Praeparatio Evangelica 11 part 3/5

Let these words from Philo the Hebrew be set down here by me, taken from the treatise entitled 'On the Tendency of the Worse to Attack the Better.' And already, on another occasion, when setting forth the doctrines of the piety of the ancient Hebrews in the books of the Preparation for the Gospel, I have also treated sufficiently of the second cause, to which I will now refer those eager to learn more. Since, then, so many things have been theologically stated among the Hebrews, and in this manner, concerning the second cause of all things, it is now time to hear also what Plato says in the Epinomis, as follows:

And let us render honors, not appointing to one a year, to another a month, and to others no share at all, nor any time, in which it passes through its own orbit, completing together the ordered universe, which the most divine Reason has arranged; which the happy man first admired, and then conceived a love of learning as much as is possible for mortal nature.

And in his letter to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus, the doctrine is set forth very cautiously, writing word for word as follows: 'This letter all three of you must read, most of all together, but if not, then two of you in common, as far as possible, as often as you can; and you must use it as a compact and binding law, swearing by that which is right, together with earnestness not lacking in refinement, and its sister, education, and swearing by the God who is the leader of all things, both those that are and those that are to be, and by the Lord who is the father of the leader and cause—whom, if we philosophize rightly, we shall all know clearly, so far as is possible for happy men.'

Does it not seem to you that Plato, in saying these things, has followed the doctrines of the Hebrews? Or from where else did it occur to him to address, as greater than the cause of all created things, another God, indeed the Father of the universal Ruler? And from where did he get the idea of assigning the title 'Lord' to the Father, the Craftsman, since no one among the Greeks before him had ever cast such things even into the hearing, let alone into the mind?

But if we need yet other witnesses again for the incontestable demonstration both of the philosopher's thought and of the construction of the argument, hear what Plotinus makes clear, writing in the work he composed concerning the three primary hypostases.

If anyone marvels at this sensible cosmos, beholding its magnitude and beauty and the order of its eternal motion, and the gods within it—those that are seen, and those that are unseen—and the daemons, and all living creatures and plants, let him ascend to its archetype and to that which is more truly real, and there let him behold all things as intelligible, existing eternally alongside them in their own understanding and life, and let him behold the pure Intellect presiding over these, and wisdom beyond description.

Then, next in order, he adds, saying: Who then is the one who begot this? The simple one, and the one prior to such a thing, the cause both of its being and of its being many, the one who makes number; for number is not first—for prior to the dyad is the One, and the dyad is second, having come to be from the One.

And again, further on, he adds: How then, and what must one conceive concerning that which remains? A radiance shining forth from it, while it itself remains—just as the bright light running round the sun is ever generated from it, while the sun remains unchanged.

And all beings, so long as they remain, give forth from their own substance, by necessity, from the power present in them, a subsistence dependent upon them and directed outward from themselves, being an image, as it were, of the archetypes from which it sprang.

Fire does not keep its heat only within itself, nor does snow keep its cold only within; but especially those things that are fragrant bear witness to this: for as long as they exist, something proceeds forth from them round about them, and whatever is near enjoys the benefit of that which has thus come to subsist.

And likewise all things that have already reached perfection generate; that which is ever perfect generates that which is likewise ever and eternal; yet it generates something lesser than itself.

What then must one say about the most perfect one? Either that nothing comes from it, or that the greatest things come after it. The greatest thing after it is Intellect, and it is second. For Intellect sees That One, and needs only That One, while That One needs nothing of Intellect. And that which is generated from what is greater must itself be Intellect; and Intellect is greater than all things, because all else comes after it.

Next in order he adds, saying: Every begetter longs for and loves that which it has begotten, especially when the begetter and the begotten are alone together. And when the begetter is also the best, the begotten is of necessity united with it, being separated only by otherness. And we say that Intellect is an image of that One—for one must speak more plainly.

And again to this he adds: And for this reason the things of Plato too are threefold: 'all things,' he says, 'are around the king of all' as the first order; and second are around the second things, and third around the third things. And he says there is a father of that which is the cause, calling Intellect the cause—for Intellect is the demiurge for him.

And he says that this one makes the Soul in that famous Mixing-Bowl. And since Intellect is the cause, he calls the Good—that which is beyond Intellect and beyond Being—'the Father.' And in many places he calls Being and Intellect 'the Idea.' So that Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good, and Soul from Intellect; and that these doctrines are not new, nor first stated now, but were spoken of old, though not openly; and that the discourses now given have become interpreters of those ancient ones, confirming by testimonies that these opinions are ancient, by the very writings of Plato himself.

These are the words of Plotinus. But Numenius, who champions the doctrines of Plato, in his work On the Good likewise interprets and explains the following concerning the second cause.

He who intends to understand concerning the first and second God must first distinguish each matter in order and in a certain fitting arrangement; and then, when it seems already to be in good order, then must one attempt to speak in a becoming manner—otherwise not; else, for one who lays hold of the matter too soon, before the first things have been properly established, the treasure, as they say, turns to ashes.

Let us not suffer the same thing; but having invoked God—who, through our discourse, becomes his own witness—to show forth the treasure of our reflections, let us begin thus. Prayer is indeed called for now, but distinction is also necessary.

The first God, existing in himself, is simple, because being wholly at one with himself, he is never at all divisible. The second God, however—together with the third—is one; but being brought into contact with matter, which is a dyad, he unifies it, yet is himself split by it, since matter possesses an appetitive nature and is in flux.

Therefore, by not being directed toward the intelligible—for he would then be directed toward himself—because he looks toward matter, caring for it, he becomes heedless of himself.

And he touches the sensible and tends it, and still draws it up toward his own character, having reached out after matter.

And after other things he says: For it is not necessary that the first should create; rather, the first God must be reckoned to be the Father of the God who creates.

If, then, we were inquiring concerning the demiurgic God, asserting that the one who existed prior must act in this way in a distinctive manner, this approach would be a fitting one for our argument. But if the argument is not concerning the demiurge, and we are inquiring concerning the first, then I solemnly set aside what has been said, and let those things remain unspoken; and I proceed to grasp the argument, hunting it from another quarter.

But before the capturing of the argument, let us come to an agreement among ourselves not open to dispute: that the first God is idle with respect to all works and is king, while the demiurgic God governs, passing through heaven.

And through this one, our voyage is determined, while Intellect is sent down in its course to all those appointed to share in it.

So then, while God looks upon and is turned toward each of us, our bodies at that time live and are given life, God caring for them with his emanating rays; but when God turns back to his own vantage point, these things are extinguished, while the Intellect lives, enjoying a blessed life.

These are the words of Numenius. But do you set alongside them the words sung of old among the Hebrews from the prophecy of David, in this manner: 'How great are your works, O Lord! In wisdom you have made them all. The earth is full of your creation. All things wait upon you, to give them their food in due season. When you give to them they will gather; when you open your hand, all things shall be filled with goodness. But when you turn away your face, they shall be troubled. You will take away their spirit, and they shall fail and return to their dust. You will send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created, and you will renew the face of the earth.'

For how would these differ from the philosopher's thought, which asserts that when God looks upon and is turned toward each of us, our bodies then live and are given life, God caring for them with his rays; but when God turns back to his own vantage point, these things are extinguished?

Again, on the other hand, since the saving Word among us has said, 'I am the vine, my Father is the husbandman, you are the branches,' hear what Numenius theologizes concerning the second cause.

Just as, again, there is a relation of a farmer to the one who plants, in that same relation especially stands the first God to the demiurge. For the one, being the seed of every soul, sows it into all things that partake of his goods; while the lawgiver plants, distributes, and transplants into each of us the things laid down beforehand from that source.

And next, again, concerning how the second subsisted from the first cause, he says the following: Whatever things, being given, pass over to the one who receives them, having departed from the one who gave them, are such as service, money, coined currency, stamped coin—these, then, are mortal and human things; but divine things are of such a kind that, being shared, they have come to be there from here, and yet have not departed from here; and having come to be there, they have benefited the one who received, and have not harmed the other, and have further benefited the giver by the recollection of the things he knew.

And this fine thing is beautiful knowledge, of which the one who received it has gained benefit, while the giver is not deprived of it. Just as you might see a lamp kindled from another lamp, having light which it did not take away from the former, but rather came to have because the matter within it was kindled from that one's fire.

Such is the nature of knowledge: being given and received, it remains with the one who gave it, yet it is present, the very same, with the one who received it.

And the cause of this, stranger, is nothing human; but that the disposition and substance which possesses this knowledge is the very same, both with the God who gave it, and with me and you who have received it.

Wherefore Plato also said that wisdom came to men from Prometheus together with a certain most radiant fire. And again, further on, he says the following.

And these are lives: the one of the first, the other of the second God. Clearly, the first God will be at rest, while the second, on the contrary, is in motion. The first, then, is occupied with the intelligibles, while the second is occupied with both the intelligibles and the sensibles.

Do not marvel that I have said this; for you will hear something far more marvelous still. For instead of the motion belonging to the second, I say that the rest belonging to the first is an innate motion, from which the order of the cosmos, and eternal abiding, and salvation are poured forth into the whole.

In addition to these, he also adds the following in the sixth book: Since Plato knew that among men only the demiurge was known, while the first Intellect, which is called 'Being Itself,' was entirely unknown to them, for this reason he spoke thus, as one might put it in the following manner.

O men, the Intellect which you suppose is not the first; but there is another Intellect before this one, more ancient and more divine.

And after other things he adds: A helmsman, borne somewhere in the midst of the open sea, seated aloft above the rudders, high on his lofty seat, steers the ship by the tiller; his eyes and his mind are stretched straight up toward the upper air, toward the things on high, and his path lies upward through the heaven, even while he sails below upon the sea. So too the demiurge, having bound matter together with harmony so that it might neither be dispersed nor go astray, is himself established above it—as it were above a ship upon the sea, that is, above matter; and he steers the harmony, guiding it by means of the Forms; and he looks, instead of toward heaven, toward the God above, his eyes turned toward him; and he receives his power of judgment from that contemplation, and his impulse toward action from his longing for that God.

And the saving Word among us says, 'The Son can do nothing of himself, unless he sees the Father doing something.' But so much, then, does Numenius say concerning this matter. And that he was setting forth not his own opinions, but those held by Plato, there is no need to add anything further to his own words.

And that Plato was not the first to make use of these approaches, but that the wise men of the Hebrews had anticipated him, has been shown through what has been set forth. Fittingly, then, Amelius too—who became distinguished among the newer philosophers, himself, if anyone, a zealous devotee of Plato's philosophy—although he named the Hebrew theologian a 'barbarian,' and did not deem him worthy of mentioning by name the evangelist John, nevertheless bears witness to his words, writing the very following, word for word.

And this, then, was the Logos, in accordance with which the things that come to be, ever being, came to be—as even Heraclitus would maintain—and, by Zeus, the same which the Barbarian too maintains, standing in the rank and dignity of the Principle, to be with God and to be God; through whom all things simply came into being; in whom that which came to be was by nature living, and life, and being; and this Logos fell into bodies, and, having put on flesh, appeared in the semblance of a man—while, even then, showing forth the majesty of his nature; and indeed, being dissolved again, was deified once more, and became God, such as he was before he was brought down into the body and the flesh and man.

These words, no longer veiled, but plainly now, openly, would evidently be paraphrased from the barbarian theology. And who was this 'Barbarian' for him, if not John, the evangelist of our Savior, being a Hebrew of Hebrews?

Who, at the beginning of his own writing, theologizes somewhat in this manner: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being that has come into being. In him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father.'

And concerning this same one, hear also what another theologian of the Hebrews sets forth: 'who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things were created, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth, whether visible or invisible; and all things have been constituted through him, and all things were created in him, both the visible and the invisible.'

But indeed, in these matters concerning the constitution and substantiation of the second cause, the wise men of the Greeks are found to be in agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews. Let us then pass on to other matters.

Since the oracles among the Hebrews, after the discourse concerning the Father and the Son, enumerate the Holy Spirit in the third rank, and posit the holy and blessed Trinity in this manner—namely, that the third power surpasses all created nature, being the first of the intellectual substances constituted through the Son, and third from the first cause—observe how Plato too hinted at certain such things through his letter to Dionysius, where he says the following.

I must speak to you in riddles, so that, should the tablet suffer anything, whether in the folds of sea or land, whoever reads it may not understand. For it is thus: around the king of all are all things, and for his sake all things exist, and he is the cause of all good things; and around the second things is the second, and around the third things the third. The human soul, then, is eager to learn concerning these, what sort of things they are, looking to that which is akin to itself.

Those who attempt to explain these words of Plato refer them to the first God, and to the second cause, and, as third, to the Soul of the cosmos, defining this too as a third god. But the divine oracles, according to what has been set forth, rank the holy and blessed Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—in the order of first principle. It follows next to examine the substance of the Good.

Since the divine Scripture among the Hebrews teaches in various ways that the substance of the Good, and the Good itself, is nothing other than God—as in the passages where it says, 'The Lord is good to all who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him'; and 'Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good, for his mercy endures forever'; and as the saving Word declared to the one who questioned him about this matter, saying, 'Why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but One, that is, God.'

Hear what Plato says in the Timaeus: 'Let us say, then, for what cause the one who constituted becoming and this universe constituted it. He was good; and in one who is good, no envy concerning anything ever arises. Being free of this, he desired that all things should come to be, as far as possible, like unto himself.'

And in the Republic he says the following: 'Is it not so, then, that the sun is not sight itself, but, being the cause of sight, is seen by this very sight?' 'Just so,' he said. 'This, then,' said I, 'you may say I mean by the offspring of the Good, which the Good begot in proportion to itself: that which the Good is, in the intelligible realm, in relation to intellect and the things known by intellect, this the sun is, in the visible realm, in relation to sight and the things seen.'

And next he adds: 'This, then, which provides truth to the things known, and which renders to the knower his power, say that it is the Form of the Good.' And again he says the following.

'You will say, I think, that the sun provides to the things seen not only the power of being seen, but also generation, growth, and nourishment—though the sun itself is not generation.' 'How could it be?' 'So likewise you must say that, for the things known, not only is being known present to them from the Good, but also being itself and their substance are present to them from that source—the Good itself not being substance, but transcending substance, surpassing it in dignity and power.'

Most clearly, through these words, Plato says that not only knowability belongs to the intelligible substances from the Good—that is, from God—but also that they have their being and their substance from him; and that the Good itself is not substance, but transcends substance, surpassing it in dignity and power; so that these substances are not to be regarded as consubstantial with him, nor yet as unbegotten, since indeed they have received their being and their substance from him who is not substance, but transcends substance, surpassing it in dignity and power—whom, indeed, the Hebrew oracles fittingly and alone proclaim as God, as being the cause of all things.

Those things, then, which have neither their being nor their substance from themselves, but which do not even belong to the nature of the Good, it is not reasonable to consider gods—things to which the good does not belong by nature; for this must be attributed to one alone, and to no other—to the sole Good, which indeed Plato marvelously proclaimed to be beyond all substance, surpassing it in dignity and power. And again, Numenius too, in his work On the Good, interpreting Plato's thought, sets it forth in the following manner.

Bodies, then, it is possible for us to apprehend, being signified from things like them, and from the marks present in things lying near them; but the Good it is possible to apprehend from nothing lying near it, nor again from anything sensible like it, by any device whatsoever; rather it will be necessary—just as if someone, sitting on a watchtower, having sharply spied amid the wide-tossing waves some small fishing-boat, one of those solitary skiffs, alone, deserted, held fast amid the swells, should catch sight of the ship in a single glance—so must someone, having gone far off from sensible things, commune with the Good alone by himself alone, there where there is neither any man nor any other living creature, nor any body great or small, but some ineffable and utterly indescribable, divine solitude, where are the abodes and resorts and splendors of the Good, while the Good itself dwells there in peace, in benevolence—the calm, the sovereign one, gracious, riding serene upon its own being.

But if someone, clinging persistently to sensible things, imagines the Good as flying above nearby, and then, in his self-indulgence, supposes that he has encountered the Good, he errs entirely. For in truth, approaching it requires no easy method, but a divine one; and it is best, having disregarded sensible things, and having exerted oneself vigorously toward the disciplines, and having contemplated numbers, thus to practice thoroughly the discipline of learning what Being is.

These things he says in the first book; but in the fifth he says the following as well: 'If essence and the idea are intelligible, and intellect has been agreed to be older than this and its cause, this very intellect alone is found to be the Good. For even if the demiurge is god of becoming, it suffices that the Good be the principle of essence. And in proportion to this, the demiurge-god—being its imitator—corresponds to the Good, while becoming corresponds to essence; for becoming is an image and imitation of it.'

But if the demiurge of becoming is good, then surely the demiurge of essence will be the Good itself, connatural with essence. For the second [god], being twofold, makes both his own idea and the world, being a demiurge; and thereafter he is wholly contemplative.

Now that we have reasoned this out, let there be four names for four realities: the first god is the Good itself; his imitator the demiurge is good; essence is one thing belonging to the first, and another belonging to the second; and of the latter's essence the beautiful world is an imitation, adorned by participation in the beautiful.

And in the sixth book he adds: 'Those things that participate in it participate in nothing else but only in thinking; and it is by this alone, therefore, that they could benefit from association with the Good, and in no other way. Now this very thinking happens to belong to the first alone. If, then, it is by him that the other things are tinged with color and made good, provided that this belongs to him alone and to him only, it would be the mark of a foolish soul still to dispute it.'

For if the second is good not of himself, but from the first, how is it possible that the one by participation in whom this [second] is good should not himself be good—especially since the second, in fact, has come to share in him precisely as good?

Thus, then, Plato by reasoning attributed the Good, for him who sees keenly, to being One. And again he goes on to say:

Now these things being so, Plato set them forth by dividing them each in a different place: for separately, concerning the demiurge, he wrote in the Timaeus, saying 'he was good'; while in the Republic he called the Good 'the idea of the good'—as though the Good were the idea of the demiurge, since he has appeared to us to be good by participation in the first and only [Good].

For just as men are said to be formed by the idea of man, oxen by that of ox, horses by the idea of horse, so also, quite reasonably, the demiurge—if indeed he is good by participation in the first Good—the first intellect, being the Good itself, would be his idea.

Having thus come to be (clearly, this refers to the world), it has been fashioned with reference to that which is grasped by reason and understanding and which remains ever in the same state. And since this is so, it is wholly necessary that this world be the image of something—for that [intelligible living being] embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living creatures, just as this world contains us.

These things Plato says in the Timaeus. But I shall set forth the sense of what has been said from the work composed by Didymus, On the Doctrines Approved by Plato. He writes as follows:

He says that the ideas are certain fixed paradigms, according to kind, of natural sensible things, from which the sciences and definitions arise; for alongside all [particular] men, some [ideal] man is conceived, and alongside all horses, [the idea of] horse, and in general, alongside living creatures, [the idea of] a living creature, ungenerated and imperishable.

And just as from a single seal many impressions arise, and numerous images of one man, so from each single idea come countless natures of sensible bodies—from the idea of man, all men, and by the same reasoning in the case of the other natural things.

The idea is an eternal essence, the cause and principle by which each thing is such as the idea itself is.

Just, then, as the particular [ideas] precede the sensible bodies as archetypes, so also does the most beautiful and most perfect essence, containing all [ideas] within itself, serve as the paradigm of this world; for it was in likeness to this that [the world], by providence, was wrought by the god who fashioned it out of the whole of essence.

These are the words of the man mentioned. But Moses, all-wise, anticipates even these things, teaching that before the visible sun and stars, and before the visible heaven—which he calls the 'firmament'—and before the dry land as we know it, and before the day and night as we know them, a light other than that of the sun, and day and night and the rest, were made by God, the ruler of all and cause of the universe.

But also the children of the Hebrews who came after Moses maintain that there is a certain incorporeal sun, not visible to all, nor apprehended by mortal eyes, as the prophet says, speaking in the person of God: 'But unto those who fear me shall the sun of righteousness rise.'

And another Hebrew prophet knows righteousness itself—not the particular righteousness found among men, but its idea—who says concerning God: 'Who raised up righteousness from the east? He called it to his presence, and it shall go forth as it were before the nations.'

And our common discourse has just now shown us, from the Hebrew scripture, in what precedes, that there is a divine, incorporeal, and substantial Word. Concerning this Word the same [Hebrews] say the following as well: 'who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption.'

He is also called Life, also called Wisdom, also called Truth. And the Hebrew scriptures teach that all these things exist and subsist according to essence (that is, if the apostles and disciples of our Savior are indeed Hebrews)—yes, and also countless other incorporeal powers, beyond the heaven and beyond all material and ever-flowing essence, whose images, they say, have been imprinted upon sensible things; things which have accordingly already received the very name 'image.'

They have said, then, that man is expressly the image of an intelligible pattern, and that the whole life of men proceeds in an image. So Moses says: 'And God made man; according to the image of God he made him.' And again, another Hebrew, philosophizing on his ancestral traditions, says: 'Surely man walks about in an image.' Now hear also how the interpreters of the sacred laws clarify the meaning found in the writings of Moses. So the Hebrew Philo, interpreting the ancestral traditions, says in his very own words:

But if one should wish to use terms more plainly, he would say the intelligible world is nothing other than the Word of God, now in the act of world-making. For neither is the intelligible city anything other than the reasoning of the architect, when he is already intending to build the intelligible city.

This doctrine is that of Moses, not mine. For indeed, in recounting the origin of man further on, he expressly confesses that man was formed according to the image of God.

And if the part is an image of an image, then clearly the whole form also—this entire sensible world, if it is greater than the human [image]—is manifestly an imitation of the divine image; and the archetypal seal, which we call the intelligible world, would itself be the pattern, the archetypal idea of ideas, the Word of God.

He says that 'in the beginning God made heaven and earth,' taking 'the beginning' not, as some suppose, in a temporal sense (for time did not exist before the world), but [time] either came into being together with it, or after it.