Against the Manichaeans 1 part 2/4

but privation and deficiency [are opposite] to wholeness.

Thus evil, too, will rather be a privation, and thus it is opposite to the good as privation is to possession;

for evil is nothing other than a privation of the good, and complete evil is a complete privation of the good.

Therefore we say that evil is rather a not-being, as a privation of the natural possession, than a being.

What, then, do you say matter is: life, or corruption and death; motion and moving, or motionlessness and movable; light or darkness? Manichaeus:

Corruption and death, motionlessness and unmoving, darkness and not light.

If, then, it is corruption, how did it bring forth fruits? How did it live? For corruption does not live, nor has life, nor imparts life;

for what someone does not have, how can he impart it? And how, being motionless, was it moved and reached as far as the boundaries of the light? Who gave it life and the capacity for motion? If it was the Good [principle], then he is neither good nor wise;

not good, in that he gave life and motion to evil; and neither wise nor knowing, in that he brought upon himself wars and troubles, and moved against himself the evil that was at rest and quiet;

for he became the author of discord and evils — but if it was not God [who did this], then it was someone else, and then there are no longer two [principles], but rather three;

for what someone does not have, he cannot acquire of himself.

But it had life and motion potentially.

If it had life and motion potentially, then it was potentially good, since life and motion are good.

The life and motion of evil is not good, but evil.

That which comes from potency into actuality is mutable and has a beginning, and is not without beginning; and if it had life and motion in potency, it acquired actuality afterward.

If, then, its life and motion are evil, it was evil in potency and not in actuality, and evil will not be without beginning.

But if its life and motion are good, it came from evil into good.

What then? Is not the corruption of one thing the generation of another? — The Orthodox:

Corruption does not become generation; rather, that which was fashioned by God from non-being into being, created by the command of God, is mutable, since it began from a change.

For to come from non-being into being is itself a change;

having begun from change, such things are altogether mutable and alterable.

Matter, then, being mutable, is brought to life by the divine command, and is corrupted, and again is brought to life;

so that it is not corruption that produces generation, but the divine command that gives life and effects generation.

Are the regions proceeding from the light filled with light, or not? — The Manichaean:

It is surely evident to everyone that it is filled with light.

Are light and darkness receptive of one another, or not receptive? — The Manichaean:

Then they are not by nature what they are;

for that which exists by nature does not change, and life that exists by nature is not receptive of death.

How then did darkness come into contact with light and not dissolve? Again, was the place of the light filled with the good and with light, or not? — The Manichaean:

How then was the darkness accommodated? For a vessel holding one medimnos will not hold two medimni — that is, a vessel capable of holding one modius will not hold two modii.

Then, when the fruits of darkness entered into the borders of the light, what did they do, or what did they suffer? — The Manichaean:

They saw the light and were amazed, and they were seized with longing for it, and came into love of it.

Is darkness blind, or full of light? — The Manichaean:

And how can the blind see, or how could that which is wholly evil admire or fall in love with the good? Yet are these two principles destructive of one another? — The Manichaean:

Then it is not evil alone that is corruption, but the good as well.

Evil is corruption, but the good is life.

Then evil corrupts the good, so that it does not subsist, while the good gives life to evil; thus evil will subsist, but the good will perish.

As you said, then, matter is evil, and corruption, and death.

If, then, evil is evil to others but good to itself, it holds together in itself, and is not wholly evil, not wholly corruption;

for insofar as it holds itself together, in this respect it will not be evil.

But if it is wholly evil and wholly corruption, it will also be destructive of itself, and non-existent.

Set forth for us, then, the account of the mixture which you mentioned.

There was, as I said, God and matter, each within its own boundaries: the good one — God, life, light, motion, knowledge, understanding, and every good; and matter — evil, corruption, darkness, death, existing in complete stillness, quiet, and immobility.

Then, after many ages, matter rose in strife against itself, and its fruits against one another; and so, with some pursuing and others being pursued, there was, as I said, God and matter, that is, two principles;

and the soul is a part of the light, while the body is a creation of darkness and matter.

And each of them existed in its own portion; the good was in one portion, but the evil one in three.

Then the evil one, moved by a disorderly impulse, went out from his own borders and came into the borders of the good; and the good, perceiving this, put forth from himself a power called the Mother of Life, and the Mother of Life put forth the First Man; and by this First Man I mean the five elements, which are air, wind, light, water, and fire.

Having then put these on, he went forth and did battle with the darkness.

But the archons of darkness devoured a part of his armor, which is the soul;

and they also seized the First Man, and he was tormented by them, being in the darkness, and he cried out to the good one, and the good one put forth another power called the Living Spirit.

And it descended and gave its right hand to the First Man and led him up.

But he left below the part which the archons had devoured, that is, the soul;

for from the portion of the good the souls came to be, but from the substance of evil, the bodies.

If, according to the divine Apostle, there is no communion of light with darkness, how did the mixture of soul and body come about? And experience itself, which is...

...more powerful than vain words, teaches us this.

Did darkness enter into the borders of the light, and was not dissolved? And again:

How was the darkness accommodated within the borders of the light? And again:

If the good one was wise, how did he not foreknow the onset of the evil one, and fortify beforehand both himself and his own place? For if he was neither wise nor foreknowing, he was foolish;

and how do you call the foolish one good? And again:

If all the darkness entered into the borders of the light, its own place remained empty;

but if only a part of it entered, how did a mere part of it defeat the one sent by the good to make war upon it? For unwise is he who sends the weaker against the stronger.

Or else the good one is weak, and the evil one is stronger.

If the good one willingly gave up a part of himself, that is, the soul, then he who delivers what is good over to evil is not good.

And how can he, having himself surrendered the soul to the evil one, judge those who are enslaved to the evil one? For they will say to him:

"You handed us over" — and thus the judgment is nullified.

But if the archons of evil seized a part of him against his will, then he is weaker and more ignorant — first, for having lost a part of himself, and second, for not being able to snatch back what was seized from him;

for if he was not able from the beginning, neither will he be able afterward.

And how, having seized the archons of evil, did he crucify them and make the heavens from their flesh and the mountains from their bones, yet did not recover the part of himself that had been seized? And thus, too, the judgment is nullified.

For those who sin are without blame;

for if he himself was not able to recover his own part, how will the soul that has been mastered by evil be able not to sin, and be without blame? And if at last the good one will bind evil, he will fully recover the soul, and man will not be punished.

If evil comes to the soul from the body, then the soul is without blame.

A body lying dead does not sin.

Therefore evil does not come from the body, but from the soul.

Tell us, O Manichaeans, is the beginningless evil you posit, which you call matter, incorporeal, or a body, or composite? And if incorporeal, how is it matter? For matter is not incorporeal.

But perhaps you will say that it is incorporeal, yet it made the body.

From its own substance, or from non-being? And if you say from its own substance, you speak falsely.

For a body does not proceed from an incorporeal substance — for that which exists by nature does not change, nor will a substance turn from incorporeal into body — nor from body into incorporeal, nor from rational into irrational, nor from irrational into rational.

For essential quality is unchangeable, while things that change and are altered do so accidentally — coming to be and ceasing to be without the corruption of the underlying subject.

But if you say from non-being, tell us: why, being incorporeal and evil, did it not also make the mixture out of evil elements? Why did it not also make souls evil by nature, just as you say the body is evil by nature? Why did it mix into its own evil a portion of the good? For the good one did not do this;

so that it is not entirely evil, but has a portion of good.

This, then, applies if you say it is incorporeal.

But if it is a body, how did it move? For every body, in itself, is without choice and dead.

How, then, did it move? Who gave it motion? The good one? Then he who set evil in motion is not good, or is not wise, nor provident.

But if you say it is composite, know that everything composite is easily dissolved, and it is necessary that the simple elements from which the composition arose exist first — just as it is necessary that the pitch exist by itself, and the wax by itself, and only then does the composition of the pitch-and-wax come to be.

Then there will be two principles of evil, and not one.

Your two principles are either wholly without any communion with each other, or they share in some respects and differ in others. And if they are wholly without communion—

then the one will exist, and the other will not exist.

But if they share in being, as substance and accident do, then the one has its existence in the other;

for the accident does not subsist by itself, just as color cannot exist apart from a body.

The body is a substance, while the color is an accident;

and the accident comes to be and ceases to be without the destruction of the subject; while the color changes, the body itself remains the same.

So say, then, which one you wish to call substance, and which you wish to call accident;

but if both are substances, know that substance does not differ from substance as such, yet substance is not contrary to substance except according to accident.

If the good one exists, and the evil one exists, and each of them is an eternal and unchangeable substance, active, creative—

then both are one in substance, and differ only in quality.

We observe the elements and the seasons, heaven and earth and sea, always remaining constant; and night and day, and the motions of sun and moon and stars, and the rains, and the produce of the earth, arranged and regulated according to reason and in orderly sequence.

If, then, the two principles are contrary to one another, how is everything conducted in such good order, unless they were reconciled in a friendly manner? If matter had been consuming itself, how then was it in motion? But if it was moving toward its own consumption, how did it come to the borders of light? If matter tends downward, and its natural place is the lower and darker regions, how, having come to the borders of light, did it go forth from its own nature? Darkness is blind;

how then did it see the light? If matter is disorderly and mindless, how does it have rulers? And how can it wage war against him who possesses reason and order? Or, in waging war, will it prove the stronger, so as to seize something from the wise one and not itself be seized? But if the good God allowed a part of himself to be seized, in order to restrain matter from advancing into his own borders, being unable to do so otherwise — then the evil one is the stronger, and the good one is crafty and deceitful.

And how is he good, or even God, if he resorts to guile rather than power? That which always remains the same is truth, and truth is good;

If, then, matter is without beginning, it will also be unchangeable;

but if unchangeable, it always remains the same;

but if it always remains the same, it is truth;

but if it is truth, it will be good.

But if matter does change, it changes from good to evil — being formerly good and later becoming evil — or from evil to good — being formerly evil and later becoming good;

for change leads to the contrary.

The eternal substance is unchangeable;

for it did not come into being out of non-being;

and that whose existence is not the result of gradual advancement has an unchangeable substance.

God, then, being good and eternal, does not undergo change, but is always good; and whatever he makes is good;

for from the good it is not possible for evil things to arise; yet the things made are changeable, since he brings them from non-being into being.

Rational beings, then, are indeed receptive of change, on account of their being brought from non-being into being, but they possess free will on account of being rational.

Beings endowed with free will remain as they were made — that is, good — when they are servants, discerning, and obedient to their Maker, which befits created nature;

for virtue is to remain within the bounds of one's own nature.

By his own free will, then, man turned away, desiring something great, but not in a good manner;

for it is a great thing to be God, but it is evil for one who is not God to be ungrateful toward his Maker, to transgress his own nature, and to wish to be that which it is impossible for him to become;

for it is impossible for that which is not without beginning to be God, or for that which has had a beginning to be without beginning.

The seeking after what is unfitting, then, leads to the privation of the things that exist.

What is the wickedness of the devil? ORTHODOX:

The rebellion against his Maker.

God, then, gave him continued being, both so that he might not seem to fear the rebellion of a servant, and so that he might teach us to be disposed with beneficence even toward the wicked.

For he not only made him, but also made him ruler of the world; and if he should ever wish to become good, God receives him and does him good.

Therefore, though able to destroy him, he did not

destroy him, but bears with his folly beneficently, granting him being ungrudgingly and beneficently — for this is proper to him.

But that he should become good is not of God alone, but also of himself;

for that which comes about by compulsion is neither good nor virtue.

But if you say, 'Why did he allow him to make war on men?' — I say, it is for their benefit;

for many are crowned through him.

But if you say that many also perish, I say that, just as the devil himself was able to become evil of his own judgment, without any assault from another — which is indeed a graver charge against him — so too man could have become evil of himself, even without having an assailant, and his sin would have been the graver for it;

for he who sins through another's instigation is deemed worthy of greater excuse and pardon than he who sins of himself.

For he who sins of himself is without excuse, just as he who pursues virtue of himself is praised the more.

Therefore the devil, having sinned of himself, remained impenitent, while man, having sinned not of himself but through the devil's assault, came to repentance, and was deemed worthy of renewal and the remission of sins.

Being, then, is good, and a gift of God.

Why, though God foreknew that the devil would become evil, did he nonetheless make him? ORTHODOX:

He made him on account of the abundance of his goodness.

'Since this one is going to become evil, and will destroy all the good things given to him, shall I too deprive him utterly of the good, and make him non-existent?' By no means.

'But even if he himself will be evil, I will not deprive him of participation in me, but will give him one good thing: participation in me through being, so that, even against his will, he may partake of me, the Good, through being.'

For there is no one who holds together and sustains existing things in being except God;

for being is good, and a gift of God.

Being belongs to existing things from God who is good;

if, then, being is good for all existing things, as given by God who is good, then being is also good for the devil.

All existing things have received their being from God.

All the things given by God to each one are also good;

for the things given by the Good are good.

Evil is nothing other than the casting away of good things — that is, of the things given by God.

Those, then, who have their being from God are, even if in nothing else, partakers of the good in a partial way, according to its furthest echo.

It is good, then, for the devil to exist, and through his being to partake of the good.

Being, then, is good, but well-being is more excellent.

For perfect existence consists in being healthy, whereas being sick is both a partial evil and a corruption;

for it is not complete non-existence, but partial existence and partial non-existence.

Not to exist at all is a complete and perfect evil;

for that which is completely non-existent is complete corruption and non-existence.

Being, then, and well-being are good, and come from God; but that evil should arise from a good creature is due to the judgment of the one who becomes evil.

God, then, on account of the abundance of his goodness, has given good things even to the evil one — being and well-being.

You charge us, O Manichaeans, with the question why God, foreknowing that the devil would become evil, made him; and we have shown at length that, according to the natural principle of justice, he made him well.

For according to the natural order it is better even merely to exist, and, in respect of the very principle of existing, to share in the good.

For being itself comes from God, who alone eternally is, who is good and the giver of good things;

and what comes from the good is altogether good.

But if you say that it would have been better for him not to have come into being than to have come into being and be punished without end, we reply that that punishment is nothing other than the fire of desire for evil and sin, and the fire of missing the mark of that desire.

For those who have become fixed immutably in evil do not desire God, but evil — yet there, in that state, there will be no exercise of evil and sin possible.

For we neither eat nor drink, nor

do we clothe ourselves, nor marry, nor grow rich, nor does envy have any power, nor any of the forms of sin.

Therefore, desiring these things and not having them, they are consumed by their desire as though by fire.

But those who desire the good — that is, God alone, who is and eternally is — and attain it, rejoice in proportion to their desire, according to the measure by which they attain the object desired.

Now that which is truly good is what is good by nature — even if a thing shares only to some small degree, by virtue of its very existing, in the good.

But that which merely seems good is not good by nature, but evil.

To prefer the enjoyment of created things to the enjoyment of the Creator, and one's own will to the will of the Maker — that is, to prefer what seems good to us, which has rather been shown to be evil, to that which is truly good by nature — belongs neither to the just man nor to the good. But it was better for him to come into being and possess some portion, however small, of the truly good, than, on account of evil — that is, unjust desire and grief — to be deprived even of that small portion of the good.

For God does not judge according to our irrational judgment, but according to what is truly good and just; he does not follow our passions, nor does he betray the principle of justice for the sake of a so-called compassion which is in reality mere passionate feeling.

God calls the things that are not yet as though they were, and beholds and judges things that are to be as though they had already come to pass.

Just as a judge justly punishes one who has already sinned — and if he does not punish him, he is unjust — and the judge himself is not the cause of the sin or of the punishment of the one punished, but rather the free choice of the sinner is; so God, seeing the future as though it had already come to pass, decreed that he should come into being and, should he become evil, be punished as a consequence of his own act.

Therefore he both made him, and made him good;

but he himself, by his own free choice, became evil, and became to himself the cause of his punishment — or rather, he punishes himself by craving things that do not exist.

That the foreknowledge of God did not become the cause of the devil's becoming evil is clear;

for neither is the physician who foreknows a coming disease the cause of that disease; rather, the cause of the disease is bodily disorder, while the foreknowledge is a mark of the physician's skill, and the cause of the foreknowledge is that things are indeed going to happen thus.

And that it is so, the Apostle says:

"He who calls the things that are not as though they were."

This too must be known: that in whatever state the soul departs from the body, in that state it remains unchangeable from then on, whether longing for the good or for evil.

And in addition to all these things, we say this is good: whatever God wills;

for just as light is defined from the sun, so also the good is defined from God.

Therefore everything that the Good One wills is good, and this is what good means: what he wills.

God is judge, not we the judges of God.

Why then do we cross-examine him? Does God tremble, and quail, and fear? A God who feared would be no God at all.

If the sun and moon became like ships in order to carry back the portion which matter seized from God, then before this there was no sun and no moon, and man was in darkness.

If, according to you, affliction is evil, then pleasure and enjoyment must altogether be good; and if this is so, then fornication and gluttony are good, and whatever delights and pleases the one doing it, while whatever grieves — self-control, fasting, vigil, and such things — are evil.

If you charge God with the total destruction of the flood, the burning of the Sodomites, and the drowning of Pharaoh — acts of discipline for their benefit — charge him rather with punishing eternally.

To bring something forth from one's own substance is not properly a work of creation; but to bring something forth out of things that are not — that is creation.

If, then, evil creates, it brings forth from things that are not, and no longer from matter.

But if from matter, that is, from the substance of evil — if evil is without beginning, then it is altogether immortal and immutable as well, for that which has not begun does not cease nor change;

but if it changes and perishes, it is not without beginning — and if evil is unchangeable, then the body that comes from its substance will also be incorruptible and unchangeable.

Whose then was the corruption and the evil? For corruption altogether corrupts something, or else it is not corruption.

If the good is passible, then the Good One himself is passible too — and how then could he be perfectly good? And the Good One, being corrupted by it, will pass over into non-existence.

But if it corrupted itself, it has been corrupted and has perished, and it does not exist.

But if it corrupted a part of the good, then it also corrupted a part of itself.

But of whatever nature a part is corruptible, the whole nature also is corruptible;

for it is impossible for the same nature to be both corruptible and incorruptible.

For if we say that the body of man, being a part of man, is corruptible, but the soul is incorruptible, this is because they are not of one nature.

For the soul, even though it dwells in the body, is nevertheless not a body, but incorporeal;

so that the soul is of one nature and the body of another, and it is not that one part of the same nature is corruptible and the other incorruptible, but rather one nature of man is corruptible, and the other is incorruptible.

And neither is the soul from an unoriginate substance — for it is changeable — nor is the body;

for it too is changeable and corruptible.

Man is said to be of one nature, not because the soul and the body are of one nature, but because all men alike, each one, have a soul and a body, and each one has two natures.

Mutation is a transition from the contrary to the contrary: from not-being into being, or from being into not-being, or from virtue into evil, which is a transition from the natural states into the privation of these.

Virtue is the fulfillment of the law of God; and the law of God is his will — for no one commands what he does not will; and the will of God is good, unchangeable, always being the same.

So then the good is something that exists — and so too is virtue, for virtue is good — but evil is not a being at all, but rather a willful disobedience toward that which is, namely the law of God, and an abrogation of it, subsisting adventitiously, by agreement, in the very committing of the act, and ceasing the moment the act itself ceases.

This too must be known: that God does not punish anyone in the age to come, but each one makes himself either receptive or unreceptive of participation in God. And participation in God is delight, while non-participation in him is punishment;

but here, in this present life, God brings on trials not as one who punishes, but as one who disciplines and heals evil, that we may come to know him, and turn back, and attain his holiness.

"For the discipline of the Lord opens my ears." The Manichaean:

"If he is good, why in the age to come does he punish the evil one, and does not rather destroy him?" The Orthodox:

God is good, but he is also just;

as good, therefore, he made whatever he made, good.

Therefore, just as it was just that those made by him good, who were going not only to preserve the good given to them but also to work it further, should come to be and be deemed worthy of the perfect good and eternal delight, so also it was just that those made by him good, who were going not to preserve the good given to them, but willfully to turn aside toward evil through the rejection of the good things, should come to be and be deprived of eternal delight.

The seraphim are farther distant from God than the evil one is from the seraphim.

If, then, the devil had not come into being, the one before him would have appeared worst of all, and evil in comparison with those before him, and we would say:

"Why did God, foreseeing that he would become such, make him?" And likewise concerning the one before that one, until we should come even to the seraphim themselves.

For indeed we often observe a most pitiable thing and think there is nothing more pitiable than it, and afterward we see another thing worse.

For whatever we reckon to be the worst evil among those we have seen, we suppose there is nothing worse than it.

God therefore made all things exceedingly good, each according to its own nature, just as he willed;

for he is not subject to law, but whatever he wills, this is good — not what we judge to be so.

For we are not judges of God, but, just as from the sun, or rather from fire, every light is illuminated, so from the will of God every good is determined.

For if you say that God did well in this and ill in that, and ask why he did this and why he did not do that, you are making yourself a judge of God, and greater than he, and wiser.

He has authority, then, as God, to do whatever he wills, and this is good; and he has authority, of the things he does, to reveal to us the reasons he wills to reveal, and to conceal those he wills to conceal.

And each of the rational beings that came into being good either willingly remained in the good, as it was created, or willingly turned aside and departed from the good and lost it.

For the good is the best order, preserving for each thing what is proper to it according to nature — and this is the same as virtue — while evil is the dissolution of order, that is, disorder.

All things that exist, insofar as they exist, are both good and from the good; but insofar as they are deprived of the good, they are neither good nor existent.

For lifeless things, insofar as they did not receive life from the Good, are lifeless, as being deprived of life; likewise also the insensate and irrational things, insofar as they did receive [something from the Good], are good.

God knows evil as good, just as He knows fornication as desire, affection, and union.

And with Him even the causes of evils are beneficent powers;

often vessels of election have come to be out of fornication.

If wickedness is evil, then good is the punishment that banishes it;

For fornication is evil, not the chastisement [that corrects it];

for the punishment is not evil, but making oneself worthy of punishment [is].

If evil is eternal, and creates, and has power, and exists, and acts — whence does it have these things? Either from the good, or the good has them from evil, or both from some other cause — [the truth being] that evil also subsists parasitically within the good, and that the good makes good even the evils and its own privation.

For affection, being good, makes fornication appear good, because within the good, even that which is not, in a certain way, strives to be.

For God is said 'not to be' in accordance with the transcendent negation of all things.

That nature itself puts forward the principle as one is made evident by number itself, which does not begin from two, but from one.