Letters & Polemics (CSEL) 37 part 22/28

Nor is it to be supposed that this tempter would have cast the man down, unless there had already gone before, in the man's soul, a certain pride that needed to be curbed, so that through the humiliation of sin—a sin he had falsely presumed himself incapable of—he might learn his lesson. For it was most truly said: 'Before ruin the heart is exalted, and before glory it is humbled.' And perhaps the voice of such a man is heard in the Psalm: 'I said in my abundance: I shall never be moved.' Then, having now experienced what evil there is in the proud presumption of one's own power, and what good there is in the help of God's grace, he says: 'O Lord, in thy will thou didst give strength to my beauty; but thou didst turn away thy face, and I was troubled.'

But whether this was said of this man or of another, leave that aside: to a soul exalting itself and over-confident, as though relying on its own strength, it had nevertheless to be shown even by the experience of punishment how ill it fares with a made nature, if it withdraws from its Maker. For hence above all is it commended what a good God is, since it is well with no one who withdraws from him; because both those who take delight in death-dealing pleasures cannot be free from the fear of pains, and those who by a greater stupor of pride feel not at all the evil of their own desertion appear far more wretched to others who have learned to discern these things—so that, if they will not accept the medicine of avoiding such things, they may at least serve as an example whereby such things can be avoided.

For as the apostle James says, 'each one is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; and sin, when it is completed, begets death.' Whence, when the swelling of pride has been healed, one rises again, if the will—which before the trial was lacking, that one might remain with God—may at least be present after the trial, that one may return to God. Now certain people are disturbed by this temptation of the first man, that God permitted it to happen, as though they did not now see the whole human race being tempted without cease by the snares of the devil. Why does God permit this too? Is it not because virtue is proved and exercised, and the palm is more glorious to have been tempted and not consented than not to have been able to be tempted?

For even those very ones who, forsaking the Creator, go after the tempter, tempt more and more those who abide in the word of God, and afford them an example against the lust of desertion, and strike into them a godly fear against pride. Whence the apostle says: 'considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted.' For it is wonderful how greatly this humility, by which we are made subject to the Creator, lest we should presume upon our own strength as though not needing his help, is commended by continual care throughout all the divine Scriptures. Since therefore even by the unjust the just profit, and by the impious the pious, it is said in vain: 'God would not create those whom he foreknew would be evil.'

For why would he not create those whom he foreknew would profit the good, so that they might be born both useful for exercising and admonishing the good wills of the good, and might be justly punished for their own evil will? 'He would have made,' they say, 'a man such as would not sin at all.' Behold, we grant that a nature which will not sin at all is better; let them too grant that a nature is not evil which was so made that it could refrain from sinning, if it would; and that the sentence is just by which that nature was punished which sinned by will, not by necessity.

As therefore true reason teaches that a creature which nothing unlawful delights at all is better, so true reason no less teaches that that creature also is good which has in its power so to restrain unlawful delight, should it arise, that it rejoices not only over other lawful and rightly done things, but even over the very restraining of that depraved delight. Since therefore this nature is good, and that one better, why would God make that one alone and not rather both? And by this, those who were prepared to praise God for that one alone ought to praise him more abundantly for both; for the one exists in the holy angels, the other in holy men.

But those who chose for themselves the part of iniquity and by a culpable will depraved their praiseworthy nature—not because they were foreknown ought they therefore least of all to have been created. For they too have their own place, which they fill among things for the profit of the saints. For God needs neither the justice of any upright man—how much less the iniquity of the perverse! But who, upon sober consideration, would say: 'It were better not to create one whom he foreknew could be corrected by another's iniquity, than to create even one whom he foreknew ought to be damned for his own iniquity'? For this is to say: 'It were better that there should not be one who, using another's evil well, would mercifully be crowned, than that there should be even an evil one who would be justly punished according to his own desert.'

For when sure reason demonstrates two goods that are not equal, but one higher and the other lower, the slow of heart do not understand that, when they say, 'Let both be of such a kind,' they are saying nothing other than, 'Let only that one exist.' And so, while they wish to equalize the kinds of goods, they diminish the number, and by immoderately increasing the one kind, they abolish the other. But who would listen to them, if they were to say: 'Since the sense of seeing is more excellent than that of hearing, let there be four eyes and no ears'?

So, if that rational creature is more excellent which, without comparison to any punishment and without any pride, is made subject to God, while a certain creature is so made in men that it cannot recognize in itself God's benefit except by seeing another's punishment—so that it may not be high-minded, but may fear, that is, may not presume upon itself, but may trust in God—who, rightly understanding, would say, 'Let this one be such as that one is,' and not see that he is saying nothing other than, 'Let this one not exist, but let only that one exist'?

But if this is said unlearnedly and unwisely, why then would God not create even those whom he foreknew would be evil, 'willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, and on this account enduring with much patience the vessels of wrath that are fitted unto destruction, that he might make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory'? For thus 'he that glorieth, let him glory only in the Lord,' when he acknowledges that it is not his own, but his—not only that he exists, but also that it is well with him only from him from whom he has his being. Most inopportunely therefore is it said:

'There would not be those to whom God bestows so great a beneficence of his mercy, if they could not exist otherwise, unless there were also those in whom he might demonstrate the justice of his vengeance.' For why should not both rather exist, since in both the goodness of God and his equity are rightly proclaimed? But, they say, if God willed, even these would be good. How much better did God will this: that they should be what they willed, but the good not fruitlessly, while the evil should not be unpunished, and in this very thing should be useful to others! But he foreknew that their will would be evil. He foreknew indeed—and, because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, therefore the evil will is not his but theirs. Why then did he create those whom he foreknew would be such?

Because, just as he foresaw what evil they would do, so also he foresaw what good he himself would do out of their evil deeds. For he so made them that he left to them whereby they too might do something, so that, whatever they might even culpably choose, they should find him working praiseworthily out of them. For from themselves they have the evil will, but from him both a good nature and a just punishment, a place due to themselves, for others an aid to exercise and an example of fear. But, says he, he could even convert their will to good, since he is omnipotent. He could indeed, plainly. Why then did he not do it? Because he willed not. Why he willed not, rests with himself. For we ought not to be wiser than it behoves to be wise.

Yet I think we have shown a little before sufficiently that it is no small good to be a rational creature—even this one, which by comparison with evils guards against evil. This kind of good creature would surely not exist, if almighty God had converted all evil wills into good and had inflicted the due punishment on no iniquity; and thus there would exist only that kind which profits by no comparison of the evils of sin or of punishment. So, as it were, by the increased multiplication of the more excellent kind, the number of the very kinds of goods would be diminished. Therefore, they say, is there something in the works of God that has need of another's evil, whereby it may profit unto good?

Have men so become deaf and blinded, by I know not what zeal for contention, that they do not hear or see that by the punishment of certain ones very many are corrected? For what pagan, what Jew, what heretic does not daily prove this in his own household? Yet when it comes to disputation and the inquiry into truth, men are unwilling to attend to their own perceptions, from which they might see by what work of divine providence there comes upon them the disturbance of discipline to be imposed—so that, even if those who are punished are not corrected, yet by their example the rest may fear, and the just ruin of some may avail unto the salvation of others. For is God the author of the malice or wickedness of those about whose just punishment he takes counsel for those whom he has determined must be counseled in this way? Certainly not.

But since he foreknew that they would be evil by their own vices, he did not on that account cease to create them, reckoning it to the benefit of those whom he created in this kind, that they might not be able to profit unto good except by comparison with evils. For if they did not exist, they would surely be of use to nothing. Is it too little good that they should exist, who are certainly useful to that other kind? And whoever does not wish that this kind should exist, does nothing other than that he himself should not be in it. 'Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all his wills.'

He foresees the good to come and creates them; he foresees the evil to come and creates them; offering himself to be enjoyed by the good, lavishing many of his gifts even upon the evil; mercifully sparing, justly avenging; and again, mercifully avenging, justly sparing; fearing nothing from anyone's malice, needing nothing from anyone's justice; taking counsel for himself in nothing, yet taking counsel both by the works of the good and by the punishments of the evil for the good.

Why then would he not permit the man to be tempted by that temptation whereby he was to be exposed, convicted, and punished—when the proud concupiscence of his own power should bring forth what it had conceived and be confounded by its own offspring, and by a just punishment should deter from the evil of pride and disobedience his posterity, for whom these things were being prepared to be written down and announced? But if it be asked why above all the devil was permitted to tempt through the serpent: whom would not the Scripture of so great an authority admonish that this was done for the sake of signifying—working in prophecy by as many proofs of divinity as the world has now been filled with by their fulfillments?

Not that the devil wished to signify anything for our instruction, but since he could not approach to tempt unless permitted, could he approach by any other means than that by which he was permitted? Whatever therefore that serpent signified must be attributed to that providence under which the devil himself has indeed his own lust of harming, but a power only such as is given, either for the overthrowing and destroying of the vessels of wrath, or for the humbling or proving of the vessels of mercy. Whence the nature of the serpent comes, therefore, we know; for 'the earth brought forth in the word of God all cattle, both serpents and beasts.'

All this creation, having in itself an irrational living soul, is subject to the whole rational creation—whether of good or of evil will—by the law of the divine order. What wonder therefore is it, if the devil was permitted to work something through the serpent, when Christ himself permitted the demons to enter into the swine? It is rather concerning the very nature of the devil that inquiry is more scrupulously wont to be made; which certain heretics, offended by the vexation of his evil will, try wholly to alienate from being a creature of the highest and true God, and to give him another principle that is against God.

For they are not able to understand that everything which exists, in so far as it is a substance, is both good and cannot exist except from that true God, from whom is all good; but that an evil will is moved inordinately by preferring inferior goods to superior ones, and that it thus came to pass that the spirit of the rational creature, delighted by its own power on account of its excellence, swelled with pride, through which it fell from the beatitude of the spiritual paradise, and pined away with envy. In which, nevertheless, this very thing is good—that it lives and vivifies a body, whether aerial, as is the spirit of the devil himself or of the demons, or earthly, as is the soul of any man, even a malignant and perverse one.

So, while they are unwilling that anything which God has made should sin by its own will, they say that the very substance of God was first by necessity, and afterward inexpiably by will, corrupted and perverted. But of the most insane error of these people we have already said much elsewhere. In this work, however, it must be inquired according to Holy Scripture what is to be said of the devil. First, whether from the very beginning of the world itself, delighted by his own power, he stood apart from that fellowship and charity by which the angels are blessed who enjoy God; or whether for some time he was in the holy company of the angels, himself likewise just and likewise blessed. For some say that his fall from the heights was for this reason, that he envied man made to the image of God.

But further, envy follows pride, it does not precede it; for envy is not the cause of being proud, but pride is the cause of envying. Since therefore pride is the love of one's own excellence, while envy is the hatred of another's happiness, it is sufficiently plain whence each arises. For in loving his own excellence, a man envies either his equals, that they should be made equal to him, or his inferiors, lest they be made equal to him, or his superiors, that he is not made equal to them. Therefore by being proud one is envious, not by being envious is one proud. Rightly did Scripture define pride as the beginning of all sin, saying: 'Pride is the beginning of all sin.' To which testimony there is also not incongruously fitted that which the apostle says:

'The root of all evils is avarice'—if we understand avarice generally, by which anyone desires something more than he ought on account of his own excellence and a certain love of what is his own. To which the Latin tongue wisely gave a name, when it called it 'private' (privatum), which clearly is said rather from loss (detrimentum) than from increase; for every privation diminishes. Whence therefore pride wishes to rise up, thence it is thrust into straits and want, when by a ruinous love of self it is reduced from the common to the private. But there is a special avarice, which is more usually called the love of money; by whose name the apostle, signifying the genus through the species, wished universal avarice to be understood, saying: 'The root of all evils is avarice.'

For by this the devil too fell, who assuredly loved not money, but his own power. Accordingly, perverse love of self deprives the swollen spirit of holy fellowship and cramps it in misery, as it now longs to be sated through iniquity. Hence in another place, when the apostle had said, 'For men shall be lovers of themselves,' he immediately subjoined, 'lovers of money,' descending from that general avarice, whose head is pride, to this special one, which is proper to men. For men would not be lovers of money either, unless they thought themselves the more excellent for being the richer. To which disease charity is contrary, which 'seeketh not the things that are its own'—that is, it does not rejoice in private excellence; rightly therefore also it 'is not puffed up.'

These two loves—of which the one is holy, the other unclean; the one social, the other private; the one taking counsel for the common good on account of the fellowship above, the other reducing even the common good into its own power on account of arrogant domination; the one subject, the other rivaling God; the one tranquil, the other turbulent; the one peaceable, the other seditious; the one preferring truth to the praises of the erring, the other greedy of praise by any means whatever; the one friendly, the other envious; the one wishing for its neighbor what it wishes for itself, the other wishing to subject its neighbor to itself; the one ruling its neighbor for its neighbor's benefit, the other for its own—these preceded in the angels, the one in the good, the other in the evil, and marked out the two cities founded within the human race, under the admirable and ineffable providence of God administering and ordering all things which he creates, the one of the just, the other of the unjust.

By whose temporal intermingling this age is carried on, until at the last judgment they be separated, and the one, joined to the good angels, may attain eternal life in its King, while the other, joined to the evil angels, may be sent into eternal fire with its king. Concerning which two cities perhaps we shall discourse more at large in another place, if the Lord will. When therefore pride cast down the devil, so that by a depraved will he perverted his own good nature, Scripture does not say; yet that this was done before, and that from it he envied man, manifest reason declares. For it is plain to all who consider these things that pride is not born of envy, but rather envy of pride.

But it can not be thought without reason that from the beginning of time the devil fell through pride, and that there was no prior time in which he lived at peace and blessed with the holy angels, but that from the very outset of the creature he apostatized from his Creator—so that what the Lord says, 'He was a murderer from the beginning, and stood not in the truth,' we may understand in both respects: not only that he was a murderer, but also that he stood not in the truth. And a murderer indeed from that beginning from which man could be slain; but he could not be slain before there existed one who might be slain. From the beginning therefore the devil is a murderer, because he himself slew the first man, before whom no man existed. But in the truth he stood not, and this from the beginning, from which he himself was created.

He would have stood, if he had willed to stand. For how can he be believed to have led a blessed life among the blessed angels, who was not foreknowing of his own future sin and punishment—that is, of his desertion and of the eternal fire? If he was not foreknowing, it is rightly asked why he was not. For neither are the holy angels uncertain of their eternal life and blessedness; for how are they blessed, if uncertain? Or shall we say that God was unwilling to reveal this to the devil, while he was yet a good angel—either what he would do or what he would suffer—but revealed to the rest that they would abide eternally in his truth?

But if this is so, then already he was not equally blessed—nay, was not even fully blessed—since those who are fully blessed are certain of their blessedness, so that no fear should disturb it. But by what evil was he rightly so distinguished from the rest, that God would not reveal to him even those future things that pertained to himself? Was he perhaps an avenger before the other was a sinner? Far be it. For God does not condemn the innocent. Or was he perhaps of another kind of angels, to whom God did not give even foreknowledge of the future things concerning themselves? Who these could be blessed I do not see, whose very blessedness is uncertain to them.

For some have held this too, that the devil was not in that sublime nature of the angels which is supercelestial, but in that of those who were made somewhat lower in the world and distributed according to their offices. For such perhaps something even unlawful might delight; which delight, however, if they were unwilling to sin, they would restrain by free choice, just as man—especially that first man, who did not yet have the punishment of sin in his members, since that too is overcome by holy men subject to God, through his grace, by piety. Furthermore, this question about the blessed life—whether anyone is to be said to have it already, of whom it is uncertain whether it will remain with him or whether misery may at some time succeed it—can arise also concerning that first man himself.

For if he was conscious of his own future sin and of divine vengeance, whence could he be blessed? Therefore he was in paradise not blessed. But indeed he was not foreknowing of his own future sin. Therefore, through this ignorance, either he was uncertain of that same blessedness—and how then was he already truly blessed? Or he was certain by a false hope, not by knowledge—and how then was he not foolish? Yet nevertheless, of a man still constituted in an animal body, to whom, if he lived obediently, there was yet to be given the fellowship of the angels and the change of his body from animal into spiritual, we can understand a blessed life according to a certain measure, even if he was not foreknowing of his own future sin. For neither were those foreknowing to whom the apostle says:

'You who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness, considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted.' Yet not absurdly nor improperly do we say that they were already blessed by this very thing, that they were spiritual—not in body, but in the justice of faith—'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation.' How much more therefore, and in an ampler measure, was man blessed in paradise before sin, though uncertain of his own future fall, who so rejoiced in hope on account of the reward of the future transformation, that there was no tribulation for whose enduring patience should do service!

For although not by a vain presumption certain of the uncertain, like a fool, but by a hope that is not unfaithful, before he should attain that life in which he would be most certain of his own eternal life, he could exult, even as it is written, 'with trembling'; and by this exultation far more abundantly in paradise than the saints on this earth, he was blessed in a certain lower mode than in that eternal life of the saints and the supercelestial angels, yet not by no mode at all.

But to say of certain angels that they can be blessed in a kind of their own, being uncertain of their future iniquity and damnation, or at least of perpetual salvation—to whom no hope would underlie that they too would at some time be made certain of this matter by some change for the better—is a presumption scarcely to be borne; unless perhaps this too be said, that these angels were so created, distributed to worldly ministries under others more sublime and more blessed, that for deeds rightly done they might receive from those set over them that blessed and more sublime life, of which they could be most certain, and by the hope of which, rejoicing, they might not incongruously be called already blessed.

If the devil fell from the number of these, together with the associates of his iniquity, this is similar to the case of men who likewise fall from the justice of faith, transgressing by a like pride, either seducing themselves or consenting to that seducer. But let those who can maintain these two kinds of good angels—one of the supercelestial, among whom there never was he who by falling became the devil, the other of the worldly, among whom he was. For me, however,

I confess, whence I might maintain this according to the Scriptures does not for the present occur to me; but constrained by that question in which it is asked whether he was foreknowing of his own fall before he fell, lest I should say that the angels are or ever were uncertain of their blessedness, I said that it can not without reason be thought that the devil fell from the very beginning of the creature—that is, from the very outset either of time or of his own condition—and never stood in the truth. Whence some think that he was not turned aside into this malice by the free choice of his will, but was created altogether in it—though by the Lord God, the highest and true Creator of all natures; and they adduce a testimony from the book of Job, since it is there written, when the discourse was concerning him:

'This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning, which he made that it might be mocked by his angels.' With which sentence agrees what is written in the Psalm: 'This dragon, whom thou hast fashioned to be mocked by him'—except that here it says 'whom thou hast fashioned,' not as there, 'This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning,' as though at the beginning he had so fashioned him that he was evil, envious, a seducer, in short the devil—not depraved by his will, but so created. But how this opinion is not opposed to that which is written, 'God made all things,'

'and behold, they were very good,' where the devil is found not depraved by his own will, but made very evil by the Lord God himself?—although they try to show, and it may be maintained not tastelessly nor unlearnedly, that not only in the first condition, but even now, with so many wills depraved, yet in the sum total all things that have been created—that is, the whole creation altogether—is very good; not that the evil are good in it, but that they do not effect by their malice that under the command of God the administrator, by his power and wisdom, the beauty and order of the universe should in any part be disgraced or disturbed, since to each of their wills, even the evil ones, are assigned fixed and fitting limits of powers and weights of merits, so that even with these suitably and justly ordered the universe may be beautiful.

nevertheless, since it occurs to anyone, and is true and manifest, that it is contrary to justice itself that God should condemn in anyone, with no preceding merit, that very thing which he himself created in him; and since a sure and evident condemnation of the devil and his angels is recited from the Gospel, where the Lord foretold that he would say to those who are on the left, 'Go into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels'—it must in no way be believed that in him the nature which God created, but rather his own evil will, is to be punished by the penalty of eternal fire. Nor is his nature signified by what was said:

'This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning, which he made that it might be mocked by his angels'—but rather either the aerial body, which he fitted congruously to such a will; or the very ordination in which he made him, even unwilling, useful to the good; or that, foreknowing him to be evil by his own will, he nevertheless made him, not withholding his own goodness in furnishing life and substance even to a will that would be harmful, at the same time foreseeing how great goods he would work out of him by his own marvelous goodness and power.