Letters & Polemics (CSEL) 60 part 3/9

Likewise in what I said a little after — that there is no natural evil — they can seek a similar hiding-place, unless this saying be referred to such a nature as was first created without fault. For it is truly and properly called the nature of man; but we use the word in a transferred sense when we also call 'nature' that as which man is born, according to which manner of speaking the Apostle said, 'For we too were once by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.' This work begins thus: 'If the Manicheans would choose whom they might deceive...' CHAPTER X. ON THE SIX BOOKS 'ON MUSIC.' Then, as I mentioned above, I wrote six books On Music.

Of these the sixth in particular became well known, since in it a matter worthy of knowledge is treated: namely, how from corporeal and spiritual, yet mutable, numbers one may arrive at the immutable numbers which are already in immutable Truth itself; and thus how the invisible things of God are beheld, being understood through the things that are made. Those who cannot do this, and yet live by faith in Christ, come to behold those things more surely and more blessedly after this life; but those who can, if they lack faith in Christ, who is the one Mediator between God and men, perish together with all their wisdom. In this book, that which I said — 'For bodies are the better the more numerous they are with such numbers' —

'but the soul, by doing without these things which it receives through the body, becomes better, when it turns itself away from the carnal senses and is reformed by the divine numbers of wisdom' — this is not to be taken as though there will be no corporeal numbers in incorruptible and spiritual bodies (since they will be more beautiful and more comely), or as though the soul will not perceive them when it is in its best state, in the way that here it becomes better by doing without them. For here it has need to turn itself away from the carnal senses in order to grasp intelligible things, because it is weak and less fit to apply its attention to both at once; and in these corporeal things enticement must now be guarded against, so long as the soul can be enticed to base delight.

But then it will be firm and perfect, so that it is not turned away by corporeal numbers from the contemplation of wisdom, and so perceives them that it is neither enticed by them nor made better by doing without them, but is so good and upright that they can neither escape it nor occupy it. Likewise what I said — 'But this health will then be most firm and most certain, when at its own fixed time and order this body shall have been restored to its former stability' — is not to be thought said as though after the resurrection there will not be bodies better than those of the first men in paradise were, since those bodies will no longer need to be nourished by the bodily nourishments by which these are nourished;

but the 'former stability' is to be understood thus far, namely, that those bodies will suffer no sickness at all, just as these could suffer none before sin. In another place: 'The love of this world,' I say, 'is more toilsome. For what the soul seeks in it — constancy, that is, and eternity — it does not find, since the lowest beauty is brought to completion by the passing away of things, and that in it which imitates constancy is transmitted from the most high God through the soul, since the species which is changeable only in time is prior to that which is changeable both in time and in place.' These words, if they can be taken in such a way that the lowest beauty is understood to be only in the bodies of men and of all animals, with which we live by bodily sense, manifest reason defends them.

For in that beauty it imitates constancy in this respect, that the same bodies remain in their frame, in so far as they remain; and this is transmitted into them from the most high God through the soul. For the soul itself holds the very frame together, lest it be dissolved and flow apart — which we see happen in the bodies of animals when the soul departs. But if beauty itself be understood in all bodies, this opinion compels us to believe even the very world to be an animal, so that even into it that which in it imitates constancy is transmitted from the most high God through a soul. Yet that this world is an animal, as Plato held and very many other philosophers, I could neither trace out by certain reason nor learn that it can be persuaded by the authority of the divine Scriptures.

Whence I marked as rashly said something of the kind said by me — such as could be taken also in the book On the Immortality of the Soul — not because I affirm this to be false, but because I do not comprehend it to be true, that the world is an animal. This indeed I do not doubt is to be held unshaken: that this world is not for us God, whether it have any soul or none; for if it have any, He who made it is our God; but if it have none, this world can be the God of none, much less ours. Yet that there is a spiritual and vital power — even if the world be not an animal — which power in the holy angels serves God for the adorning and administering of the world, is most rightly believed even by those who do not understand it.

But by the name of 'holy angels' I would now call every holy spiritual creature set within the secret and hidden ministry of God. Yet holy Scripture is not accustomed to signify the angelic spirits by the name of 'souls.' Accordingly, in that which I said toward the end of this book:

'The rational and intellectual numbers of the blessed and holy souls transmit the very law of God — without which not a leaf falls from the tree, and by which our very hairs are numbered — with no intervening nature receiving it, all the way down to the earthly and infernal ordinances' — I do not see how the term 'souls' can perhaps be shown to accord with the holy Scriptures, since here I meant nothing to be understood but the holy angels, whom I do not recall ever having read in the canonical divine utterances to have souls. This book begins thus: 'Long enough, well nigh...' CHAPTER XI. ON THE ONE BOOK 'ON THE TEACHER.' About the same time I wrote a book whose title is On the Teacher.

In it there is disputed and inquired and found that there is no teacher who teaches man knowledge except God, according to that also which is written in the Gospel: 'One is your teacher, Christ.' This book begins thus: 'What do we seem to you to wish to accomplish, when we speak?' CHAPTER XII. ON THE ONE BOOK 'ON TRUE RELIGION.'

Then also I wrote a book On True Religion, in which it is disputed in manifold and most copious fashion that the one true God, that is, the Trinity — Father and Son and Holy Spirit — is to be worshiped with true religion; and with how great a mercy of His, through the temporal dispensation, the Christian religion, which is the true religion, has been granted to men; and how man is to be fitted, by a certain sweetness, to the same worship of God. Most of all, however, this book speaks against the two natures of the Manicheans. In this book, in a certain place: 'Let it be manifest and perceived by you,' I say, 'that there could have been no error in religion, if the soul did not worship in place of its God either a soul or a body or its own phantasms.'

Here I put 'soul' for the whole incorporeal creation, not speaking after the manner of the Scriptures, which — when they do not use the word in a transferred sense — I do not know whether they mean anything to be understood by 'soul' except that by which mortal animals live, among which are also men, so long as they are mortal. But a little after I embraced the same meaning better and more briefly, where I said: 'Let us therefore not serve the creature rather than the Creator, nor become vain in our thoughts, and religion is perfect.' For by one name I signified both, that is, the spiritual and the corporeal creature. There remains what I said there, 'or its own phantasms,' on account of which I said here, 'nor become vain in our thoughts.' Likewise what I said:

'This is, in our times, the Christian religion, to know and follow which is the most secure and most certain salvation' — was said according to this name, not according to the very thing of which this is the name. For the very thing which is now called the Christian religion existed also among the ancients, nor was it lacking from the beginning of the human race, until Christ came in the flesh; whence the true religion, which already was, began to be called Christian. For when, after His resurrection and ascension into heaven, the apostles began to preach Him and very many believed, first at Antioch, as it is written, the disciples were called Christians. Therefore I said:

'This is, in our times, the Christian religion' — not because it did not exist in earlier times, but because in later times it received this name. In another place: 'Attend therefore,' I say, 'to these things which follow, diligently and piously, as far as you are able; for such men God helps.' This is not to be understood as though He helps only such men, whereas He helps even those who are not such, that they may become such — that is, that they may seek diligently and piously; but He helps such men that they may find. And likewise elsewhere: 'Then,' I say, 'it will now follow that, after the bodily death which we owe to the first sin, in its own time and its own order this body shall be restored to its former stability.'

This is to be understood thus: that even the former stability of the body, which we lost by sinning, had so great a felicity that it did not incline into the failing of old age. To this former stability, then, this body shall be restored in the resurrection of the dead; but it shall have something more, namely, that it be not sustained by temporal nourishments, but be quickened unto sufficiency by the Spirit alone, when it shall have risen into a quickening spirit, because it will then also be spiritual. But that which was first — although it would not have died had man not sinned — was nevertheless made animal, that is, into a living soul. And elsewhere: 'To such a degree,' I say, 'is voluntary sin an evil, that it is in no way sin if it be not voluntary.'

This definition may seem false, but, if it be diligently examined, it will be found to be most true.

For that sin must be considered which is only sin, not that which is also the punishment of sin — as I showed above, when I recalled certain things from the third book On Free Will. And yet even those which are not without reason called involuntary sins — because they are perpetrated either by the ignorant or by the compelled — cannot in every way be committed without the will; since even he who sins in ignorance sins assuredly by the will, in that, when the thing ought not to be done, he thinks it ought to be done; and he who, with the flesh lusting against the spirit, does not the things that he would, lusts indeed unwilling, and therefore does not what he wills, but, if he is overcome, he consents to concupiscence willingly, and therefore does nothing but what he wills — being, namely, free from righteousness and a slave of sin.

And that which is called original sin in little children — although they do not yet use the choice of the will — is not absurdly called also voluntary, because, being contracted from the first man's evil will, it has been made in a certain way hereditary. It is not therefore false, what I said: 'To such a degree is voluntary sin an evil, that it is in no way sin if it be not voluntary.' And so the grace of God not only looses the guilt of all past sins in all who are baptized in Christ — which is done by the Spirit of regeneration — but also in the grown the will itself is healed and prepared by the Lord, which is done by the Spirit of faith and charity. In another place, what I said concerning the Lord Jesus Christ:

'He did nothing by force, but all things by persuading and admonishing' — it had not occurred to me that by scourging He cast out of the temple those who sold and bought. But what is this, or how great is it, seeing that He also cast out the demons unwilling from men, not by the word of persuasion but by the power of might? Likewise in another place: 'These first,' I say, 'are to be followed, who say that the one supreme God alone is to be worshiped; if among these the truth shall not have shone forth, then at last one must migrate.' This can seem to have been said as though I had doubted concerning the truth of this religion. But I said it as was fitting for him to whom I was writing. For I said thus: 'If among these the truth shall not have shone forth,' in no way doubting that among them it would shine forth, just as the Apostle says:

'If Christ has not risen' — in no way doubting that He has risen. Likewise what I said: 'Nor have those miracles been permitted to last into our times, lest the soul should always seek things visible, and the human race grow cold through their familiarity — the race which had blazed with their novelty' — is indeed true; for it is not the case that even up to now, when the hand is laid upon the baptized, they so receive the Holy Spirit that they speak with the tongues of all nations, nor that even up to now the sick are healed by the passing shadow of the preachers of Christ; and if any such things were then done, it is manifest that they afterward ceased. But it is not to be so understood, what I said, as though no miracles are to be believed to be wrought now in the name of Christ.

For I myself, when I wrote that very book, already knew that at Milan, at the bodies of the martyrs, in that same city a blind man had been given sight, and some other things — such as many, even in these times, are done — so that we can neither know them all, nor enumerate those which we do know. And in another place, that which I said: 'as the Apostle says, All order is from God' — the Apostle did not say this in the same words, although the meaning seems to be the same. For he says: 'The things that are, are ordained by God.' And elsewhere: 'Absolutely,' I say, 'let no one deceive us: whatever is rightly blamed is rejected in comparison with something better.' This was said concerning substances and natures; for it was concerning these that the discussion was, not concerning good acts and sins.

And likewise elsewhere: 'But not even so,' I say, 'is man to be loved by man as carnal brothers or sons or spouses or any kinsfolk or connections or fellow-citizens are loved; for that love too is temporal. For we would have no such relationships — which come about by being born and by dying — if our nature, remaining in the precepts and image of God, were not relegated into this corruption.' This meaning I altogether disapprove, which I have already disapproved above, in the first book On Genesis against the Manicheans. For it leads to this: that those first spouses are believed not to have been going to beget descendants unless they had sinned — as though it had been necessary that mortals be begotten, if they were begotten from the intercourse of male and female.

For I had not yet seen that it could have come to pass that non-mortals should be born of non-mortals, if by that great sin human nature had not been changed for the worse; and thereby, if in both the parents and the children happiness and fecundity had remained, up to a certain number of the saints, which God has predestined, men would be born not destined to succeed dying parents, but to reign together with the living. There would therefore be even these kinships and affinities, if no one sinned and no one died. Likewise in another place: 'Tending toward the one God,' I say, 'and binding back our souls to Him alone — whence religion is believed to be so called — let us be free from all superstition.'

In these words of mine the reason that was rendered, whence religion is so called, pleased me more. For it does not escape me that the authors of the Latin tongue set forth another origin of this name — that it is called religio because it is 're-chosen' (religitur); which word is compounded from 'legere,' that is, 'choosing' (eligere), so that religo appears Latin just as eligo does. This book begins thus: 'Since the whole way of a good and blessed life...' CHAPTER XIII. ON THE ONE BOOK 'ON THE PROFIT OF BELIEVING.'

Now indeed at Hippo Regius, as a presbyter, I wrote a book On the Profit of Believing to a friend of mine, whom I knew to have been deceived by the Manicheans and to be still held fast in that error, and to be mocking the discipline of the catholic faith, because men were bidden to believe, but were not taught by most certain reason what was true. In this book I said: 'In which precepts and commandments of the law, however — which it is not now lawful for Christians to use, such as the Sabbath or circumcision or sacrifices and whatever is of this kind — so great mysteries are contained that every pious man understands nothing to be more pernicious than that whatever is there should be taken to the letter, that is, to the word, but nothing more wholesome than that it be revealed by the Spirit. Hence it is:

'The letter kills, but the spirit gives life.' But I have expounded these words of the Apostle Paul otherwise, and — as far as it seems to me, or rather as appears from the things themselves — much more suitably, in that book which is entitled On the Spirit and the Letter, although this sense too is not to be rejected. Likewise I said: 'For there are two kinds of persons praiseworthy in religion: one of those who have already found, whom it is necessary to judge even most blessed; the other of those who most zealously and most rightly seek. The first, then, are already in the very possession; the others on the way, by which nevertheless one most certainly arrives.'

In these words of mine, if those who have already found — whom we said are already in the very possession — be so understood as most blessed, that they are so not in this life but in that which we hope for and toward which we tend by the way of faith, this meaning has no error; for they are to be judged to have found what was to be sought, who are already there whither, by seeking and believing — that is, by holding the way of faith — we desire to arrive. But if these are thought to be, or to have been, in this life, that does not seem to me to be true; not because in this life nothing at all true can be found which may be discerned by the mind and not believed by faith, but because whatever it is, it is so slight that it does not make men most blessed. For neither does that which the Apostle says:

'We see now through a mirror in an enigma,' and 'Now I know in part' — this 'in part' is not discerned by the mind; it is discerned plainly enough, but it does not yet make men most blessed. For that makes men most blessed which he says: 'But then face to face,' and 'Then shall I know, even as I have been known.' Those who have found this are the ones to be said to stand in the possession of blessedness, to which the way of faith leads, which we hold and whither by believing we desire to arrive. But who those most blessed are, who are already in that possession whither this way leads, is a great question. And that the holy angels are there, indeed, there is no question. But concerning the holy men already deceased, whether they are to be said to stand already in that possession, is rightly asked.

For they have now indeed been stripped of the corruptible body by which the soul is weighed down, but even they themselves still await the redemption of their body, and their flesh rests in hope, not yet shining forth in the future incorruption. But whether, for contemplating the truth with the eyes of the heart — as it is said, 'face to face' — they have anything the less on this account, this is not the place to inquire by disputing. Likewise what I said: 'For to know great and honorable, or even divine, things is most blessed' — we ought to refer to that same blessedness. For in this life, however much of it be known, it is not yet most blessed, since incomparably far greater is that which is not known thereof. And what I said:

'That it makes a great difference whether something is held by the mind by certain reason — which we call knowing — or whether it is usefully commended to posterity to be believed by report or by writings,' and a little after, 'What we know, therefore, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority' — this is not to be so taken that in more customary speech we should be afraid to say we 'know' what we believe on suitable witnesses. For properly speaking, when we speak, we say we 'know' only that which we comprehend by the firm reason of the mind. But when we speak with words more fitted to custom — as the divine Scripture also speaks — let us not hesitate to say that we 'know' both what we perceive by the senses of our body and what we believe on trustworthy witnesses, provided nevertheless that we understand what difference there is between these and that.

Likewise what I said: 'It is doubtful to no one that all men are either foolish or wise' — may seem to be contrary to that which is read in the third book On Free Will: 'as though human nature admitted no middle affection besides the foolish and the wise.' But that was said there where it was inquired concerning the first man, whether he was made wise or foolish or neither; since in no way could we call foolish him who was made without fault (seeing that folly is a great fault), and in what way we might call wise him who could be seduced was not sufficiently apparent. And therefore, for brevity's sake, I wished to say: 'as though human nature admitted no middle affection besides folly and wisdom.'

For I had in view also the little children, who — although we confess that they contract original sin — nevertheless we cannot properly call either wise or foolish, since they do not yet use free choice either well or ill. But now, when I said that all men are either wise or foolish, I wished those to be understood who already use reason, by which they are distinguished from cattle so as to be men — just as we say that all men wish to be happy. For surely in a saying so true and so manifest we do not fear lest even the little children be understood, who cannot yet wish this? In another place, when I had recalled the miracles which the Lord Jesus did while He was here in the flesh, I added, saying: 'Why,' you will say, 'are these things not done now?' And I answered:

'Because they would not move men, unless they were wondrous; but if they were customary, they would not be wondrous.' But I said this because now such great things, and not all things, are done — not because none are done even now. But at the end of the book: 'But since this discourse of ours,' I say, 'has proceeded much farther than I thought, let us here make an end of the book. In which I wish you to remember that I have not yet begun to refute the Manicheans, nor yet assailed those trifles — nor disclosed anything great concerning the catholic Church herself, but wished only, if I could, to root out for you even the opinion of true Christians maliciously or ignorantly instilled into us, and to rouse you to the learning of certain great and divine things. Therefore let this volume so stand.'

'But when your mind has been made more appeased, I shall perhaps be readier in the rest.' I did not say this as though I had as yet written nothing against the Manicheans, or committed nothing of catholic doctrine to writing — since so many volumes published above concerning both matters testify that I had not been silent — but because in this book, written to that man, I had not yet begun to refute the Manicheans and had not yet assailed those trifles, nor disclosed anything great concerning the catholic Church herself, since I hoped that, this beginning having been made, I would write to him those things which I had not written here. This book begins thus: 'If to me, Honoratus, one and the same thing seemed to be...' CHAPTER XIV. ON THE ONE BOOK 'ON THE TWO SOULS.'

After this book, while still a presbyter, I wrote against the Manicheans On the Two Souls; of which they say that one part is of God, the other of the race of darkness, which God did not create and which is co-eternal with God; and they rave that these two souls, one good and the other evil, are both in one man — saying, namely, that the evil one is proper to the flesh, which flesh they also say is of the race of darkness, but the good one is from the adventitious part of God, which, when it had clashed with the race of darkness, both were mingled together; and they attribute all the good things of man to that good soul, but all the evil things to that evil soul.

In this book, when I said that there is no life whatsoever which, by the very fact that it is life and insofar as it is life at all, does not pertain to the highest fountain and beginning of life, I said it in such a way that it is to be understood as pertaining to the Creator as a creature does, and not to be reckoned as being from Him as though it were a part of Him. Likewise, when I said that sin exists nowhere except in the will, the Pelagians may suppose this to have been said in their favour on account of infants, whom they deny to have original sin for this reason, that it should be remitted to them in baptism, since they do not yet make use of the choice of the will.

As if indeed the sin which we say they draw originally from Adam—that is, being implicated in his guilt and on this account held liable to punishment—could ever have existed except from the will, by which will it was committed when the transgression of the divine precept took place. It might also be thought that this opinion is false, in which we said that sin exists nowhere except in the will, because the Apostle said: But if I do what I do not will, it is no longer I that work it, but the sin that dwells in me. For this sin is so far from being in the will that he says: What I do not will, that I do. How then is sin nowhere except in the will?

But this sin, of which the Apostle thus spoke, is called sin for this reason: that it was brought about by sin and is the punishment of sin, since indeed this is said of the concupiscence of the flesh, which he discloses in what follows, saying: I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwells no good; for to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I find not. For the perfection of the good is that not even the concupiscence of sin should be in a man—to which indeed, when one lives well, the will does not consent; yet nevertheless it does not accomplish the good, because concupiscence is still present, to which the will is opposed. The guilt of this concupiscence is loosed in baptism, but the infirmity remains, against which, until it is healed, every faithful person who makes good progress most earnestly struggles.

But the sin which is nowhere except in the will is chiefly to be understood as that which a just condemnation followed—for this entered into the world through one man—although this sin also, by which one consents to the concupiscence of sin, is not committed except by the will. On this account I also said in another place: Therefore one does not sin except by the will. And likewise in another place I defined the will itself, saying: The will is a movement of the mind, with none compelling, either toward not losing or toward attaining something.