駁尤利安 第 1 章 第 5/6 段

And though this expression is somewhat hyperbolic, it would, I think, be seen to be well made, if we say that man is the best of all living beings upon the earth, and that he was made even according to the image of his Creator.

That the whole creation was brought into existence by the all-powerful nods of God is, I think, nothing difficult to learn thoroughly, even from what the teachers of his own superstition have written.

For it seemed good to them all both to think and to say that, in sum, all things had been made by him, both intelligible and sensible, both invisible and visible things.

For they have agreed that all things exist around the King and Lord of all.

And indeed Plato insists on saying:

"Gods of gods, of whom I am the demiurge and father of your works."

We have now adduced, I mean, the sayings of the Greeks concerning these matters, and I shall pass over repeating the same things again, but I shall call to mind the words of Hermes Trismegistus.

For he said, in his work Addressed to Asclepius:

"Then, O greatest good daimon, how did the whole earth appear?" And the great good daimon said:

"According to order and desiccation, as I said, and when the many waters were commanded by the Lord to withdraw into themselves, the whole earth appeared muddy and trembling."

"Then, when the sun shone forth and unceasingly burned and dried it, the earth was made firm amid the waters, being encompassed by the water."

"Let there be earth, and let a firmament appear" — and immediately, at the beginning of the creation, earth came to be.

And these things, then, concerning the earth.

And concerning the sun, again, he speaks as follows:

"O thrice-great good daimon, whence did this great sun appear?" And he said:

Likewise he himself also says, in the first of his detailed discourses Addressed to Tat:

"And the Lord of all things immediately called out to his own holy, intelligible, and demiurgic Word:"

"and at the very moment of speaking, Nature, by her own breath, drew to herself the fire that possesses an upward-tending nature — I mean the unmixed, brightest, most active, and most fecund fire — and raised it aloft from the water."

That, then, all things were made by the command of God through the demiurgic Word, it would befit a human being to think, and it would be true to say —

but as to how, or in what manner, he alone would know.

But that he apportions, by his own authority, to each of the things that have come to be, its being in this or that manner, and that the manner of the existence of all things has him alone as its determiner, would become clear also from what Moses said:

"Let there be a firmament" — and it was so; and:

"Let the water be gathered together into one gathering, and let the dry land appear."

For these words indeed determine the nature of each of the things brought forward into being.

For he has represented God as saying to his creatures:

"Upon you, who are under me, I will lay this command, given to you through my Word:"

And the straightforward and unadulterated account would run thus.

And he himself was not moderately awed at Plato's opinion, and he says:

{Julian} But hear what Plato himself says concerning the cosmos:

"The whole heaven, then, or cosmos, or whatever else it would most readily accept being called — let it be so named by us — whether it always was, having no beginning of coming-to-be, or whether it came to be, having begun from some beginning? It came to be —"

"for it is visible and tangible, and has a body."

And all such things are perceptible, apprehended by opinion together with sense-perception.

Thus, then, according to the likely account, one must say that this cosmos came to be, in very truth, a living creature possessed of soul and intelligence, through the providence of God.

But he who is wholly given over to Plato's ingenious argumentation, and crowns it with praises carried to the utmost — since he has gone astray together with him and has understood nothing that is blameless, but is carried about as by every wind — we shall soon make plain, again setting beside it Julian's own words:

{JULIAN} Let us compare but one thing with one: what sort and manner of creation the God of Moses makes, and what sort the God of Plato.

“Let us make man according to our image and according to likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and the cattle and all the earth and all the creeping things that creep upon the earth.”

“And God made man, according to the image of God he made him, male and female he made them, and God blessed them, saying:”

“Increase and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it, and rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all the cattle and all the earth.”

“Gods of gods, of whom I am the demiurge and father — these works shall be indissoluble, so long as I am willing.”

“Now everything that has been bound is dissoluble; but to wish to dissolve that which has been well fitted together and is in good condition — this belongs to an evil being.”

“Yet you will by no means be dissolved, nor will you meet the portion of death, since you have obtained by my will a bond greater still and more sovereign than those by which you were bound together when you came to be.”

“Now then, learn what I say to you, as I make it plain:”

“Three mortal kinds still remain ungenerated; and if these do not come to be, heaven will be incomplete;”

“for it will not contain within itself all the kinds of living beings.”

“But if these came to be by my hand and partook of life, they would be made equal to gods.”

“In order, then, that they may be mortal, and that this universe may in truth be all-complete, do you turn yourselves according to nature to the making of living beings, imitating my power in respect of your own coming-to-be.”

“And insofar as it is fitting that they be called by the same name as the immortals — that which is called divine, ruling within them over those who are ever willing to follow justice and to follow you — this I myself, having sown it and set it in motion, will hand over to you.”

“As for the rest, do you, weaving the mortal together with the immortal, fashion living creatures and beget them, and, giving them nourishment, make them grow, and receive them back again as they waste away.”

...as had been declared; and he thinks it a small matter that this was given by God to human nature — namely, that man should come to be, from him, according to his image and likeness.

And yet how would not everyone accustomed to sound judgment agree that this is the work of those who know best how to adorn a matter most beautifully? For what, tell me, is better than to say that the divine likeness has been imprinted upon us? Do we not say that the divine essence is the highest and uppermost of all things, flashing round about with ineffable glory, and being itself, in its very substance, the whole form and beauty of virtue? How then is not what I have said manifest to all? Why then does he mock things so excellent, and for what does he deride the fittingness of this too — that the intelligent, rational, and most God-like of the living beings upon the earth, I mean man, should be honored with dominion over all things? And indeed the very nature of things itself agrees with the words spoken through Moses:

but he takes no account at all of what is reasonable, and has swerved uncontrollably toward the notion that one must cling only to the words of Plato.

And indeed he stands in admiration — and this too without examination — of that oration fashioned for him [Plato], I know not how, which he says was delivered by the God of the universe to certain generated and falsely-named gods.

But I think that we too must say to him, in answer to this:

For if in these words Plato is engaging in characterization, and, after the manner of the poets, puts into the person of God such words as he thinks fitting to him, he has missed the mark not slightly, and one might justly blame him for personifying God without knowing in what manner he ought to have done so.

But if he pretends that this is a genuine invocation of God, let him take his leave, babbling nonsense;

for it is by no means right to say that the God who holds dominion over all things has allowed gods who are not true to share in the glory that belongs peculiarly to himself alone.

“My glory I will not give to another, nor my praises to graven images.”

And come, let us briefly set the truth against Plato's words and say this:

Let it be granted, if one wishes, that the powers above, the intellectual ones, having come to be from God, are honored with the appellation “god”;

for we too say that there are certain beings in heaven who are named both gods and lords.

But we ourselves also have been crowned with such an appellation, God saying to us:

“I said, You are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High.”

But there is in these words a most necessary reason for the matter, and the account of God's generosity toward us would, if rightly understood, be most correctly stated thus:

For we ourselves too are accustomed to call, for instance, the image of a man by the very same name — “man.”

Therefore the intellectual and rational creation, inasmuch as it is held by God in greater esteem than that which is not rational and intellectual, is seen to have obtained the better glory, gilded with the appellation “god.”

Yet of the other creatures, not one at all has been named “god.”

For that heaven, that is, the cosmos, is simply not a living being, nor indeed animate at all — even should none of those reckoned wise among us choose to say so — it suffices for refutation, apart from the others who are said to be wise, to cite Aristotle, the very disciple of Plato himself.

For he said, as we have already firmly asserted before, that the cosmos as a whole is neither wholly animate throughout, nor rational, nor intellectual.

That, then, the whole cosmos through and through, or whatever this universe truly is (for so he himself called it), is neither animate nor indeed intellectual — the very power of truth allows him to say; and Plato, as I have said, meets his most persistent opposition from his own household, that is, from those closest to him.

But that God would not have said that gods who are not at all animate or intellectual ought to create — this the very nature of the matter itself will show us, proceeding through fitting proofs.

and these things, as I think, would be entirely alien to the essence highest of all.

But to disdain to affirm this of him would be nothing other than to impute to him vanity, and to draw up against him a charge of arrogance.

For how could he choose to rule over that whose coming-to-be he disdains? Or in what manner does he delight in the acts of worship we offer him, if from the beginning he did not even deign to create it? But that he does indeed wish to be honored by us, and demands ready obedience, and desires that human nature be made like to himself through every virtue, I could adduce — and quite easily — a very great number of true testimonies from the God-inspired Scripture.

But since Julian trusts rather in his own authorities, I say that Porphyry has written, in the second book of On Abstinence from Animate Beings, as follows:

“Let us, then, also sacrifice — but let us sacrifice as is fitting: to the God who is over all, as a certain wise man said, offering nothing perceptible, neither by incense nor by naming;”

“for there is nothing material which is not at once impure to that which is immaterial;”

“wherefore not even speech proper to the voice is fitting for him, nor even the inward word, when it has been defiled by a passion of the soul; but let us worship him through pure silence and pure thoughts concerning him.”

“This sacrifice, then, is accomplished in freedom from passion, and in contemplation of God.”

God, then, does indeed wish to be honored by us, and to be signified toward, intellectually, through a devout manner of life, as we inscribe his beauty upon our own souls.

Then how, tell me, does he demand these things from us, when he has all but cast us off to other creators and, so to speak, deprived us of that self-working craftsmanship bestowed as a gift on all the other creatures? And why then does he provide at all for the things upon the earth, if indeed, according to Plato's opinion, they were given as playthings to other gods? For that he does provide, and that his sparing care and gentleness extend even to the most trifling things, he who alone knows God his own Father will teach us, saying:

“Are not two sparrows sold for a penny, and not one of them will fall to the ground without our Father who is in the heavens?” But perhaps he will strike out this saying as untrue (for he wars against God to an outrageous degree), while accepting those sayings that have proved kin to him — that is, I mean, in respect of having gone astray.

Alexander, then, the disciple of Aristotle, writes thus in his work On Providence:

“To say that God does not wish to exercise providence over things here below is entirely alien to God;”

“for it belongs to a certain envy, and to a nature altogether absurd, not to do the better things while being able to do them.”

“Since, then, each of these is alien to God, neither both together nor even one of them could belong to him.”

“It remains, then, that the divine both is able and wills to exercise providence over things here below;”

“and if it both wills and is able, it is clear that it also exercises providence;”

“therefore it is not reasonable that even the most incidental thing should come to be apart from the divine mind and will.”

“And some say that Plato too held this opinion, while Zeno of Citium and those of the Stoa openly advocate this doctrine.”

That, then, the highest God, who alone by nature is God of all things, does also exercise providence over what concerns us — of this they themselves too have borne witness.

To suppose that others too are able to create, and to call into existence things that once were not, will wage war against sound opinion;

for it is by no means right to say that the properties peculiar and exceptional to the divine and ineffable nature can naturally inhere in any of the things that have come to be from it.

But this thing will be fitting rather to that nature alone, and will redound to the glory of the highest nature alone;

for, as I have just said, the things belonging solely and peculiarly to the essence highest of all are inaccessible to the creature.

And one of such things, we say, is precisely the ability to act in a creative, demiurgic manner, and to bring into existence things that once were not.

How, then, could a generated and made nature — to which it must follow, wholly and in every way, that it be subject to corruption, according, I say, to the very principles inherent in its nature — perform the works of God? For if creating is understood in God as a mode akin to knowledge, one might not unreasonably grant that the knowledge of how to create has been given by him to the creature, since we ourselves too at times create certain things, when we have the underlying matter and employ skillful art in regard to it;

but if, as I have said, creating in a manner befitting God is the activity and power of a magnificent nature, and lies, in a way worthy of God, beyond the measures of creation, why do they drag down the dignity of the highest nature and bestow it, according to their own opinion, upon things subject to generation and corruption? Do they, then, suppose they are grasping something necessary? Rather, they slander the divine sayings;

for they say that the Unbegotten permitted the begotten to fulfill that which belongs to him, and to him alone, and which he alone is able to accomplish.

“But surely,” they say, “it was also necessary that, if something should come to be from God, this should certainly be better than dying and being corrupted.”

If, then, they say that he was ignorant of this, the creature knows something more than he does;

for he creates, as they themselves say, things subject to corruption.

But if they pass over this point and roundly affirm that they know it, how is it a mark of goodness not to do what one knows to be good? Surely, I take it, the immortal is better than the mortal.

Then, besides this, I think it is not unlearned—rather, it is wise—to say this too:

As for the gods to whom, they say, the King and Lord of all entrusted the work of craftsmanship, they say that these are not immortal, but bound together and dissoluble, remaining for the time being outside of corruption, in this condition by the will of God.

For nothing, as I have said, is immortal or indissoluble;

but the will of God concerning each of the things he has made—this is nature to it; and it reaches, without any hesitation, even to the things that concern us;

for he is one and alone, and he has not learned this from another;

for the matter is not a form of knowledge, but a prerogative befitting God, belonging to his own nature and to it alone, just as, indeed, the other dignities also, which are by no means accessible to created things, but have been allotted, as I said, to that nature alone, and by nature.

But that it is among the most utterly outlandish things to assign to other gods the activity of creation, thereby removing it from the God who is truly and by nature such, one might discern even from his [Julian's] own teachers.

If, then, it is agreed that there are two beings—that which comes to be and that which makes—they are one in union, the one preceding, the other following:

preceding is God who makes; following is that which comes to be, whatever it may be.

And let him not hold back because of the variety of things that come to be, fearing to attach lowliness and disrepute to God;

for it is a single glory to him to make all things, and this act of making belongs to God just as the body belongs [to a living being].

And to him who makes, nothing is reckoned evil or shameful.

For these are the affections that accompany coming-to-be, just as rust accompanies bronze, and filth the body;

but neither did the bronze-worker make the rust, nor did the parents make the filth.

And after some further remarks, he again proceeds with more heated words, setting forth a vivid example, and says:

Then is the same painter permitted to depict heaven and earth and sea and gods and men and all irrational and inanimate things, yet God is not able to make all things? O what great folly and ignorance concerning God!

For such men suffer the most terrible thing of all:

for while claiming to reverence and bless God, by not attributing the making of all things to him, they do not even know God;

and besides not knowing him, they also commit the gravest impiety against him, attaching to him the passion of disdain or of incapacity.

For if he does not make all things, he fails to make them either out of disdain, or because he is unable—both of which are impious;

for God has but one attribute, the good, and the good is neither disdainful nor incapable.

For this is God: the good, the entire power to make all things.

And that which comes to be, comes to be by the good and by him who is able to make all things.

But if you wish to learn how he himself makes, and how the things that come to be come to be, it is possible for you to do so;

behold a most beautiful and most fitting image: a farmer casting seed into the earth—here wheat, there barley, there yet some other kind of seed;

behold the same man planting a vine, and an apple tree, and the rest of the trees;

so also God sows immortality in heaven, change on earth, and life and motion throughout the universe.

These things, then, the ancient sages among the Greeks, men not without renown, themselves held to be true, and indeed urged others also to choose to hold.

This fair-minded man, who scorns the common herd, having bidden farewell to the opinions of others, is overcome only by the words of Plato; and indeed he endeavors to expound clearly—as he supposes, with great wisdom—the public discourse which he says was composed for him [Plato] in the person of God, and he says:

{JULIAN} But surely this is not a mere dream, is it? Ponder it well and learn its meaning.

Plato calls gods the visible ones—sun and moon, stars and heaven—but these are images of the invisible ones;

the sun that appears to our eyes is [an image] of the intelligible sun that does not appear, and again the moon that appears to our eyes, and each of the stars, are images of the intelligible realities.

Consider, then, that what follows upon this is also well said:

for, he says, three mortal races remain—namely, that of men, that of animals, and that of plants;

for each of these has been determined by its own proper principles;

if, then, he says, each of these too should come to be through me, it would be altogether necessary for it to become immortal.

Therefore, having sown the kinds of these and having laid the foundation, I—if you also are willing—will hand them over [to you to complete];

but if the interval between the immortal and the mortal is great—an interval neither enlarged by any addition nor diminished by subtraction with respect to mortal and perishable things—then it is fitting that different beings be the cause of these, and yet others of yet other things.

{CYRIL} But that in these very words he confounds everything, and mingles the natures of things with one another, those who are willing may perceive quite easily.

For first, he says that the more visible of the gods are images of the less visible ones, which Plato was wont to call the intelligible and the sensible, naming the things that are seen 'objects of opinion accompanied by sensation.'

Now, through these words, our noble Julian seems to wish to indicate the Forms, which Plato at one time strongly maintains to be substances subsisting by themselves, and at another time defines as conceptions of God.

Yet, however this may be, those skilled in these matters say that this doctrine is unacceptable even to his [Plato's] own disciples;

for 'let the Forms fare well,' says Aristotle;

'for they are mere twitterings, and even if they exist, they are of no relevance to the argument.'

Why, then, does he himself see fit to uphold, and attempt to introduce as an opinion beyond mockery, that which is held by his own teachers not to stand well? Then, beyond this, we shall find yet another argument of his that has fallen ill of ignorance in no small measure:

He further adds that the God of all, who fashioned earth and heaven, is the demiurge both of the visible and of the intelligible things.

Since, then—as he himself has also plainly agreed—the unbegotten God is the author of the coming-to-be of both these and those, how does he say that they have come to be from him, and coexist with him and inhere in him? How, tell me, will the begotten coexist with the unbegotten God? And in what manner will it inhere in him? For we maintain that the Word of God, being unbegotten, necessarily coexists with him who begot him, and inheres in him, yet proceeds from him in the manner of begetting.

But this scrupulous advocate of Plato's inventive eloquence says that the supreme God is unbegotten, while those who came to be from him inhere in him and were both begotten and proceeded from him—thereby stirring up and confounding everything, and holding the purity required for the vision of God to be of no account whatsoever.

One might say to him that saying which is parodied on the tongues of the many:

'Let the boundaries of the Mysians and the Phrygians be kept apart.'

Away with such frigid idle talk, O man!

Your discourse concerns God, who is beyond all things, and yet you are caught having conceived quite petty thoughts about his glory.

Then, having himself declared him to be the author of the coming-to-be of all things, and alone sufficient for creatures so splendid and admirable, he says that other gods assisted him and cooperated in the work of creation for the lesser things of all—who might, perhaps, say to the God who is over all:

'Gather a contribution from us, and supply for the universe the three mortal kinds that are yet lacking;'

'for while you give the soul, we will add the body, weaving what is mortal onto what is immortal.'

But perhaps he will say, and will close ranks with his own doctrines by interjecting this, that the union of the elements produces the nature of earthly bodies.

In this too, then, he follows his own teachers;

for they say that Empedocles, son of Meton, both held this opinion and indeed chose to think so;

for he says that the principles of existing things are fire, air, water, and earth, and to these he adds Love and Strife;

[counting these as] the ruling substances, and he speaks thus:

According to Empedocles, Strife divides, while Love [gathers] into the One;

and for him, too, this is incorporeal, while the elements are as matter.

So that, even if the union of the elements does contribute some benefit of its own to earthly bodies, we shall not accept the matter without careful examination.

For we shall necessarily inquire closely who it is that governs their coming together, and who has gathered into one the things that by nature war against each other, and, as it were, tames them, so that the power of each does not remain unmixed with the others, but all incline together, as it were, with one another, toward the existence and coming-to-be of any single thing whatsoever.

Is it not, then, clearly the contrivance of God, the best craftsman of all things, wrought for earthly bodies, so that, lacking no share of any of the elements, they might have benefit from them? For somehow that which is kindred is dear [to itself].

Therefore, the creators of the three kinds would not be certain other beings; rather, the author of the coming-to-be of all things would reasonably be understood to be the One who is supreme and alone, and the origin of all things, beyond whom there is absolutely nothing further, but rather all things are under him and through him and beneath his feet, as having been created.

That he rejoices in his own works, both the discourses of the Greeks affirm, and we too declare it, since the divinely inspired Scripture itself also agrees with this.

'I was that in which he delighted, and daily I rejoiced in his presence at every season, when he rejoiced, having completed the world, and delighted in the sons of men.'

Then how is it not better that he should rather delight in his own works, and not in the creations of others? But perhaps Plato says that he was overcome by some hesitation—that is, as I said, that he grudged the things on earth their share of what is better.

And it is no wonder, since even before the demiurge-god himself he set the Good itself as unmoved, undisturbed, stable, and removed from the necessity or wish to work any of the things brought into existence, he says; but as though hesitating in regard to this, assigned the work of craftsmanship to the second god who is from him and after him.

But behold, he also appoints alongside him others who know how to work as his equals, so that nothing in him might appear pre-eminent.

He says that the begotten gods worked the remaining three kinds [of living beings];

Is it not, then, clearly seen among them — setting aside what pertains to us — that there is a very great difference in kinds and forms and sizes of bodies? For their coming-to-be would extend from the highest down to the very meanest of all;

and indeed, if these same things were said also concerning plants, no one would thereby speak falsely

...and of other things too — as many as the things made might be — reaching down even to the very meanest among them.

Are these things, then, tell me, not laughable, and mere idle trifling, straying far from what is plausible and from notions conducive to truth?

How, then, could this fail to be plain to everyone? That he takes delight in unsound and outlandish opinions, together with his own teachers, would surely be evident;

for, insisting stoutly that heaven is God, he again speaks thus:

{JULIAN:} Why need I call upon Greeks and Hebrews here as witnesses? There is no one who does not stretch out his hands to heaven when he prays, and swear by God or by gods; and whenever he conceives any notion whatsoever of the divine, he is carried thither.

And this they experienced not without reason:

for seeing that nothing pertaining to heaven diminishes, nor increases, nor changes, nor undergoes any disorderly affection, but that its motion is harmonious and its order well-tuned, that the ordinances of the moon are fixed, and the risings and settings of the sun fixed, always at fixed seasons, they reasonably supposed it to be God, and the throne of God.

For such a thing, since it is increased by no addition nor diminished by subtraction, and stands outside the change that comes by alteration and turning, is free from all corruption and coming-to-be;

and being immortal by nature and indestructible, it is pure of every stain.

{CYRIL:} That these are the words of a man raving, and one wholly bereft of notions conducive to truth, is not without evidence.

But since he has supposed — I know not how — that the raising on high of hands, and indeed of the eyes, by those who intend to pray, would suffice him as proof that heaven is God, come, let us say to him in answer to this:

Tell me then: if someone should happen to gaze upon clouds, and should himself send the eye of his body upward upon them as well, would that fact suffice him as full assurance that he must confess these too to be goddesses? How, then, would he not deserve to be laughed at, who has been thus carried away into deception by such frigid notions? But since, he says, heaven has reasonably been marveled at, and supposed by the many, both to be God and the throne of God, on account of the qualities it by nature possesses, let him come forward and teach us whether he has reckoned the two to be identical, and puts what pertains to both on an equal measure;

but I would never suppose that he has arrived at such a pitch of derangement as to think that to be God and to be His throne differ in no way at all.

For that the things pertaining to God ought not reasonably be understood after the manner of our own sense-perception, nor indeed after the manner of bodies — even should this at times be expressed less carefully than it ought — no one, at any rate, would doubt.