under the same species are united by the principle of nature — and a hypostatic difference;

for they are distinguished from one another by certain characteristic properties, that is, by accidents.

For since what is solitary is unsociable and harsh, whereas fellowship with things of the same kind is pleasant and gentle — for every living creature loves its like and delights in its like — even that first and only blessed, beginningless, and imperishable nature is contemplated in three hypostases: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Thus the hypostatic Wisdom says:

I am she in whom he took delight — that is, clearly, God the Father.

For this reason he created diverse hypostases within each order of the angelic powers, and likewise of human nature — indeed, within every species — so that, sharing nature with one another, they might rejoice in one another and, being bound together by a natural relation, might be disposed in friendship toward one another.

And the difference of hypostases distinguishes what belongs to one from what belongs to another, so that each, recognizing what is his own by kind and possession, might take care of it and not encroach upon what belongs to another as though it were his own, and so that the existence of each might be known.

It is necessary, therefore, for one who conducts an inquiry into anything to know first what it is, and only then, on that basis, to declare whether it is one or two.

I say this with regard to the matters inquired into concerning our Lord Jesus Christ — I mean the natures and the hypostasis, the wills and the operations, and the remaining properties.

But that this may become clearer, let us first say how nature differs from hypostasis, and then we shall know plainly both the properties constitutive of nature and those of hypostasis.

And thus let us consider the properties in our Lord Jesus Christ, whether they be twofold or single.

[Scholion] Nature, then, according to the holy fathers, is the common and indeterminate — that is, the most specific species — such as man, horse, ox; whereas hypostasis is the particular, that which subsists by itself, a substance together with accidents, which has obtained existence in itself, distinctly and separately from the rest of the hypostases, in actuality and in fact — that which shares with the individuals of the same species the principle of nature, but has, by virtue of certain accidents, that is, characteristic properties, its difference from the individual of the same nature and the same species.

Nature is the common, such as humanity — for Peter is a man, and Paul, and the rest of individual men — whereas hypostasis is the particular, this one and that one.

Peter is a hypostasis, and Paul is another hypostasis; but Peter is not one nature and Paul another nature — rather, Peter is a hypostasis possessing the complete nature of humanity;

wherefore he is also a complete man.

And Paul is another hypostasis, possessing that same complete nature of humanity.

Thus each human hypostasis has the same complete nature, but not the same hypostasis.

Nor do all men have one and the same hypostasis;

for Peter is one and Paul another — one hypostasis and another — but Peter is not one nature and Paul another nature.

For all men are of one nature.

So much, then, for the present concerning nature and hypostasis.

Let us also say what a natural property is, and what a hypostatic property is, and the difference between them.

Nature, then, according to the holy fathers, is the common and indeterminate — that is, the most specific species — such as man, horse, ox; whereas hypostasis is the particular, that which subsists by itself, such as Peter, Paul, John.

For nature is the common, gathering together and...

for each species is a nature.

And first, even though it is supra-essential, take the blessed nature of the Godhead:

for it is one and common, embracing the three uncircumscribed hypostases, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Likewise also the nature of angels and of men, and every species of animals, plants, or inanimate bodies.

One must know that, according to the holy fathers, nature, substance, and form are the same.

Hypostasis, on the other hand, is a certain substance together with accidents, which has obtained existence in itself, distinctly and separately from the rest of the hypostases, in actuality and in fact — that which shares with the individuals of the same species the principle of nature, but has its difference from the individual of the same species and of the same nature by virtue of certain accidents, that is, its characteristic properties.

For Peter, and each man, is a substance — since he is a man — but with accidents; for he is either tall or short, either snub-nosed or hook-nosed;

these are accidents — and each has his existence in himself.

Nature is the common element of men, the common element of horses, such as humanity — for Peter is a man, and Paul, and the rest, each one being a man — whereas hypostasis is the particular, this one and that one.

Peter is a hypostasis, and Paul is another hypostasis; but Peter is not one nature and Paul another nature.

For both Peter and Paul, each of them, is a complete man;

but Peter is not Paul, nor is Paul Peter.

So much, then, for the present concerning nature and hypostasis;

hypostasis (ὑπόστασις), person (πρόσωπον), and individual (ἄτομον) are the same thing.

Let us then say what a natural property is, and what a hypostatic property is, and the difference between them.

[Scholion] A natural property, then, is that which constitutes the nature, without which the nature of which it is a property cannot subsist — such as, in the case of man, the vital, the rational, the volitive, the perceptive, the ambulatory, the respiratory, and the like.

For one who does not reason is not a man;

for there has never been a man who does not reason, whether well or badly; likewise, neither one who does not perceive, nor walk, nor breathe.

A natural property, then, is that which constitutes the nature and distinguishes species from species, that is, one nature from another, and is contemplated in every hypostasis of the same species — such as the rational.

For it constitutes the nature of man, being taken up in his definition — for man is a rational, mortal animal — and the rational distinguishes man from all irrational creatures.

For indeed every man is rational;

for whoever is not rational is not a man.

For it is impossible for a man not to be a rational, mortal animal.

A natural property, then, is that which constitutes the nature, without which the nature of which it is a property cannot subsist — as, in the case of man, the vital, the rational, the perceptive, the ambulatory, the respiratory, the volitive, the operative, the mortal, and the like.

For one who does not live, or does not reason, is not a man;

for there has never been a man who does not live or does not reason, whether well or badly.

And one who does not will is not a complete man;

for there has never been a man who does not will, whether well or badly.

Likewise, one who does not perceive, nor breathe, nor walk, is not a perfect man, but deficient.

A natural property, then, is that which constitutes the nature and distinguishes one species from another — that is, one nature from another nature — and which is observed in every hypostasis of the same species, such as the rational and the mortal.

For these constitute the nature of man, being taken up in his definition — for man is a rational, mortal animal — and they distinguish man: the rational from all irrational beings, and the mortal from the immortal, both God and the angels.

And every man is rational, and

for whoever is not rational and mortal is not a man.

For it is impossible for man not to be a rational, mortal animal.

[Note] A hypostatic property is that which distinguishes one hypostasis from another, such as snub-nosed, white, black, bald, and the like;

for not every man is snub-nosed, but one is snub-nosed, another hook-nosed, another straight-nosed; nor is every man white, but one is white, another black, another wheat-colored; nor is every man bald, but one is bald, another long-haired, that is, thick-haired.

And, to put it simply, with respect to humanity:

Whatever all men possess as given by the Creator are natural properties, according to the holy fathers and true reason — both those belonging to their formation and those belonging to their condemnation.

For nature is a power given by divine command to each species, according to which it naturally operates and is acted upon.

Thus, having eyes and a nose and the rest of the members is a natural property — for one deprived of any of these is not a perfect man — but the difference among these is hypostatic;

sight and the act of seeing are natural, but a particular manner of sight — that is, good sight or poor sight — is hypostatic;

the desire for food, and eating itself, are natural, but the desire for particular foods, and a distinct desire — whether intense or relaxed — are hypostatic;

willing, and the act of willing, are natural; a particular willing, and willing in a particular manner, are hypostatic.

Whatever some hypostases of the same species possess, while others do not, are hypostatic properties.

A hypostatic property is that which distinguishes one hypostasis from another, such as snub-nosed, black, and the like;

for not every man is snub-nosed, but one is snub-nosed, another hook-nosed, another straight-nosed; nor is every man white, but one is white, another black, another wheat-colored.

Whatever all men possess as given by the Creator are their natural properties, both those of their formation and those of their condemnation.

for it has not been given by the Creator.

For nature is a power given by divine command to each species, according to which it naturally operates and is acted upon.

Whatever some hypostases of the same species possess, while others do not, are hypostatic properties.

Neither, then, can the sum total of the properties of this species be observed in another species, nor can the sum total of the properties of this hypostasis be observed in another hypostasis.

For the same natural property is observed in different species — as the rational is observed in both angel and man, and the mortal in man and in all irrational animals — and the same accident, that is, hypostatic property, is observed in different hypostases, as whiteness is observed in different hypostases (for there are many white men); but not all the natural properties of man are observed in another species, nor are all the hypostatic properties of this particular man observed in another hypostasis.

But that which is observed in one species alone, and in all its hypostases, is not called a property, but a proprium.

Thus, having eyes, a nose, and the rest of the members is natural to man — for one deprived of any of these is not a perfect man — but the difference among these is hypostatic, marking off a hypostasis from a hypostasis of the same species and the same substance, and not from one of a different species and a different substance;

for as we have already said, a hypostasis is not compared with a hypostasis of a different species as hypostasis to hypostasis, but as nature to nature.

Sight and the act of seeing are natural; but a particular manner of sight — that is, good sight or poor sight — is hypostatic;

the desire for food, and eating itself, are natural; but the desire for particular foods, and a distinct desire that is intense or relaxed — that is, great or slight — is hypostatic;

willing and operation, and the act of willing and operating, are natural; but the

particular willing and operation, and willing and operating in a particular manner — whether well or badly — are hypostatic.

That which is according to nature, in obedience to the Creator, is good; but that which is contrary to nature, according to pleasure and one's own inclination, against the law of God, is evil.

[Note] One must know, then, that every human hypostasis possesses both existence and the fact of having been brought by the Creator from non-being into being — that is, the properties of being created: living, operative, perceptive, intellective, rational (reasoning), and appetitive, that is, capable of willing — as well as subsisting from essence and accidents.

These, then, are essential and natural; but the particular and distinct movement of these is a hypostatic difference.

For sharing in these establishes the sameness of nature, but the mode of existence, and the distinct and self-constituted hypostasis and constitution of each, and the particular, self-moved, and distinct use of the natural faculties, show the hypostases to be distinct, and make it possible to speak of many men.

Thus, in the case of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since the existence of each is distinct, there are three hypostases;

but since each does not will and operate in a particular, distinct, and separate manner, but in a unified manner, there are not three gods, but one God.

These things having been said, let us see whether there are two natures in Christ, and thus we shall know whether he has double natural properties;

for it is impossible for a nature to subsist apart from its natural and constitutive properties.

One must know that every human hypostasis possesses both existence and the fact of having been brought by the Creator from non-being into being — that is, the properties of being created: living and operative, perceptive and intellective and rational, and appetitive according to sense and reason, that is, capable of willing self-determinately — as well as subsisting from essence and accidents.

All these are essential and natural; but the particular and distinct movement of these is a hypostatic difference.

For sharing in these establishes the sameness of nature, but the mode of existence introduces the difference of hypostases; and the distinct existence and constitution of each, and the particular, self-moved, and distinct use of the natural faculties, make the hypostases distinct and cause men to be spoken of as many.

Thus, in the case of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since the existence of each is distinct, there are three hypostases;

but since the nature and its properties are observed equally in each of the hypostases, they are of one essence and nature;

and since they do not exist in separation, nor does each will and operate in a particular and distinct manner, but in a unified manner, the three are not three gods, but one God; and they exist and are spoken of as with one another and in one another.

These things having been said, let us see whether there are two natures in Christ, and thus we shall know whether he has double natural properties;

for it is impossible for a nature to subsist apart from its natural and constitutive properties.

[Note] Is Christ perfect God and perfect man, even after the union of the natures — perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood? Yes, absolutely.

But are Godhead and manhood one nature or two? Two, truly;

for the nature of Godhead is one thing, and the nature of manhood another.

Therefore there are two natures in Christ, and Christ is in two natures, since he is perfect God and perfect man.

Do we confess Christ to be from two natures? Absolutely.

Why from two? Because he is from Godhead and from manhood.

For what does it mean to say 'Godhead' and 'manhood'? Does it signify two natures? Absolutely;

for the nature of Godhead and of manhood is not one.

Do we confess Christ, after the union, to be in Godhead and manhood? Absolutely.

Therefore, if after the union we confess him to be in Godhead and manhood, and Godhead and manhood are two natures and not one, then we confess him to be in two natures.

Does Christ have the nature of the Father,

even after the union, complete and undiminished, unchangeable and unconfused? In every way.

Does he also have the nature of the Mother — that is, the nature of Adam — complete, undiminished, unchangeable, and unconfused? Entirely so.

Is the nature of God the Father and the nature of the Holy Virgin one or two? Two, absolutely.

Therefore there are two natures in Christ even after the union.

For before the union there were not two natures in God the Word, but one — that of the Father.

It is impossible for one and the same nature to be both created and uncreated, both having a beginning and without beginning, both passible and impassible.

For if it began, it is not without beginning; and if it is uncreated, it was not created.

Therefore Christ is not one nature, but one hypostasis possessing two natures — one uncreated and one created, one without beginning and the other having a beginning.

Is Christ perfect God and perfect man even after the hypostatic union of the natures? Yes, absolutely.

Perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood? Truly.

But are Godhead and manhood one nature or two? Two, truly;

for the nature of Godhead is one thing, and that of manhood another.

It is one and another — not one, but two.

Therefore there are two natures in Christ, and Christ is in two natures after the union according to hypostasis, since after the union he is perfect God and perfect man, and perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood.

Do we confess Christ to be out of two natures? Certainly.

Why out of two? Because he is out of Godhead and manhood.

What then? Does saying 'Godhead' and 'manhood' certainly indicate two natures? Certainly.

for the nature of Godhead and the nature of manhood are not one.

Do we confess Christ, after the union, to be in Godhead and manhood? Certainly.

Therefore, if we confess him, after the union, to be in Godhead and manhood, and Godhead and manhood are two natures and not one, it is necessary to say that he is in two natures after the union, just as also out of two natures.

Does Christ have the nature of the Father, even after the union, complete, without deficiency, unchangeable and unconfused? In every way.

And does he also have the nature of the Mother, that is, of Adam, complete, without deficiency, unchangeable and unconfused? Without doubt.

Is the nature of God the Father and the nature of the holy Virgin one, or two? Certainly two, and not one.

Therefore there are two natures in Christ after the union.

For before the union there were not two natures in God the Word, but one, that of the Father.

Is the Godhead in Christ a passible nature, or impassible? Certainly impassible.

And is the manhood in Christ passible, or impassible? Passible, evidently.

A passible nature and an impassible nature, then, are not one nature, but two; and there are two natures in Christ.

Is the Godhead of Christ the very same as that of the Father and the Spirit, or not? The very same, and not another.

Is this a complete nature in Christ, or a part of a nature? Complete.

Is his manhood a complete nature in him? Complete.

Therefore there are two complete natures in Christ.

But if you say that Christ is of one composite nature, then Godhead and manhood are parts of Christ's composite nature, and God the Father and Adam will be parts of the one nature of Christ, and Christ will be a complete nature while the Father, compared to Christ, will be a partial and incomplete nature.

Why do you not say 'two natures' in the case of Christ? Because number introduces division.

Then does saying 'three hypostases' of the Godhead also divide the Godhead?

for number signifies only the difference and quantity of the things numbered — whether the things numbered are united or divided.

For in saying three hypostases of the Godhead, we do not divide them from one another — for they are united according to essence — but we signify the difference of the hypostases, and that they are not confused nor merged into one hypostasis.

Likewise, in saying two natures of Christ, we do not divide them — for they are united according to hypostasis — but we signify the difference of the natures, and that they have not been changed and confused into one another.

For you hold Christ to be of one composite nature,

saying he is out of Godhead and manhood, you say that he is consubstantial neither with the Father nor with us;

for neither is the Father of a composite nature, nor are we composed of Godhead and manhood.

But you also confess the Godhead to be passible;

for if Christ is of one composite nature out of both Godhead and manhood, and Christ suffered, then evidently his one composite nature, the God-manhood, suffered.

But it is clear that you Arianize;

for just as they did, you too say that nature and hypostasis are the same thing, and you call the Godhead of Christ passible and call his nature composite, in order to blaspheme him as being of a different essence from the Father.

But far be it from us to think in this way;

for we know the difference between nature and hypostasis, according to the holy Fathers.

Wherefore, with respect to the Godhead, we confess the trinity of hypostases and the unity of nature; and in our Lord Jesus Christ, according to Gregory the Theologian, conversely to what we hold concerning the Trinity, we proclaim the unity of hypostasis and the twofold and differing natures, and we confess him to be one composite hypostasis — the very same one being consubstantial with the Father and impassible according to the nature of the Godhead, and consubstantial with us and passible according to the nature of the manhood.

For it is impossible for one and the same nature to be both created and uncreated, both having a beginning and without beginning.

For if it began, it is not without beginning; and if it is uncreated, it was not created.

So Christ is not one nature, but one hypostasis having two natures — one uncreated and one created, one without beginning and one having a beginning, one impassible and one passible.

If a nature is composed out of different natures, then not even one of them is consubstantial [with what it came from].

For each of them has only its own definition, while the composite nature has another, composite definition.

But it is impossible for things that admit different definitions to be consubstantial.

If, then, Christ is one nature, how will he be consubstantial with the Father and with the Mother? For the one is God, and the other is man.

But God and man are not one nature;

for the definition of Godhead and of manhood is not one.

For the one is Creator, and the other is creature.

One and the same nature cannot be consubstantial with things of a different essence.

A nature is not said to be consubstantial with a nature, nor is a single-natured hypostasis said to be consubstantial with hypostases of a different essence.

If, then, Christ is one nature after the union, how will he be consubstantial with the Father and the Mother, who are of different essence from one another? And that Christ is one hypostasis and not two, we shall know from what follows:

Is Christ one Son, or two? Certainly one.

And how can there be two hypostases, if the Son is one? If there are two hypostases, there is one and another; and either there will be two Christs, or Christ will be one and God the Word another, and there will no longer be one Son.

If Christ is two hypostases, and he sits at the right hand of the Father upon the cherubic throne and is worshipped by all creation together with the Father and the Spirit;

then we worship a Quaternity, and not a Trinity.

If Christ is one nature after the union, what is it called? 'Christhood,' evidently — the God-manhood.

By which nature? If it is one, evidently by his one nature.

Then it is his God-manhood; and so the Godhead in Christ will turn out to be passible.

Which nature suffered — his Godhead, or his manhood? His manhood.

And did his divine nature remain impassible? Yes.

Is his nature that suffered and the one that did not suffer the same, or one and another? Certainly one and another.

And if they are one and another, how are the two one? But the two natures — that is, the one and the other — are not one nature; rather, Christ is one hypostasis but two natures, one impassible and one passible.

And thus the argument runs smoothly.

But we say that Christ is one composite hypostasis;

for being one of the hypostases of the Godhead, by the good pleasure of the Father he was made flesh of the Holy Spirit and of Mary the Ever-Virgin and Theotokos, and became perfect man, not by change or confusion or