Dialogues on the Holy Trinity 1 part 13/23

For the Son has indeed admittedly said that he was created, yet he did not say that he underwent this without cause, but rather 'for his works,' and 'as the beginning of his ways'—clearly meaning the ways of God the Father.

Therefore 'creation' in these passages would signify, not a bringing forth from things that are not in any sense, but rather the bringing forward of one who exists and subsists, for the sake of certain works that were to be done—just as, indeed, one might consider a weaver, or perhaps a smith, standing idle and conceived as doing nothing: the will of the one who rouses them to their tasks makes them active with respect to whatever each is fitted for, but it could in no way be supposed also to have brought them into being.

If then, with absolutely nothing added, the Son had simply said, 'The Lord created me,' their oft-repeated claim, so far as it goes toward giving grounds for suspicion, would not be altogether implausible.

But since he does not say that he was created simply and without qualification, but 'for works' and 'as the beginning of ways':

why do they not let go of the unseemly interpretation and choose the better one, bearing in mind that it is written concerning God:

{A.} What then, tell me, have they learned, that they hold a mind so perverse and hard to rein in, and, using deceptions of manifold complexity as though some full suit of armor, these twisted men hammer away—though it is right rather to love setting straight toward the truth even what does not seem to have been said in a very God-befitting manner, on account of the human element and the Son's likeness to us? Besides—for I think it is fitting to say this too—even as he speaks of being 'created,' he has also added that he was 'begotten.'

'For before all the hills he begets me,' he says.

Shall we then do away with the begetting because of the word 'created,' or shall we let go of 'created' and grant the 'begotten'?

For the two expressions seem mutually to counter what is signified by each, yet the statement is truthful in both.

Therefore the same one has been begotten of the Father as God, but has been created, again, according to the flesh.

And a sacred word persuades us of this:

'For behold,' it says, 'the Virgin shall conceive in her womb and bear a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel,' which, being interpreted, is 'God with us.' For how could the Word, being God, come to be with us? Is it perhaps by nearness and spatial relation, and by the law of bodies? Then how would this not be absurd? Therefore, when he took on our conformity and the lowliness of servitude, and the unbegotten one came down among created things to be with us, then he came to be with us—though he is as far exalted and set above as the nature of divinity could be conceived to be above a creature and a made thing.

'Why, O Lord, do you stand far off, do you overlook us in times of need, in tribulations?' For he who, by the law of nature, stands apart, and has marked off for himself a peculiar property and preeminence unshared with and inaccessible to all others, came to be with us when he underwent, for our sake, the voluntary self-emptying.

But if they will say that it is not so, then, as I think, nothing at all still prevents us from saying without reservation that the divine word among us has, in this passage, sung idly and to no purpose, in saying that the Son came to be with us when he became man.

For when was he not with us, if indeed he is a created being? {B.} You speak well.

{A.} And if indeed he is also said to have become Christ and Lord, you will understand that he has emptied himself, taking on the measure befitting a servant on account of his likeness to us.

And it was, I think, both wise and necessary, that the divine nature should not be overcome by what belongs to us, nor by the dishonor of the flesh, as though bearing inescapably the predicate of servitude and the imported dishonor, but rather that the lowliness arising from servitude should yield to the glory of divinity.

Therefore, since he has for our sake been reckoned among servants, but has again returned to the lordship inherent in him, which cannot be cast off, and which is grounded in the laws of nature, he is said to have been called Lord, and to have come to be with us on account of his humanity.

But if we should, disregarding the true contemplation, attribute to the Word all the things of the flesh—that is, the things done and said on account of the flesh—we shall commit impiety in no small measure.

and indeed he was visible and tangible and 'made a little lower than the angels,' and 'was numbered among the transgressors,' and 'was led as a sheep to the slaughter,' and underwent so pitiable a death.

Must we then attribute to the nature of the Word—even if conceived apart from flesh—the disgrace of being found also in these lowest and gravely afflicted circumstances?

And what would follow from this? The beloved and co-enthroned one would have slipped away, I suppose, from everything henceforth that upholds him in the God-befitting glory, or rather even from being set at least on an equal footing with the holy angels.

On what account then does he alone shine in glory upon the divine thrones and sit enthroned with the Father, while they stand around in a circle, not dishonoring the measure of their servitude under him? And he both is and is called 'Lord of Sabaoth,' while they extol him with acclamations belonging to lordship, and declare that heaven and earth are full of his glory? Is it not, then, the disease of an utterly cold and stale mind to say that he—who is thus marveled at even by those who possess a portion of glory—is a made thing? {B.} Absolutely so.

They say, nevertheless, that the Son was put forward for the works of the Father not only when he took on the form that is like ours, but from the moment he came into being, so that through him he might work all things—as though he were contributing to creatures a kind of instrumental service, supplying the motion that comes from himself.

{A.} What extraordinary and unrestrained recklessness of speech!

To say that he possesses creative power, yet at the same time fails in what is fitting, and is thus lacking also in the highest degree of strength? {B.} How so? {A.} Do you not consider, before all else, this: that if it were better for God the Father always to be seen as a craftsman who, together with his own movements, introduces some instrumental service, and that it is thus his nature to accomplish whatever he wishes—that is, that he could not escape the charge of blame, should he go about his works in some other manner—

—how has he not wronged the Son, by not bringing him into existence through the instrumentality and mediation of some other, but rather granting to him alone and solely the direct working of his own power? And indeed the other creatures, which they say fall short of the Son's glory, obtained the best and most excellent manner of being brought into existence;

whereas he, although honored with such surpassing advantages, obtained the more ignoble manner, one of secondary rank—

'But perhaps,' some will say, 'direct working was the better way, and it was this that the Son obtained.'

Then let them answer: what persuaded the counsel of the Father—so supreme and beyond wonder—not to choose the better way rather than the worse in the necessity of creating, but thus to miss what was most exceedingly fitting, hesitating unreasonably to choose to accomplish what needed to be done? {B.} Was it necessary, then, he says, for the Father of all to apply his energy immediately to his creatures? {A.} What else, my friend? But tell me, was it preferable for him to receive instrumental and ministerial assistance? And yet from this a very great crowd of absurd notions will arise and come to light for us.

For what need could there be of a co-worker for God the Father, and what benefit there could be of an instrument and a mediator, I do not see.

For if he truly knows the concurrence of a co-creator to be necessary for himself, and thus needfully brought forward for this purpose the one called the Son—who, according to them, belongs among the created things—how could he possess complete strength in being a Creator, if he gathers together in himself, through an instrument and with difficulty, the being fully perfected for that which he is said by nature to be? And I will not even speak of the further blasphemy.

For the created thing has thereby appeared to be the fulfillment of divinity, and that which was taken up in a ministerial rank has become the most necessary aid to the creative power of the Father.

Then how, tell me, with no mediator intervening, did he suffice for the making of the Son, if indeed he is a created being, even though he is set so much greater and incomparably above other creatures? For they pretend to bewitch him with such deceptive honors, blushing, I suppose, at the unseemliness of the blasphemy.

But he who, without assistance and alone, sufficed for something so surpassing and transcendent, how could he have been too weak for the being of things of lower rank, lacking a co-worker? Is it not, then, worthy of lamentation for those who have not even shuddered at merely conceiving such things? {B.} How could it not be? But you would still hear more.

For they say that direct working in all things is a small matter for God the Father.

{A.} Away with such blasphemy, man!

You might rightly say this, placing your own soul as far as possible from responsibility for such things:

'Set a guard, O Lord, upon my mouth, and a door of enclosure round about my lips;'

'do not incline my heart to words of wickedness, to make excuses for sins, together with men who work iniquity.' For he who says that direct working in all things is a small matter for God the Father declares that he has not been rid of vanity and arrogance, and will attach to him this pair of the most detestable and hateful passions.

He would also be ignorant in another way, not even considering where his argument leads.

But I myself would like to inquire of you.

B: What then? A: Do they not say the Son is created? B: Yes, but what of it? A: If then, so far as it is possible, we should behold what the nature that rules over all things is, shall we not see everything created as small in comparison with it? B: Small, admittedly.

A: Then he would insist that the Son alone, and he alone, does the work of creating;

but blushing, as it were, at this claim, he immediately shifts his ground, and hands over to another's operations the task of calling into existence the things that never were.

It is a most excellent and noble portion for God to be able to create, since through this too we come to know who and how great He is.

For from the greatness and beauty of created things their Maker is proportionately beheld, according to what is written.

But if he shall reckon these things, through which He is known, to be small and contemptible, he will himself be put to shame by his own nature, knowing, as is likely, that it is most unlovely.

And yet it is exceedingly glorious for every man and every angel to possess perfectly those very things through which each is by nature seen to be what he is, and none would ever blush at what he has been allotted, if he wished to be known for what he truly is by nature.

Why then should God be ashamed henceforth of what He possesses, or count as a reproach the very things by which He is understood to be God? But if it is a small thing to Him, and of no account at all, to make the Seraphim and bring forth the angels, when He measures by them the greatness and most excellent superiority of His own nature, would it not likewise, by the same reasoning, be a small thing for Him to wish to be worshiped and glorified by them? For of those whose Maker He does not deign to be, how could He choose to be thought God? And why then does He desire honor and worship from us, if He does not even deign to bring us into being? And how would He not injure His own glory, if He should reckon small that through which He is glorified? B: How then, they say, did the Father create all things through the Son? A: As through His Word and Wisdom, and the power inherent in Him.

For the Son is all these things to the Father:

but let us examine this matter thoroughly in this way, taking the royal road, and pressing straight along the path of truth.

Would you not agree, and very readily too, that if we say the Father is Creator, it altogether follows that we must understand Him—being neither powerless nor unwise—as never creating apart from the Word either? B: Yes, it does follow.

Accordingly the Psalmist says:

'You have made all things in wisdom.' And explaining the origin of the universe yet more clearly, the prophet Jeremiah cried out, saying:

'The Lord, who made the earth by His power, who established the world by His wisdom, and by His understanding stretched out the heaven.' A: What then? While Isaiah plainly writes for us that all things were created by God's wisdom and power and understanding, does not the wise John say that all things came to be through the Son? For he says, 'All things came to be through Him, and without Him not one thing came to be.' B: Yes.

B: What then does this mean? A: That the Son has been revealed to us as the Wisdom and Power of God the Father.

B: How, or on what grounds, could this be disputed? A: Well then, tell me: should we hold that the Son was brought into existence in the Father's wisdom, understanding, and power, or, on the contrary, unwisely, senselessly, and weakly? For they say he is created.

B: And indeed this is altogether foolish.

For there never was a time when the Father was without wisdom and power.

A: I shall indeed commend you for choosing to think rightly and justly.

But what would those who number the Son among created things say to this? For if he did not exist eternally, but was brought into existence in time by the law of creation, then, even though he is the Wisdom, Power, and Understanding of the Father, they will be confessing that the Father, before him, was powerless, weak, unwise, and without understanding, and they will grant that the Son was made unwisely and without strength—though he is clothed with abundant wonder, and belongs not to the order of created things but exists in incomparable excellences.

But if, thrusting aside the shame of such blasphemy—against the smiling scorn, I think, of every sound argument—they should suppose that he too must have been brought into being by the Father's wisdom and power, they must necessarily confess that he would consequently be older than himself, and, besides this, his own creator.

For the Son would have given subsistence to himself, if indeed, being himself the whole wisdom and power of the Father, he came into being by his own power and wisdom.

Do you see, then, how in every way the argument collapses into absurdity? B: Quite so.

A: And it could be shown, without much labor, in yet another way, that their doctrine is utterly foolish.

Should we believe that He ought to create in such a way that, by His will alone, He grants to created things the occasion for existence, and simply decrees that things which never were should come to be, and so brings the whole creation to completion; or rather that He has some instrumental service, and has received the assistance of a mediator as something necessary—just as if one should say that a stonemason has been furnished with the tools by which he is to be a stonemason and a maker of the things he knows how to make? B: Then who, tell me, would deny that it is exceedingly fitting for God to create by will alone? A: You have spoken excellently;

since indeed the divine Moses too showed us God creating in precisely this way, and not otherwise.

'Let there be a firmament,' and it was so—the completion of the work appearing, as it were, together with the very utterance of the words, with no delay whatsoever suggesting, according to them, a mediator, or a servant working and moved by instrumental means.

For the word was, as it were, the very substance of the work; the bare gesture of will was the establishment of what was not; and the coming-to-be of the things made lay in the willing alone.

Since, then, it is best and most fitting for God the Father to create in this manner, why do they attribute to Him this assistance of a mediator and servant, devised—I know not how, or rather devised in idle chatter—claiming that the Son was made out of sheer necessity, so that through him the Father might be served with respect to the rest of creation? For it seems they have failed to realize that, even while insisting that the Son is created and belongs among created things, they thereby declare him better and more excellent than the Father.

B: In what way? A: If the Father must act necessarily through a mediator, while the Son accomplishes whatever he wishes by will and gesture alone—saying to a leper with authority:

'I will it; be cleansed'—and restoring to life those already overcome by death, and indeed instilling in the blind that long-desired and unaccustomed light—would one not then behold the mediator and servant, that is, the Creator by nature, in glories far more resplendent, and would not the instrument thus surpass the craftsman? B: So it seems.

A: And yet why do they dishonor as stale the reflection and deliberate resolve to think rightly, making their inclination toward the worse a thoughtless one, and admitting only what seems good to themselves—not even, it seems, considering this: that a thing made by man could never accomplish the very things of which the man himself is the maker, nor could that which is fashioned by someone ever possess perfectly, and without variation, that which by nature and in truth is proper to the essence of the one who fashions it? B: How could it? Since indeed the reverse is also true.

For the products of the craft—whether of bronze-working or of carpentry—could never themselves become, say, a carpenter or a bronze-worker.

A: And I admire you for your great acuity, and I have already commended you for it.

In what way then, if the Son is created, will he operate identically and without variation with God the Father, and, having obtained in his own nature the property and distinction belonging to the highest of all essences, call the things that never were as though they already existed, and bring them into existence with such great strength and effortlessness that the whole act of creation is accomplished by the mere act of willing? Would not the Father himself likewise create in just this way, having his own nature sufficient for this task, and his activity entirely unassisted by any created thing? B: So it is.

A: Just as, then, the things fashioned by human hand and skill are unable to do and perform his works, in the very same way, I think, the things belonging to God could not perform the works of a divine hand.

Since, then, the Son has created and has worked, he too will not be, mingled indiscriminately with all the rest, a mere handiwork of the divine hand; nor indeed has he been brought forth as Creator out of things that are not, but rather he has received this attribute essentially, and in no lesser measure than the Father himself possesses it.

B: But, he says, being acted upon by the Father, he performs the works concerning creation.

'The words that I speak to you, I do not speak from myself;'

'but the Father, who abides in me, He himself does the works.' And again:

what would our opponents say to us? For they will by no means cease to misrepresent the truth and the things that ought to be understood wisely, if they twist them toward the economy according to the flesh, most maliciously falsifying them.

If, then, having become in childish fashion utterly denying and disowning concerning the mystery of Christ, they should thrust aside the Word's incarnate economy, recklessly reshaping to their own liking whatever words they please...

But if they should agree with those who have chosen to think rightly, that the Word, being God, became flesh and was made man, in what way do they wrong the wisdom of the economy, and reshape the words most fitting to it however they please, and, as far as it lies in them, persuade others to set it in opposition to the nature and glory of the Only-Begotten? For the wretched Jews, though they ought to have admired exceedingly, applauded with praise, and glorified as God the Christ who excelled in teachings surpassing the Law and the narrow scrupulosity of Moses, and moreover in wonders beyond reason—this indeed they did not do, but were rather provoked to wrath;

but shaking out every sail, as it were, with envy, they slipped impiously into the necessity of choosing to slander him.

Accordingly they also used to say, at one time, 'This man does not cast out demons except by Beelzebul, the ruler of the demons'; and at another time, again:

'Where did this man get this wisdom and these mighty works?' But it was still somehow hard, and utterly remote from the artful economy, for those so disposed, to say openly that he who truly was God from God appeared for our sake in a manner like us, and became man;

'Mine, O you men, are wisdom and power, and I am the worker of these wonders, possessing an authority that is not borrowed, nor priding myself on foreign dignities, but on my own alone.'

For if he had said such things, those who gnashed even at such moderate words, and, leaping like dogs, dared to bark at him, would surely not have restrained themselves, had he uttered anything at all beyond the measure of humanity.

But since he himself exists in the Father, and has his own Begetter within himself, on account of their unfeigned and essential identity, he said that the Father, abiding in him, fulfills the works.

For truly no one, if he has any sense, would suppose that a work befitting God, and peculiarly belonging to him, is a work of flesh—that is, of humanity—if humanity is considered alone and by itself.

And I think that this reasoning does not miss the mark of the necessary and true understanding.

A: I would say, moreover, that they will also be fighting against their own arguments, if they suppose the Son acts only as one who is being acted upon, and, besides this, that they will still be committing impiety even against the Father himself.

A: For, my friend, is it not the case that whatever is given by anyone to anyone must also be capable of being taken away—even if it should not actually be taken away—so long as the giver, being able to do this, has not yet decided that it must be taken away? And will not that which is not grounded in the laws of nature, but is adventitious and from outside, be liable to loss for some, in that it is able to suffer removal, even if it should happen not to suffer it? B: Very much so.

A: Behold, then, how great is the impiety contained in this against the Only-Begotten.

For if he acts because he is acted upon, and the ability to create was given to him by the Father, what is there to prevent us from saying further:

that he will one day become inactive, should the Father choose to take back what was given, and to banish from the Son's nature that operation by which, as they claim, he is moved and thereby shown to be a maker?

For that which is moved by another would come to rest, should it happen not to be moved, since its motion is not the fruit of its own nature.

A: And in addition to this, their terrible and bitter sophistry will prove to be stale.

B: What do you mean? A: Did you not inquire just now about those who solemnly discourse to us concerning the Father, exalting the account of him far above what is, for them, lowly and debased? For they used to say that the Son was brought into existence out of usefulness and necessity, so that, since it is unseemly for the Father to act directly by himself in everything and to be in immediate contact with creation, one who is somehow lesser than he—that is, the Son—might accomplish the rest.

A: Where, then, has their clever fabrication vanished to, if the Father acted through the Son at all in the works concerning creation? For to act through some intermediary that has no self-directed and independent motion of its own toward anything, but undergoes, as it were, only an instrumental one—this, I myself would say, is unquestionably to act directly by oneself.

And it is already foolish to say that it is unseemly for God the Father to be in immediate contact with other things, as being small, but no longer so in the case of the Son.

For what, once it belongs to the order of created things at all, is not slight compared to God's nature? Or let them realize, as they go about measuring the unmeasurable nature and reckoning certain things small in relation to it, that they have babbled, I know not how, in claiming that something is great and supernatural, and not very far removed from it.

A: Setting aside then, O Hermias, superfluous sophistries and, as it were, solemn nonsense, let us now proceed to the truth alone, having resolved to confess that the Only-Begotten is God, and has appeared by nature from God the Father.

And if the truly Existing One is the beginningless, most ancient, and unbegotten nature, let slander and deceit be gone.

For how could we still admit that the Word of God, who truly is, is late-born and made? And would not every one, I think, of those who think rightly say that we would thereby have slipped away from the best counsels?

Or tell me this—for I shall ask—would you not agree that what I say is true? For if anyone should name someone 'Son of God', he would think, I believe, of no other, even though a great many have been adopted into sonship, but the mind of the hearers would be swept along by a swift and unambiguous course to that One alone who is Son both by nature and in truth.

Does not this matter seem true to you? B: Yes.

A: Just as, then, there being one true God by nature among us, if someone should think it fitting to name one of our own 'god', without adding anything further, we would not for a moment admit into our mind the indication of any other—even though so vast a multitude has been received into the appellation 'god', both in heaven and on earth, as it is written:

in this same way, the mind of those who love God would most keenly discern the one and truly Son, if anyone at all should name someone 'Son of God'. And he would add, moreover, this to what has been said.

B: What sort of thing do you mean? A: For would you not say, my excellent friend, that the truly Existing One is one thing, and not many? And this is God, that is, the nature of God.

A: Are then the things that have been made and called into existence through him not real beings? B: They are beings indeed—

for how could they not be, seeing that they have subsistence at all?

Yet only in imitation of that which truly exists.

A: I cast my vote for the truth, since you have discerned it most excellently.

For that which exists by imitation always somehow steals away, in a manner, from the glory of that which exists by nature.

Just as, then, even if many things that exist might perhaps be conceived as existing in imitation of that which truly is, yet that which truly is, is one;

in the same way, I think, even if many should be called gods and sons, yet there is one who is by nature and in truth Son and God;

having, as it were, a root of his ineffable begetting, namely the nature of the Father.

Therefore he would also fittingly be confessed by us ourselves and by the holy angels to be co-eternal, and not to have been brought forth in a creative manner together with the creatures, as it has seemed good to the perverse to think—those who have not known the truth that is truly Truth, that is, Christ, through whom and with whom be glory to God the Father, together with the Holy Spirit, unto the ages of ages.

BOOK FIVE: That the properties of the Godhead and its glory belong by nature to the Son, even as to the Father

It will result for us, it seems, from every persuasive and necessary line of reasoning, that the Son is by no means late-born, nor bears the ineffaceable reproach of having been made, but rather must be confessed to have sprung forth from the very substance of the Father, true God from true God, having obtained a lofty and supernatural glory, and passing beyond every created nature by measureless and incomparable excellences, surpassing it by as much as one might suppose the Father himself to surpass it.

But, if it please you, I will say something more.

A: Indeed, my friend, I would attain to this most gladly and most eagerly, namely that we ought nobly to contend against the arguments of those who confound the truth.

For the sacred word has proclaimed to us that the meek man should also be a fighter; but do you go on and finish what seems good to you, keeping in mind what is written:

'Squeeze the milk, and it will become butter.' B: Know then that, if they should inquire of you why you call the Son 'true God' and 'consubstantial with the Father,' those on the opposing side would immediately say:

'In these matters, most excellent one, according to you, would it not be more fitting for him to take pride in his own goods, rather than to be adorned with things from outside? For he who is truly God is, of himself, all-perfect, complete, and lacking nothing—I suppose—of the things that belong to such a nature.'

A: What are you saying? How rash this argument is, and how uncontrollably it has veered toward what is grievous!

But tell me plainly nonetheless, in what manner has the crooked band of the perverse contrived for us such a crowd of ill-considered blasphemies? B: 'If,' he says, 'the Son is true God and consubstantial with the Father, let him have from himself the things by which he is God, and let him take pride rather in his own advantages—or should I say, those from the Father.'

'For whatever he is seen to have, this is from the Father and God-given.'