Letters & Polemics (CSEL) 19 part 3/4

so that by that very thing they may be judged least to be followed and most to be guarded against, whereby they profess themselves to be liars for the concealing of their heresy. This must first be assailed in them; this, as it were their suitable defence, must be struck with the blows of truth and cast down. Nor is any other hiding-place—which they did not have—to be furnished them, whither they may flee; so that, if perchance they be exposed by those whom they had tried but were unable to seduce, they might say: 'We wished to test them, since we prudent Catholics were taught that this must be done for the finding out of heretics.' But it is fitting that I state somewhat more commendably why this threefold method of disputing seems to me right against those who wish to bring in the divine Scriptures as patrons for their lies:

namely, that first we show that some things which are there thought to be lies are not what they are thought to be, if they be rightly understood; then, that if any lies there are manifest, they are not to be imitated; thirdly, against all the opinions of all men, by which it seems to pertain to the office of a good man to lie at some time, that it must in every way be held that in the teaching of religion one must in no way lie. For these three things I commended and in a certain manner enjoined upon you to carry out a little before. To show, then, that certain things which are thought in the Scriptures to be lies are not what they are thought, if they be rightly understood—let it not seem to you of little avail against those men, that they find their supposed examples of lying not from the apostolic but from the prophetic writings.

For all those things which they mention by name, where anyone lied, are read in those books in which not only many sayings but also many deeds have been written figuratively, because they were also done figuratively. But in figures, what is said as it were as a lie is, when well understood, found to be true. The apostles, however, in their epistles spoke in one way; and in another way were written the Acts of the Apostles, the New Testament being now, of course, revealed, which was veiled by those prophetic figures.

Finally, in so many apostolic epistles and in that so great book itself, in which their acts are narrated with canonical truth, no such liar is found as might be set forth by these men from it as an example for the license of lying—since indeed that dissimulation of Peter and Barnabas, by which they were compelling the Gentiles to judaize, was deservedly rebuked and corrected, both that it might not do harm then and that it might not avail for imitation by those to come. For when the apostle Paul had seen that they walked not uprightly according to the truth of the Gospel, he said to Peter before all: 'If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the Gentiles to judaize?'

But as for that which he himself did, in retaining and performing certain lawful observances after the Jewish custom, so as to show himself not an enemy of the Law and the Prophets—far be it that we should believe he did this in a lying manner. For concerning this matter his well-known opinion suffices, by which it had been established that neither were the Jews, who then believed in Christ, to be forbidden the traditions of their fathers, nor were the Gentiles, when they became Christians, to be compelled to them; so that those sacraments, which it was agreed had been divinely commanded, should neither be shunned as sacrileges, nor yet be thought so necessary, now that the New Testament was revealed, as if without them whoever were converted to God could not be saved.

For there were those who thought and preached this, although the Gospel of Christ had already been received. And to these Peter and Barnabas had feignedly consented, and therefore were compelling the Gentiles to judaize. For this was to compel: so to preach those things as necessary, as though, even the Gospel being received, there were no salvation in Christ without them. This was the error which certain men thought; this the fear of Peter feigned; this the freedom of Paul rebuked. As for what he says, 'I became all things to all men, that I might gain all,' he did this by having compassion, not by lying. For each one becomes as it were the person to whom he wishes to bring aid, when he brings aid with as great a mercy as he would wish aid to be brought to himself, were he himself placed in the same misery.

And so he becomes as it were that person, not because he deceives him, but because he thinks of himself as being like him. Whence is that saying of his, the apostle's, which I have already recalled above: 'Brethren, if a man be overtaken in any fault, you who are spiritual instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness, considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted.' For if, because he said, 'I became to the Jews as a Jew, and to those who were under the Law as under the Law,' he is therefore to be thought to have undertaken the sacraments of the Old Law in a lying manner, then he ought likewise to have undertaken the idolatry of the Gentiles by lying in the same way, since he said also that he became to those who were without Law as without Law, that he might gain them—which assuredly he did not do.

For nowhere did he sacrifice to idols or worship those figments; but rather, freely, as a martyr of Christ, he showed them to be detested and shunned. From no apostolic acts, therefore, or discourses do these men bring forth examples of lying to be imitated. From prophetic deeds or sayings, then, they seem to themselves to have something to bring forth, because they think that the foreshadowing figures are lies, on the ground that they are sometimes similar to lies. But when they are referred to those things for the signifying of which they were thus done or said, the significations are found to be truthful, and thereby in no way to be lies. For a lie is a false signification with the will of deceiving.

But there is no false signification where, even though one thing is signified by another, yet that which is signified is true, if it be rightly understood. There are certain things of this kind even of the Saviour in the Gospel, since the Lord Himself deigned to be a prophet of the prophets. Such are those where, concerning the woman who suffered an issue of blood, He says, 'Who touched me?' and concerning Lazarus, 'Where have you laid him?' For thus He asked as though not knowing what He assuredly knew. And thereby He feigned Himself not to know, that by that seeming ignorance of His He might signify something else. And since that signification was truthful, it certainly was not a lie.

For those persons were signified—whether that woman suffering an issue of blood, or that man dead four days—whom even He who knew all things did in a certain manner not know. For she too bore the type of the people of the Gentiles, whence the prophecy had been sent forth beforehand: 'A people whom I have not known has served me'; and Lazarus, removed from the living, lay there as it were by a significative likeness, where that one lay whose voice it is: 'I am cast forth from before thine eyes.' And therefore, as though there were not known to Christ both she, who she had been, and he, where he had been laid, it was figured by the words of one asking, and every lie was avoided by the truthful signification.

Hence too is that which you mentioned them to say: 'that the Lord Jesus, after He had risen, walked on the way with two disciples, and as they drew near to the village whither they were going, feigned to go farther,' where the evangelist, saying, 'But He Himself feigned to go farther,' even set down that very word in which the excessively mendacious take delight, that they may lie with impunity—as if everything that is feigned were a lie, whereas so many things are feigned truthfully for the sake of signifying one thing by another. If therefore Jesus had signified nothing else in feigning to go farther, it would deservedly be judged a lie. But further, if it be well understood and referred to that which He wished to signify, it is found to be a mystery.

Otherwise all those things will be lies which, on account of a certain likeness of the things to be signified, are narrated as though done, when they were not done. Whence is that so lengthy narrative concerning the two sons of one man, the elder, who remained with his father, and the younger, who journeyed far away. In which kind of feigning men have even attributed human words or deeds to irrational living creatures and to things lacking sense, that by such feigned narratives, but truthful significations, they might convey what they wished in a more commendable manner. Nor is it among the authors of secular letters only—as in Horace, where a mouse speaks to a mouse and a weasel to a little fox—that through a feigned narrative a truthful signification may be referred to the matter under discussion:

whence also no one was ever so unlearned as to think that the fables of Aesop, related to that same end, ought to be called lies. But in the sacred writings also, as in the Book of Judges, the trees seek a king for themselves and speak to the olive and to the fig and to the vine and to the bramble. All of which is assuredly feigned, that by a narrative indeed feigned, yet not lying but with a truthful signification, one may arrive at the matter intended. These things I have said on account of that which is written concerning Jesus, 'and He Himself feigned to go farther,' lest anyone from this word, like the Priscillianists, wishing to have lying permitted, should moreover contend that even Christ lied.

But whoever wishes to understand what He prefigured by feigning, let him attend to what He accomplished by acting. For afterwards, having journeyed farther above all the heavens, He nevertheless did not forsake His disciples. For the signifying of this future thing, done divinely, that thing was humanly feigned in the present. And therefore a truthful signification is set forth beforehand in that feigning, because in this later journeying of His there followed the truth of that signification. Let him therefore contend that Christ lied by feigning, who denies that He fulfilled by doing what He signified.

Since therefore the mendacious heretics do not find in the writings of the New Testament examples of lying to be imitated, they consider themselves most abundantly supplied in this disputation, by which they suppose that one must lie, when from the old prophetic books—because there it appears only to the few who understand to what the significative sayings and truthful deeds are referred—they seem to themselves to find and bring forth many lies. But desiring to have examples of deceiving to be imitated, as it were, by which they may defend themselves, they deceive themselves, and their iniquity has lied to itself.

But those persons, who are not to be believed to have wished there to prophesy, if they feigned anything by doing or saying it with the will of deceiving—although even from their very deeds without words something prophetic can be carved out, foresown and disposed through the omnipotence of Him who knows how to use well even the evils of men—nevertheless, so far as concerns those persons themselves, they lied without doubt. But they ought not therefore to be thought worthy of imitation, because they are found in those books which are deservedly named holy and divine.

For these books have written down both the evil deeds of men and the good—the former to be shunned, the latter to be followed—and some things so set down that concerning them a judgement has even been pronounced, but others left to be judged by us with silent judgement there, since it behoved us not only to be nourished by the manifest things, but also to be exercised by the obscure. But why do these men think that Thamar lying is to be imitated by them, and do not think that Judah fornicating is to be imitated? For there they read both; and that Scripture neither blamed nor praised any of these, but merely narrated both and left both to be judged by us. But it would be strange if it permitted with impunity any of these to be imitated. For that Thamar lied not from lust for harlotry, but from the will to conceive, we know.

But fornication too—even if Judah's was not of such a kind—may belong to someone by which he acts so that a man may be set free, just as her lie was, that a man might be conceived. Is one therefore to fornicate also, if on account of that it is thought there was need to lie? Not concerning lying alone, therefore, but concerning all the works of men in which there arise, as it were, compensatory sins, must it be considered what judgement we ought to pronounce, lest we open a door not only to any small sins whatsoever, but even to all crimes; and lest there remain no misdeed, no outrage, no sacrilege, in which there could not exist some cause whereby it might rightly seem to be done, and lest this opinion overthrow the whole integrity of life.

But he is to be judged to say nothing, who says that some lies are just, unless he says that some sins are just, and thereby that some things are just which are unjust—than which what more absurd thing can be said? For whence is sin, save because it is contrary to justice? Let it be said, then, that some sins are great, others small, because that is true, and the Stoics are not to be heeded, who contend that all are equal; but to say that some sins are unjust and some just—what else is this than to say that some iniquities are unjust and some just?—since the apostle John says: 'Everyone who commits sin commits also iniquity; and sin is iniquity.'

Sin therefore cannot be just, except when we place the name of sin in another thing, in which one does not sin, but either does something or suffers something on account of sin. For sacrifices for sins too have been called sins, and the penalties of sins are sometimes called sins. These plainly can be understood as just sins, when the sacrifices are called just or the punishments just. But those things which are done against the law of God cannot be just. And it was said to God: 'Thy law is truth'; and thereby that which is against truth cannot be just. But who would doubt that every lie is against truth? No lie, therefore, can be just. Likewise, to whom is it not clear that everything which is just is from truth?

But John cries out: 'Every lie is not of the truth.' Every lie, therefore, is not just. Wherefore, when examples of lying are set before us from the holy Scriptures, either they are not lies, but are thought to be, so long as they are not understood; or, if they are lies, they are not to be imitated, because they cannot be just. But as for what is written, that God dealt well with the Hebrew midwives and with Rahab the harlot of Jericho, it was not done for this reason, because they lied, but because they were merciful toward the men of God. There was therefore rewarded in them not deceit, but benevolence—the kindness of the mind, not the iniquity of the one lying.

For just as it would be neither strange nor absurd if, at some earlier time, certain evil works committed by them, God should be willing to pardon on account of later good ones, so it is not to be wondered at that at one time, in one cause, God, beholding both—that is, the thing done mercifully and the thing done deceitfully—both rewarded the good and, on account of this good, pardoned that evil. For if sins which are committed on account of the concupiscence of the flesh, not on account of mercy, are remitted on account of later works of mercy, why should not those things which are committed on account of mercy itself be deservedly remitted by mercy? For a sin is graver which is wrought by the intention of one harming than that which is wrought by the intention of one succouring.

And thereby, if the former is blotted out by a work of mercy afterward following, why is not this, which is lighter, blotted out by that very mercy of the man both preceding, that he should sin, and accompanying, when he sins? So indeed it may seem. Yet it is one thing to say: 'I ought indeed not to have sinned, but I will do works of mercy by which I may blot out what I formerly sinned'; and another to say: 'I ought to sin, because I cannot otherwise show mercy.' It is one thing, I say, to say: 'Since we have already sinned, let us do good'; and another to say: 'Let us sin, that we may do good.' In the former it is said, 'Let us do good things because we have done evil'; but in the latter, 'Let us do evil, that good things may come.' And thereby, in the former the bilge-water of sin is to be drained out, in the latter the doctrine of sinning is to be guarded against.

It remains, therefore, that we understand that to those women, whether in Egypt or in Jericho, there was rendered for their humanity and mercy a reward that was indeed temporal—which itself also, even without their knowing it, figured by prophetic signification something eternal. But whether one must ever lie, even for someone's salvation—since it is a question in the resolving of which even the most learned are wearied—far exceeded the measure of those poor little women, placed among those peoples and accustomed to those manners.

And so this ignorance of theirs, like that of other things which they were likewise ignorant of, but which are to be known by the sons not of this age but of the age to come, was borne with by the patience of God, who nevertheless rendered to them, for the human kindness which they had expended upon His servants, earthly rewards, though signifying something heavenly. And Rahab indeed, delivered from Jericho, made a passage into the people of God, where, advancing, she might be able to attain to eternal and immortal gifts, which are to be sought by no lie. Then, however, when she rendered that good and, for the condition of her life, praiseworthy work to the Israelite spies, she was not yet such that it should be exacted of her: 'Let your speech be Yea, yea; Nay, nay.'

But as for those midwives, although Hebrew, if they were wise only according to the flesh, what or how much is it that the temporal remuneration profited them—namely, that they made houses for themselves—unless by advancing they came to pertain to that house, concerning which it is sung to God, 'Blessed are they that dwell in thy house; for ever and ever they shall praise thee'? But it must be greatly confessed that the mind draws near to justice, and, although not yet in the deed itself, yet in hope and in disposition is to be praised, which never lies except with this intention, by which it wishes to profit someone, but to harm no one.

But when we ask whether it is ever the part of a good man to lie, we are not now asking about a man still pertaining to Egypt or to Jericho or to Babylon, or still to that earthly Jerusalem itself, which is in bondage with her children, but about a citizen of that City which is above, our free mother, eternal in the heavens. And it is answered to us who ask: 'Every lie is not of the truth.' But the sons of that City are certainly sons of the truth; they are sons of that City concerning whom it is written that in their mouth no lie was found; that City's son is he concerning whom likewise it is written: 'The son who receives the word shall be far from destruction; but receiving it, he received it unto himself, and nothing false proceeds from his mouth.'

If at any time to these sons of the heavenly Jerusalem and of the holy eternal City, as being men, some lie of whatever sort creeps up, they humbly beg pardon; they do not moreover seek glory from it. But someone will say: 'Would those midwives, then, and Rahab have done better, if they had shown no mercy by being unwilling to lie?' Nay rather, those Hebrew women, if they were such as those about whom we ask whether they must ever lie, would neither say anything false, and would most freely refuse the foul services of slaying the little ones. 'But,' you will say, 'they themselves would die.' Yet see what follows. For they would die with an incomparably ampler reward of a heavenly habitation than those houses could be which they made for themselves on earth;

they would die, destined for eternal happiness, having suffered death for the most innocent truth. What of that woman in Jericho? Could she perhaps do this? Would she not, if by lying she did not deceive the citizens who were seeking, betray the hidden guests by speaking the truth? Or could she say to those questioning her, 'I know where they are, but I fear God, I do not betray them'? This indeed she could say, if she were already a true Israelite, in whom there was no guile—which she was going to be, passing over by the mercy of God to the City of God. 'But,' you will say, 'they, hearing this, would slay her, would search the house.' But was it consequent that they would also find those whom she had diligently hidden?

For that most cautious woman had looked ahead and had placed them there where they could lie hidden, even if credence had not been given to her lying. So she too, if nevertheless she had been slain by her fellow citizens for the work of mercy, would have ended this hay-like life by a death precious in the sight of the Lord, and her benefit toward those men would not have been in vain. 'But,' you will say, 'what if those by whom they were sought had, by searching everything, come even to that place where she had hidden them?' In this manner it can be said: 'What if they had been unwilling to believe a most vile and base woman, not only lying but even perjuring?' Assuredly even so those things would have followed which she brought about by lying out of fear. And where do we place the will and power of God?

Or could He perchance not have both kept her, neither lying to her fellow citizens nor betraying the men of God, and guarded those men of hers from all destruction? For by Him from whom they were guarded even after the woman's lie, they could, even had she not lied, assuredly have been guarded. Unless perchance we have forgotten that this was done in Sodom, where the males, inflamed with unspeakable lust against males, could not even find the door of the house in which were those whom they sought—when the just man, in a cause altogether most similar, was unwilling to lie for his guests, whom he knew not to be angels, and feared lest they should suffer a violence worse than death. And certainly he could have answered those who sought such things as that woman in Jericho answered.

For in exactly similar fashion those men too sought by asking. But the just man was unwilling, for the bodies of his guests, to stain his own soul with his lie; for whose sake he was willing that the bodies of his daughters should suffer violence by the iniquity of another's lust. Let a man do, therefore, even for the temporal safety of men, what he can; but when it has come to this juncture, that he cannot provide for such safety except by sinning, let him now judge that he has nothing to do, when he perceives that what remains is something which he cannot rightly do.

Accordingly Rahab in Jericho—because she received the pilgrim men of God with hospitality, because in receiving them she put herself in peril, because she believed in their God, because she diligently hid them where she could, because by another way she gave most faithful counsel for returning—let her be praised as one to be imitated even by the citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem. But as for the fact that she lied, even if something prophetic there is understandingly expounded, it is nevertheless not wisely set forth as to be imitated—although God has memorably honoured those good things, and has mercifully pardoned this evil.

Since these things are so, seeing that it is too long to treat of all the things which in that 'Balance' of Dictinius are set forth as examples of lying to be imitated, it seems to me that not only these things, but also whatever things of such a kind there are, are to be reduced to this rule: that either what is believed to be a lie should be shown not to be a lie—whether where the truth is kept silent and no falsehood is spoken, or where a truthful signification wishes one thing to be understood from another (which kind of figures, whether of sayings or of deeds, abounds in the prophetic writings)—or that those which are convicted to be lies should be shown not to be imitated; and if any, like other sins, should creep up on us, that justice is not to be attributed to them, but pardon to be sought. This indeed seems so to me;

and the matters disputed above compel me to this opinion. But because we are men and live among men—and I confess that I am not yet in the number of those whom compensatory sins do not disturb—often in human affairs the human feeling overcomes me, nor am I able to resist, when it is said to me: 'Behold, a sick man is in danger from a grave illness, whose strength can no longer bear it, if his only and most beloved son be announced to him as dead. He asks of you whether he lives, whom you know to have ended his life. What will you answer, when whatever else you say besides one of three things—either he is dead, or he lives, or I know not—he believes nothing other than that he is dead, because he understands you both to fear to say it and to be unwilling to lie?'

It amounts to the same, even if you remain wholly silent. Now of those three statements two are false — 'he lives' and 'I do not know' — and they cannot be uttered by you except by lying. But the one that is true, namely that he is dead, if you speak it and the death of the shocked man should follow, you will be cried out against as having killed him. And who could endure people who exaggerate how great an evil it is that a wholesome lie should be shunned and a murderous truth be cherished? I am strongly moved by these objections, but it would be a marvel if I were moved wisely as well.

For when I set before whatever eyes my heart may have that intelligible beauty of Him from whose mouth no falsehood proceeds — although, where Truth shines and grows ever brighter and clearer, there my quivering weakness is beaten back — nevertheless I am so kindled with love of such great comeliness that I despise all human things which call me back from it. Yet it is a great matter that this affection should persist to such a degree that the effect be not wanting in the time of temptation. Nor does it move me, as I contemplate that luminous Good in which there is no darkness of falsehood, that Truth should be called murderous by us who are unwilling to lie and by men who die upon hearing the truth. For surely, if a shameless woman should demand fornication, and, when you do not consent, should die, distraught with savage

love, distraught, should die — will chastity then be a murderer? Or rather, seeing that we read: 'We are the good odour of Christ in every place, both in them that are saved and in them that perish; to the one indeed an odour of life unto life, but to the others an odour of death unto death' — shall we then declare even the odour of Christ to be a murderer? But because we are men, and in questions and contradictions of this kind human sense for the most part gets the better of us or wearies us, therefore the same apostle presently added: 'And who is sufficient for these things?'

To this is added — and here one must wail more pitiably — that if we grant that, for the recovery of that sick man, one ought to have lied about the life of his son, then little by little, bit by bit, this evil grows, and by brief accessions creeps on imperceptibly into so great a heap of wicked lies that it can never be discovered at all where a stop might be put to so great a plague as it strengthens by the smallest additions into an immensity. Whence most providently it is written: 'He that despiseth small things falleth by little and little.' What then? That such lovers of this present life — who do not hesitate to prefer it to the truth, lest a man die, nay rather that a man who must one day die should die a little later — want us not only to lie but even to perjure ourselves?