Sermons & Tracts 6 part 1/11

QUESTION ONE. Whether the soul is from itself. Everything true is true by truth; and every soul is a soul by that whereby it is a true soul. Every soul therefore has from truth that it is at all a soul. But the soul is one thing, truth another. For truth never suffers falsity, whereas the soul is often deceived. Not, therefore, since the soul is from truth, is it from itself. But truth is God: God therefore the soul has as its author, that it may be a soul. II. On free will. Everything that is made cannot be equal to that by which it is made. Otherwise justice, which must render to each its own, would necessarily be taken away from things. When God therefore made man, although He made him most excellent, He did not make him that which He Himself was.

But a man who is good by will is better than one who is good by necessity. Free will therefore had to be given to man. III. Whether man becomes worse with God as author. With no wise or good being as author does a man become worse. For this is no small fault, nay it is so great that it cannot befall any wise man whatsoever. But God is more excellent than every wise man. Much less, therefore, does man become worse with God as author. For God's will is far more excellent than the will of a wise man. And when it is said 'with Him as author', it is said 'with Him willing it'. There is therefore a defect of the will by which man becomes worse: and if this defect is far removed from the will of God, as reason teaches, it must be asked in what it lies. IV. What is the cause that man becomes worse.

That man should become worse — the cause is either in himself, or in some other, or in nothing. If in nothing, there is no cause. Or if it be taken thus 'in nothing', namely that man was made out of nothing, or out of those things which were made from nothing, then again the cause will be in himself, in that his matter, as it were, is nothing. If in some other, is it in God, or in any other man, or in that which is neither God nor man? But not in God; for God is the cause of good things. If therefore in man, it is either by force or by persuasion. But by force in no way, lest anything be more powerful than God. Since indeed God made man so excellently that, if he willed to remain most excellent, he would be hindered by no resistance.

But if we grant that a man is corrupted by the persuasion of another man, it will again have to be asked by whom the persuader himself was corrupted. For the persuader of such things cannot but be depraved. There remains some I-know-not-what, which is neither God nor good: yet this, whatever it is, either brought force to bear, or persuaded. As to force, the same answer is given as above; as to persuasion, whatever it is, since persuasion does not compel one against his will, the cause of his depravation returns to the will of that same man, whether he was depraved with something or with nothing persuading him. V. Whether an irrational animal can be happy. An animal which lacks reason lacks knowledge. But no animal which lacks knowledge can be happy.

It does not therefore fall to animals devoid of reason to be happy. NOTICE OF THE BENEDICTINE FATHERS. This present Book of the Eighty-three Diverse Questions has been newly revised against fifteen manuscript codices, namely two of the Roman Vatican library, one of the Parisian Royal library, two of the college of Navarre, one of the Sorbonne, one of the greater convent of the Augustinians, one of the abbey of St Genevieve, one of our own monastery of St Germain, likewise one each of St Maur des Fossés, St Bénigne of Dijon, St Michael in Peril of the Sea, two Cistercian ones, and one of the most illustrious lord D. de St Georges, bishop of Clermont.

Variant readings were also employed, which the theologians of Louvain, in their zeal to correct this same little work, gathered from five Belgian manuscripts. Finally, the older editions were collated: 'Rat', that is, the one printed at Lyons by John Trechsel under the care of Augustine of Regensburg in the year 1497; 'Er', which Desiderius Erasmus revised and had published from the Froben press at Basel in the year 1528; and the Louvain edition, which from the recension of the Louvain theologians was printed at Antwerp with the Plantin type in the year 1576. Besides these, we compared all those editions mentioned at the beginning of the Retractations and Confessions, volume 1. VI. On evil. Everything that is, is either corporeal or incorporeal.

The corporeal is contained under a sensible form, the incorporeal under an intelligible form. Everything therefore that is, is not without some form. But where there is any form, there is necessarily some measure, and measure is something of good. The highest evil therefore has no measure; for it lacks all good. It is not, therefore; because it is contained under no form, and this whole name of 'evil' has been found from the privation of form. VII. What is properly called 'soul' in a living being. The soul is sometimes so spoken of that mind is understood together with it; as when we say that man consists of soul and body: sometimes it is so spoken of that mind is excepted. But when it is spoken of with mind excepted, it is understood from those works which the one having it has in common with the beasts.

For beasts lack reason, which is always proper to mind. VIII. Whether the soul is moved of itself. He perceives that the soul is moved of itself who perceives that there is will in himself. For if we will, no other wills on our behalf. And this motion of the soul is spontaneous; for this has been bestowed on it by God. Yet this motion is not from place to place, as in the case of a body. For to be moved locally is proper to a body. And when the soul by its will — that is, by that motion which is not local — nevertheless moves its own body locally, it is not from this shown that the soul itself is also moved locally. Just as we see something moved by a hinge through a great space of place, and yet the hinge itself is not moved in place. IX. Whether truth can be perceived by the bodily senses.

Everything that a bodily sense touches, which is also called 'sensible', is changed without any interval of time: as when the hairs of our head grow, or the body declines into old age, or flourishes into youth, it is being done perpetually, nor does it altogether cease to be done. But that which does not abide cannot be perceived: for that is perceived which is grasped by knowledge. But that which is changed without intermission cannot be grasped. The sincerity of truth is not therefore to be expected from the bodily senses. But lest anyone say that there are certain sensible things ever abiding in the same manner, and bring against us the question of the sun and the stars, in which he cannot easily be refuted;

this at least there is no one who is not forced to confess: that there is nothing sensible which does not have something like the false, so that it cannot be distinguished. For, to pass over other things, all the things that we perceive through the body — even when they are not present to the senses — we nevertheless undergo their images as though they were altogether present, whether in sleep or in madness. And when we undergo this, we are wholly unable to discern whether we perceive them by the senses themselves, or whether they are images of sensible things. If therefore there are false images of sensible things which cannot be discerned by the senses themselves, and nothing can be perceived except what is discerned from the false, then the judgment of truth is not established in the senses.

Wherefore we are most wholesomely admonished to be turned away from this world, which is assuredly corporeal and sensible, and to be turned with all eagerness toward God, that is, toward Truth, which is grasped by the intellect and the inner mind, which ever abides and is of one same manner, which has no image of the false from which it cannot be discerned. X. Whether body is from God. All good is from God: everything beautiful is good, in so far as it is beautiful; and everything that possesses form is beautiful. But every body, in order to be a body, is contained under some form. Every body therefore is from God. XI. Why Christ was born of a woman. When God delivers, He delivers no mere part, but delivers the whole that is in peril.

The Wisdom and Power of God therefore, who is called the only-begotten Son, having taken up manhood, showed forth the deliverance of man. But the deliverance of man had to appear in each sex. Therefore, because it was fitting that He should take up the male, which is the more honourable sex, it followed that the deliverance of the female sex should appear from this, that that man was born of a woman. XII. The saying of a certain wise man. 'Come, O wretched mortals,' he says, 'do this: take care lest the malignant spirit ever pollute this dwelling; lest, mingling itself with the senses, it defile the sanctity of the soul and darken the light of the mind. This evil creeps in through all the avenues of sense;

it gives itself to shapes, adapts itself to colours, cleaves to sounds, lurks in anger, in the deceit of speech, submits itself to odours, pours itself into tastes, and by the muddy flood of turbid motion darkens the senses with shadowy affections, filling with certain mists all the passages of the understanding, through which the ray of the mind is wont to spread the light of reason. And because it is a ray of the ethereal light, and in it is the mirror of the divine presence — for in it God, in it the innocent will, in it the merit of right deeds shines forth — God is everywhere present; but then He is present at once to each of us, when the unstained purity of our mind has reckoned itself to be in His presence.

For just as the sight of the eyes, if it has been impaired, thinks whatever it cannot see to be not present — for in vain does the present image of things stand around the eyes, if soundness be lacking to the eyes — so also God, who is nowhere absent, is present in vain to polluted souls, whom the blindness of the mind cannot see. XIII. By what proof it is established that men excel the beasts. Among the many things by which it can be shown that man excels the beasts in reason, this is manifest to all: that wild beasts can be tamed and made gentle by men, but men in no way by beasts. XIV. That Christ's body was not a phantom. If Christ's body was a phantom, Christ deceived: and if He deceived, He is not truth. But Christ is truth.

His body therefore was not a phantom. XV. On the intellect. Everything that understands itself comprehends itself. But that whereby it comprehends itself is finite to itself. And the intellect understands itself. Therefore it is finite to itself. Nor does it wish to be infinite, although it could be; because it wishes to be known to itself, for it loves itself. XVI. On the Son of God. God is the cause of all things that are. But that which is the cause of all things is also the cause of His own wisdom: nor was God ever without His wisdom. Therefore He is the eternal cause of His eternal wisdom: nor is He prior in time to His wisdom. Furthermore, if to be an eternal Father belongs to God, and there never was a time when He was not Father, He was never without the Son. XVII. On the knowledge of God. Everything past now is not;

everything future is not yet: everything therefore both past and future is lacking. But with God nothing is lacking: neither the past therefore nor the future, but with God everything is present. XVIII. On the Trinity. Everything that is, is one thing whereby it consists, another whereby it is distinguished, another whereby it agrees. Every creature therefore, if it both exists in some manner, and is very far distant from that which is altogether nothing, and agrees with itself in its own parts, its cause too must needs be threefold: that whereby it is, that whereby it is this, that whereby it is at one with itself. But we call the cause of the creature — that is, its author — God. There must therefore be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent, and more blessed.

And therefore also, when truth is sought, there cannot be more than three kinds of question: whether a thing exists at all, whether it is this or another thing, whether it is to be approved or disapproved. XIX. On God and the creature. That which is immutable is eternal: for it is ever of the same manner. But that which is mutable is subject to time: for it is not ever of the same manner, and therefore is not rightly called eternal. For that which is changed does not abide: that which does not abide is not permanent. And this is the difference between the immortal and the eternal: that everything eternal is immortal, but not everything immortal is with sufficient subtlety called eternal:

because even if something always lives, yet if it suffers mutability, it is not properly to be called eternal, since it is not ever of the same manner; although, because it always lives, it may rightly be called immortal. But sometimes even that which is immortal is called eternal. But that which both suffers change, and by the presence of the soul is said to live — though it is not soul — can in no way be understood as immortal, and much less as eternal. For in the eternal, when it is properly spoken of, neither is anything past as though it had passed away, nor anything future as though it were not yet, but whatever is, only is. XX. On the place of God. God is not anywhere. For that which is anywhere is contained by place: that which is contained by place is a body.

But God is not a body: therefore He is not anywhere. And yet, because He is, and is not in a place, all things are rather in Him, than He is anywhere. Nor yet are they in Him in such a way that He should be their place: for a place is in space, which is occupied by the length and breadth and height of a body; and God is nothing of such a kind. All things therefore are in Him, and He is not a place. Yet the temple of God is by an abuse of language called the place of God, not because He is contained by it, but because He is present to it. And this is understood to be nothing better than a pure soul. XXI. Whether God is not the author of evil. Whoever is the author of all things that are, and to whose goodness it belongs only that whatever is should be, in no way can it belong to Him that a thing should not be.

But everything that fails, fails from being — that which is — and tends toward non-being. Now to be, and to fail in nothing, is good; and it is evil to fail. But He to whom non-being does not belong is not the cause of failing, that is, of tending toward non-being; because, so to speak, He is the cause of being. He is therefore the cause of good only: and for this reason He Himself is the highest good. Wherefore He who is the author of all things that are is not the author of evil: because in so far as things are, in so far are they good. XXII. That God does not suffer necessity. Where there is no want, there is no necessity: where there is no defect, there is no want. But there is no defect in God: there is therefore no necessity. XXIII. On the Father and the Son.

Everything chaste is chaste by chastity, and everything eternal is eternal by eternity, and everything beautiful by beauty, and everything good by goodness. Therefore everything wise too is wise by wisdom, and everything like by likeness. But 'chaste by chastity' is said in two ways: either because it begets chastity, so that it is chaste by that chastity which it begets, and to which it is the beginning and cause of being; or otherwise, when a thing is chaste by participation of chastity, which can at some time be not chaste; and so it is to be understood of the rest. For the soul too is understood or believed to attain eternity, but it becomes eternal by participation of eternity. But God is not eternal in this way, but in that He is the author of eternity itself.

This may be understood also of beauty and of goodness. Wherefore when God is called wise, and is called wise by that wisdom without which it is impious to believe that He ever was, or could be, He is not called wise by participation of wisdom, as is the soul, which can both be and not be wise: but because He Himself begot that wisdom by which He is called wise. Likewise those things which by participation are either chaste, or eternal, or beautiful, or good, or wise, receive — as has been said — that they can be neither chaste, nor eternal, nor beautiful, nor good, nor wise:

but chastity itself, eternity, beauty, goodness, wisdom in no way admit either corruption, or — so to speak — temporality, or baseness, or malice. Therefore even those things which by participation are like admit unlikeness: but likeness itself can in no part in any way be unlike. Whence it comes that, when the Son is called the likeness of the Father — because it is by participation of Him that whatever things are like, whether to one another or to God, are like (for He is the first form, whereby they are, so to speak, 'formed', and the form whereby all things are shaped) — He can in no part be unlike the Father.

The same therefore as the Father, so that this One is the Son, that One the Father, that is, this One the likeness, that One He whose likeness it is; this One substance, that One substance, whence there is one substance. For if it is not one, the likeness receives likeness; which most true reason denies can come to pass. XXIV. Whether sin and right action lie in the free choice of the will. Whatever happens by chance happens at random: whatever happens at random does not happen by providence. If therefore some things happen in the world by chance, the whole world is not administered by providence. If the whole world is not administered by providence, there is then some nature and substance which does not belong to the work of providence. But everything that is, in so far as it is, is good.

For that is supremely good, by participation of which the rest are good. And everything that is mutable is good — not through itself, but by participation of the immutable good — in so far as it is. Further, that good, by participation of which the rest, whatever they are, are good, is good not through another but through itself, which we also call divine providence. Nothing therefore happens by chance in the world. This being established, it seems to follow that whatever is done in the world is done partly by divine agency, partly by our own will. For God is far and incomparably better and more just than any man, however good and just.

But the Just One, ruling and governing all things, allows no punishment to be inflicted on anyone undeservedly, no reward to be given undeservedly. But the desert of punishment is sin; and the desert of reward is right action. Now neither sin nor right action can justly be imputed to anyone who has done nothing by his own will. There is therefore both sin and right action in the free choice of the will. XXV. On the cross of Christ. The Wisdom of God took up manhood as an example whereby we might live rightly. But it belongs to a right life not to fear the things that are not to be feared. But death is not to be feared. It was fitting therefore that this very thing should be shown by the death of that man whom the Wisdom of God took up.

But there are men who, though they do not fear death itself, nevertheless dread some particular manner of death. Yet none the less, just as death itself is not to be feared, so no manner of death is to be feared by a man living well and rightly. None the less therefore this too had to be shown by the cross of that man. For among all the manners of death there was nothing more execrable and more dreadful than that manner. XXVI. On the difference of sins. Some sins are of infirmity, others of ignorance, others of malice. Infirmity is contrary to virtue, ignorance is contrary to wisdom, malice is contrary to goodness. Whoever therefore knows what the virtue and wisdom of God is, is able to estimate which are venial sins.

And whoever knows what the goodness of God is, is able to estimate for which sins a certain punishment is due, both here and in the age to come. When these things have been well handled, it can with probability be judged who are not to be compelled to a sorrowful and lamentable penitence, although they confess their sins; and for whom no salvation at all is to be hoped, unless they have offered to God, through penitence, the sacrifice of a contrite spirit. XXVII. On providence. It can come to pass that through an evil man divine providence both punishes and gives aid. For the impiety of the Jews both supplanted the Jews, and was for the salvation of the Gentiles. Likewise it can come to pass that through a good man divine providence both condemns and helps, as the Apostle says: To some we are the savour of life

unto life, but to others the savour of death unto death (2 Corinthians 2:16). But since all tribulation is either the punishment of the impious, or the exercise of the just — because the same threshing both crushes the chaff and strips the grain from the chaff, whence 'tribulation' took its name — and again, since peace and rest from temporal troubles both profit the good and corrupt the wicked: all these things divine providence moderates according to the deserts of souls. Yet nevertheless the good do not choose for themselves the ministry of tribulation, nor do the wicked love peace. Wherefore these very ones, through whom that is done which they know not, receive the wage not of the justice which is referred to God, but of their own ill-will.

Just as it is not imputed to good men that harm befalls someone even though they wished to benefit him, but the reward of benevolence is granted to their good intention: so also the rest of creation, according to the merits of rational souls, is either felt or hidden, either burdensome or agreeable. For since the most high God administers well all that He has made, nothing is disordered in the universe, and nothing is unjust, whether we know it or not. But in one part the sinful soul is afflicted: yet because, according to its merits, it is there where it is fitting for such a one to be, and suffers those things which it is just for such a one to suffer, it in no way deforms the whole kingdom of God with any foulness of its own.

Wherefore, since we do not know all the good that the divine order works concerning us, in good will alone do we act according to the law; but in other things we are acted upon according to the law, since the law itself remains unchangeable and governs all changeable things with a most beautiful governance. "Glory therefore to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will" (Luke 2:14). XXVIII. Why God willed to make the world. He who asks why God willed to make the world seeks the cause of God's will. But every cause is efficient. Now everything that effects is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause is not to be sought. XXIX. Whether there is anything up or down in the universe.

"Mind the things that are above" (Col 3:2). We are bidden to mind the things that are above, namely spiritual things, which are to be understood as being above, not by the places and parts of this world, but by the merit of their excellence; lest we fix our mind upon a part of this world, of which whole world we ought to divest ourselves. But up and down exist in the parts of this world. For the universe itself has neither up nor down. For it is corporeal, since everything visible is corporeal. But in the whole body there is nothing up or down. For since motion seems to occur in six directions—the motion that is called straight, that is, which is not circular—forward and backward, to the right and to the left, upward and downward;

there is no reason at all why for the whole body there should be no before and after, and no right and left, yet there should be an up and down. But those who consider thus are deceived, because it is hard to resist the senses and habit. For the turning of the body—which happens if one wishes to be moved head-downward—is not so easy for us as the turning from right to left, or from front to back. Wherefore, setting words aside, one must engage the mind by itself, that it may be able to discern this. XXX. Whether all things were created for the use of man. As there is a difference between the honorable and the useful, so also between enjoying and using. For although it could be subtly maintained that everything honorable is useful and everything useful honorable:

nevertheless, because that is more properly and more usually called honorable which is to be sought for its own sake, while that is useful which is to be referred to something else: according to this distinction we now speak, keeping this indeed in mind, that the honorable and the useful in no way be opposed to each other. For these are sometimes thought, ignorantly and vulgarly, to be opposed. We are therefore said to enjoy that thing from which we take pleasure. We use that which we refer to that whence pleasure is to be taken. And so every human perversion, which is also called vice, is to wish to use things to be enjoyed, and to enjoy things to be used. And again, every right ordering, which is also named virtue, is to enjoy things to be enjoyed, and to use things to be used. Now the honorable is to be enjoyed, but the useful to be used.

I call the honorable the intelligible beauty, which we properly call spiritual; and the useful, the divine providence. Wherefore, although there are many beautiful visible things which are less properly called honorable, yet beauty itself, from which whatever things are beautiful are beautiful, is in no way visible. Likewise there are many useful visible things; but usefulness itself, from which whatever things profit us do profit, which we call divine providence, is not visible. Let it be well known that under the name of visible things all corporeal things are contained. We ought therefore to enjoy the invisible beautiful things, that is, the honorable ones: but whether all of them, is another question; though perhaps it is fitting to call honorable only those things which are to be enjoyed.

But useful things are all to be used, according as there is need of each of them. And even beasts are thought—not so absurdly—to enjoy food and any bodily pleasure; but nothing can use anything except a living being that partakes of reason. For to know to what each thing is to be referred is not given to those who lack reason, nor even to rational fools. No one can use a thing whose reference he does not know; nor can anyone know it except the wise man. Wherefore those who do not use well are more rightly said to abuse. For that which one uses badly profits no one; and what does not profit is certainly not useful. But whatever is useful is useful in the using: thus no one uses anything but the useful.

Therefore whoever uses badly does not truly use. The perfect reason of man, then, which is called virtue, uses first itself to understand God, that it may enjoy Him by whom also it was made. It uses the other rational living beings for fellowship, and the irrational ones for pre-eminence. It refers even its own life to this, that it may enjoy God: for thus it is blessed. Therefore it uses even itself; which indeed begins misery through pride, if it be referred to itself and not to God. It uses also certain bodies to be given life, for beneficence; for thus it uses its own body: