論聖三一對話錄 第 1 章 第 4/23 段

'You are from below' [John 8:23] — but concerning his own hypostasis, he says:

'I am from above' [John 8:23]. But how the One who is above and from above would, for us, be brought down to what is below and alien to him, is easy for anyone to understand who has examined the matter closely.

'For is it not the case that, just as one might grant that every unbegotten thing shares a common principle with every other unbegotten thing — I mean, in respect of existing unbegottenly — so also, following the same line of reasoning, the begotten would stand equal to, and in like manner as, every other begotten thing?' B: 'How, then, could this be disputed? For the syllogism holds identically and without alteration in both cases.'

A: 'Will you then still say, O Hermias, that this impiety is hard to detect — or do you suppose that the deceitful reasoning of our adversaries can escape notice, adorned as it is with a counterfeit elegance and decked out with god-befitting little phrases, so as to be able to carry away the minds of the more simple, while all the while it labors in travail to bring forth a blasphemy of the utmost ugliness? For the Son has been reduced by them to a mere creature, and he in whom we live and move and have our being [Acts 17:28] has now been reckoned among things subject to generation and corruption.'

For if, according to them, the term 'begotten' will be the very definition of the Son, and we are to accept the word as signifying his essence, then he will bear the same relation, insofar as he is understood as begotten, to every other begotten thing.

And these are countless, beyond all reckoning, extending even to the most contemptible of things — I mean the gnat and the fly, and things yet more base.

A: Then for what reason do they even call him 'Son,' or suppose that God exists as 'Father,' if he has not truly begotten the Son from his own proper essence, as we hold? Let them, then, no longer call him either 'Father' or 'Son';

for truth is ever dear to Christians.

As for the vomit that issues from them, then, how is silence not better? 'Do not answer a fool according to his folly,' it says [Proverbs 26:4]. But lest, like those who pursue an idle chase, they fall upon the multitude with even greater intemperance and harshness, making a fortress of their skill in argument, and supposing the reasoning somehow procured for them, propped up by wretched syllogisms, to be utterly irrefutable —

'For I will not hope in my bow, and my sword will not save me' [Psalm 44:6 LXX].

'For you saved us from those who afflicted us, and you put to shame those who hated us' [Psalm 44:7 LXX]. B: Come, then, quite nobly:

A: I will proceed indeed, and quite eagerly;

but I think it necessary to say that point first, before the others.

B: Which point is that? A: That it is most senseless and most unskillful for them to say that 'unbegotten' is a definition applied to God;

and I say that a definition (horos) is that which has the force of a definition (horismos).

Or is not such the argument that has arisen among them, and would they not be caught, having proceeded to such a pitch of shamelessness? B: Yes.

For fearing nothing, they will declare that it is so, and indeed they will also press their case.

For ignorance is a certain reckless thing, standing as far as possible from all shame, and giving no thought whatsoever to hesitation.

For it is least inclined to fear casting its vote against even the truly right and blameless opinion itself, should that be necessary; rather it rushes headlong, without any careful consideration, toward whatever it happens to think, even should something quite outlandish appear to it.

Behold, then, those caught in the snares of ignorance—terribly so, especially in this matter.

For indeed we shall find that those who are truly wise in these matters—those for whom it is a point of honor to excel and to press for exactness—do not construct the definitions of essences by a single name and a single word; and we shall find this to be at odds with what these men maintain.

And it is not merely a fault to construct definitions in a single word; even if one should proceed through two words, they say it is still not made fully and completely clear at once in that way either, but rather through three terms, or perhaps even more.

For thus the things being defined would be most clearly manifest.

B: Such as what? A: For if someone were asked to declare, say, what a man is;

then he should give the most concise answer, as though in a single word, and define it by saying 'animal';

For man is admittedly an animal, yet not solely and distinctively so, but the term applies synonymously to others as well.

For there are very many other animals as well.

For indeed a dog and an ox and a leopard are animals too.

But if, adding a second word to the first, he should define it as being a mortal animal, he will nonetheless still fall short of a precise and wholly complete indication, even though what he says is true.

For we say that a dog and an ox and the rest are also mortal animals.

But if the account should proceed in order through all the things that belong to man essentially, both generically and specifically, calling him at once a rational animal, and at once mortal, and receptive of mind and knowledge, he will have produced a definition lacking in none of the elements necessary for its manifestation.

Do you understand, then, henceforth, that our account is right and true? B: I understand;

how could it not be? A: Since, then, it is unskillful and unlovely, and lacking any share in the very science most dear to them, to write down the force of a definition in a single word, what then would they say—though they think themselves exceedingly wise—if they should assert that 'unbegotten' is the definition of the essence of God the Father? They seem to leap upon such arguments altogether without reflection, even though they suppose their own intellect to be, as they think, subtle and finely honed.

For this point too, I think, gallops right past them and eludes them entirely.

B: What do you mean, or what sort of point? A: For indeed, the definitions of essences, if they are set forth according to the manner that is proper and congenial to them, begin from the genus, and along with the genus bring in the essential difference, or differences, of each of the things signified;

and suppose again that this is what I wish to say.

For I say that our argument concerning these matters must proceed thus.

A: For tell me: if someone came up to you and wished you to explain to him what a dog is, and what an ox is, what would you say, Hermias? B: I would say that they are animals.

A: Then tell me, having said only this, would you think you had given a sufficient explanation? B: Not entirely;

for I would add, if indeed I should choose to speak fittingly, the natural differences proper to each as well.

A: That is most true and well said.

A: Consider then—or rather, let those who ignorantly reduce 'unbegotten' to the force of a definition declare to us whether they wish the word to signify a genus, or to signify a difference.

If, then, they say it is a genus, let it signify nothing set apart from the rest, lest we be caught attaching the force of the specific difference to the genus, and the genus itself be thrust out of its own proper power.

But if, setting this aside, they should say it is a difference, let them further demonstrate to us of what it will be the difference, when no genus has been openly laid down in advance for the argument.

And how could a definition of essence be sufficient for us, and be seen according to its own proper account, if it were composed from a difference alone? Is it not necessary that they incur ridicule, if they insist on holding it so? B: They will indeed incur it, since this at least is beyond doubt.

A: If, then, in addition to this, someone should wish to say that their doctrine, utterly gorged with the extreme of reproach, will disgrace itself completely, how would he not speak the truest of truths? B: Having shown what? Tell me.

A: For as I said before, the definition of any essence whatsoever could never soundly come to be from a difference alone.

For the genus is always somehow conceived beforehand, prior to its own proper difference; from it, as if from a starting-post, the argument runs swiftly forward and, entering distinctly upon what follows in order, produces a manifestation that is correct and free of doubt.

If, then, they ignorantly insist that 'unbegotten' fulfills the force of a definition, it will not be a difference;

for it would no longer simply signify to us that the subject has not been begotten—yet we shall not even grant that the word possesses such further force; rather, what applies to them would more readily be taken as a genus, plainly and without distinction,

even though to wish to call it a genus in the case of God would be altogether devoid of due and fitting reasoning, and quite reasonably so, since in his case, or indeed prior to him, nothing among existing things is to be found.

Nevertheless, let 'unbegotten' be supposed a genus concerning him, according at least to what seems good to them without careful consideration—yet a genus signifying to us nothing at all, so that it may not occupy the place and force of a difference.

Since, then, the term 'unbegotten' no longer introduces the indication of not having been begotten, what difference could it show us between Father and Son, or how could the Son be lesser in any respect at all, even if he should be understood to exist as begotten? This, for my part, I do not fully understand;

but what do you say, Hermias? B: What could I say to this? A: But that 'unbegotten' could not soundly admit the force of a definition, we have, I think, refuted clearly, thoroughly, and in a scholarly manner, though we find it unaccustomed to us to proceed by such arguments, yielding as we do to necessity, acting against our own preference, and laying hold, out of need, of matters beyond our expertise and practice.

Nevertheless, to heap up further considerations upon those already found is no small labor; yet, insofar as I am able, I shall attempt it.

Those, then, who are exceedingly skilled, precise, and devoted to the study of these matters say that what is called 'convertibility' is fitting to every definition.

B: And what exactly is this? I would most gladly learn it from you.

A: Well then, I shall proceed by the same examples, and, going back over them, I shall explain.

For we define man by such an account: a rational, mortal animal;

and a horse, in turn, by such: a neighing animal.

And we shall also give the demonstration of the things proposed in another way, not necessarily beginning from the first terms at all, but starting from the last words and going backward to the beginnings of the definitions.

For if something is a mortal and rational animal, you will understand this to be a man; and again, if something is a neighing animal, this will show forth the nature of a horse.

If, then, 'unbegotten' is a definition, why does it not admit of convertibility? For let them not hesitate to confess that if anything is unbegotten, this too is both the definition and the essence of God the Father.

For there are countless such things, beyond number, and it would be tedious, I think, to name them one by one.

Do you perceive, then, into what great absurdity their argument has slipped? B: Yes, a terrible absurdity indeed.

A: And again, 'unbegotten' could not be a definition in yet another way, if we should examine it once more from this angle.

B: How do you mean? A: For indeed, when we wish to declare what fire or, say, water actually is, or of what sort each is in nature, concerning fire we say that it is a body both hot and dry;

and of the other, water, in turn, that it is moist and cold.

And this, I think, is to define them from what they positively are.

But if, in explaining the nature of fire, we should say that it is neither cold nor moist, omitting to say that it is hot and dry, and again, concerning water, that it is neither hot nor dry, though it were necessary to say that it is cold and moist, from what source would you think we were making our explanation? B: From what they are admittedly deprived of, and are not.

A: Well then, if someone should think and speak in this way about any of the things that exist, would he thereby demonstrate most clearly and unerringly the truth that belongs to each? B: Not at all.

A: If, then, in the case of God the Father, 'unbegotten' signifies to us only that he has not been begotten, how could it have the force of a definition, since it thus signifies not what he is, but what he is not? B: You mean, surely, that he has not been begotten? A: That is what I said;

for this is what the force of the word travails to bring forth for us.

And what, again, will they make of it, if we should add and say that the definitions of essences do not necessarily stand in opposition to anything, nor indeed could they be shown to belong to the class of 'relatives'—those things such that, if one should name the one, he would surely, as it were, be reminded of the other as well? For the manifestation of each of these is always bound up together with both.

B: The argument is not very clear to me.

A: And yet there is nothing to prevent it; for indeed you are quite able to understand it clearly.

For if someone should happen to name 'Father', he has thereby led the mind of his hearers into thoughts concerning a son, or, simply and plainly, an offspring.

And the reverse would also be true;

for the begetter, too, will surely come rushing in together with the signification of 'offspring'.

And in like manner, I think, 'right' and 'left' will hold in the same way;

for as soon as one of these is named, the other has sprung up together with it at the very same moment.

But whoever sets forth, say, the definition of the essence of man, or of any other animal whatsoever, has not joined to it anything distinguished from it, that is, something necessarily opposed to it, just as, of course, in the case of the right hand there is the left, or in the case of the father, the son, or simply, in the case of the begetter, the begotten.

For man is man and stone is stone, having no distinction in relation to anything, but the names are theirs simply because they are in some way proper and particular to them.

But the word 'unbegotten,' having the meaning that someone has not been begotten, in some way implies together with itself 'the begotten,' whose quality it escapes while settling into its own proper meaning.

Then how could the word 'unbegotten' be a definition, since it does not stand in a like relation to 'begotten,' at least as concerns what is signified by both? {B.} Are you saying, then, that 'the unbegotten' is nothing in the case of God the Father? {A.} Not nothing—far from it.

I myself would say that it is reserved for him alone and fittingly attaches to him, insofar as it expresses the fact of not having been begotten; yet it must by no means be taken as having the force of a definition.

{B.} But, they say, let 'the unbegotten' not be set as having the force of a definition in the case of God and Father—yet let this nevertheless be his essence.

And if 'the begotten' is opposed to 'the unbegotten,' then the Son could not be, by nature, the same as the Father, since the quality of the names quite plainly defines for us the essential difference between them.

{A.} How exceedingly sharp this argument is, and how easily it is diversified by the many-turning excursions of its notions from one thing to another!

And it seems to me that the champions of these unholy doctrines undergo something like what they say those whose craft is painting and drawing on panels are accustomed to do: whenever, their conception and indeed their hand having erred, they have depicted some animal in a color contrary to its nature, they repaint it again in different hues, to what seems the better shade, and only then do they think they have barely managed not to appear to those who view the picture to have deceived them, and that the fruits of their skill turn out well.

But by the very means through which they think they win approval for what has already been bungled, they unwittingly bring upon themselves, as it were, a fearful outcry, and the praise for the correction will only make manifest the ugliness of what was unskillfully wrought by them.

Or is what I have said not true? {B.} It is indeed true.

Bearing no grudge, even if they should choose to shift to other arguments, let us go along with them there too, lest some occasion for arrogance against us be furnished them by our seeming to shrink from the contest.

{A.} Let us then allow it, for you think matters stand rightly this way.

And indeed, when they ignorantly proclaim that 'the unbegotten' is the essence of God, someone, I think, will immediately laugh broadly at this and say:

If 'the unbegotten' is the essence of God, and there are countless things in the world that exist without having been begotten, then everything unbegotten is the essence of God—or rather, 'the unbegotten' will have the standing of an essence.

For instance, the sun exists unbegottenly; and in the same manner the moon has been made, as well as the stars and the heavens;

for I pass over the Principalities and Thrones and all the creation above us, which has obtained its entrance into being not through begetting, as we obtained ours.

But not everything unbegotten is the essence of God, nor indeed could 'the unbegotten' be reckoned as the definition of essence for things that exist unbegottenly.

Therefore we would not accept 'the unbegotten' for this purpose, if we still preserve a sound and uncorrupted mind.

Besides—for I think this too must be added—if 'the unbegotten' is essence, and the name 'essence,' with neither genus nor species nor even difference or differences added, discloses nothing whatsoever to the hearers except that it is only 'essence,' then let 'the unbegotten' likewise disclose nothing in the case of God, nor let it be reckoned as signifying the fact of not having been begotten, but only that it is essence—of what, unclear;

for it still lacks genus, and species, and difference.

And let us in the same way say, with respect to the Son, the name 'begetting,' and let it be understood as merely 'essence,' still bare and in no way further defined.

Since, then, both of these two names have been uttered by us simply and without distinction, and introduce the notion of nothing except only 'essence,' what, then, would be the remaining difference between Father and Son? For essence in relation to essence, with nothing added—neither 'greater,' as he says, nor 'lesser'—will possess absolutely nothing that cuts it off into any sort of otherness whatsoever; rather, by a correct reckoning, there would be, without any doubt, a complete likeness of essence to essence, so long as they are understood and named only as essences.

Therefore, having ignorantly and indiscriminately taken 'the unbegotten' as the essence of God, let them blush deeply for their ignorance, and let them not, having raised up this term as a rampart against the nature of the Son while barking against the doctrines of truth, present as evident a difference nowhere seen by us—if neither does 'the unbegotten,' in the case of God the Father, signify the fact of not having been begotten, nor does the other term, in the case of the Son, signify having been begotten, but both are 'essences,' and this without distinction.

For our argument has just now demonstrated to us that nothing separates essence from essence in respect of being otherwise, insofar as we speak of and understand them as essences.

Do you, then, think the argument is clear and sound, or will you correct and reshape it for the better? {B.} Not at all.

{A.} But if they should also steal away from the word 'unbegotten' its signification of not having been begotten, and insist that it simply exists as essence, what reasoning could persuade us against those who wish to strip 'begetting' away from 'the begotten' and to set it down as having merely the force of essence—just as they themselves indeed do with 'the unbegotten'? Then how shall we still distinguish, and what argument will mark off for us the difference in person and in hypostasis between the Father and the Son, or the Son and the Father? For who, then, is the one who begot, and who is the one begotten, becomes in some way no longer apparent.

Then the whole account of our faith would utterly vanish and be swept away.

For from where, and how, would we still believe in the Father and the Son as begetter and begotten? For we certainly will not accept the signification of these names as bare and corrupted, especially in these matters—far from it.

I would fittingly say that this signification is exact and necessary, if indeed our faith is directed toward truth and we have not missed true knowledge of God, having been baptized into the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

And indeed we ourselves also have been taught, he says, to name God thus and to address him so in our prayers:

'Our Father, who art in heaven.' {A.} Then, my good friends, we would say to them in reply: have we been commanded to call God 'Father' as belonging to the race of created things, or because we have been crowned with the glory of adoption and reckoned among his children? {B.} As creatures, by nature; but as sons, by grace.

{A.} But wherever 'father' is named, and indeed also 'son,' let 'that which is made' not be brought in alongside, nor let the notion of having been made be seen slipping in meanwhile, since the relation of father is toward son, and again of son toward father, with nothing intervening—just as, of course, that of maker toward the thing made, and of the thing made toward the maker.

If, then, we shall take away from each thing what is proper to it, and, unskillfully dishonoring the relative force of the terms so called, we shall be caught assigning to 'the thing made' the relational force belonging toward 'father,' and to 'son' the relational force belonging toward 'maker,' as derived from what these terms signify, how would we not, quite reasonably, thereby incur ridicule for the utmost derangement of mind? {B.} As sons we shall call God 'Father';

for I think it is mere idle chatter to insist superfluously otherwise.

{A.} But neither could there truly be a father, nor indeed a son, unless someone is understood to have begotten and to have been begotten.

Let God, then, they say, be called 'Father,' if you will, in an improper, figurative manner of speaking.

{A.} From where, my good man, did he obtain this title, if he himself is not Father by nature? Or will they perhaps say that he got it from us, who are fathers by nature and in truth? {B.} Be well assured that they will say this too.

{A.} Then where, indeed, shall we place the blessed Paul, who assigns the origin of fatherhood not to us, nor yet to any other of the created things, but consecrates and dedicates it, as it were, solely to the truly God and first Father—

for one might hear him, as he has written for us:

'From whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named' (Eph 3:15). Answer me, then, Hermias, and you will thus help train our argument by this exercise: if I should choose to learn afresh, did God become unbegotten in time, not having been this at the beginning, or rather, is God conceived of as existing unbegottenly at the very moment he is conceived of as God? {B.} He was unbegottenly;

for how would it not be utterly foolish to assert anything other than this? {A.} Since the word 'unbegotten' signifies not having been begotten, or how else? {B.} It clearly signifies not having been begotten.

{A.} For why, in general, was it necessary for God, who exists without beginning, to be seen as such? Or what distinction, in relation to what things, would the term—or rather, the nature—have imparted to him, if 'the unbegotten' is his nature, when as yet nothing begotten had come to be or existed alongside him—if indeed they say that the Father is not the begetter of the Son? For in relation to what would he be 'unbegotten,' when the essence of begotten things had not yet at all been introduced? For surely they would not say, as it seems to me, that things created in a begotten manner are co-unoriginate and co-eternal with the unbegotten God.

And if God was always Father, being unbegotten, then it is altogether necessary to say that there also subsisted the one on account of whom he was unbegotten, that is, the Son who exists in a begotten manner—whose image we ourselves too, having grown rich in it and having obtained its form through the virtue of piety, imitate when we call God 'Father,' being named fathers in likeness of the highest and first Father.

For the archetypes are always prior to their images.

{B.} And what prevents our opponents from saying that God is called 'Father' by an improper usage, since we ourselves are altogether fathers by nature, while he, being called 'Father' as the cause of created beings' coming into being and existing, has 'the unbegotten' as the force of his essence? {A.} But Paul, being truthful, has testified to us that the name of fatherhood extends from that One over every rational creature, according to the image and imitation of the First, clearly displaying what indeed also exists in us ourselves.

But he by no means said that also every 'unbegottenness' in heaven and on earth is from him, in which case nothing at all would need to be begotten, so that the image of the Unbegotten might be impressed upon created things.

For that which especially knows how to adorn creation is conformity and resemblance to the One who is highest of all.

...should it, then, be fashioned in conformity to that which exists unbegottenly? {A.} That is not what I am saying; rather, I thought I ought to demonstrate the absurdity of the notions arising from this line of reasoning—notions from which a wise word persuades us that it is fitting to depart and to go as far away as possible;

'Keep yourself pure' (1 Tim 5:22), and also the saying:

that one ought not to share in the sins of others—sounding forth in sharp discord against such error.

And yet, since we ought to cling fast and hold firmly to the unimpeachable glory of the holy Fathers, why is it necessary to take delight in things foreign to us, and thus to partake of a savage mind? For it is a savage mind that barks against the glory of the Son and speaks unrighteousness against God, according to what is written.

For it seemed, I think, quite rightly to those renowned men who became stewards of the mysteries of our Savior, well-disposed and most approved, that 'the unbegotten' is by no means the essence of God and Father, but only a word signifying to hearers the fact of not having been begotten.

This we say is indeed inherent in the account concerning the hypostasis of God the Father, while affirming that it is not itself, in its own right, the essence of God.

For it is possible for those who are willing to examine the matter closely to see that, among all the things that exist for us—or even among things that exist only in suspicion of being, and that virtually feign the very appearance of existence—some are, as it were, in their own proper seats, and indeed have obtained by lot, in a hypostatic manner, this very being which they are; while others have no proper seat anywhere from which to derive it, but are rather without a seat of their own, not fixed in natures of their own, but hovering around the essences of other things that exist; and by being able to happen to belong to this thing, or say to that one, they seem virtually even to subsist together with the things that possess them, and falsely present, as it were, another's nature as their own.

{B.} What do you mean? {A.} For surely you will recall that our argument has already labored over this and has, as far as possible, well demonstrated that things reckoned in the category of accidents, or simply of things merely inherent, one might observe to exist least of all in themselves, but rather more in other things; and though such a thing seems to be, and to be spoken of, as something in its own right, it has, as its own, the nature of that which has received it.

For 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' are not something existing in itself and hypostatically, contributing to us only the indication of having been begotten, or, as the case may be, of not having been begotten.

{A.} 'Unbegottenness,' then, must be reckoned as inherent in the account of the hypostasis of God the Father, and it must be posited as belonging to it, yet not as being it.

For consider, if you will, the absurdity in this way:

For if they truly say that 'the unbegotten' is essence, and yet countless things among beings exist in a begotten manner, what prevents them, in their continued error, from saying that none of the things that exist actually subsist at all—even though they have obtained being in a begotten manner—if indeed each thing would run away from and slip out of being essence by not being unbegotten? {B.} It would slip out; how could it not? {A.} And how would it not also be fitting to say to them this, which is most appropriate of all? For if they shall reckon 'the unbegotten' as the essence of God the Father, and God—being super-essential and beyond all things—has cut this off as, so to speak, his own peculiar nature, wholly set apart and removed from all others, then it must be thought that the rest of things exist in a begotten manner and are situated in some nature of their own, having nothing naturally in common with that nature.

For between the begotten and the unbegotten, what relation, and of what kind, could there be, as far as concerns quality—clearly, the quality pertaining to essence? Then what would those who are ready for any evil whatsoever say, when they see the very properties of God the Father also in the Offspring, that is, in the Son? For the Father is Life, and Light, and true God;

but the Son also is these things, not by participation or in an altered manner, but essentially and in an equal manner.

Do you perceive, then, at last, that the properties and prerogatives of the Godhead would not, in principle and manner, more fittingly pertain to unbegottenness—lest we should also say they belong to other things which appear to exist and subsist apart from begetting—but would rather fittingly belong to God as Father? For in this way that which is identical in essence would extend, I think, by the law of nature, both to the Son and from him.

'The unbegotten,' then, is by no means the essence of God, but, as I have said, is merely significant of the fact that the Father alone has not been begotten, and does not subsist as a distinct particular thing.

But perhaps our opponents would say:

'If you say that he is in identity and consubstantial with God the Father, you will presumably not hesitate also to think that he always co-exists with him, and that he was begotten not apart from passion and effluence—an effluence proceeding, so to speak, from the act of begetting—even though every argument persuades us to hold that a cause pre-exists its effect, and that everything begotten in some way damages the nature of the one who bore it.'