On the Nature of Man 1 part 9/9

For some of them halt merely at making well, and thereafter give no further thought, as do carpenters and painters and sculptors;

while others only care for and exercise providence, as do herdsmen and shepherds.

So then, in the discourse on creation we would fittingly demonstrate that the things which have come to be were made well;

and in that on providence, that they also obtain the fitting care after their coming to be.

How, then, is man ever begotten from man, and ox from ox, and each thing sprung from its own proper seed and not from another, if providence be absent? For if anyone should say that, according to the original generation, the matter proceeds by a chain of succession, this would be to say that providence altogether coexists with creation.

For the created thing's proceeding by a chain of succession shows that providence was laid down together with creation.

For the ongoing conduct of existing things after creation belongs to providence;

and thus he would be saying nothing other than that one and the same is at once the Maker and the Provider of existing things.

Is it for the sake of providence that the difference of form is made to vary in individuals? For consider: if all preserved unaltered the same characteristic appearance, how great would be the confusion of affairs, and how great the ignorance and darkness that would hold sway over man—recognizing neither his own kin, nor distinguishing the stranger, the enemy, or the wicked from the friend and the good.

But all things would truly be 'together in a heap,' as Anaxagoras says.

For, this being so, nothing would prevent one from consorting with sisters and mothers, nor from committing rape, nor from openly doing any other wrong, if only he escaped detection for the present moment;

for having been seen, he would not thereafter be recognized.

Nor would law or civil polity be established, nor would fathers and children know one another, nor would any other of the things pertaining to man hold together;

for man would be blind, as far as regards men, since sight would furnish him with little benefit;

for apart from age and stature he would distinguish nothing else.

Of so many good things has providence become the cause for us, diversifying the form of men through all time and everywhere, and leaving out no moment from doing this—which is also the greatest proof that individual things too are the object of providence, seeing that each person is recognized even down to the mould of his fashioning, of his characteristic features, and of his voice, even if such a thing is not preserved with exactness, inasmuch as the form suffices.

For over and above this, providence has added for us also the difference of colours, so that the weakness of human nature might be aided in manifold ways.

And I think that many of the animals which are of like appearance in their species—such as the crow and the raven—have certain differences in their aspect, by which they recognize one another as mates.

At any rate, crows and ravens often flock together in great numbers;

yet they separate off in pairs, each male and each female recognizing its own mate.

But how would they recognize one another, unless there were in each some proper characteristic mark—not clearly distinguishable to us, yet naturally easy to discern for those of the same kind? And the tokens, and rumours, and omens, and portents from the heavens (for the discourse is now directed to the Greeks), preserving, according to their own proper principle—as they themselves say—the outcomes of the things signified by them, altogether signify, doubtless by the principle of providence, and verify by their fulfillment the things signified.

But that providence exists is clear both through these things and through those that will be said hereafter;

let us now say what providence is.

Providence, then, is the care that comes from God upon existing things.

And they define it also in this way:

Providence is the will of God, by which all existing things receive their fitting conduct.

But if providence is the will of God, then it is altogether necessary that, in accordance with right reason, the things that come to be should come to be in the best and most God-befitting manner, and as they alone could well be, so that they admit of no better arrangement.

And it is necessary that one and the same be the Maker and the Provider of existing things;

for it is neither consistent nor fitting that one should make, and another care for the things that come to be;

for such a thing is invariably seen to arise from weakness.

And in the animals too there lies stored up much illustration of what has been said.

For everything that has begotten also takes thought for the nourishment of what it has begotten; but man, so far as he is able, exercises forethought over all the other concerns of life as well.

Those things which fail to exercise forethought do so through weakness, not by nature.

It has therefore been shown that the one who provides is God, and that providence is His will.

Concerning the objects of providence. That providence exists, and what it is, has been stated.

It remains to say over what things providence extends: whether over universals, or over particulars, or over both universals and particulars.

Plato, then, would have providence govern both universals and particulars, dividing the account of providence into three.

For the first, he says, is the providence of the first God;

and this God exercises forethought first and foremost over the Ideas, then over the whole universe as a whole—such as heaven and the stars and all universal things, that is, the genera, both substance and quantity and quality and the other such things, and the species subordinate to these.

(He assigns coming-to-be to the sun and the zodiacal circle.)

But of the conduct and the end of things to be done, and the attainment of the goods of life—both the natural goods and those called material and instrumental, and the things opposed to these—Plato declares that this is the third providence.

And presiding over this providence, he says, are certain appointed daemons about the earth, guardians of human actions.

And both the second and the third providence derive their being from the first, so that virtually all things are governed by the first God, who has appointed both the second and the third providers.

Now to refer all things to God, and to say that all providence depends on His will, deserves praise;

but it is no longer praiseworthy to call the beings that circle the heaven a second providence.

For what results from them is not providence but fate and necessity.

For according to whatever configuration those bodies assume, of necessity the things that come to be must come to be so and cannot be otherwise;

but it was shown long ago that nothing that falls under providence is subject to necessity.

The Stoic philosophers, championing fate and what is in our power, leave no room at all for providence;

but in truth they also do away with what is in our power, as was shown earlier.

Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus deny that there is any providence, either over universals or over particulars.

Epicurus, at any rate, used to say that the blessed and incorruptible neither has troubles itself nor causes them to another, so that it is bound neither by anger nor by favor;

for all such things belong to weakness.

For it arises in connection with something unwilled.

These men, then, follow consistently from their own first principles.

For, holding that this whole universe came together spontaneously, they naturally assert that all things are without providence.

For of things of which there is no craftsman, who could be the provider? For it is plain that things which came to be spontaneously in the beginning must of necessity be borne along spontaneously.

We must therefore take a stand against their first opinion;

for once this is overthrown, what has been said will suffice to demonstrate that providence exists.

So, reserving the refutation of these men for their proper occasions, let us come to the opinion of Aristotle and of the others who say that particulars are without providence.

For Aristotle too would have particular things governed by nature alone, as he hinted in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics;

for he lays it down that this nature, being divine and inherent in all generated things, naturally furnishes each with the choice of what is beneficial and the avoidance of what is harmful;

for each of the animals, as has been said, selects the food suited to itself, pursues what is beneficial, and knows by nature the remedies for its ailments.

Euripides and Menander in certain passages say that the mind within each individual exercises forethought over that individual, but that none of the gods does so.

But the mind concerns itself only with what is in our power;

for it deals either with matters of action and the arts, or with contemplation.

But providence concerns things not in our power—being rich or not, being healthy or not—none of which the mind can bring about, nor indeed can nature, as Aristotle himself holds;

for the works of nature too are manifest.

What has mind or nature to do with the fact that the murderer is sometimes punished and sometimes escapes? Unless one were to say that the former belongs to the providence of mind and nature,

while the latter belongs to fate.

But if things pertaining to mind and nature belong to providence, while their consequences belong to fate, then what is in our power has been abolished.

For the things of the mind—both the practical and the theoretical—have been shown to be in our power.

But not all the things pertaining to providence belong to nature, even if the things of nature come about according to providence.

For many of the things under providence are not works of nature, as was shown in the case of the murderer.

For nature is a part of providence, not itself providence.

These men, then, ascribe the providence of particulars to nature and to the mind;

but others say that God cares for the persistence of beings, so that none of the things that come to be should fail, and that He exercises providence over this alone, while particulars are borne along at random;

and that for this reason many injustices, many murders, and, in a word, every kind of wickedness holds sway among men;

and that punishment by no means follows either from what accords with right reason or from what accords with law.

But where neither law nor reason prevails, how could anyone say that there is a God who takes care? For it comes about that the good, for the most part, are wronged and humbled and beset with countless evils;

while the wicked and violent grow great in power and wealth and offices and the other goods of life.

But to me those who say these things seem to be ignorant of many other principles concerning providence, and above all of the soul's immortality.

For, supposing it to be mortal, they circumscribe the affairs of man within this present life;

and further, they hold distorted judgments concerning what is good.

For they suppose that those clothed in wealth, and puffed up with dignities and glorying in the other material goods, are happy and blessed;

but the goods of the soul they count as nothing, though these far surpass the bodily and external goods by every measure.

For the goods of the higher things are the higher goods.

By as much, then, as the soul surpasses the body, by so much do the virtues surpass wealth and health and the rest.

Accordingly, the virtues, both alone and together with the other goods, make a man blessed;

with the others, in a broad sense; but alone and by themselves, in a strict and defined sense.

For of things that exist, some are conceived according to strict definition, like 'two cubits long,' and others in a broad sense, like 'a heap.'

For even if you take away two measures from a heap, what remains is still a heap;

and so too, if from blessedness in the broad sense you take away the goods of the body and the external goods, and leave the virtues alone, even so the blessedness remains;

for virtue is of itself self-sufficient for happiness.

Every good man, then, is blessed, and every wicked man is wretched, even though he should possess collectively all the so-called goods of fortune.

Ignorant of this, the many suppose that only those who are in good bodily condition and are wealthy are blessed.

Wherefore they find fault with providence, which governs our affairs not only from what is apparent, but also according to its own foreknowledge.

For God, knowing that it is beneficial for one who is now upright and good to be poor, and that wealth coming upon him would corrupt his disposition, keeps him beneficially in poverty;

but knowing that a rich man would often become more dangerous if he lacked means—for he would take to robbery or murder or some other greater evils—He allows him to enjoy his wealth.

Poverty, then, has often profited us, as have burying children and having servants flee;

for their preservation would have proved more bitter than their loss, had the children turned out worthless and the servants become robbers.

For we, knowing nothing of the things to come but looking only upon things present, do not rightly judge what befalls us.

But to God even the things that are to come are as though present.

These things, however, have been said against those who condemn providence, to whom the word of Scripture also would fittingly be spoken:

For how is a man not to be shunned who legislates against God and issues counter-commands to the works of providence—one who does not even dare to gainsay human legislations? Leaving aside, then, such transgressions, or rather impieties, let us show that they are wrong to say that particular things are unprovided-for, while only universals and generic things obtain providence.

For one might say that there are only these three causes for there being no providence over particulars:

either that God does not know that it is good to care for these also, or that he does not wish to, or that he is not able.

But ignorance and unlearnedness are altogether most alien to the blessed Being.

For he is himself knowledge and wisdom and understanding.

And how could there escape God's notice what not even a right-minded man would fail to know—namely, that as all the particulars perish, the universals too will perish? For the universals are constituted out of all the particulars.

The species, at any rate, are coextensive with all the particulars together, and are convertible with them, and perish together with them and are preserved together with them.

But nothing prevents all individuals from perishing when they obtain no care from above.

But if they say that he provides only for this—that not all particulars perish, so that the species may be preserved—they unwittingly say that there is a certain providence even over particular things;

for by providing for these, as they themselves say, he preserves the species and the genera.

But they say that he is not ignorant, yet does not wish to exercise providence.

But the not-wishing arises through two pretexts: either through indolence or through unseemliness.

And who, unless he were mad, would bring against God the charge of indolence? For again indolence is begotten by these two, pleasure and cowardice:

for either, being drawn about by some pleasure, we grow indolent, or through fear we withdraw.

But it is lawful to conceive neither of these concerning God.

But if they should decline to charge him with indolence, yet say that it does not befit God—for it is unworthy of so great a blessedness to condescend to petty and small things and, as it were, to be defiled together with the material and volitional absurdities, and that on this account he does not wish—they are unaware that they are attaching to God the two worst passions, disdain and defilement:

for either through disdain the Creator overlooks the rule and administration of particulars—which is most absurd to say—or, as they themselves say, he shuns the defilement.

But if, of the sun's rays, which have a nature to draw up all moisture, they do not say that the sun is polluted, nor the rays themselves, when they shine upon mire, but that they remain undefiled and pure, how do they suppose that God is defiled by the things done here below? These are not the doctrines of men who know the nature of God:

for the Divine stands untouched and incorruptible and undefiled and superior to all alteration; for defilement and all such things are works of some change.

And how is it not most absurd that a craftsman of any art whatever, and especially a physician, who cares for the general matters, should leave nothing of the particulars—not even the smallest—without craft and without care, knowing that the part contributes to the whole, and yet to declare that God the Creator is more unlearned than the craftsmen? But then—he wishes, but is not able.

And how is it not directly incongruous to call God weak and unable to do good? Moreover, in two ways one might say that God cannot provide for individuals: either because he is not by nature able to, or because particular things are incapable of receiving providence.

But that he is by nature able to provide, they too concede by the very things whereby they say that he provides for universals;

moreover, the lower things are not able to reach up to those set above, but the power of the superior descends, preserving, even to the last and to the insensible things:

for all things are suspended from the divine will and thence draw their continuance and preservation.

And that the substance of the individual and multiplied things is also receptive of providence is clear from the animals that are governed by certain rulers and leaderships, of which there are many kinds; for bees and ants and most gregarious creatures are ordered under certain leaders whom they follow in obedience:

and one might especially perceive this by looking to the polity of men, for it manifestly admits the administrations and cares of lawgivers and of rulers.

And how could that which is receptive of these be incapable of receiving the providence of the Creator? And it is no small proof that particulars too obtain providence, that the knowledge of it has been naturally sown in men; for when constrained by necessity we immediately flee to the Divine and to prayers, as though nature led us untaught to the help that comes from him (and nature would not lead us untaught toward that which does not by nature come to pass):

for indeed, in sudden disturbances and fears, involuntarily, before we even reflect, we call upon God.

And everything that naturally follows upon anything whatever has a strong demonstration, admitting no contradiction.

Whence, then, were those who hold these opinions led on to this argument? First, by supposing that the soul is dissolved together with the body; and second, by not being able to discover the reason of the providence over particulars.

This the transmigrations taught among the wisest of the Greeks make plain, as also the so-called places said to be allotted to the souls according to the life of each, and the punishments which the souls undergo of themselves.

For even if these accounts fail in some other respect, yet they agree together in this—that the soul exists after this life and undergoes penalties for its transgressions.

But if the reason of the providence over particulars is incomprehensible to us—as indeed it is, according to that which says, 'How unsearchable are your judgments, and your ways past finding out'—yet on this account we ought not to say that there is no providence.

For neither, because we do not know the measure of the sea and the number of the sand, would anyone say that there is neither sea nor sand:

for so they would say that there is neither man nor any other animal, since they do not know the number of men and of the other animals.

For individuals are infinite to us;

and things infinite to us are unknown to us.

And universals are often comprehensible by reason, but particulars it is impossible to comprehend.

And since in each man there is a twofold difference—both toward another man and toward himself (for great too is each one's variation and difference toward himself day by day, in his manners of life and pursuits and needs and desires and the things that befall him:

for this animal is quick to turn, changing swiftly with its needs and occasions)—the providence fitting each one must likewise be different and varied and manifold and running in concert, extending itself together with the incomprehensibility of the multiplied things, if indeed it must be suitable to each in every matter and proper to it:

and the difference of particulars is infinite; infinite therefore is also the reason of the providence fitting them:

and if infinite, it is also unknown to us.

One must not, therefore, make one's own ignorance into an abolition of the care for the things that are.

For the things which you suppose to happen not well, these happen according to reason for the Creator;

but you, being ignorant of the causes, say that they do not happen according to reason.

For what we experience in the case of the other unknown things, this also we experience in the case of the works of providence:

from some conjecture, and that a dim one, we form our notion of the things pertaining to it, taking certain images and shadows of its works from the things that come to pass, by guesswork.

We say, then, that some things come to pass by the permission of God;

and of this permission there are many kinds.

For often he permits even the righteous man to fall into misfortunes, that he may display to others the virtue hidden within him, as in the case of Job.

At another time he permits something absurd to be done, that through the seemingly absurd deed he may accomplish something great and wonderful, as through the cross the salvation of men.

In another manner he permits even the holy man to suffer evil, lest, out of a right conscience and the power given to him, he fall into arrogance, as in the case of Paul.

Someone is abandoned for a season for the correction of another, that the others, considering his case, may be instructed, as in the case of Lazarus and the rich man;

for naturally, seeing certain persons suffer, we are restrained, as it was well said also by Menander: 'fearing the Divine' at your suffering.

Someone is abandoned also for another's glory, not through his own or his parents' sin, as the man blind from birth was, for the glory of the Son of Man.

Again, someone is permitted to suffer for another's emulation, so that, the glory of the sufferer being magnified, the suffering may become a thing undreaded by others, in hope of the coming glory and in desire of the awaited good things, as in the case of the martyrs and of those who have given themselves up for their country or race or masters.

But if to anyone it should seem unreasonable that the holy man suffers evil for another's correction, let him know that this life is a contest and a stadium of virtue.

By as much, then, as the labors are greater, by so much are the crowns greater;

for the recompense of the prizes is according to the measure of the endurance.

For this reason Paul was permitted to be beset by countless afflictions, that he might carry off the greater and perfect crown of victory.

All the works of providence, then, come to pass well and as they ought.

Employing the things acknowledged by all, one would most rightly consider the matter:

He is good, and alone wise.

Therefore, because he is good, he is fittingly a provider;

and because he is wise, he cares wisely and most excellently for the things that are.

For if he does not provide, he is not good;

One must therefore, giving heed to these considerations, condemn none of the works of providence, nor blaspheme.

Rather, we ought to accept all things without questioning, to marvel at all things, to hold that all things have been done well and come to pass fittingly, even if to the multitude they appear unjust; lest, in addition to our blasphemy, we heap upon ourselves also the heavy reproach of our own ignorance.

But when we say that all things come to pass well, it is plain that we are not speaking of the wickedness of men, nor of the deeds that lie in our own power and are done by us;

but rather of the works of Providence, of those things which do not lie within our power.

How then do holy men fall into bitter deaths and are slain though guiltless? For if they are slain unjustly, why did righteous Providence not prevent the murder? But if justly, then surely those who slew them are guiltless.

To this we shall reply that he who slays, slays unjustly, while he who is slain is either slain justly or slain to his own benefit.

Justly, at times, on account of misdeeds absurd and monstrous, though hidden from us;

and to his own benefit, when Providence forestalls the evil deeds that are to come from him, and because it is good for him that his life should be brought to a halt at this point—as with Socrates and with the saints.

But he who committed the murder murdered unjustly;

for it was not for this purpose, nor was it permitted him, that he did it, but for gain and for plunder, and of his own free will.

The suffering, however—such as being slain—does not lie within our power.

And no death is evil save that which comes through sin, as is plain from the death of holy men.

But the sinner, even if he dies upon his bed, even if he ends his life suddenly and without pain, has died an evil death, bringing along with him his sin as an evil shroud.

The one who committed the murder, however, murdered wickedly;

for in the case of those who are slain justly he has ranked himself in the lot of the executioners, and in the case of those slain to their own benefit, in the lot of the bloodthirsty and the accursed.

The same holds also for enemies who slay and take captive and work every evil against their prisoners.

The same holds also for those who take more than their due and seize possessions;

for to those who are despoiled it is, in all likelihood, to their benefit not to possess, while those who took more than their due are unjust—since they took away for the sake of their own greed, and not because it profited the others.