Praeparatio Evangelica 7 part 4/4

I would also justly raise this further question: whether God filled matter entirely, or was in some part of it. If, then, one should wish to say that God was in some part of matter, he thereby says that God is much smaller than matter, if indeed a part of it contained the whole of him; but if he should say God is in the whole of matter, it must be explained how he then fashioned it. For it is necessary either to speak of some contraction of God, upon which he then fashioned that from which he had withdrawn, or else to say that he was fashioned along with matter himself, having no place to withdraw into.

But if someone should say that matter is in God, one must likewise inquire whether this is as though he were divided from himself — just as in the air there exist kinds of living beings, the air being divided and parceled out to receive the things that come to be within it — or whether it is as in a place, that is, as water is in earth.

For if we should say it is as in the air, we must necessarily say God is divisible; but if it is as water in earth — and matter was disorderly and unordered, and moreover contained evils as well — we must say that God is the place of the disordered things and of the evils. This seems to me not a reverent thing to say, but rather a perilous one. For you wish there to be matter, so that you might not say God is the maker of evils; yet in choosing to avoid this, you end up saying he is the receptacle of evils.

Now, if you were saying that you suspect matter to be unbegotten on the basis of the things that have come into being, I would have made a lengthy argument concerning it to demonstrate that it is impossible for it to be unbegotten; but since you said that the origin of evils was the reason for such a supposition, I think it fitting on that account to proceed to an examination of these matters. For once it becomes clear in what manner evils exist, and that it is not possible, by positing matter for God, to say that God is not the cause of evils, this supposition, I think, will be overturned.

'You say, then, that qualityless matter coexists with God, out of which he fashioned the coming-to-be of this world.' — 'So it seems to me.'

'Well then, if matter happened to be without quality, and the cosmos came to be by God, and in the cosmos there are qualities, then God has become the maker of the qualities.' — 'So it is.'

'Now, since I also heard you say before that it is impossible for anything to come to be out of things that do not exist, answer my question: do you think the qualities of the cosmos did not come to be out of pre-existing qualities?' — 'I think so.' — 'And that they exist as something other than the substances?' — 'That is so.'

'If, then, God fashioned the qualities neither out of pre-existing qualities nor out of the substances — since they are not even substances themselves — it is necessary to say that they came to be by God out of things that did not exist. Hence you seemed to me to be speaking pointlessly when you said it was impossible to suppose that anything came to be by God out of things that did not exist.'

'But let the argument concerning this stand as it does. For indeed, among us too, we observe men making certain things out of things that do not exist, even though they seem, above all, to be making them out of something. Let us take, for example, the case of architects. For they too make cities not out of cities, and likewise temples not out of temples.'

'But if, because a substance underlies these products, you think that they make them out of things that exist, you are mistaken in your reasoning. For it is not the substance that makes the city, or again the temples, but the art exercised upon the substance; and this art does not arise out of some pre-existing art in the substances, but arises out of one that is not present in them.'

'I think you will meet this argument by saying that the craftsman produces the art in the substance out of the art he already possesses. But in response to this, it seems to me right to say that not even in man does this art arise out of some pre-existing art. For it is not possible for the art, existing on its own, to give itself; for it belongs among the accidents, things that receive their being only when they come to be in a substance.'

'For man will exist even without architecture, but architecture will not exist unless there is first a man. Hence it is necessary to say that the arts are, by nature, brought into being in men out of things that do not exist. If, then, we have shown that this is so in the case of men, how would it not be fitting to say that God is able to make, not only qualities, but substances as well, out of things that do not exist? For by the fact that it appears possible for something to come to be out of things that do not exist, it is shown that substances too can come to be in this way.'

'But since you have a desire to inquire concerning the origin of evils, I will proceed to that discussion, and I wish to ask you a few brief questions. Do evils seem to you to be substances, or qualities of substances?' — 'It seems to me right to say they are qualities of substances.'

'And matter was without quality and without form.' — 'So I stated at the outset in my argument.' — 'Well then, if evils are qualities of substances, and matter was without quality, and you said God is the maker of the qualities, then God will also be the fashioner of evils. Since, then, even on this view it is not possible to say that God is not the cause of evils, it seems to me superfluous to attach matter to him. But if you have anything to say in response to this, begin your argument.'

'If our inquiry had proceeded out of a love of contention, I would not have thought it worth defining a second time about evils; but since we are conducting this examination of arguments rather for the sake of friendship and for the benefit of one's neighbor, I ask that you agree we should determine these matters again from the beginning. I think my own intention has long been plain to you, as well as my earnestness in argument — that I do not wish to prevail by speaking a plausible falsehood, but that the truth be shown through precise examination — and I know clearly that you too are so disposed. Therefore, whatever method you think you can use to discover the truth, use it without any hesitation. For by using the better method, you will benefit not only yourself, but certainly me as well, concerning the things I do not know.'

'It seems to me you have clearly demonstrated that evils too are certain substances; for I do not see them existing apart from substances. Since, then, my good man, you say that evils too are substances, it is necessary to examine the notion of substance. Does it seem to you that substance is a kind of corporeal composition?' — 'It does.'

'And does this corporeal composition exist on its own, in itself, not needing anything else in order to receive its being?' — 'That is so.'

'And does it seem to you that evils are activities of something?' — 'So it appears to me.'

'And do activities receive their being only when the one who acts is present?' — 'That is so.'

'And if the one who acts does not exist, then what he does will never exist either?' — 'It will not.'

'Well then, if substance is a certain corporeal composition, and this needs nothing in order to receive its being, while evils are activities of something, and activities need something in which, coming to be, they receive their being — then evils will not be substances.'

'But if evils are substances, and murder is an evil, then murder will be a substance; but indeed murder is the activity of someone, therefore murder is not a substance. But if you wish to say that the agents who act are substances, I agree with you as well. For example, the murderer, insofar as he is a man, exists as a substance; but the murder which he commits is not a substance, but a work of the substance.'

'We call a man evil at one time because of murdering, and at another time again good because of doing good. And these names are attached to the substance from the accidents that belong to it, which are not the substance itself; for neither murder is the substance, nor again adultery, nor any of the like evils; but just as the grammarian is named from grammar, and the orator from rhetoric, and the physician from the art of medicine, though the substance is neither medical nor rhetorical nor grammatical, but receives its appellation from the accidents belonging to it — from which it seems to be named, without itself being either of them — so too, it seems to me, the substance takes on its name from the things that appear to be evils, without itself being either of them.'

'And likewise consider along with me: if you conceive in your mind of some other being as the cause of evils for men — then he too, insofar as he operates in these things and instigates the doing of evils, is himself also evil from the things he does. For it is on this account that he too is said to be evil, because he is the maker of evils. But the things which someone does are not identical with himself, but are his activities, from which he receives the appellation of being called evil.'

'For if we should say that he himself is identical with what he does, and he does murders and adulteries and thefts and all such like things, then he himself will be these things. But if he is these things, and these things have their existence when they occur, and when they do not occur they also cease to exist, and these things occur through men, then men will be the makers of these things, and the causes both of their existing and of their ceasing to exist.'

'But if you say these are his activities, then it is from the things he does that he has his being called evil, not from what constitutes the substance. And we said that "evil" is predicated from the accidents attaching to the substance, which are not the substance itself — just as the physician is named from the art of medicine.'

'And if each one is evil from the things he does, and the things he does receive a beginning of their existence, then he too began to be evil, and these evils also began. And if this is so, he will not be evil without beginning, nor will the evils be unbegotten, seeing that they are said to be begotten by him.'

'You seem to me, my friend, to have made your argument against the other man adequately; for from the premises you laid down beforehand, you seemed to draw your conclusion well. For truly, if matter happened to be without quality, and God is the maker of the qualities, and evils are qualities, then God would be the maker of evils.'

'Let this argument, then, be well said against that man; but to me it seems false to say that matter is without quality. For it is not possible to say of any substance whatsoever that it is without quality. For indeed, in the very act of saying it is without quality, one thereby indicates its quality, describing what sort of thing matter is — which is itself a kind of quality.'

'Hence, if it is agreeable to you, take up the argument with me again from the beginning. For to me it seems that matter has had its qualities without beginning. For thus I say that evils too come from its outflow, so that God may be without responsibility for evils, and matter may be the cause of all these things.'

'I welcome your eagerness, my friend, and I commend your earnestness in argument. For it is truly fitting that each lover of learning should not simply and casually assent to what is said, but should conduct a precise examination of the arguments. For even if the one who raises the question, having defined his terms contrary to reason, gives the interlocutor an opening to draw whatever conclusion he wishes, this will not thereby persuade the hearer; rather, he will say whatever seems capable of being said well. And from this one of two things will result: either, upon hearing what he seems moved to say, he will be fully benefited, or he will refute his interlocutor for not speaking the truth.'

'It does not seem to me that you have rightly said that matter has had its qualities from the beginning without origin. For if this is so, of what will God be the maker? For whether we speak of substances, we say they already pre-exist; or again, whether of qualities, we say these too already exist.'

'Well then, both substance and qualities existing, it seems to me superfluous to call God a creator. But so that I may not seem to be constructing an argument merely for my own sake, answer me now that I ask: in what manner do you say God is a creator? Is it that he changed the substances so that those which once existed no longer exist, but others came to be in their place, or is it that he preserved the substances which existed before this, but changed their qualities?'

'It does not seem to me that any change of substances has occurred; indeed, to say this appears to me absurd. Rather, I say that some transformation of qualities has occurred, and it is in respect of this that I say God is a creator — just as, for example, one might say that a house came to be out of stones, concerning which one cannot say that the stones no longer remain stones in substance, even though, having become a house, they are stones still.'

'For I say the house came to be by the quality of the arrangement of the stones, the former quality of the stones having evidently been transformed. In the same way it seems to me that God too, the substance remaining, effected a certain transformation of its qualities, in respect of which I say that the coming-to-be of this world took place by God.'

'Since, then, you say that a certain transformation of qualities has taken place by God, answer me a few brief questions I wish to pose. Tell me, do you likewise think that evils are qualities of substances?' — 'I do.'

'And did these qualities exist in matter from the beginning without origin, or did they have a beginning of their being?' — 'I say these qualities coexist with matter unbegottenly.'

'But do you not say that God has effected a certain transformation of the qualities?' — 'This I do say.'

'Was it, then, toward the better, or toward the worse?' — 'I think it right to say toward the better.'

'Well then, if the evils are qualities of matter, and God turned its qualities toward the better, whence must we still seek the origin of evils? For the qualities did not remain such as they originally were by nature. Or else — if there were previously no evil qualities, and you say that it was as a result of being transformed by God that the original qualities concerning matter came to be such evil ones — then God will be the cause of evils, having turned qualities that were not evil into being evil.'

'Or does it seem to you that God did not turn the evil qualities toward the better, but that you say only the remaining ones, which happened to be indifferent, were turned by God for the sake of the ordering of the world?' 'This is the view I have held from the beginning.'

'How then do you say that he left the qualities of the base things as they were? Was it that he was able to remove them too, but was unwilling, or that he did not have the power to do so? For if you say he was able but was unwilling, it is necessary to say that he is the cause of these things, because, though able to make there be no evils, he allowed them to remain as they were, and especially when he began to fashion matter.'

'For if he had no concern at all for matter, he would not be the cause of what he allowed to remain as it was; but since he fashioned one part of it, and left another part just as it was — though he was able to turn that part too toward the better — he seems to me to deserve to incur the blame, for having left a part of matter to be evil, to the ruin of the part which he had fashioned.'

'Moreover, it seems to me that in this respect, the very part that he fashioned has been wronged most greatly, since it now partakes of the evils. For if one were to examine the matter with precision, one would find that matter is now in a worse condition than in its former disorder. For before it was set in order, it had the advantage of not even perceiving the evils at all; but now each of its parts receives a perception of the evils.'

'Take, for me, the example drawn from man. For before it was fashioned into an image and became a living being by the craft of the maker, it had, by nature, the advantage of partaking of none of the evils; but from the moment man is made by God, he acquires also the perception of the evil that draws near him — and so this very thing, which you say came about from God as a benefit to matter, turns out rather to have accrued to it for the worse.'

'But if you say that the evils have not ceased because God is unable to remove them, you will be asserting that God is powerless. And this powerlessness would consist either in his being by nature weak, or in his being enslaved through fear, overcome by something more powerful.'

'If, then, you should dare to say that God is by nature weak, you seem to me to be putting even his own salvation at risk; but if you say it is because he is overcome by fear before something greater, then the evils will be greater than God, overpowering the impulse of his will — which seems to me an absurd thing to say concerning God.'

'For why should not these things rather be gods, since, according to your own argument, they are able to overpower God — if indeed we call that “god” which has authority over all things?'

'I wish also to ask you briefly concerning matter itself. Come, tell me: was matter something simple, or composite? For the difference among the things that have come to be brings me around to this line of inquiry. For if matter happened to be something simple and of a single form, while the world is composite, and has its constitution from diverse substances and mixtures… for the composite indicates a mixture of certain simple things.'

'But if, on the other hand, you should wish to say that matter is composite, you will certainly be saying that it was composed out of certain simple things. And if it was composed out of simple things, then there was a time when these simple things existed by themselves, out of the combination of which matter came to be — from which very fact it is shown to be generated.'

'For if matter is composite, and composite things have their constitution from simple things, then there was once a time when matter did not exist — that is, before the simple things came together. But if there was once a time when matter did not exist, and there was never a time when the unbegotten did not exist, then matter will not be unbegotten.'

'And from this it follows, then, that there will be many unbegotten things. For if God was unbegotten, and also the simple things out of which matter was composed were unbegotten, there will not be merely two unbegotten things. Does it seem to you that none of the things that exist is opposed to itself?' 'It does.'

'And is water opposed to fire?' 'It appears to me to be opposed.' 'And likewise darkness to light, and heat to cold, and besides these, moisture to dryness?' 'It seems to me to be so.'

'Then, if none of the things that exist is opposed to itself, these elements cannot be a single matter, nor indeed from a single matter. I want to ask you again a question similar to this one. Does it seem to you that parts do not happen to be destructive of one another?' 'It does.'

'And are fire and water parts of matter, and likewise the rest as well?' 'It is so.' 'What then? Does it not seem to you that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and the other things similar to these?' 'It does.'

Therefore, if the parts are not destructive of one another, they will not be parts of one another; and if they are not parts of one another, they will not belong to a single matter. But indeed they cannot even be matter at all, since nothing among existing things is by nature destructive of itself, according to the definition of 'opposite.'

For nothing is opposed to itself; for opposites are by nature opposed to other things. For instance, white is not opposed to itself, but is said to be opposed to black; and likewise light is shown not to be opposed to itself, but appears to be so disposed toward darkness — and so with very many other things as well. If, then, matter were some single thing, it would not be opposed to itself. Since opposites are thus disposed, it is shown that matter [as a single, unopposed substrate] does not exist. So much, then, from the aforementioned writer. Now that the discourse has received a sufficient outline, let us pass on to the eighth book of the Evangelical Preparation, and, calling upon God as our ally, complete what remains of the subject before us.